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THE RISE OF
THE SPANISH EMPIRE
IN THE
OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW



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THE RISE OF THE SPANISH EMPIRE

IN THE
OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW

BY
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CORRESPONDIENTE DE LA REAL ACADEMIA DE LA HISTORIA

VOLUME III
THE EMPEROR

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1925

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THE SPANISH EMPIRE

IN THE

OLD WORLD AND IN THE NEW

ROBERT HIGGINS W. MERRIAM

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VOLUME III
THE EMPIRE

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PREFACE TO VOLUME III

I DEEPLY regret that more than seven years have elapsed since the publication of the preceding volumes of this work. There have, however, been certain compensations for the long delay; and of these the greatest has been the fact that it has enabled me to utilize several books whose recent appearance has made the study of Spanish history, and particularly of the period of Charles V, both easier and more fruitful than ever before.

Macmillan
7/29/30

Fuller references will be made to these books in the bibliographical notes to the ensuing chapters; but it also seems worth while to enumerate the most important of them here, in order to show how greatly the study of the present field has been facilitated by their publication. First on the list are three bibliographical works: B. Sánchez Alonso, *Fuentes de la Historia Española* (Madrid, 1919); R. Foulché-Delbosc and L. Barrau-Dihigo, *Manuel de l'Hispanisant*, vol. i (New York, 1920); R. Ballester y Castell, *Bibliografía de la Historia de España* (Gerona, 1921) — a goodly crop for a period of three years, and by far the most considerable of its kind in Spain since the days of Nicolas Antonio, two centuries and a half ago. A new general history of Spain by A. Ballesteros, which promises to supplant all its predecessors, has also begun to make its appearance. The first three volumes, already published, carry the story to the death of the Catholic Kings, and the fourth will probably be out by the time the present

volume sees the light; the work marks an epoch in the progress of Spanish historical writing. Coming down to the period of Charles V, the contemporary *Historia de Carlos Quinto* by Pero Mexia, of which only a portion had hitherto been printed, was published in full for the Hispanic Society in 1918, while the first three volumes of the long-awaited *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V* by the royal cosmographer Alonso de Santa Cruz were put forth for the first time by the Real Academia de la Historia in 1920-22. The quatercentenary celebrations of some of the great men and events that rendered memorable the early years of the Emperor's reign have been the occasion for the publication of a number of works of a more special nature; the Conde de Cedillo's *El Cardenal Cisneros* (Madrid, 1921) and J. T. Medina's *El Descubrimiento del Océano Pacífico* (Santiago de Chile, 1920) may be cited as examples. The Emperor's political testament has also been recently subjected to the searching investigations of German and Austrian scholars. Altogether I have had plenty of new books to work with, containing primary and secondary material.

I have also been very fortunate in finding manuscripts. The collections of the Real Academia de la Historia (especially the Salazar manuscripts), of the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, of Simancas, of the Escorial, of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, of the British Museum (especially the Simancas transcripts), and of the New York Public Library have all been drawn upon; and I have had access to private transcripts from the Archivo de Indias at Seville. These archives have yielded far more than could adequately be made use of in a book covering such an enormous field as does this. And yet I cannot refrain from repeating the conviction which I expressed in the preface to the first

volume of this work, that the amount of practically unutilized printed material for Spanish history still remains so vast, that it is quite as important that it should be thoroughly explored as that extensive researches should be made for something new. Such books as the *Hispaniae Consolatio* discussed in the latter part of Chapter XXI, and the list of chronicles of the conquest of Peru unused by Prescott which are mentioned in the second and third paragraphs of the bibliographical note to Chapter XXIX, furnish instances of this.

Though the length to which the present instalment of this work has run is greater than I originally intended, I have found it impossible to resist the temptation to treat the history of Spain in the Old World and in the New on something approaching the same scale. The title of the book seemed to call for such an arrangement, which has not, so far as I know, been attempted in any recent history of the period. The question of proportions is one on which there will inevitably be the widest divergence of opinion; all that I can claim to have done is to have drawn them as I have seen them within the framework of the Spanish Empire.

The preparation of this volume has laid me under even deeper obligations than did that of its predecessors to the advice and assistance of others. I have derived help and encouragement from conversations with the late A. Morel-Fatio, and with M. Raymond Foulché-Delbosc of Paris, with Mr. E. Armstrong of Oxford and with Señor A. Ballesteros of Madrid — all of them recognized masters in this field; in the case of Señor Ballesteros it is a pleasure to add that he did everything to make my working hours, during a trip to Spain in the autumn of 1922, both happy and fruitful in the extreme. I owe most of my acquaintance with the

economic history of the period to Señor Cristóbal Espejo of Madrid, whose profound knowledge of this topic I am the gladder to proclaim because his great modesty has hitherto been so successful in concealing it. The patience and courtesy of Señor Jerónimo Bécker and of the Reverend Father Pedro Longás y Bartibás enabled me to have access to the manuscripts in the Real Academia de la Historia at a time when the collections were closed; and the Reverend Father Guillermo Antolingave me precious information about the treasures of the Escorial. The names of all my Harvard colleagues who have aided me in the different stages of my work are too numerous to mention here; but I would acknowledge a very special debt of gratitude to Professor E. F. Gay, to Mr. G. P. Winship, to Professors J. D. M. Ford, A. M. Tozzer, C. R. Post, and C. H. Haring, and to Messrs. P. P. Cram and E. D. Salmon. I have gone to them repeatedly for assistance and advice of the most various kinds, and they have invariably responded with that readiness and generosity which are the foundation of the great fellowship of scholars. My hearty thanks are also due to Professor A. I. Andrews of Tufts for sharing with me the intimate knowledge of the Turkish Mediterranean campaigns which he has possessed for more than a score of years without ever consenting to give himself any credit for it; to Professor A. S. Aiton of the University of Michigan for generously placing at my disposal the results of his researches into the life and office of the viceroy Mendoza; to Professor H. I. Priestley of the University of California for information in regard to the territorial limits of the audiencia of Mexico; and to Mr. P. A. Means of Stockbridge, Mass., for criticism of my paragraphs about the Incas, and for calling my attention to the chronicle described on pages 614-615. The map of the Philippines and

Moluccas opposite page 433 has been reproduced by the courteous permission of Messrs. George Philip and Son, Ltd., Publishers, of London, and those of Mexico are largely modelled on originals in the Hakluyt Society's edition of the *Conquest of New Spain* by Bernal Díaz del Castillo. The habit of depending, for accuracy of statement and workmanship, on the assistance of Mr. G. W. Robinson of Harvard — if once it be acquired — is not easily lost; as one with whom it has become fixed for the past fourteen years, I can gratefully testify that it is more useful than ever today. My wife's encouragement and criticism at all stages and in all phases of my work have been invaluable, and the sharp eyes of my son Daniel have saved me from many errors in correcting the proofs.

R. B. M.

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

August, 1925.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

FOR VOLUME III

See the List of Abbreviations for Volumes I and II (Vol. I, pp. xxvi-xxviii), and add :

- Armstrong . . . Edward Armstrong. *The Emperor Charles V.*
London, 1902. 2 vols.
- Bernays . . . Isaac Bernays. "Zur inneren Entwicklung
Castiliens unter Karl V." In *Deutsche
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*,
i (1889), pp. 381-428.
- B. M. . . . British Museum, London.
- Bib. Nac. Madrid . Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid.
- Bib. Nat. Paris . . Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
- C. S. P., Spanish* . Great Britain. — Public Record Office.
*Calendar of Letters, Despatches, and State
Papers, Relating to the Negotiations be-
tween England and Spain.* Edited by G.
A. Bergenroth and others. London,
1862-1916. 11 vols. in 16.
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Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs,
in the Archives and Collections of Venice.*
Edited by Rawdon Brown and others.
London, 1864- . 24 vols. published to
1923.
- Foronda . . . Manuel de Foronda y Aguilera. *Estan-
cias y Viajes del Emperador Carlos V.*
Madrid, 1914.
- Gómara . . . Francisco López de Gómara. *Annals of
the Emperor Charles V.* Spanish text and

- English translation. Edited by R. B. Merriman. Oxford, 1912.
- Gounon-Loubens . Jules Gounon-Loubens. *Essais sur l'administration de la Castille au XVI^e siècle*. Paris, 1860.
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- Haring C. H. Haring. *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies in the Time of the Hapsburgs*. Cambridge, Mass., 1918.
- Laiglesia Francisco de Laiglesia. *Estudios Históricos (1515-1555)*. [Nueva ed.] Madrid, 1918-19. 3 vols.
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- Morel-Fatio . . . Alfred Morel-Fatio. *Historiographie de Charles-Quint*. Première partie. Paris, 1913.
- Prescott, *C. M.* . W. H. Prescott. *History of the Conquest of Mexico*. New York, 1843. 3 vols.
- Prescott, *C. P.* . The same. *History of the Conquest of Peru*. New York, 1848. 2 vols.
- Sandoval Prudencio de Sandoval. *Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos V*. Nueva impression, Antwerp, 1681. 2 vols.
- Santa Cruz . . . Alonso de Santa Cruz. *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V*. Madrid, 1920- . 3 vols. published to 1922.

BOOK V

SPAIN IN THE OLD WORLD

CHAPTER XXI

FRESH RESPONSIBILITIES AND A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN

THE six years which followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic were in some respects the most critical in the history of the Spanish Empire. They saw the control of its destinies pass from native into alien hands. They witnessed fresh extensions of its responsibilities and power; all over the earth, and at a pace hitherto undreamed of, did its prestige and its burdens increase. While it was being linked with foreign kingdoms and Roman imperial traditions in the Old World, it conquered a mighty empire in the New. The voyage of Ferdinand Magellan was a symbol of the universality of the position it had won. And finally, these six years saw the beginning of a radical alteration in the attitude and aspirations of the Spanish people. In 1516 they were still primarily interested in internal affairs. Though unquestionably proud of the great conquests of the preceding reign, they continued to think rather in national than in imperial terms. They regarded with misgivings the foreign dynasty which fate had placed upon their thrones, and four years later, a large proportion of them were in full revolt against it. But in 1522, when their young sovereign came amongst them for a second time, a striking change had already taken place. Their rebellion had died down from lack of fuel to feed the flames. They had had an opportunity to perceive that the rule of the much dreaded foreigner had its advantages as well as its drawbacks; if it meant outside burdens and distractions, it also brought

riches, power, and renown. Little by little their earlier forebodings gave place to a conviction that under the leadership of the house of Hapsburg it was their destiny to rule the world. The significance of this great turning point can only be appreciated if we keep constantly before our eyes the picture of Spain's acquisitions and achievements in every quarter of the globe. Clearness and convenience prescribe separate treatment of contemporary developments in the Old World and in the New; but a general conspectus of the events recorded in the first chapters of the two books comprised in the present volume is essential to the formation of an intelligent verdict on the meaning of these crucial years.

The bitter hostility of Ferdinand the Catholic toward his grandson, Charles of Burgundy,¹ reveals itself in various utterances and stipulations in regard to the succession to the Spanish kingdoms. To disinherit the prince entirely was out of the question; but Ferdinand was resolved to do his utmost to delay the inevitable. For this, the absence of Charles in Flanders, the presence of his brother Ferdinand in Spain, and above all the condition of his unfortunate mother — immured in Tordesillas — furnished an admirable opportunity. Joanna was the legal heiress, and had been recognized as such in a will drawn up by her father at Burgos on May 2, 1512; her unfitness to rule, however, was also openly acknowledged, and Charles was designated as regent. But until Charles should arrive, it was provided that his younger brother Ferdinand should take his place, and it was generally believed that their grandfather cherished hopes that the substitution might prove permanent.² Certainly

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 334-335.

² Cf. Galíndez Carvajal, *Anales Breves*, in *D. I. E.*, xviii, pp. 344 ff.;

Häbler, p. 6, note; Walther, *Die Anfänge Karls V.*, p. 147. Zurita who could not bear to have his history end

he left no stone unturned to strengthen the hand of the 'Infante'¹ against Charles; significant, in this connection, were his repeated efforts to win for his favorite grandson the hand of the Princess Renée, daughter of Louis XII, and thereby to forestall the match which had been arranged for her with Charles.² Badoero, the Venetian ambassador, writing early in the year 1515, goes so far as to affirm that Ferdinand was very glad to see how much the grandees liked the Infante, who had been reared in Spain, and that he ardently hoped that they would make him king, in case Charles should come to Castile to take possession of his inheritance.³ Even after Ferdinand's death, the impression prevailed in Spain that he had intended to set aside the lawful heir. As late as October, 1520, his cousin, the Admiral Fadrique Enríquez, assured the Junta of Tor-desillas that the king, on his death bed, had nominated his namesake as 'gobernador' or regent for his mother, without reference to the claims of Charles.⁴

Yet the facts of the case, though the admiral may not have been aware of them, were exactly the contrary of the statement he had made. For during the last months of Ferdinand's life, the counsellors of the absent prince, who were accurately informed of the situation in Spain, made a determined effort to eradicate his grandfather's prejudice

with an unseemly quarrel between his hero Ferdinand and his patron Charles, vigorously denies that the former made any testamentary disposition whatever in favor of his namesake (vi, fol. 403) and gives in support of the denial a detailed account of a will which he represents the king to have drawn up on April 26, 1515. There is, however, no other evidence that such an instrument was ever framed, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the usually trustworthy *cronista*, in this particular instance, was deliberately distorting the facts.

¹ Meaning, of course, young Ferdinand. The fact that he was generally known by that title, in contrast to Charles, who was always referred to as 'El Principe,' clearly indicates that the Spaniards regarded him as belonging to themselves, and looked on his brother as a foreigner.

² *C. S. P.*, Spanish, ii, nos. 104-109, 120, 144, 154, 159, 162, 179, 186, 187, 190.

³ Marino Sanuto, *Diarii* (Venice, 1879-1903, 58 vols.), xix, col. 373.

⁴ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, p. 337.

against him, and to insure his own rights to the succession. For this purpose they despatched Charles's friend and tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, dean of Louvain, in October, 1515, to plead his cause at the Spanish court.¹ The selection was altogether wise. Adrian was patient and tactful. He was capable of appreciating the Spanish point of view. It may have counted in his favor that he was not on the best of terms with Charles's most intimate advisers in the Netherlands. To assume that Ferdinand was persuaded to forget his dislike of the Archduke would be absurd; but he was apparently brought to see that it was no longer practical politics to give vent to his hostility by attempting to deprive him of his inheritance. At any rate, an agreement was reached in early January, 1516, that Charles should come to Spain in the immediate future, not like his father before him, with armed forces, but only with his retinue as a prince; that he should be recognized as heir in all the Spanish kingdoms, without prejudice to the rights of his grandfather, so long as the latter should live; and finally that the same fleet which bore him to Spain should carry back his brother Ferdinand to the Netherlands, to take over the government there.² Most of these arrangements were nullified by the old king's death a few weeks later; but the principal point for which Adrian had contended — namely, the setting aside of the Infante's claims to the regency in Spain — had been definitely and permanently won. The day before he died, Ferdinand called his most intimate counsellors together, and, after prolonged consultation, annulled his will of 1512, recognized the right of succession to the Spanish kingdoms

¹ Walther, p. 149.

² *D. I. E.*, xiv, pp. 347 ff.; Santa Cruz, i, pp. 88 ff.; Zurita, vi, fol. 404; Carvajal, in *D. I. E.*, xviii, pp. 340-341; Häbler, pp. 7-8; Wilhelm Bauer, *An-*

fänge Ferdinands I., pp. 31 ff.; and Höfler, in *Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna), phil.-hist. Classe, lxxiv, p. 508.

of his daughter Joanna, and her legal heir, Prince Charles, and ordered that until the latter should arrive in Spain the regency of Castile should be intrusted to Cardinal Ximenes, and that of the realms of the Crown of Aragon to his natural son, the archbishop of Saragossa. Several places in the kingdom of Naples and an annual stipend of fifty thousand ducats were all that was left to the Infante.¹

The sentiments of the mass of the Spaniards on the question of the succession accurately reflected those of Ferdinand, and they knew little or nothing of the circumstances which had brought the king in his last days to bow to the inevitable, and cancel the previous dispositions made in favor of his namesake. So much has already been said concerning the prevalence of separatism of every sort in the Iberian Peninsula, that it is unnecessary to emphasize the danger of generalizations; still, if there was any one characteristic common to all ranks and classes of the Spain of that period, it was certainly dislike and distrust of foreigners. The reasons for this are not far to seek. Geographical facts and historical traditions furnished the background. A natural pride in glorious deeds done under the Catholic Kings, and a consequent tendency to look down on others who had accomplished less, counted for much. All the contemporary accounts bear witness to it. Peter Martyr tells us that "among Spaniards no foreigner is accounted of importance. They boast that they know for themselves, and that is enough."² "They think they know more, and can accomplish more than any other people,"

¹ Carvajal, in *D. I. E.*, xviii, pp. 344 ff.; *D. I. E.*, xiv, pp. 353-355; Bauer, pp. 32-34; Walther, p. 147. Carvajal, who tells us that he was one of the counsellors summoned by Ferdinand on this occasion, doubtless exaggerates his own and his companions' share in

causing the dying king to make these final dispositions; but to reject his whole account of the affair, as some writers have done, is to err in the opposite direction.

² Ep. iii.

comments Corner in 1521.¹ Guicciardini in his 'relation' of 1513 was even more explicit. "They are by nature proud, and believe that no other nation can be compared with their own. In their conversation they are constantly vaunting their own exploits; . . . they have little use for strangers, and are exceedingly rude in their dealings with them."² And it was but natural that Charles should be regarded in Spain as a foreigner, and should come in for his share of this contempt. He had never left the Netherlands since the day of his birth, and he had been surrounded from the cradle by essentially non-Spanish influences. Spaniards had, or thought they had, a little inkling of what this boded for them; for they cherished the bitterest memories of the wanton recklessness with which, ten years before, the Archduke Philip had impoverished Castile in the interests of his greedy Flemings.³ The only Spaniards who had got any good at all out of Philip's brief rule in the Peninsula were the old self-seeking Castilian nobles, who, dreading the strong hand of the king of Aragon, had flocked to the court of the young Hapsburg in the hope that his wastefulness and incompetence would afford them a long looked for opportunity to retrieve their own shattered fortunes.⁴ The aristocracy's gain was the loss of every other portion of the body politic; and if Philip had been unsatisfactory, there was every probability that Charles would be worse. The Infante, who had always lived among them, would have been much more acceptable to the mass of the Spaniards.

Discussion of the attitude of Spain towards Charles naturally leads to that of the attitude of Charles towards Spain. Much light is thrown on this matter by a confidential letter,

¹ *Relazione di Franc. Corner*, cited in Baumgarten, *Geschichte Karls V.*, i, p. 64.

² *Opere Inedite*, vi, p. 274.

³ Peter Martyr, *Opus Epistolarum*, ep. cccxii.

⁴ Zurita, vi, fols. 46-82, *passim*; Walther, pp. 62-65, and references there.

written to Cardinal Ximenes shortly after Ferdinand's death, by Alonso Manrique, bishop of Badajoz, who had resided in the Netherlands since 1509, and knew whereof he spoke. Briefly summarized, his verdict was that Charles knew little of Spain and of the Spaniards, and that most of that was wrong.¹ Under all the circumstances, it could scarcely have been otherwise. The prince had grown up under the tutelage of his Hapsburg aunt Margaret, and of his Francophile minister Chièvres. His dynastic interests and responsibilities, as future head of the house of Hapsburg, had been set before him; his obligations to revive the pristine splendors of the ancient dukes of Burgundy had been reiterated again and again; but the claims of his maternal inheritance had scarcely been insisted on at all. It is true that a number of Spanish representatives had been in attendance at his court since the death of his father, in 1506, but their attitude and conduct had probably rather alienated than attracted him. The majority were Castilian nationalists who hated the rule of King Ferdinand because he was Aragonese. They formed, in fact, the remnants of the party that had ranged itself on the side of the Archduke Philip in 1506; somewhat less self-seeking perhaps than the adherents of that ruler had been, they represented, for more patriotic reasons, essentially the same point of view. Their leader was that Juan Manuel who had ruled in the counsels of Charles's father; and closely associated with him were the above mentioned bishop of Badajoz, and Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, his successor in that see.² They lost no opportunity to poison the young ruler's mind against his maternal grandfather, and the latter responded by sending an Aragonese delegation to Charles's court to present his side of the

¹ *C. S. P.*, *Spanish*, ii, no. 246; *Baumgarten*, i, pp. 31-33.

² *Walther*, p. 112.

case. The rival partisans struggled and intrigued to gain the upper hand, and their strife became involved with various factional bickerings in Charles's council; at one time Ferdinand's supporters succeeded in persuading the Emperor Maximilian to order their arch-enemy, Juan Manuel, into confinement.¹ We may well believe that the spectacle of all these plottings and recriminations both puzzled and disgusted Charles. He retained, to an unusual degree, throughout his youth, that love of calmness and regularity, that aversion to the unaccountable and inconsequent, which is a common characteristic of children. The real meaning and significance of the wrangles of his Spanish visitors were at present quite beyond him. He only knew that they were constantly at odds with one another for remote and insufficient cause. They disturbed the regular round of Hapsburg and Burgundian affairs, and were an unwelcome reminder of future responsibilities which he probably, at that moment, was by no means anxious to assume.

A few words in regard to Charles's appearance and character at this early stage of his career will serve to emphasize the difficulties of the situation, and shed further light on the mutual repulsion between his future Spanish subjects and himself. At sixteen, he was far from prepossessing. Neither in aspect nor in conversation did he give any promise of the ability, ambition, or independence which he was afterwards shown to possess. The portraits that have come down to us give a far clearer idea of his appearance than the contradictory descriptions of contemporaries.² He had a good body, thin, but well formed, and of medium height. His forehead was broad and clear, but his eyes bulged and

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, ii, nos. 119, 160, 169; Walther, pp. 112-114, 119-122, 153-156.

² Most of these early portraits have

been well reproduced in E. Pacheco y de Leyva, *Retratos de Carlos I de España y V de Alemania* (Madrid, 1919).

stared; they looked, said the Venetian Pasqualigo, as if they were stuck on and did not really belong to him.¹ His salient feature, however, so prominent that it really diverted attention from the upper part of his face, was his long protruding lower jaw, which caused his mouth not seldom to hang open, and sometimes gave him almost the air of an imbecile.² Proper mastication was consequently impossible; and as the prince's appetite was almost uncontrollable, digestive troubles affected him all his life. The unhealthy pallor, which was remarked upon by all observers, was doubtless attributable to the same cause. Another result of this peculiar malformation was a hesitant speech and continual stammering;³ and the unfortunate impression which this infirmity must have produced was considerably enhanced by his linguistic limitations. French and Flemish were perhaps Charles's natural languages; but he was never absolutely at home in the former, and he did not begin the latter until he was thirteen. His Latin was bad, and his Italian worse. Of German and Spanish he was still completely ignorant. His other intellectual accomplishments were far from remarkable. He was reasonably well versed in history, but knew almost nothing of theology. He took no interest in mathematics until later in life, and is said to have once complained that he was educated as if intended for a schoolmaster.⁴ He had a real taste for music⁵ and a genuine love of the chase; this last, in the estimation of his grandfather, Maximilian, was his sole redeeming feature as a boy of nine. Save for it, the Emperor roundly declared, he might well have been a bastard.⁶ Eight years later, when

¹ Sanuto, xx, col. 422.

² *Ibid.* Richard Pace, the shrewd English envoy, declared (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, no. 3248) that Charles was "but an idiot."

³ Sanuto, xxx, col. 324.

⁴ Walther, pp. 204 ff.; Armstrong, i, pp. 8-10, and references there.

⁵ Cf. E. vander Straeten, *Charles-Quint musicien* (Ghent, 1894).

⁶ *Correspondance de Maximilien I^{er} et de Marguerite d'Autriche*, ed. A. J. G.

Maximilian saw him again, he altered his earlier verdict for the worse. The prince, he averred, with a shake of his head, was as immovable as a heathen idol.¹

Of the character that lay behind this unattractive exterior, it was almost impossible to judge. Charles, at this stage of his career, was an enigma to his contemporaries. On one point only there was general agreement, and that was his preternatural gravity and reserve. All the joy and enthusiasm of youth seemed to have been denied him, and he gave the appearance of being always slightly tired. "Sexdecennis est, gravitate tamen senili," writes Peter Martyr; "molto melincolico," reports Pasqualigo.² This sedateness was, perhaps, not entirely unbecoming to a future sovereign, but it discouraged intimacy, and left observers of Charles's character in the dark. Most of them jumped at the conclusion that he was really a nonentity. Just before his departure for Spain a couple of Italians reported that, having been thrice in his presence, they had never heard him utter a single word, that he had no ability whatsoever, and was exclusively governed by others.³ His most intimate adviser was the Burgundian Chièvres, for whom he entertained affection and profound respect;⁴ and despite the harshness of the Spanish verdicts on this minister — perfectly explicable in view of subsequent events — it was really to Charles's credit that he clung to him as he did. It showed a sense of duty, and even, paradoxical as it may seem, a certain sort of independence. Chièvres represented to Charles his

Le Glay, i, pp. 241-242. Apparently Charles's skill at the chase was not sufficient to prevent him, on one occasion, from accidentally slaying a drunken artisan. *Ibid.*, ii, p. 155.

¹ L. & P. Hen. VIII, ii, p. 938. Cf. also Francesco Sansovino, *Il Simolacro di Carlo Quinto imperadore* (Venice, 1567). A passage from it, on the de-

tails of Charles's private life, is given in Morel-Fatio, pp. 152-153.

² Peter Martyr, epp. dxv, dlxix; Sanuto, *Diarii*, xx, col. 422.

³ C. S. P., *Venetian*, ii, no. 969; Sanuto, xxiv, col. 89.

⁴ Sanuto, xxx, col. 325; Walther, pp. 127-132, 206-207.

responsibilities to his Netherlandish subjects — the only subjects he had ever known; the minister was the embodiment of immediate and evident obligations. That Charles refused to be diverted from these by the changeful and capricious demands of Maximilian and Margaret, and the even remoter claims of different Spanish delegations, is a point in his favor.¹ It reveals conscientiousness, strength of character, and concentration. And Chièvres himself could have testified, had he wished, that the prince had a will of his own. When, in his eighteenth year, Charles found on the person of his sister Eleanor a letter, which proved that his old friend Frederick, Count Palatine, was making love to her without his knowledge and consent, he promptly banished the offender from his court; and all the pleadings and intercessions of Margaret, of the Prince of Orange, and of Chièvres himself availed nothing to mitigate the sentence.² But of all this the average observer was still ignorant; the externals gave no inkling of it whatsoever, and the mass of mankind judges by externals. Certainly the Spaniards, who knew far less of the prince than any of his subjects, derived little encouragement from the prospect.

In one respect the death of King Ferdinand simplified the complicated diplomatic situation which had arisen through the rivalry of the different factions about the person of the prince; it put an end to the quarrel between the Castilian nationalists and the Aragonese representatives at the Burgundian court. For Charles was now practically sovereign in both portions of his Spanish inheritance, and under the guidance of Chièvres did his best to efface the memory of

¹ Walther, pp. 163-164.

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, nos. 3608, 3641, 3646. The English envoy, Spinelly, on learning of this episode, reported to Henry VIII that it showed the prince

to be of "good stomak and couraggy, . . . fast in his determynacions" and one who would "much extyme the honnor of the worlde."

the jealousy between the eastern and western kingdoms. Almost all the leaders of both of the Spanish parties in the Netherlands were got rid of on one pretext or another in the course of the year 1516-17. Pedro de Urrea, one of the representatives of Ferdinand, was sent off to Rome. Another, Juan de Lanuza, was dismissed. Juan Manuel, the Castilian, was also kept away from Charles's court, and finally reappeared as his ambassador to the Vatican in 1520.¹ Their places were taken by Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, now bishop of Badajoz, who had not been so deeply involved in the preceding quarrels, and by Pedro Quintana, a nephew of the famous state secretary, Miguel Pérez de Almazán, who was specially summoned by Charles from Spain.² Both these men were cosmopolitan in training and point of view; their advent betokened the intention of the prince and his advisers to take up the Spanish problem as a whole, and not as an affair of Aragon or of Castile. In order to remove all doubts, and to preclude the dangers inherent in his mother's infirmity and her legal position as sole heiress in the Spanish realms, Charles was proclaimed King Catholic jointly with her on March 14, 1516, at Brussels in the Cathedral Church of Saint Gudule.³ In the autumn of the same year it was determined to enlarge the famous Order of the Golden Fleece "in view of the increased power and prestige of the Burgundian House," and to reserve ten places in it for distinguished Spaniards; this action is the more significant when contrasted with the previous failure of the Emperor Maximilian to have the Order extended to Austria.⁴ Clearly the Netherlands

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 744.

² Walther, pp. 41, 152-154, and references there.

³ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, nos. 1668, 1687. It is worth noting that, ten days before, the Council of Castile had written to Charles to request him not

to take the title of king during the lifetime of his mother. Cf. Sandoval, i, pp. 50 ff.

⁴ Walther, pp. 158-159; Baron de Reiffenberg, *Histoire de l'Ordre de la Toison d'Or* (Brussels, 1830), pp. 304-306.

regarded the acquisition of the Spanish inheritance for their sovereign as a point of honor, and felt that a union of both peoples under a single ruler would work to the advantage of both. There was something to be said for this point of view. So accustomed are we to think of the relations of Spain and the Low Countries as they were in the time of Philip II and William of Orange, that we forget the many traditions of cordial good feeling that lay behind. Particularly noteworthy was their interdependence in economic life. The wool trade was almost a *sine qua non* of commercial prosperity for both, and their joint fleets could probably have controlled the seas.¹ Given good relations with France (and to attain and preserve such good relations had been the constant aim of Chièvres's foreign policy), it was by no means impossible, at that period, that Spain and Burgundy, including Franche Comté, could have been successfully and advantageously united under a single rule.

But if the death of the king of Aragon simplified the Spanish problem, as it presented itself to the court of Brussels, it also rendered its immediate solution far more urgent than before. It was desirable from every point of view that Charles should go to Spain as soon as possible, and it was generally understood between his Flemish advisers and the regent Ximenes that nothing of importance should be permanently decided there until he should arrive; yet on the other hand there were many obstacles in the way of a speedy departure.² There were pressing questions of internal politics to settle in the Netherlands. Wars had to be fought in Gelderland and Frisia. The opposition of the Emperor Maximilian, who was disgusted with the Francophile tendencies of Chièvres's administration, had to be over-

¹ Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, ii, p. 387.

² *Cartas de Jimenez*, p. 105; Walther, p. 158.

come.¹ Most necessary of all was the assurance of good relations with France, without which the whole Spanish enterprise would be hazardous in the extreme; and this was secured, August 13, 1516, by the treaty of Noyon, which settled, for the time being, all outstanding questions between the contracting parties, and sealed their reconciliation by the betrothal of Charles to Louise, the daughter of Francis I.² That Chièvres was able to accomplish all these things in the twenty months that followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic was no mean achievement. Yet it is not difficult to see why the Spaniards, who were imperfectly informed about the situation in the Netherlands, chafed at the long delay. It confirmed their previous estimate of Charles as an essentially foreign prince, with outside responsibilities to which he gave precedence over his duties as a Spanish sovereign. Some of them decided to act on the principle that if the mountain would not come to Mohammed, Mohammed must go to the mountain. "They flock here in incredible numbers every day," wrote Spinelly to Henry VIII from Brussels in May, 1516.³ No less than twenty-four commanders of the Order of Santiago were to be found in that city in the following July, enough to make possible a formal capitular meeting there.⁴ No doubt a chief cause of the coming of these people was their desire to advance their own private ends; but they all showed a firm determination to instil into their young ruler the Spanish point of view, and to insure that he should not enter upon his new inheritance a total stranger to the traditions and aspirations of the Iberian Peninsula. Since a deathbed change of policy

¹ Walther, pp. 164 ff., and references there.

² Pirenne, iii, p. 84.

³ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, nos. 1822, 1848; also Carvajal, in *D. I. E.*, xviii,

pp. 396 ff., and Santa Cruz, i, pp. 143 ff.

⁴ *Cartas de los secretarios del Cardenal Jiménez*, ed. V. de la Fuente (Madrid, 1875), p. 212.

on the part of their late monarch had blasted all their hopes of the successor whom the vast majority of them would have preferred, they had wisely resolved to accept the inevitable, and do their utmost to turn the Flemish alien into a loyal Spaniard.

Meantime, in Castile, the iron hand of Cardinal Ximenes governed the realm, put down revolt, and maintained the prestige of the authority of the crown. So dominant was the personality of this extraordinary prelate that he overshadowed every one associated with him in the government, and also his co-regent in the eastern kingdoms; the realms of the Crown of Aragon, under the less masterful rule of the archbishop of Saragossa, seemed to shrink into insignificance during the years 1516-17. The task that the cardinal inherited was beset with difficulties; and his loyalty and determination were subjected to the sternest tests. For all the malcontents in the realm seized the vacancy of the throne as their longed for opportunity to gain their own selfish ends. The Castilian aristocracy raised its head in revolt, and had to be suppressed by strong statesmanship and force of arms.¹ The ambitions of Queen Germaine were a constant source of anxiety. The Infante Ferdinand was the hardest problem of all.² His grandfather's preference for him was a matter of common gossip. Being only thirteen years old, he would have made just the sort of ruler that the grandees would have delighted to see. Plots and intrigues continued to centre about him, until finally Charles authorized the cardinal to separate him from his most intimate adherents.³ This vigorous action was rendered easier by the

¹ Conde de Cedillo, *El Cardenal Cisneros*, pp. 24 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 165 ff.; Carvajal, in *D. I. E.*, xviii, pp. 384 ff.

³ Carvajal, in *D. I. E.*, xviii, pp. 411 ff.; Conde de Cedillo, *op. cit.*, pp. 151 ff.; Bauer, *Anfänge Ferdinands I.*, pp. 40-41, 43-44, 51-54, and references there.

fact that it had been already agreed that Ferdinand should be sent off to the Netherlands to take Charles's place, after the arrival of the latter in Castile; and in May, 1518, six months after Ximenes's death, this arrangement was carried into effect.¹ There was universal grief at the Infante's departure. If the grandees regarded him merely as a means of restoring their own shattered fortunes, the people felt that he was the last symbol of Spanish, as opposed to foreign rule. "Woe unto thee, Castile, if thou sufferest the Infante Ferdinand to be carried away,"² ran a writing that appeared on the doors of St. Francis of Valladolid; and there can be no doubt that these words represented the general feeling. Ximenes, however, had definitely accepted the new regime with all that it implied. Castilian to the core, he had followed the late king's will, and cast in his lot with the absent Hapsburg.

The unrest in the realm and the need for stern repressive measures led the cardinal to try an experiment fully in consonance with his own inclinations and with the traditions of the previous reign. He had always delighted in military affairs;³ and the use of the troops of the Hermandad under the Catholic Kings, and the provisions of the royal ordinance of 1496, gave him excellent precedents for the creation of a standing army. He accordingly sought and obtained Charles's permission to call on each of the different cities of Castile to raise, equip, and drill a military force proportional to its population, to be permanently ready for the service of the crown. The cost of this body was to be borne by the cities in time of peace, and by the central government in time of war; and in order to make the experiment popular, a number of privileges and immunities were offered to those

¹ Häbler, p. 29; Bauer, pp. 58-63.

² Peter Martyr, ep. dcxiv.

³ Cf. Peter Martyr, ep. dlxxiii: "belli-

cis colloquiis et apparatibus gaudet"; Gomez, *De Rebus gestis*, fol. 160 r.

who entered the ranks.¹ Violent opposition, however, soon manifested itself on every hand. The nobles regarded the 'alistamiento,' as the measure was called, in the light of a menace to their independence, and were naturally loudest in their complaints; but the cities were not far behind. The expense was heavy, and the scheme itself was an invasion of cherished municipal privileges. In some places the hostility remained latent; in others it manifested itself in riots, and in appeals over the head of the regent to the absent prince. Salamanca expelled the officers sent by Ximenes to organize the new army. In Valladolid the regent's representative had to hide and then flee in disguise for his life; and when the cardinal announced his intention of punishing the inhabitants, they rushed to arms.² The resistance of Valladolid was in fact the rock on which the project was wrecked. Together with Burgos she protested to Charles, who, desirous above all things to avoid trouble while he was in Flanders, gave assurance that if peace were preserved the obnoxious order would be suspended.³ It was in vain that the cardinal warned his young master that such leniency was but playing into the hands of his worst enemies, the grandees.⁴ The court of Brussels was determined on conciliation, and the whole plan had to be given up. But the attempt, though it failed, brought the government all the unpopularity that might have been expected to ensue from its success. Every one realized what the cardinal had intended to do, for Charles's interference had come too late to cloud the issue. Nobles and burgesses alike were up in arms, and the way was paved for a temporary union between

¹ Höfler, *Spanische Regesten*, no. 47; Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, p. 177; Conde de Cedillo, *op. cit.*, pp. 73 ff.

² Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 177-178; Carvajal, in *D. I. E.*, xviii,

pp. 380 ff.; Häbler, pp. 18-20; Hefele, tr. Dalton, pp. 469 ff.

³ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, p. 182.

⁴ Höfler, *Regesten*, no. 66; *Cartas de Jimenez*, no. lxxxix.

the aristocracy and the third estate against the crown, which, a few years later, nearly cost the king his throne.¹

The cardinal was as solicitous for the interest of the Spanish Empire as he was for the authority of the crown of Castile. His efforts for the progress and prosperity of the Spanish dominions across the Atlantic, and for the fair treatment of the American Indians, form an interesting and important episode in the history of Spanish civilization in the New World. Nearer home, he distinguished himself by repelling an expedition of Jean d'Albret for the recovery of the Spanish portion of Navarre. The invading forces were caught unprepared in the narrow valley of Roncal; they were overwhelmed there in March, 1516, by the sudden attack of the Spaniards under Colonel Cristóbal Villalva, one of the ablest of the disciples of the Great Captain. Victory on the battlefield was followed by stern measures to prevent a repetition of the attempt. Many of the great fortresses of the realm, more likely to prove nuclei of revolt than strongholds of authority, were razed to the ground; only Estella, Viana, and Pamplona were suffered to remain. An imposing army of occupation was installed in the reconquered land; and a new viceroy, the Duke of Najera, whose vast wealth rendered him inaccessible to corruption, superintended the execution of the orders of his master. Certain constitutional and administrative reforms were also carried out; their tendency, needless to add, was to curtail the liberties and privileges of the Navarrese, who execrated the cardinal in Spain, and his representatives on the spot. The harshness of these measures was subsequently softened

¹ Further details about the topics treated in this and the preceding paragraphs may be found in Sandoval, i, pp. 44-63, 71-74, 82; and in B. Porreño, "Vida del Cardenal Ximénez,"

in his *Dos Tratados Históricos tocantes al Cardenal Ximénez*, ed. Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles (Madrid, 1918), pp. 186-202.

by sundry modifying edicts of Charles, who saw and improved the obvious opportunity to win an easy popularity by a show of conciliation; but it is doubtful if the Spanish rule in Navarre could have survived the much more serious test to which it was to be subjected in 1521 had the cardinal been less pitiless in 1516.¹

In any history of the Spanish Empire the name of Cardinal Ximenes will always be chiefly remembered in connection with North Africa. The campaign against Oran, in 1509, and the other conquests which immediately followed after it, had been primarily rendered possible by his energy and enthusiasm. During the period of his regency he launched an expedition against Algiers, and despite the assertion of his biographer to the contrary,² we may well believe that he was deeply cast down by its failure. According to some authorities the immediate occasion of this enterprise was one for which there had been many a precedent in the history of the relations of Spain and of North Africa — an appeal for Christian aid from local Berber potentates who had acknowledged themselves vassals of the king of Spain, in their dread of domination by a more powerful coreligionist. The suppliants this time were the rulers of Tenes and Mostaganem, and possibly one of the sons of the sheik of Algiers.³ The oppressor against whom they sought aid was the Turkish corsair, Arudj Barbarossa, who had just strangled the Algerian ruler with his own hands and proclaimed himself king of the realm in his stead. But it seems more probable that the principal cause of the expedition was the sorry state of the Spanish garrison of the Peñon d'Algel. It was short of supplies and especially of water, which, owing

¹ For full references on this paragraph see Boissonnade, *Réunion de la Navarre à la Castille*, pp. 454-471; also Santa Cruz, i, pp. 117 ff.

² Gomez, *De Rebus gestis*, fol. 180 r.

³ Algiers, since 1510, had been ruled by a local chieftain, under Spanish suzerainty; cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 257.

to the vigilance with which the enemy guarded the wells on the mainland, had to be fetched from the distant Balearics. The letters of the commander of the garrison — a Catalan, Nicholas de Quint — give a vivid picture of the sufferings of his men; "No hermit," avowed one of his subordinates, "has ever endured such pangs of hunger and thirst."¹ A powerful relief force was accordingly fitted out at Cartagena; when it finally sailed in the end of September, 1516, it comprised some thirty-five ships and about 3000 men.² Its command was intrusted to Diego de Vera, a favorite pupil of Gonsalvo de Cordova, and one of the famous 'eleven' who had fought the French at Trani in 1502; Peter Martyr assures us, however, in his laconic fashion, that he was far more talkative and boastful than energetic.³ Certainly he made a lamentable failure on this occasion, and his blunders are exposed in merciless fashion in the report of the commander whom he set out to relieve.⁴ He took no pains to time the arrival of his fleet so as to effect a surprise. He assaulted the city of Algiers without utilizing his artillery in preparation. He suffered Arudj to draw him forward into a trap where his troops were overwhelmed by a furious counter attack. Only the cannon of the Peñon saved his army from annihilation; and on his return voyage to Spain his best ships were driven ashore by a storm, and their crews either captured or slain. "Even Homer sometimes nods," is Sandoval's grim comment on this reverse, "and for our sins, it generally happens at the very time that it is most important for him to be awake."⁵

¹ *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 443-487, *passim*, especially p. 457; Sandoval, lib. ii, § xxii; Mercier, iii, pp. 17-18; Adrien Berbrugger, *Le Pégnon d'Alger*, pp. 26-57.

² C. Fernández Duro, *Armada Espa-*

ñola, i, pp. 102-103, makes it 40 ships and 7000 men.

³ Peter Martyr, ep. dlxxiv.

⁴ *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 483-486.

⁵ Sandoval, i, p. 63.

There was another portion of the Spanish Empire which was destined to give its youthful sovereign many an anxious moment during the two years which followed the death of Ferdinand the Catholic — namely, the island of Sicily. Here Cardinal Ximenes had no jurisdiction, and was consequently unable directly to intervene; his correspondence, however, shows that he was deeply concerned over the insurrection which broke out there, and the danger that it might spread to the neighboring kingdom of Naples.¹

The immediate cause of the uprising in Sicily was the unpopularity of the viceroy Hugo de Moncada,² who had been sent thither by Ferdinand the Catholic in 1509. The earlier years of his tenure of office had been principally occupied in lending military aid to the North African campaigns, especially in 1511, after the capture of Tripoli;³ in all this he exhibited energy, dauntless courage, and remarkable capacity as a soldier. Unfortunately his internal administration was marked by avarice, cruelty, and arrogance. He appropriated the government resources for purposes of his own. He substituted his own will for the law of the land, and utilized the Inquisition to terrorize people into submission.⁴ Every one looked forward to the death of Ferdinand, by which the appointment of Moncada would be legally terminated, as the sole means of escape from intolerable conditions. But the viceroy was determined to retain his office. When the news of Ferdinand's death arrived, he sought, at first, to keep it secret till he should be able to extort from the estates a recognition of his authority. Then when the opposition of the nobles and burgesses in the

¹ *Cartas de Jimenez*, p. 113.

² Cf. *Life of Moncada* by Gaspar de Baeza, in *D. I. E.*, xxiv, pp. 15-78; his correspondence with Charles V follows on pp. 79-514.

³ It will be remembered that Tripoli was intrusted to Sicilian safekeeping; cf. *ante*, II, p. 258.

⁴ I. La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, iii, pp. 41 ff.

Sicilian parliament rendered it impossible to carry out this plan, he reversed his tactics, and sought, by openly proclaiming the accession of Charles and of Joanna, at once to win the confidence of his new sovereigns, and also to gain for himself the adherence of the masses. This manoeuvre, however, was even more unsuccessful than the first. Not only did it fail to produce the intended effect; it precipitated an uprising in Palermo against Moncada, which resulted in his expulsion and flight to Messina. The movement soon spread over all the rest of the island. The viceroy's edicts were set aside; his friends and appointees were hunted out and killed. For a brief period the cities were delivered over to mob rule. Finally, however, a provisional government was set up by the aristocracy under the able leadership of the Count of Golisano, and succeeded after a brief struggle in gaining the adherence of the mass of the Sicilians. On the subject of Moncada it took a decided stand; it sent a messenger to the court of Brussels to demand that he be immediately recalled, and that the measures for which he had been responsible be promptly revoked. At the same time it protested that the island was entirely loyal to Charles and his mother, and that it would welcome the new dynasty, provided its laws and privileges were not infringed.¹

Charles took up the matter vigorously. Moncada and Golisano, with the latter's principal adherents, were cited to appear before him in the autumn of 1516, and were confronted with one another at the royal court.² The Sicilian representatives won an initial victory by preventing the return of the detested viceroy, but they failed to gain any profit from it for themselves. Golisano and his friends were forced to dance attendance at the royal court for over two years and

¹ La Lumia, iii, pp. 65-103; Santa Cruz, i, pp. 120 ff.

² Sanuto, xxii, col. 569; xxiii, cols. 13, 40.

a half; not until June, 1519, were they suffered to return to their native land.¹ Their provisional government was declared null and void, and most of the viceroy's edicts and impositions were restored. Moreover the successor who was appointed in Moncada's place was a Neapolitan nobleman, the Count of Monteleone, who was bound to be unpopular with the Sicilians as a foreigner, and who naturally reaped the fruits of all the errors of his predecessors. The new title with which he was invested — lieutenant-general of the realm — was an additional ground for suspicion and dislike. In July, 1517, within three months of his arrival, the island was again in the throes of a revolution.²

This second uprising was more serious than the first. The populace and not the aristocracy furnished its leaders and its platform. The place of the Count of Golisano was taken by a burgess of Palermo, named Gian Luca Squarcialupo, whose aspirations reached much further than the redress of grievances, and contemplated the foundation of an independent republic.³ There were murders and riots in all the Sicilian cities except Messina. Monteleone was powerless to restore order, and Charles was so remote that the revolutionists felt it safe to ignore him. But the movement was not destined to last long; it contained within itself the seeds of its own dissolution. The nobles had flirted with it at the outset, when they thought that it promised to bring them some advantage; when they discovered that they were to have no share in its direction or its spoils, they shifted over into opposition, and revolution gave way to class war. Finally, on September 8, 1517, a group of them fell upon Squarcialupo and murdered him in the church of the Annunciation in Palermo.⁴ Deprived of its leader, the populace

¹ *D. I. E.*, xxiv, p. 263.

² *La Lumia*, iii, pp. 103-123.

³ *La Lumia*, iii, pp. 116 ff.

⁴ *La Lumia*, iii, pp. 157-163.

soon lost its enthusiasm for fighting; and when, six months later, a force of six thousand men was sent over from Spain to restore order, there was little left for it to do.¹ Politically and administratively the movement was almost barren of results. Monteleone was maintained in office with the title of viceroy; some few concessions were made to the popular demands, but the only portion of the inhabitants who really gained anything from what occurred was the aristocracy, whose loyalty Charles rewarded with an increase of privileges and power.

The whole affair must have made a painful impression on the mind of the young king. It gave him his first inkling of the difficulties inherent in the rule of the far flung empire which he had inherited from his Spanish forebears. But it also demonstrated the important fact that an aristocracy, if properly manipulated, could be converted from a menace to the omnipotence of the crown into an invaluable bulwark against popular revolution. The history of Charles's subsequent dealings with the revolt of the Castilian Comuneros shows that he took this lesson to heart.

At last the long awaited day arrived, and on September 9, 1517, Charles set sail from Flushing for Spain. The fleet that bore the young monarch to his new inheritance numbered some forty sail, and his following nearly five hundred souls. Among them were his sister Eleanor, his chief adviser, Chièvres, and a large number of Flemish magnates, the Castilian bishop, Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, and Sir Thomas Spinelly, the envoy of Henry VIII.² Every effort had been made to fit out the expedition in such a manner as would be

¹ La Lumia, iii, p. 170. This was the first foreign army of occupation which Sicily had seen since its annexation to the realms of the crown of Aragon a century before; and its presence engendered an ill feeling of which the

French were to take advantage in the succeeding years.

² Laurent Vital, "Premier voyage de Charles-Quint en Espagne," in *Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas*, iii, pp. 46-47.

worthy of the gorgeous traditions of the Burgundian court and secure the favor and protection of Christ and the saints. "In order that the king's ship might be recognized by the rest in the daytime, it carried at its topmast two square banners, and on its sails many beautiful paintings and sacred scenes. On its mainsail was painted a picture of the crucifixion, between the figures of the Virgin Mary and St. John the Evangelist, the whole enframed between the two pillars of Hercules which appear on the royal arms, together with the king's motto *Plus oultre*, written on a scroll twined around the said pillars. On the main topsail was painted a representation of the Holy Trinity, and at the mizzen that of St. Nicholas. On the foresail was a picture of the Virgin with her Child, treading on the moon, and surrounded by the rays of the sun, with a crown with seven stars above her head; and over it all there was painted the figure of St. James, the lord and patron of Castile, slaying the infidels in battle; and on the jib was the picture of St. Christopher. All these figures were painted on both sides of the said sails, for the reason that they are saints frequently called upon by those who are in peril or danger from the sea."¹ Other details were arranged on a scale correspondingly magnificent, and the contrast to the rude discomforts which awaited the young king during the first six months of his sojourn in Castile must have produced an ineffaceable impression.

For everything seemed to go wrong during the early days of that memorable visit. The pilots had intended to land in Biscay, and were deeply chagrined to discover when they first came in sight of the Spanish coasts that they were far to the westward, more than a hundred miles out of their course, off the little Asturian town of Villaviciosa. Natur-

¹ Laurent Vital, "Premier voyage de Charles-Quint en Espagne," in *Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas*, iii, p. 57.

ally no preparations had been made to receive the king, and when the expedition neared the shore the inhabitants mistook it for a raid by French or Turkish pirates. They retreated into the mountains, carrying with them their wives, children, and household goods; they armed and made ready for battle. Shouts of "Spain, it's the king" from the royal followers were not enough to convince them of their error; not till one of them "approaching covertly through the bushes and hedgerows recognized the arms of Castile on the banners of the new arrivals"¹ were their misgivings completely dissipated. When they learned the truth, they did their best to atone for their previous mistake, but their efforts in that direction failed to please. The men had no manners; the women were somewhat better in this respect, but their apparel scandalized the Flemings; few of them wore stockings, and their uncombed hair streamed down their backs. There were no proper buildings in which their distinguished guests could lodge. Most of the company had to sleep the first night on straw or open benches, and cook their first meals with their own hands. An impromptu bull fight, organized for their edification on the Monday morning, could not make them forget the difficulties of eating and sleeping. The whole neighborhood, moreover, was infested by the plague, and on Wednesday, the twenty-third, the king left Villaviciosa on his way southward. Till he reached Tordesillas, on November 4, he had a most dismal time. He was welcomed, with at least outward cordiality, at all the towns through which he passed; a bull fight invariably took place, and various delegations of the Castilian nobility arrived to pay their respects; but the lack of suitable quarters, of provisions, and, strangely

¹ Laurent Vital, "Premier voyage de Charles-Quint en Espagne," in *Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-Bas*, iii, p. 91.

enough, also of horses, made the occasion very different from the royal progresses to which Charles had been accustomed in the Netherlands. "For two hundred persons, lords, gentlemen, and gentlewomen," wrote Spinelly, "there were not forty horses, nor could any be procured, because in that mountainous country the principals goeth afoot, and the chief places were infected with the sickness. . . . The lack of victuals did compel the king to depart, and so the third day after his landing he took the journey toward Santander, and rode four days upon a hobby, the which I gave unto his Grace for fault of better. The most part of his company went afoot, and of the residue, the greater number rode upon pack horses; and as for the gentlewomen, many of them in carrettes, with oxen. Nevertheless, considering the surety and sweetness of the land, every man suffered it joyously in patience."¹

Charles's object in going to Tordesillas was to visit his mother, whom he had not seen for twelve years. His faithful follower Laurent Vital sought to be present at the interview by smuggling himself into the room as a torch bearer; but his intention was defeated by the king, who informed him that he preferred to remain in darkness. Vital has left us, however, an elaborate account of the whole affair, as related to him by eyewitnesses; and one may read much more between the lines. Political ambition rather than filial affection was the dominant note. Chièvres glided in and out of the chamber, and poured into the queen's ear the most glowing accounts of the political capacities of her son. He assured her that Charles could safely be trusted with the government, and that she need therefore concern herself about it no longer. In fact "he virtuously acquitted

¹ Laurent Vital, "Premier voyage de Charles-Quint en Espagne," in *Collection des Voyages des Souverains des Pays-*

Bas, iii, pp. 93 ff., and *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, no. 3705.

himself of his duty to advance his young master; for by his tactful and truthful representations, the affair was conducted so well that it would have been impossible to do better in the interests of the king and his countries in that part of the world."¹ Clearly it was the plan that the queen should be gently set aside, and her condition at the time doubtless justified this course. But whether the Spaniards, ignorant of the facts and prejudiced against Charles, could be made to see matters in the same light, was another question.

While at Tordesillas Charles received word of the death of Cardinal Ximenes, on November 8, at Roa, east of Valladolid, whither he had recently transferred his residence in order to be near the king. The correspondence that has come down to us between the regent and the royal court does not entirely bear out the traditional view that Chièvres did his utmost to keep Charles and the cardinal apart; and it seems clear that the king's "permission to retire," which has been handed down as a classical example of royal ingratitude, never actually reached Ximenes's hands.² Whatever the facts in regard to the cardinal's last days, it is no exaggeration to say that Charles owed him the preservation of his Spanish inheritance; no less devoted or less masterful a representative could have made possible the difficult transition from Trastámara to Hapsburg. Had the long looked for interview between king and regent ever actually taken place, the young monarch might well have been spared some of his gravest errors in the ensuing months.³ As it was,

¹ Vital, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 135-137.

² Cf. Häbler, p. 41, note, and references there; also Conde de Cedillo, *El Cardenal Cisneros*, pp. 339-373, and J. Vales Failde, *Carlos I no fué ingrato con Cisneros* (Madrid, 1918).

³ A paper of thirty-two 'instructions'

for the guidance of Charles, which Ximenes had drawn up and given to Adrian of Utrecht, sufficiently indicates the cardinal's point of view. It is printed in the *Semanario Erudito*, xx, pp. 237 ff. Cf. also Quintanilla, *Arche-tipo de Virtudes*, pp. 246 ff.

Charles met his first real test in the eyes of his Castilian subjects without any preparation or guidance except from his Flemish counsellors. It took place at Valladolid, which he entered on November 18 "in the midst of a most imposing cavalcade, and so richly accoutred that the burgesses confessed that no monarch so noble or so triumphant had ever entered there before."¹

The first two months of the king's stay in the old Castilian city were chiefly occupied with festivities, tournaments, and audiences to the principal grandees. Vital devotes many pages to a description of the ceremonies, descanting with evident pleasure upon the excellence of Charles's horsemanship, and his chivalrous bearing in the lists.² Outwardly, despite a few minor clashes, the impression he created was not unfavorable; but under the surface there were plenty of signs of approaching trouble. Amidst all the merrymaking a good deal of important business was being done, and much of it was of a nature to cause deep misgivings to those who knew the facts. There were numerous complaints that the king was inaccessible to his Spanish subjects, and that when he granted an audience he rarely uttered a word. For this Charles's linguistic limitations were doubtless chiefly responsible, but that only made the matter worse; his inability to converse in Spanish was taken by most of the Castilian magnates as a deliberate insult.³ Meantime the greed of Charles's Flemish followers aroused intense dissatisfaction. To the Spaniards it seemed as if it were their sole object to seize all the riches of the realm for purposes of their own. On the pretext that Ximenes "had done more damage in casting down the walls of the towns of Navarre than all his wealth amounted to," the king

¹ Vital, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 151.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 153-223.

³ When the interview was in Spanish,

the bishop of Badajoz acted as interpreter. Cf. C. E. Gossart, *Charles-Quint, Roi d'Espagne*, p. 63.

appropriated to his own use the sum of 212,000 ducats of gold, which the cardinal had left "to be given to the churches and his servants."¹ An attempt was made, with the consent of the Pope, to extort a tenth from the Castilian clergy; though the latter declined to pay, on the ground of the inadequacy of the reasons alleged, the episode did no good to the royal cause.² And it was not on money alone that the eyes of the foreigners were bent; political and ecclesiastical preferments were sought by them as well. Chièvres had himself made contador mayor of Castile, with a yearly salary of four thousand ducats.³ Adrian of Utrecht, who had joined the king soon after his arrival, was already bishop of Tortosa and cardinal.⁴ Worst of all, and most humiliating to Castilian pride, was the disposition of the primatial see of Toledo, "the crown of Spain and the light of the whole world, free from the time of the mighty Goths";⁵ for it was conferred on Guillaume de Croy, a youth of sixteen, the nephew of

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, no. 3937. It seems fitting that some estimate of the relative values of the commoner Spanish coins of the sixteenth century should be inserted at this point. A Spanish ducat contained 375 maravedis, an escudo (by royal order of the year 1537) 330, a peso de ocho reales (piece of eight, or Spanish dollar) 272. The bullion content of gold in a ducat was 3.485 grammes, or 2.32 times that of an American gold dollar. For further details cf. H. C. Lea, *History of the Inquisition of Spain*, i, pp. 560-566, and C. H. Haring, "American Gold and Silver Production in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century," in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, xxix, May, 1915, pp. 475-479. The question of the relative purchasing power of money at that period and today is one on which it is still impossible definitely to pronounce. There was of course an enormous difference between the prices of the early and those of the later years of the Emperor's reign. In my judgment it would

be safe to say that one could buy at least ten times as much on the average for the same amount of money in 1525 as in 1925. The list of prices for the year 1548, in Gómara, pp. 138-139, illustrates some of the difficulties of the problem; moreover, it must be remembered that the figures there given were compiled after prices had begun to rise, and in a place where everything was exceptionally high on account of the presence of the royal court.

² Peter Martyr, ep. devi.

³ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, no. 3874. The "omnipotence of Chièvres" (*ibid.*, no. 3801) elicited all sorts of hostile comments; as far as the average observer could see, the king counted for nothing. Cf. Sanuto, xxv, col. 426; also Santa Cruz, i, pp. 164 ff.

⁴ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, nos. 3212, 3495.

⁵ From Juan de Padilla's farewell letter to Toledo, as given by Sandoval, i, p. 356. Cf., however, below, p. 91, note 1.

Chièvres, who left Spain with Charles in the spring of 1520, but continued to enjoy the rich revenues of the archbishopric, until his death at Worms in the following January.¹ And while these jovial, comfortable Flemings gayly plundered Castile, they commented with evident amazement on the wretchedness and misery of the people they were impoverishing. "It is indeed the very truth," wrote Vital, "that I have seen several little children just born, who have been found, in the coldest winter season, lying on the ground, abandoned by their fathers and mothers, and in danger of being devoured by beasts, crying piteously from hunger and cold, in such fashion that it was most heartrending to see them lying there; and I cannot imagine how nature can permit their mothers, especially, thus to abandon their own flesh and blood, and to leave them in such want and misery."²

In January, 1518, the Castilian Cortes assembled at Valladolid, to swear allegiance to their new sovereign as lawful ruler of the kingdom. Besides the thirty-six delegates from the cities, the prelates and the nobles were also there; the representatives of the clergy numbered ten, while the aristocracy counted forty-eight.³ It was the procuradores, however, who proved themselves on this occasion to be the doughtiest champions of the privileges of the realm. At the preparatory session, which was presided over by the Burgundian chancellor Jean le Sauvage,⁴ they revealed the resentment which they had cherished for so long; through

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII.*, ii, no. 3874. The English envoy, Spinelly, even hoped to get "a good bishopric in Spain" for Cardinal Wolsey, as Chièvres was "so well disposed to him." *Ibid.*, no. 3605.

² Vital, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 181.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 223 ff. It seems clear, however, from the language of the proceedings of the Cortes, and of the contemporary Spanish authorities, that

the clergy and aristocracy were there independently, and not as a part of the national assembly.

⁴ Sauvage was never made chancellor of Castile, as many writers would lead us to suppose. Cf. Häbler, p. 45, note 1. The office of *cancillería mayor* of Castile had been annexed to the archbishopric of Toledo by the Catholic Kings, and was consequently held by the occupant of that see. Cf. Colmeiro, *Curso*, p. 546.

the mouth of Juan Zumel, one of the deputies of Burgos, they protested unanimously against the presence of foreigners at their deliberations as an invasion of their liberties and an insult to Castile. The session was hurriedly closed in order to prevent a violent scene, and on the following morning Zumel was sent for by the chancellor and threatened with death and confiscation of property as a stirrer up of sedition against the king. The deputy, however, was staunch. He insisted that he was legally justified in everything he had done, declared that Charles should not be recognized as king until he had sworn to observe all the laws of Castile,¹ and protested against the impoverishment of the realm by favorites and by foreigners. Heated discussion of these different points ensued during the next few days; but Zumel showed an admirable obstinacy, and finally gained the substance if not the form of his contentions. In return for recognition by a majority of the procuradores, the king, by the mouth of the bishop of Badajoz, swore respect, in a general way, for all the laws and customs of the realm. On the subject of the foreigners — the tenderest point of all — he was, perhaps, less specific than was desired; but with this single exception, the popular party had, on the whole, prevailed. A significant episode was the exhibition of petty irritation by the Castilian grandees over the fact that the procuradores had been suffered to precede them in the ceremony of swearing allegiance. It showed that the old class jealousies still persisted in Spain, in a manner that boded ill for united action in any common cause. It is probable that Charles and his advisers learned a lesson from what they saw; for it was by dividing the forces of their opponents that they subsequently overcame the revolt of the Castilian Comuneros.²

¹ Zumel was clearly wrong on the constitutional point here. Cf. Colmeiro, *Introd.*, i, pp. 61-62.

² *D. I. E.*, ii, pp. 334-337; Pero Mexia, *Historia*, pp. 77 ff.; Sandoval, i, pp. 85-87.

In accordance with immemorial custom, the procuradores at the closing session voted a servicio to the crown, and also presented a cuaderno of petitions. The subsidy on this occasion was six hundred thousand ducats, which was to be spread over a period of three years; the Catholic Kings, as Peter Martyr significantly remarks, were accustomed, when they demanded tribute, to be satisfied with two thirds of this sum.¹ The petitions preferred by the procuradores numbered eighty-eight, and most of them had appeared in the cuadernos of the preceding reigns. Such were the requests that the residencias of alguaciles, alcaldes, and other officials be regularly enforced, that the exportation of gold, of silver, and of horses be prohibited, that justice be administered alike for all the inhabitants of the realm, and that there should be no alienation of the property of the crown.² But intermingled with these familiar demands were certain others which, if not totally new, were at least endowed with a special significance by the unprecedented conditions which at that moment obtained. Such was the blunt request that no office of profit or emolument within the realm nor letter of naturalization be granted to foreigners, coupled with the plain hint that the will of the sainted Isabella had already been transgressed in this particular. The king was also asked to promise to send for the new archbishop of Toledo and to cause him to reside within the realm.³ He was moreover advised to marry at once in order to secure the succession in Castile; the Infante Ferdinand ought not to be suffered to leave the realm, pleaded the procuradores, until his Highness had had children.⁴ The king's inability to speak Spanish was severely commented upon; and it is interesting to observe that the procuradores

¹ Peter Martyr, ep. dcviii.

² Cortes, iv, pp. 264, 266, 269-271, 275.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 263 (pets. 5, 6).

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262 (pets. 2, 3).

clung resolutely to 'su Alteza' as the old traditional Spanish designation of royal rank, despite the king's obvious preference for 'su Magestad.' On this point indeed Charles's contentions were turned against himself, for the only time in the whole list of petitions that the procuradores made use of the title he desired was in referring, not to him, but to his mother Joanna.¹ Clearly the condition and treatment of the unfortunate queen was a constant source of perplexity to the popular representatives. There is evidence of a general belief that she was being kept prisoner under false pretences, as part of a black plot to deprive her of her royal rights. Was she really incapable of reigning herself, or was the tale of her insanity a sham in the interests of her unpopular son? The first of the eighty-eight petitions was a brave attempt to force the issue: "We beg your Highness at the outset," so it ran, "that the queen, our sovereign lady, be granted the retinue and establishment which her Majesty of right ought to have, as the queen and the ruler of these kingdoms." The royal reply was evasive; under the circumstances it could scarcely have been anything else, but the question was indubitably serious.² In the course of the previous ceremony of recognition, it had apparently arisen in another form with the stipulation that on all public documents Joanna's name should appear before her son's, and that if ever she should chance to regain her reason, he should abandon the government and permit her to reign in his stead.³ Charles doubtless realized, what his subjects only discovered two years later, that the condition of his mother was hopeless; but the many evidences that Castile pinned its faith on her recovery and return to power must have been a constant and unwelcome reminder that he was still regarded almost as a usurper in his new dominions.⁴

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 262 (pet. 1).

² *Ibid.*, p. 262.

³ Sandoval, i, p. 89.

⁴ On this and the preceding paragraph, cf. Santa Cruz, i, pp. 167 ff.

On March 22, the king bade good-by to Valladolid and took his way to the eastward into the realms of the Crown of Aragon.¹ On May 9 he made a solemn entry into Saragossa, where the Cortes were beginning to assemble.² The difficulties that awaited him there proved even greater than those which he had left behind. He made an excellent beginning by solemnly swearing on the day of his arrival to observe all the laws and privileges of Aragon; but he was much disappointed to find that after all he had done, there was grave hesitation about recognizing him as king.³ The claims of the Infante Ferdinand and the rights of his mother were openly discussed; it was remembered that the archbishop of Saragossa had recently returned "foaming with rage" from Tordesillas, where he had been forbidden to interview his half-sister the queen;⁴ every one was asking why Joanna was so carefully secluded. At the formal opening of the Aragonese Cortes an effort was made to impress the deputies with a sense of the greatness of Charles's prospects and power. His grandfather, it was represented, was the Holy Roman Emperor, the kings of Denmark and of Hungary were his brothers-in-law, those of England and Portugal his uncles, and the Pope was most favorably inclined. The attempt, however, fell painfully flat; for the present, at least, Aragon was far more interested in the maintenance of her privileges than in all the royal relationships in the world. Charles was finally recognized, conjointly with his mother, as lawful sovereign of the realm; a moderate subsidy of 200,000 ducats was also granted, but the atmosphere of Saragossa remained charged with discontent.⁵ A number of Castilians who had accompanied

¹ Vital, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 259.

² Foronda, p. 124.

³ Peter Martyr, epp. dxxvii-dxxviii.

⁴ *Ibid.*, ep. dcii.

⁵ Sandoval, i, p. 98; V. Blasco de Lanuza, *Historias Ecclesiasticas y Seculares de Aragon*, i, p. 154; D. J. Dormer, *Anales de Aragon*, pp. 84 ff. The

the king took serious offence at the attitude of the Aragonese ; that any one should resist the monarch that Castile had accepted was regarded by them as a deadly insult. A street fight ensued, in which Charles, after some difficulty, managed to reconcile the combatants. The episode was unquestionably instructive, like the quarrel over precedence between the nobles and burgesses at Valladolid ; but it increased, rather than diminished, the difficulties of the immediate situation. Worst of all was the effect of the avarice of the Flemings. Peter Martyr reverts to it again and again. "Regis facilitas in dando," "De avaritia Cancellarii," "Quot ducatorum miserit in Flandriam," "Collachrymatio super Rege devorato a suis," are typical phrases in his letters.¹ A fresh cause for the financial drain had been recently superadded to the greed of Charles's followers. Rumors of the approaching death of the Emperor Maximilian had already begun to fill the air ; an imperial election was imminent in the near future, and if Charles was to be chosen, the electors must be bribed. Francis I, the rival candidate, was already in the field ; even before Charles had reached Saragossa he had been obliged to send off a hundred thousand ducats into the empire to be used for the advancement of the interests of the house of Hapsburg.² It is doubtful if the Aragonese knew how the money was being spent, for they were traditionally blind to affairs which did not directly concern them ; the Flemings probably came in for more odium than they actually deserved. But the detestation of Charles's foreign advisers reached a pitch in Saragossa which it had never attained in Valladolid ; and it was doubt-

Aragonese were apparently even more careful to safeguard Joanna's rights than were the Castilians, and continued to speak of the reign of "D. Juana y

D. Carlos" until the queen's death in 1555. Cf. Dormer, p. 1.

¹ Peter Martyr, epp. dcxix, dcxxii, dcxxiii.

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, no. 4091.

less a stroke of good fortune for the king when Sauvage, who was popularly regarded as the greediest of them all, was carried off, on June 7, by the pestilence. His successor in the chancellorship was Mercurino Gattinara, an able and cosmopolitan Piedmontese, who has been justly characterized as "a fit minister for a heterogeneous empire."¹

The intractability of the Aragonese prolonged the king's stay in Saragossa far beyond the period he had expected to spend there. He had summoned the Catalan Cortes to assemble in Barcelona, on October 2, 1518; but as he was unable to leave Aragon till the end of the following January, the meeting was necessarily postponed. When he finally reached the Catalan capital, the representatives of the three estates took the line that he could neither swear nor be sworn to as the lawful sovereign, so long as his mother was alive; being men of "flesh and blood," however, they finally conceded the point at issue, and, on May 12, the required oath was given and received.² The Catalans were also determined not to be fleeced by the Flemings; indeed, they succeeded in turning the tables in this respect, and treated the foreigners to a dose of their own medicine. Sandoval informs us that they put Chièvres in such difficulties that he wished himself well out of Spain; many of the 'lesser Cerberuses'³ also, convinced that the Catalans were more than a match for them, deserted the king and flocked back to the Netherlands. But outside of these inevitable quarrels over procedure and finance, the general attitude of the Catalans was considerably less unfavorable to the king than that of the Castilians or the Aragonese. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, we may assume that Charles had learned something from his previous experience and avoided

¹ Häbler, pp. 52-53; Armstrong, i, p. 34. Cf. also below, p. 119, note 1.

² Sandoval, i, p. 104; Häbler, p. 55.

³ Peter Martyr, ep. dcxlv.

repeating some of his earlier mistakes. He was much more of a person than he had been when he landed in Castile; the retiring, inarticulate boy was becoming a man; he was no longer "spellbound under the ferule of Chièvres."¹ The traditional cosmopolitanism of the Catalans also counted for much. They may have insisted on the maintenance of their privileges, but they could appreciate an outside point of view. Moreover a piece of news had arrived while the king was on his way to Barcelona, which fixed every one's eyes on foreign affairs — the long expected word of the death of the Emperor Maximilian, which left Charles head of the house of Hapsburg and the logical candidate for the imperial succession.² Small wonder if the attention of the Catalans was diverted from their internal grievances by all these things. They already began to discern, what the mass of the Spaniards took much longer to realize, that the rule of this alien Fleming might have its glorious compensations; that if he failed to do his full duty by his different Spanish dominions, he might also conceivably give them a position of prominence and power which they never, under any other auspices, could have possibly attained. Here, in fact, were the first evidences of a gradual change of sentiment on the part of Spain towards Charles — the change which makes the early part of his reign so critical a period in the history of the Spanish Empire. It was many long years before it was complete. Charles's reputation and popularity in the peninsula were destined to fall much lower before they were retrieved; but he never forgot the comparatively sympathetic attitude of the Catalans at this early crisis in his career, and repaid it by the most scrupulous respect for the laws and customs of the principality throughout the remainder of his reign.³

¹ Peter Martyr, ep. dcccxxv.

² Santa Cruz, i, pp. 193 ff.

³ Cf. F. de Bofarull y Sans, "Predilección del Emperador Carlos V por los

Catalanes," in vol. v (1896) of *Memorias de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona*, pp. 315-434, especially pp. 321, 333.

It was not, however, by the territorial acquisitions of their youthful sovereign, but rather by his imperial prospects that the imagination of the Catalans was chiefly stirred. The former were perhaps still regarded as less of an asset than a liability, but there was every chance that the latter would prove a most desirable prize. The Hapsburg lands to which the king fell heir were Austria, and its dependencies in Styria, Carniola, Carinthia, and Tyrol, the family domains in northwestern Switzerland, and scattered territories along the upper Rhine. Spain had nothing in common with any of these different states — not even such economic ties as had kept her in touch with the Low Countries. Political association with them, through the possession of the same sovereign, was consequently undesirable from every point of view ; it meant that they all would necessarily suffer from the evils of royal absenteeism, not that they would effectively coöperate for the attainment of a common end. But the prospect that their sovereign might soon be proclaimed the temporal head of Christendom was one which few Spaniards could contemplate without emotion. Doubtless the vast majority of them had the haziest notion of the real significance of the imperial title ; but it appealed to their love of the grandiose, and seemed a fitting consummation of their achievements during the preceding reign. For the Castilians, it awakened memories of Alfonso the Emperor and of Alfonso the Learned ; for the Catalans and Aragonese, it revived the triumphs of Pedro the Great, and the glories that had been won by the monarchs of the house of Barcelona as heirs of the Hohenstaufen in their struggle with the popes. In view of the commanding position Spain had won under the Catholic Kings, the highest dignity in Christendom seemed no more than was her due. That Charles's election would mean war with France must have been evident to

all intelligent observers, but in view of the mediaeval traditions of the realms of the Crown of Aragon, and of the victories in Italy which had been won under the Catholic Kings, the Catalans were not likely to balk at that prospect. They had their grievances against their sovereign in 1519, and were still primarily interested in getting them redressed. They were alive to the danger that Charles's territorial inheritance in Central Europe might divert him from his responsibilities in the Iberian peninsula. But the imperial dignity had a fascination which they could not resist, and in general there can be little doubt that they hoped he would attain it.¹ Certainly no part of Spain was more favorable to his aspirations than cosmopolitan Barcelona; he was fortunate to be there during the critical months of the electoral contest.

The election, however, could not be won without money; and when Charles asked for money, the Catalans drew back. Even the imminent danger of the war with France could not make them see the necessity of liberal giving. "I do not believe," writes Peter Martyr, "that a single penny will ever reach the royal coffers";² and until long after the election was over and announced this gloomy forecast was literally fulfilled. For the necessary bribery that was accomplished at Frankfort, Charles was obliged to depend chiefly on the financial magnates of the empire; Spain's role in the whole contest was largely that of an interested spectator. Over and above the manipulation of the individual electors, of whom the archbishop of Mainz was at once the most influential and the most venal,³ the struggle hinged chiefly on the

¹ Peter Martyr, epp. dcxxxv, dcxl. On Martyr's detached attitude at the time cf. J. H. Mariéjol, *Pierre Martyr d'Anghera* (Paris, 1887), p. 109. Cf. also L. Pastor, *History of the Popes*, Engl. tr., vii, pp. 287-288, for contemporary

accounts of the boisterous rejoicings of the Spaniards in Rome when the news of the election was announced.

² Peter Martyr, ep. dcliv.

³ B. Greiff, *Was Kayser Carolus dem Vten die römisch küniglich Wal cost im*

attitude of Leo X. At the outset the chief object of the papal policy was to prevent the election of the king of Spain, whose territorial inheritance gave him such unquestioned predominance as to threaten the independence of the see of Rome. As the most promising means of attaining this end, Leo began by supporting the candidacy of Francis I; in the middle of April he believed that he had accomplished his purpose, and that Charles's failure was definitely assured. But that was by no means the whole of Leo's plan. He had made use of Francis to get rid of Charles, but he had no desire to see Francis elected. He was disturbed by the French king's preponderance in Northern Italy, which had been the immediate consequence of the battle of Marignano; having got what he wanted out of the Eldest Son of the Church, he was now anxious to cast him aside. Naturally Francis resented such treatment as this; in May he was at sword's points with his former ally; while Leo, on his part, had by this time become convinced that Charles stood a good chance of being elected after all — so good in fact that it might be unwise to oppose him. By the middle of June his change of front was complete; on the twenty-eighth the electors voted unanimously in Charles's favor; on July 6 the result was announced in Barcelona.¹ The sovereign of Spain was now also King of the Romans, and Holy Roman Emperor in everything but name; what is more, he had attained the coveted dignity with the open consent and approval of the papacy. Pope and Emperor, contrary to precedent, were now not at odds, but in alliance; and the new combination was to prove almost as significant

1520 Jar (Augsburg, 1869); B. Weicker, *Die Stellung der Kurfürsten zur Wahl Karls V.* (Berlin, 1900).

¹ Sanuto, *Diarii*, xxvii, col. 543; for the papal side of the story, see F. Nitti, *Leone X e la sua politica* (Florence,

1892), pp. 212-214; also L. Serrano, "Primeras Negociaciones de Carlos V con la Santa Sede," in vol. ii of the *Cuadernos de Trabajos* of the Escuela Española de Arqueología é Historia en Roma (Madrid, 1914), pp. 21-96.

for the development of the Spanish Empire as it was baleful to that of the German Reformation.

The moment the news of his election arrived, Charles was all impatience to depart for the Empire. The situation in Germany was very delicate. The coronation ceremony at Aix could not be indefinitely postponed. France was openly hostile. England's friendship was not certain. Everything demanded that Charles should leave Spain as soon as possible. The same day that he heard of his election at Frankfurt, rumor had it that he proposed to pass August in Valencia, thence proceed to Granada to hold his court, and that in March he would take ship for the Netherlands on his way to the Empire.¹ Clearly his responsibilities as a Spanish monarch were relegated to the background; for the past two years they had absorbed all his energies; but now, in turn, they must give way to greater things. The Spaniards were naturally quite unable to enter into this point of view. Each one of the different Iberian kingdoms doubtless felt that it had the best right to occupy the centre of the stage; but they were all united in resentment at Charles's obvious intention to leave the peninsula at the earliest opportunity. However great his outside responsibilities, they felt that they had received less than their share of his attention. They had wanted him to win the Empire in order to increase the dignity of Spain, but they had no mind to have Spain become the tail to the imperial kite.² Their standpoint, in other words, was the exact opposite of universal. Despite all the great events of the preceding reign, their interests were still primarily local and particularistic. If the king was to

¹ Sanuto, xxvii, col. 543.

² Significant in this connection is the Emperor's attempt to relieve the fears of his Spanish subjects by issuing, at Barcelona, on September 5, 1519, a "Real Provision . . . para que por anteponer el

título de Emperador al de Rey de España no se entendiese que perjudicaba á la libertad y exenciones de estos reinos." The same 'provision' was proclaimed on September 20 at Valladolid. *R. A.*, v (1875), pp. 225-226.

inherit the Empire, they insisted that it should be directed from Spain.

The way in which these sentiments found expression in Barcelona was well calculated to augment the impatience of the king. Taking advantage of all the elaborate technicalities of their system of parliamentary procedure, the Cortes continued to postpone their vote of funds. Charles could, of course, have sent them home at any moment after his formal recognition in the month of May, and was doubtless frequently tempted to do so; on the other hand, a dismissal without a grant would have created a precedent most undesirable for the crown. For six long months after the announcement of the election, the quarrel continued. Not until January, 1520, was the money voted, and even then it was but a beggarly 250,000 "pounds of Barcelona," scarcely enough to defray the expenses of the king's extended stay.¹ Only the unexpected arrival in the previous December of a present of Mexican gold from Hernando Cortés had availed to save Charles from bankruptcy.² It was the first real indication of the wealth of the Indies, a foretaste of the way in which the preponderance of the Hapsburgs in the Old World was to be supported by the resources which they could draw from the New. In the meantime a whole half-year had been wasted, and the foreign horizon had become increasingly dark. Charles's immediate presence in the Empire was now more indispensable than ever; if he delayed longer, he risked the loss of his paternal inheritance. Under the circumstances, his projected visit to Va-

¹ Bofarull, vii, p. 28.

² Peter Martyr, ep. del. and Baumgarten, i, p. 215, note; also, for a detailed description of the treasure, see F. A. MacNutt, *Letters of Cortes to Charles V.*, i, pp. 170-171; also Santa Cruz, i, pp. 210 ff. Still another account of the

treasure may be found in a curious little volume published in 1871 for the bookshop of F. Müller at Amsterdam with the very misleading title of *Trois lettres sur la découverte de Yucatan . . . écrites par les compagnons de . . . Grijalba, Mai, 1518*. Cf. note 3 to p. 474 below.

lencia had to be abandoned. Even before the dismissal of the Catalan Cortes his decision had been made. It was announced that he would despatch Adrian of Utrecht as his accredited representative to that kingdom, to swear to the observance of its laws and to receive the oath of allegiance of its representatives, while he took his way with all speed into Galicia to the nearest port of embarkation for the Netherlands and Germany.¹

The adventures of Adrian at Valencia form part of a new ramification of Spanish discontent, which may best be reserved for separate consideration; our principal interest is to follow the career of Charles. On January 23 he left Barcelona in hot haste for the westward; nineteen days later he once more trod Castilian soil at Calahorra,² whence he despatched summonses to the procuradores of the Castilian cities to assemble in Cortes at Santiago de Compostela on the twentieth of the following March.³ The moment that word of this action got abroad, a wave of furious indignation swept through the land. Castile had been primed for an explosion for many months. The mere fact that Charles had spent thrice as long in the realms of the Crown of Aragon as he had seen fit to accord to the western kingdom had been enough to maintain a smouldering discontent. That he now was returning only in order to depart again for the Empire simply served to fan the flames. The central and southern parts of the kingdom still remained unvisited. Valladolid was the only important Castilian city that had ever seen its king. And the summons of the Castilian Cortes to far-off Santiago was the crowning insult of all. There was no precedent whatever for a meeting place so remote, in a province without a city which sent representatives to the

¹ Peter Martyr, epp. dclxviii, dcli.

² Foronda, pp. 157-159.

³ Colmeiro, *Introd.*, ii, p. 103.

national assembly; and no possible cause for its selection, as the shrewder ones must have plainly seen, save the facilities which its remoteness afforded for bullying the procuradores, and its convenience to the Emperor's port of embarkation. Clearly the real object of calling the Cortes there was to get a fresh subsidy, despite the fact that the three years over which the preceding one was to be spread had not yet elapsed. The omission to send for the two upper orders proclaimed it, as did also, for that matter, the text of the summons to the procuradores; the anticipative use in that instrument of the title 'Emperor Elect' was also remarked on with profound dissatisfaction.¹ And the climax was capped by an act of executive despotism well calculated to subvert one of the most cherished privileges of the realm. For centuries the Castilian cities had been accustomed to regard the *poderes* or instructions which they gave to their procuradores as the surest guarantee of the maintenance of their liberties. By these *poderes* they prescribed the conduct of their representatives, and the attitude they were to adopt on all measures proposed by the crown. But Charles had had enough of the limitations of parliamentary tradition, and was resolved not to be delayed as he had been in Barcelona. He therefore drew up and sent out to the Castilian cities a specimen of the *poderes* they were to give to their procuradores; and this specimen sanctioned compliance in the fullest possible manner with whatever it should please the monarch to propose. The manoeuvre promised to end all opposition; the king would have not only a docile assembly, but also every advantage in the unlikely event of resistance.²

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 242-243.

² Colmeiro, *Introd.*, ii, pp. 103 ff.; Cortes, iv, pp. 288-290; Sandoval, i,

pp. 140 ff.; Mexia, *Historia de Carlos Quinto*, pp. 112 ff.; Gossart, *Charles-Quint, Roi d'Espagne*, pp. 85 ff.

Throughout the long journey from Calahorra to Santiago Charles encountered constant evidences of the popular displeasure. An eight days' stay at Burgos signally failed to conciliate the inhabitants, who were not nearly so gratified at the royal visit, as resentful at the fact that it had been so long postponed; there were the usual festivities and outward rejoicings, but there was also an undercurrent of deep discontent.¹ It was at Valladolid, however, where the king spent the first four days of March, that the hostility of the people was most plainly manifest. An effort to elicit from the local magnates a formal approval of his intended departure was met with a courteous but decided refusal. The fact that it was through Chièvres that the appeal was made brought the financial side of the question prominently to the fore. Once more the cry went up that the realm was being impoverished by favorites and foreigners.² Orators recalled the ruinous expense and inglorious ending of the imperial adventure of Alfonso the Learned. They demanded that the king be compelled to stay in Spain. Six thousand armed men collected in the streets. Chièvres and the Flemings were threatened with death. Serious violence, however, did not actually occur. The king got away in a pouring rain to Tordesillas, at the cost of a scuffle with some hot spirits who attempted to shut the city gates. After his departure the uprising evaporated in sullen grumbling, and prophecies that the lowering skies boded ill for the future of the realm. The arrival of envoys from imperial Toledo, with a plea for methodical and united action, also served to

¹ A. Salvá, *Burgos en las Comunidades de Castilla* (Burgos, 1895), pp. 52-60.

² Sandoval, i, p. 141, tells us that it was not unusual for a Fleming in those days to address a Spaniard as "My Indian," since the Indians did not give as much gold to the Spaniards as did

the Spaniards to the Flemings. A common street-cry of the time was

"Doblon de à dos norabuena estedes,
Pues con vos no topò Xevres."

Cf. also P. de Alcocer, *Relación de Algunas Cosas*, ed. Sociedad de Bibliófilos Andaluces (Seville, 1872), p. 37.

divert the popular energies into calmer channels. The Toledans had already perceived what the mass of the Castilians were unable to comprehend, that no amount of local, uncoördinated uprisings could possibly effect anything; that riots were the enemy of orderly revolution. They were aiming, in fact, at the organization of a national revolt, fully realizing that anything short of this was predestined to fail. Had they not partially and temporarily succeeded in this endeavor, the movement in all probability would have ended in nothing. Had they wholly and permanently accomplished their purpose, it is doubtful if Charles could have retained his throne.¹

It was on March 26 that Charles finally arrived at Santiago; on the thirty-first the Cortes were formally opened in the monastery of San Francisco. A count of the procuradores revealed the fact that the representatives of Toledo were not in attendance, but had remained in the offing in order to organize the opposition; such was the method with which the imperial city elected to show its displeasure at Charles's high-handedness in the matter of the *poderes*. Salamanca sent her procuradores to the assembly with their instructions made out, *more antiquo*, in flat defiance of the royal mandate. The other cities outwardly complied with the king's demand for blanket powers, but many of them secretly forbade their representatives to sanction any service unless they could extort concessions in return.² Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, now bishop of Palencia, announced the reason for the summoning of the assembly. "Now is returned the ancient glory of Spain," he declared, "as in the days when the old writers said of her that while other nations sent tributes to Rome it was her happy lot to send emperors. She

¹ Mexia, pp. 115-126; Sandoval, i, pp. 140 ff.; Gossart, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 ff.

² Gossart, pp. 93 ff., and references there.

sent Trajan, Hadrian, and Theodosius, and now the Empire has come to seek an Emperor in Spain, and by God's grace our Spanish king is made King of the Romans and Emperor of the world." ¹ Under the circumstances, he continued, it was imperative that Charles should depart at once; he was desperately in need of money for his journey, for his coronation, and the defence of his realms; and the bishop demanded a new *servicio* equal to that which had been granted at Valladolid. The king then followed up the argument of his minister to the best of his ability, expressing his regret at being obliged to leave, promising to return within three years at the latest, and swearing to confer no more offices on foreigners. Doubtless both speeches were meant to be conciliatory, but the temper of the *procuradores* augured ill for the royal cause. The Salamancans had to be excluded from the meetings because of the uncompromising hostility of their attitude; the recalcitrant Toledans, after a collision with Chièvres, retired into the interior of Castile to spread trouble and raise troops. Meantime within the walls of the assembly everything centred on the vote of the *servicio*. Should it be granted without compensating guarantees, or should it be postponed until the king had made concessions? The latter course was warmly advocated by the deputies of Leon and Cordova, and the majority of the rest gradually rallied to their support. ² The king saw that the cards were going against him, but was more than ever resolved to get his grant before he sailed. As the easiest way of gaining time, and also of removing the *procuradores* one step further from their constituents, he announced, on April 4, that the Cortes would be transferred from Santiago to Corunna, his port of embarkation, and that they would assemble there on the twenty-second. ³

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 295.

² *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 307-308.

³ Gossart, p. 96.

The king and his advisers made the most of the interval between the sessions to bring influence to bear on the individual procuradores. There was apparently no attempt at intimidation, but the resources of bribery were utilized to excellent effect. The procuradores of Cuenca were brought into line by a promise of 50,000 and 60,000 maravedis each, as a charge on the servicio to which they were asked to consent; one of the representatives of Valladolid was similarly won over by a gift outright of 300 ducats.¹ When the Cortes reassembled, these favors were followed up by a speech from the new chancellor Gattinara, in which several important fresh concessions were announced. In deference to the request of the procuradores, he promised that the export of horses and of gold should cease, that no offices within the realm should be conferred on foreigners during Charles's absence, and that a suitable representative, "of sufficient authority and dignity, and zealous for the service of God, of the king, and of these kingdoms," should be left to carry on the government in his place.² The effect of these manoeuvres was not slow to make itself felt. The deputies were wearied of debate and had lost much of their earlier confidence. On April 24 the servicio was duly voted, to be spread over three years like that of 1518, with collections to begin in 1521, when the term of its predecessor had fully expired.³ Reassured on this essential point, Charles made the definite announcement, which had hitherto been discreetly withheld, that the person whom he had selected to govern in his absence was Adrian of Utrecht, his Flemish tutor and confidential adviser, who had been in Spain for more than four years, and who had recently been delegated as his master's representative to receive the oaths of the kingdom of Va-

¹ Gossart, p. 98; Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 331 ff.

² *Cortes*, iv, pp. 309-310.

³ *Ibid.*, iv, p. 312.

lencia.¹ Various limitations, it is true, were imposed upon Adrian's powers with the idea of making him more acceptable to the mass of the Spaniards;² but the general effect produced by his appointment was to destroy all the value of the concessions that had been granted before. It showed that the king's word could not be trusted. It was a flagrant violation of his recent promise that no office should be conferred upon a foreigner during his absence. It was a parting shot with an incendiary shell. To the outraged feelings of his Spanish subjects, however, Charles and his advisers paid little heed. He had got his grant and was now all on fire to depart. Unfavorable winds delayed him until May 20, when, after confessing and hearing mass, he set sail with Gattinara, Chièvres, and the rest of the Flemings, and a handful of Spanish grandees.³ Revolution had already started before he was out of sight of land; but others were to bear the brunt of it and suppress it for him in his absence. Luis Hurtado de Mendoza summed up the situation admirably, when he remarked that the martyrdom of Adrian had begun.⁴

Castile was not the only portion of Spain that was seething with discontent at the time of the king's departure. Another uprising of wide ramifications was already under way in Valencia. The origin of this disturbance lay in the jealousy and hatred of the artisans and laboring classes of the capital of the kingdom towards the richer burgesses and lower nobility; it was not until much later that it was

¹ Peter Martyr, ep. cclxx.

² Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 335 ff.

³ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 224 ff., *passim*.

⁴ C. von Höfler, *Der Aufstand der castilianischen Städte gegen Kaiser Karl V.*, p. 68, calls him "Lopez Hurtado de Mendoza," but this is evidently a mistake. Luis Hurtado de Mendoza was the third count of Tendilla and second

marquis of Mondéjar, elder brother of the first viceroy of Mexico and of the great Diego Hurtado de Mendoza; he is described as "el primer hombre destos reynos que puso mano a la espada para defenderlos de los rebeldes." Cf. Mémoire [du] Marquis de Mondéjar in Morel-Fatio, *L'Espagne au XVI^e et au XVII^e Siècle*, p. 58.

affected by the attitude of the crown. It arose in the spring of the year 1519, soon after Charles reached Barcelona, as a result of military preparations for defence against a squadron of Moorish pirates which had appeared off the Valencian coasts.¹ Martial exercises and the possession of arms endowed the industrial classes of the capital with a spirit of aggressiveness and self-confidence, which was measurably increased by the withdrawal into the country of many of the more prominent citizens and lesser nobles on account of the ravages of the plague. The masses were temporarily left in control, and as the expected Turkish attack did not take place, they turned their energies to the assertion of their own power. In August, 1519, a clash occurred on the occasion of the public punishment of a number of sodomites, when the violent denunciations of the public preacher had stirred the popular feelings to the highest pitch of excitement. A cry was raised for the death in the flames of several culprits who had been let off with lighter punishments. Men rushed for their arms and fell into ranks; and as the sole means of preventing a serious disturbance the royal governor insisted that the populace immediately disband, give up their weapons, and return to their homes. This demand evoked the most violent opposition. The Valencian masses regarded their right to drill and bear arms as an inalienable privilege. They formed themselves into a *Germanía* or brotherhood for the purpose of maintaining it; and finally, as the obvious means of gaining legal justification for their acts, they appealed, over the head of the royal governor, to the king himself, for a formal confirmation of their military organization.²

¹ There are several interesting letters from Charles to the Valencian estates on this matter in R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-18, fols. 69 ff. They were written in the first half of July, 1519.

² On this paragraph, cf. Sandoval, i, pp. 106-107; Peter Martyr, epp. deli ff.; M. Danvila y Collado, *La Germanía de Valencia*, pp. 62 ff. Charles had written a letter to the governor about

This appeal reached Charles in Catalonia at the very moment that he was coming to the decision that he could not afford time to visit Valencia in person; and it gave him an opportunity of which he promptly sought to take advantage. It was clear that the Valencian nobles would fight to the last ditch against any project to recognize the king, unless he were present in the flesh; the clergy were neutral on the question; everything depended on the attitude of the third estate. In exchange for a promise from the deputies of the *Germanía* to do their utmost to influence the popular representatives to favor the recognition of Charles in his absence, the king, on November 4, yielded to their petitions for the confirmation of their military organization and reversed the decree of his representative on the ground. On their return to Valencia, the emissaries were naturally accorded a triumphal reception, and the popular party proceeded to clinch its victory by choosing a central committee of thirteen members, representing the principal guilds and handicrafts of the capital, to direct and coördinate the energies of the *Germanía*, and exercise authority as its representative. It did not have to wait long for an opportunity to use its powers. It had, in fact, been scarcely elected before word was received that, owing to the representations of the royal governor, the king had changed his mind, and on January 4 had decreed that the popular party should disband its forces. The *Germanía* was in no mood to put up with such tampering as this. Its members regarded themselves as the victims of aristocratic oppression, to which they were firmly resolved to put an end. At the instigation of the Thirteen, another deputation was sent to the king, to demand a reconfirmation of the popular organi-

the suppression of the 'alboroto' on September 9, 1519; it is to be found in R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-18, fol. 93.

zation, and permission to continue to drill and to bear arms. When it reached the court Charles was prepared to consent to anything, provided it would serve to accelerate his departure. He was irritated at the stiff-neckedness of the aristocracy, and impressed by the importunities of the popular representatives. At Fraga, on January 31, 1520, on his way back to Castile, he once more altered his verdict, and granted the *Germanía* the recognition it demanded.¹

The spectacle of royal vacillation which Charles had given reacted most unfavorably on Adrian of Utrecht, who had been despatched as his representative to the Valencian estates on the eve of the king's departure from Barcelona. Adrian's instructions were, at all costs, to gain recognition for his master by the Valencian Cortes, and if possible to extort a subsidy; but the attitude he was to take on the question of the hour — that of the recognition of the *Germanía* — had been left undefined. In the presence of the three estates of the realm, he cut a sorry figure. The attitude of the assembly was frankly hostile; and Adrian increased rather than diminished his difficulties by solemnly producing a copy of the Scriptures, on which Charles had sworn to observe the laws of Valencia, and exhibiting to the Cortes the page which the king had touched when he pronounced the oath. Instead of creating an impression, the episode evoked shouts of laughter. "Does the prince think we are such poor Christians that we have no Bible in the realm?" called out one of the deputies. "He should not hold us in such low esteem!"² After such a scene as this, it was painfully evident that Adrian's mission was bound to fail; the recognition which Charles had sent him to gain was flatly refused. Meantime, outside the walls of the

¹ Danvila y Collado, *La Germanía*, pp. 194-196.

² Peter Martyr, epp. delvii-delviii; Gossart, pp. 76-77.

assembly, the Germanía for the time being dominated the situation. The nobility and the wealthier citizens were violently hostile, but in view of Charles's edict of January 31, it was impossible for Adrian consistently to oppose it; moreover his irritation against the aristocracy, who had been chiefly responsible for his failure in the Cortes, tended to make him favor the popular party. On February 21, the gilds, 8000 strong, paraded before him with banners and music, in significant celebration of the victory they had won. Three months later, by the revival of an ancient ordinance of the reign of Pedro the Great, which had been revoked after a life of only five years, they managed to possess themselves of two of the six places on the municipal council of the capital of the kingdom.¹ News of the situation, however, had reached Charles long before this latest triumph of the Germanía, and showed him that vigorous measures were indispensable to the maintenance of authority and order. The regular royal governor in Valencia was a nonentity. The king's special agent, Adrian of Utrecht, had failed, and was, moreover, badly needed in Castile. Clearly another representative of different qualifications must be sent out at once. On April 10, the king's choice was announced. It fell on Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Melito, a valiant soldier and comrade of the Great Captain, with a magnificent record in the Italian wars.² His instructions were to avoid, if possible, an open conflict; yet it was evident that Charles had again turned against the Germanía, and that if it proved impracticable to deal with it peacefully, the viceroy was expected to use force; in fact, one of the

¹ Danvila y Collado, *La Germanía*, pp. 72, 405 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 73-75, 196-197; also R. A. H., Salazar Mss. A-18, fols. 136-148, 161-163, 167-178, 196, 199 ff., 214-227; A-19, fols. 123 ff. This man was

the illegitimate son of Cardinal Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza, archbishop of Seville (1474-82) and of Toledo (1483-95), and second cousin once removed of Luis Hurtado de Mendoza. Cf. above, p. 52, note 4.

Valencian representatives at Corunna, rightly appreciating the significance of Mendoza's military qualifications, reported that his appointment would be the ruin of the popular cause. The Germanía, however, as the sequel will show, was not to be intimidated by Mendoza's authority. In Valencia as well as in Castile, at the moment of Charles's departure for Germany, the fires of rebellion were already lighted.¹

Charles certainly left Spain in 1520 more unpopular than when he entered it in 1517. His first visit to the peninsula had increased and not allayed the many misgivings which had been aroused among the Spaniards by his early life and paternal inheritance. It had convinced them of what they had only suspected before, that he was essentially a foreigner in outlook, aspirations, and policy. Such enthusiasm as had been aroused by the fact that a Spanish king had been chosen to succeed to the throne of the Caesars had been obliterated by the course of events which followed Charles's departure from Barcelona. Imperial glories were all very well, but the maintenance of the national privileges and liberties took the precedence of them. Charles's inability to speak Spanish, his unimpressive aspect, and his apparent subserviency to the greedy Flemings were doubtless chiefly responsible for the prevalent hostility; but on the other hand, it could plausibly be argued that Spanish narrowness and provincialism were also much to blame, and that if the Spaniards could be induced to adopt the larger point of view, which was indicated by their achievements under the Catholic Kings, they would soon come to a better understanding and appreciation of their new monarch. Such, at least, was the opinion of one of Charles's fellow travellers from Corunna to the Netherlands in the spring of 1520; and he whiled away the

¹ On this and the preceding paragraphs, cf. Santa Cruz, i, pp. 214 ff.

weary hours of the voyage northward in an attempt to set forth his views in writing for the benefit of the Spanish people. A few words about this author and the arguments he produced will not be out of place.

His name was Georg Sauermann; he was born in Breslau, probably in 1492, the scion of a family of substance and of education. He studied in Wittenberg, Leipzig, and finally in Bologna, where he devoted himself chiefly to jurisprudence and the humanities, and was famous for the excellence of his Latin style. In 1517 he was made rector of the University there — an unusual honor for a man only twenty-five years of age — and distinguished himself by his prompt suppression of a violent quarrel between the German and North Italian students; in the course of this affair he became acquainted with Ulrich von Hutten, who was the spokesman of the Teutonic faction. During the next year his reputation as a Latinist mounted so high that he found a welcome at the court of Pope Leo X. In the meantime his political views, which had always been most favorable to the house of Hapsburg and its imperialistic pretensions, reached full development. The spectacle of Italy, parcelled out among petty tyrants and foreign potentates, was most painful to him. He was fully alive to the Turkish peril. Some approach to a universal monarchy under Hapsburg leadership seemed to him to be the only solution of these and other problems of the day. He rejoiced in the succession and election of Charles, because they made Spain and her vast dominions a part of the combination for whose triumph he so ardently longed; and Leo, who knew his opinions and was now hand and glove with the young Emperor, sent him over to Spain with the highest recommendations, as a desirable addition to the royal and imperial court.¹

¹ G. Bauch, "Ritter Georg Sauermann," in *Zeitschrift des Vereins für*

Geschichte Schlesiens, xix, pp. 146-181.

We do not know the exact date of Sauermann's arrival in Spain, but we may be certain that he had ample opportunities to become acquainted with the state of feeling in the country before his departure with Charles from Corunna, in May, 1520. He saw that the views of the mass of the Spaniards were such as would effectively prevent them from fitting into the great schemes of a universal Hapsburg monarchy on which his hopes were centred. He realized, in fact, that Charles would be fortunate if a revolution did not speedily break out in his Iberian dominions. Nothing short of a radical change of opinion in Spain would serve to avert the catastrophe which seemed imminent, and it was in the hope of contributing to such a change that Sauermann, on his northward voyage across the bay of Biscay, set himself to the composition of a brief treatise which he called the *Hispaniae Consolatio*.¹ This treatise, which was published in the following August at Louvain in the Netherlands, is dedicated to the imperial councillor, Pedro Ruiz de la Mota, and is addressed to the Spanish people. It warns them to desist from their grumblings and complaints over local grievances, and seeks to prove that Charles's journey to the Empire was for the best interests of Spain as well as of all his other kingdoms and indeed of all Christendom. He was not leaving the peninsula for his own amusement, it insisted—but in order to assume the imperial title, to which he proposed to give a deeper meaning and significance than it had possessed for generations. He was going in order to create a universal monarchy through which he, as kings of kings, would put an end to war between Christian states,² and unite them all in

¹ There is a copy of this book in the Harvard College Library, but I have never been able to find any trace of it anywhere else. It contains twenty-four small quarto folios. The author's name is Latinized as Georgius Sauromannus.

² "Nempe proficiscit ut delati et suscepti imperii munus expleat, hoc et ut tandem orbem terrarum concordia uno Imperio, uno sceptro conjungat. . . . Siquando similitates et controversiae, quae cottidie variae et acerbissimae

a victorious onslaught upon the infidel. Sauermann pictured, in fact, a sort of super-state under Hispano-German leadership, and demanded that the Spaniards should rouse themselves to an appreciation of the glorious future which had so suddenly and providentially been placed within their reach.

The whole argument of the *Hispaniae Consolatio* rested on the doctrine of a higher internationalism and an all embracing empire. Spain was not asked to let her king go for the sake of Germany, but rather for the welfare of Christendom; the universal rather than the specifically Teutonic attributes of the exalted position which Charles had been called to assume were emphasized throughout the entire treatise. And it must be remembered that this conception had many ardent supporters in the first half of the sixteenth century. Despite the recent development of strong independent states, the mediaeval ideal of a world empire still possessed a tremendous hold on men's imaginations. Charles himself, at that stage of his development, unquestionably believed in it.¹ Doubtless the motives that inspired this belief were primarily dynastic. The principles of nationalism were essentially opposed to the enormous preponderance which fortunate marriages had given to his house; only by turning men's thoughts in anti-nationalistic directions could that position of preponderance possibly be maintained. But it was quite unjust to assume, as the average Spaniard did in 1520, that Charles's departure meant that he preferred Germany to Spain. If they could have seen some of the complaints subsequently addressed to him by his Teutonic subjects that he was ruling the Empire in the interests of

inter caeteros reges suboriunt, incid-
erint, ille potentior, veluti arbiter, et
disceptorar [sic for disceptator] protinus
intercedat, res dubias componat, sur-

gentia bella reprimat." Sauromannus,
Hispaniae Consolatio, pp. 13, 29.

¹ Walther, pp. 150-151.

Spaniards, they might have been brought to a realization of their mistake. Charles regarded the imperial dignity not as something primarily German, but rather as a token of his leadership of the Christian world.¹ Of all the states over which he held sway he really felt himself at home in only one — in the Low Countries, where he had been born and bred. Outside of that, he had for the present no preference at all ; and in later years, when his schemes of universal monarchy met with insuperable opposition, it was from Spain that he derived the most effective support ; it was to Spain that he finally retired to die. But the road to that great reconciliation was long and full of turnings. Spain had to make one more bid to maintain the old ways before she was prepared to adopt the new ; and Charles had to give more tangible proofs than the diatribe of Sauermann that his journey into the Empire would redound to the advantage of Spain. The next two years saw the beginning of the fulfilment of both these conditions. While revolution broke out and was suppressed in the peninsula, Charles vindicated his claims to the leadership of Christendom in a manner which obliterated most of the bitter memories of his first visit, and evoked warm sympathy and admiration from the hearts of his Spanish subjects.

¹ Bauch, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

NOTE ON THE GENERAL AUTHORITIES ON THE REIGN OF CHARLES V IN SPAIN

Guides to the Archives and Bibliographies. — The names of the standard published catalogues of the manuscript collections in Spain and elsewhere will be found in sections v and vi (pp. 203 ff.), of vol. i of R. Foulché-Delbosc and L. Barrau-Diigo, *Manuel de l'Hispanisant* (New York, 1920). The student of the Emperor's reign will also find it well worth while to consult pp. 61–421 of the third volume of F. de Laiglesia's *Estudios Históricos*, where he will find a list of the documents referring to the history of Charles V that have been printed in the *Documentos Inéditos*, and also whole or partial indices of those on the same field which still remain in manuscript form in the archives at Simancas, in the Escorial, in the Sección de Manuscritos of the Biblioteca Nacional, in the Salazar collection of the Real Academia de la Historia, in the private library of the king of Spain, and in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris. In several cases these indices are little more than copies of the apposite items from such catalogues as those of Julián Paz for Simancas and A. Morel-Fatio for the Fonds Espagnol in the Bibliothèque Nationale; still it is convenient to have even partial indications of the manuscript material on the Emperor's reign assembled together in a single place.

In addition to the appropriate sections of the bibliographies of B. Sánchez Alonso and R. Ballester, described in the Preface, there is a list of the different published works on the Emperor's reign in F. de Laiglesia, *Estudios Históricos*, iii, pp. 11–60; the same list also appears in the *Boletín de la R.A.H.*, lv, pp. 520 ff. Though unmethodical in arrangement and inaccurate in detail, it contains certain items not elsewhere to be found; none of its titles or statements, however, should be accepted without careful verification. A. Morel-Fatio's *Historiographie de Charles-Quint* (première partie, Paris, 1913) is a model of the very best French historical scholarship. It gives learned and painstaking analyses of the works of the eight official Spanish *cronistas* of the Emperor's reign, of the histories of Jovius, and of the writings of four lesser Italian historians of the time; it contains useful corrections and amplifications of the comments of earlier critics of these authors (e.g., Leopold von Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, iii, pp. 382–383); it also gives the Portuguese text and French translation of Charles's own Memoirs. It thus goes far to render supererogatory any discussion of the standard sources and contemporary authorities on the Emperor's reign.

Contemporary Writers. — To this last statement, however, there are, over and above such well known collections as Karl Lanz's *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V.* (Leipzig, 1844-46, 3 vols.), his *Staatspapiere zur Geschichte des Kaisers Karl V.* (Stuttgart, 1845), and Charles Weiss's *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle* (Paris, 1841-52, 9 vols.), which it does not seem worth while to enumerate here) three notable exceptions. The first is the *Crónica del Emperador Carlos V* (to 1551, and there are also a few scattering notices of the events of that year) by the royal cosmógrafo mayor, Alonso de Santa Cruz, written before November 10, 1551; of this three volumes, carrying the story to the beginning of the year 1539, were first published by the Real Academia de la Historia in 1920, 1921, and 1922. Morel-Fatio devotes five pages (100-104) of his *Historiographie* to a discussion of Santa Cruz and of his different writings, and reminds us that Ranke, who saw a manuscript copy of the *Crónica* in Rome, discovered that it was utilized by Sandoval. Morel-Fatio himself, who apparently never saw the original, rightly surmises that it contains no startling revelations; it is, however, a thorough and well balanced account of the Emperor's reign, by one who was in an excellent position to know the facts, and became official chronicler under Philip II. Like most of the historical works of the period, it is chiefly devoted to narrative history and the description of diplomacy and campaigns; nevertheless it is no exaggeration to say that it is the best contemporary general account of the reign that has come down to us. That it should have remained unprinted for so long is really remarkable; its publication by the Real Academia de la Historia marks an epoch in the study of the history of the period. Next comes the *Tratado de las Campañas y otros Acontecimientos de los Ejércitos del Emperador Carlos V desde 1521 hasta 1545*, by the Cordovan soldier Martin García Cerezeda (ed. by the Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, 1873-76, 3 vols.). It is, as its title implies, a primarily military chronicle, by one who witnessed and participated in many of the events he describes. It is deficient in literary quality, and makes no pretence at orderly arrangement or philosophical analysis, but it is full of color and vividness. I have found it particularly valuable for the campaign against Tunis. Finally, there is the *Anales de Carlos Quinto* by Francisco López de Gómara, better known as the historian of the Indies and of the Barbarossas, which I first published in 1912, only a few months before the appearance of Morel-Fatio's book, and which is consequently noticed but incidentally therein. Written before December, 1558, it gives the appearance of being rather a set of notes than a finished product; but as a contemporary epitome of important

events, and also as an index of Spanish opinion thereon, I have found it of the highest value.

Later Works. — At the head of this category stands the *Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos V.* (Valladolid, 1604–06, 2 vols., and Antwerp, 1681) by the Benedictine Prudencio de Sandoval (1553–1620), bishop of Pamplona, and in 1591 official historiographer of the crown of Castile. It has been well described as a “vaste reservoir où ont afflué des sources d’origines et de qualités très diverses, qui s’y sont confondues et perdues, et où depuis trois siècles on pêche, c’est le cas de le dire, en eau trouble” (Morel-Fatio, *Historiographie*, p. 10). Its compiler was a partisan Castilian nationalist, violently antisemitic, and equally capable of the most bare-faced plagiarism, and of deliberately altering the statements of those writers whom he copied, in case they conflicted with his own ideas. The amount of material that it contains (much of it unavailable elsewhere) renders the *Vida y Hechos* invaluable to all students of the Emperor’s reign; but it should be used with care, and never be treated (as some historians of the period have done) as if it were a contemporary authority. From Sandoval on, the list of general works on the Emperor goes down, through the well known seventeenth- and eighteenth-century biographies of Gregorio Leti and William Robertson, to such modern authorities as the very detailed *Geschichte Karls V.* (to 1539) by H. Baumgarten (Stuttgart, 1885, 1888, 1892, 3 vols.) and the two brilliant volumes of Edward Armstrong, *The Emperor Charles V.* (London, 1902). It seems scarcely worth while to analyze these works in detail, or to enumerate such books as those of Henne, de Leva, and Pirenne, which treat primarily of the Emperor’s activities outside of Spain: those who are specially interested will find adequate information concerning them in Eduard Fueter’s *Histoire de l’historiographie moderne*, or in the standard historical reviews. But it is impossible to close the list of modern works on the Emperor’s reign as a whole without paying tribute to the painstaking thoroughness of Manuel de Foronda y Aguilera’s *Estancias y Viajes del Emperador Carlos V.*, put forth, in its final form, in 1914 — the product of many years of laborious research. It gives the place in which Charles was every day of his life, and cites references in support of wellnigh every statement that it makes. These references do not invariably inspire implicit confidence; but the work is so much fuller and better than anything of the kind that has preceded it, that all students of the reign will find it exceedingly useful.

Two recent books, one by a German, the other by a Spanish historian, are devoted to the reign of the Emperor in Spain. The first,

by Konrad Häbler, bears the title of *Geschichte Spaniens unter den Habsburgern*, Erster Band (Gotha, 1907), and is in reality the continuation of the *Geschichte Spaniens* to 1516, in seven volumes, edited by Heeren and Ukert (1831-1902) and written by F. W. Lembke (vol. i), by H. Schäfer (vols. ii and iii), and by F. W. Schirrmacher (vols. iv-vii). The author's verdicts are too favorable to Charles, whom he represents as striving manfully to educate his backward Spanish subjects to higher standards and broader outlooks than they had ever known before, and the book is marred by numerous misstatements and errors of detail; with these reservations, however, it can be used to great advantage. Of the same general school, and unfortunately far more inaccurate as to facts, is the above mentioned *Estudios Históricos (1515-1555)* of the late Francisco de Laiglesia, first published in a single volume in 1908, and subsequently in three volumes in 1918-19. None of its statements should be accepted without careful verification, but the many documents which it cites are, for the most part, accurately transcribed, and give the work a certain value.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE TO CHAPTER XXI

See notes at the end of Chapter XX, *ante*, and XXII, *infra*, and add :

Sources. — F. Jimenez de Cisneros, *Cartas*, edd. P. de Gayangos and V. de la Fuente (Madrid, 1867), and *Cartas de los Secretarios del Cardenal . . . Jimenez durante su Regencia*, ed. V. de la Fuente (Madrid, 1875); "Apéndice de Documentos" to the "Crónica de los Barbarrojas," by F. López de Gómara, in *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 441 ff.; *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII* (cited in the footnotes as *L. & P. Hen. VIII*), ed. by J. S. Brewer, vols. ii and iii (London, 1864-67); Peter Martyr Anglerius, *Opus Epistolarum* (Amsterdam, 1670); Marino Sanuto, *Diarii*, edd. R. Fulin et al. (Venice, 1879-1903, 58 vols.), vols. xxiv-xxviii; Lorenzo Galindez Carvajal, "Anales Breves," in *D. I. E.*, xviii, pp. 351-422; Pero Mexia, "Historia de Carlos Quinto" (to 1530), ed. J. Deloffre, in *Revue Hispanique*, xlv (1918), pp. 1-564, also reprinted in separate form; L. Vital, "Relation du premier voyage de Charles-Quint en Espagne," in vol. iii of *Collection des voyages des souverains des Pays-Bas*, pp. 1-314, edd. L. P. Gachard and Charles Piot (Brussels, 1881); and Georgius Sauromannus, *Hispaniae Consolatio* (Louvain, 1520), are all of first-class importance, and generally well edited, though some of them cover but isolated incidents or very brief periods. C. von Höfler, *Spanische Regesten von 1515 bis Ende 1520* (*Monumenta Hispanica*, ii, Prague, 1882), will be found valuable as a chronological index to the source ma-

terial of the period, but should be used with caution (cf. Morel-Fatio, *Historiographie*, p. 7).

Later Works. — The learned bibliographical introduction of Antonio de la Torre y del Cerro's *Juan de Vallejo, Memorial de la Vida de Fray Francisco Jiménez de Cisneros* (Madrid, 1913), relieves us of the necessity of enumerating all the older and largely panegyric lives of the Cardinal (that of C. J. von Hefele, English translation by Rev. Canon Dalton, London, 1860, is the best), more especially as they have all been superseded by the Conde de Cedillo's *El Cardenal Cisneros, Gobernador del Reino* (Madrid, 1921). Wilhelm Bauer's *Die Anfänge Ferdinands I.* (Vienna and Leipzig, 1907), like the corresponding work by Andreas Walther on Charles V, already cited, is typical of the best kind of German historical monograph, accurate and detailed; and Ernest Gossart's *Charles-Quint, Roi d'Espagne* (subtitle, *Espagnols et Flamands au XVI^e Siècle*) (Brussels, 1910) is indispensable. Constantin von Höfler, "K. Karls (V.) erstes Auftreten in Spanien," in *Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna), phil.-hist. Classe, lxxiv, pp. 503-568 (Vienna, 1873), and Francisco Bofarull y Sans, "Predilección del Emperador Carlos V por los Catalanes: memoria documentada," in *Memorias de la Real Academia de Buenas Letras de Barcelona*, v (1896), pp. 315-434, are still useful, though not in all respects up to date.

CHAPTER XXII

THE COMUNEROS AND THE GERMANÍA

"THE Communes of Castile begin their revolt, but after a good start had a bad ending, and exalted, beyond what it had previously been, the power of the King whom they desired to abase. They rose in revolt because the King was leaving the realm, because of the *servicio*, because of the foreign Regent, because of the large amounts of money which were being taken out of the realm, and because the chief office of the treasury had been given to Chièvres, the archbishopric of Toledo to Guillaume de Croy, and knight-hoods of the Military Orders to foreigners." ¹ Such are the words in which a contemporary historian portrays the great insurrection which forms the principal subject of the present chapter. It would be impossible to construct a better summary in equal space; not a word is wasted, and no essential element is left out. To complete the picture it only remains to develop the ideas which are there put forward, and to fill in the more important details.

Hatred of the foreigner and of the foreign ways and customs Charles brought with him was unquestionably the dominant cause of the outbreak of revolution in Castile. Even the various demands for reform in the national administration which were to appear in the memorial of the Junta of Ávila, and in which some subsequent historians have thought they discerned evidences of aspirations for a democratic

¹ Gómara, pp. 58-59.

regime, were primarily due to the popular conviction that the national liberties were endangered by the rule of a non-Spanish king.¹ And this is the chief reason why, in its earlier stages, the revolt was joined by all classes of Castilians — why so many nobles² and clergy ranged themselves beside the commons under the banner of the revolution. Social distinctions were for the moment forgotten in a common detestation of the alien Hapsburg. It was not, indeed, in the nature of things that such a condition should long endure; the ancient forces of Spanish separatism — social as well as geographical — were ultimately bound to assert themselves, and the clever utilization of their recrudescence by the absent sovereign was the principal reason why he was able to keep his throne. At the outset, however, the grievances of Castile were felt by high and low. Save for Adrian and his immediate supporters, and the small body of troops they were able to command, there was almost no one in the realm who would fight for the absentee king.

The six weeks after Charles's departure saw the revolution spread like wildfire. The procuradores who had been bribed or bullied by the king into sanctioning the servicio at the Cortes of Santiago-Corunna were, not unnaturally, the first victims of the popular wrath. Rodrigo de Torde-sillas, procurador for Segovia, was rash enough to disregard the warnings of his friends, return to his constituency, and appear, richly clad, at its ayuntamiento. Despite all the efforts of the local clergy, who strove to protect him, with the sacrament in their hands, a rope was thrown around his neck by the furious mob, he was dragged through the streets and hung up by the feet at the public gibbet.³ At Zamora,

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 412-414; Antonio Ferrer del Rio, *Levantamiento de las Comunidades de Castilla*, p. 361.

² *Ibid.*, p. 360; E. Gossart, *Charles-Quint, Roi d'Espagne*, p. 106.

³ P. Mexia, *Historia de Carlos Quinto*, p. 142; Santa Cruz, i, pp. 236-237.

the procuradores were more prudent, and took refuge in a monastery near by; but the populace dragged their effigies through the streets and burned them in the Plaza Mayor.¹ At Burgos the mob vented its anger by destroying the house and property of the city's principal delegate to the national assembly, and by hanging a rich French merchant, widely known as a friend and protégé of Chièvres.² In Valladolid, the seat of the *Real Chancillería*, there was at first no open revolt; and Adrian of Utrecht, after summoning Iñigo de Velasco, the constable of Castile, to his side, prudently took refuge there on Corpus Christi day. So charged with discontent, however, did the atmosphere seem to be, that he maintained a discreet silence on the course of events at the Cortes of Santiago-Corunna.³

More serious, if less dramatic, than these various acts of violence, were the evidences of a nascent organization in the ranks of the popular party. In the movement to secure this end, the city of Toledo led the way. She had sent her envoys to the other towns of Castile in the early days of March to plead for united action in defence of the liberties of the realm;⁴ and though her appeals to her neighbors went unheeded for the time, she was able to set them an example in effective organization. More than a month before Charles set sail from Corunna, she had risen, under the lead of her municipal magistrates, expelled the corregidor, and set up the forms of a popular government, "in the name of the king and of the queen, and of the Comunidad."⁵ The conservatism of the formula is noteworthy. It implied loyalty to Charles if only he would dismiss the Flemings

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 345-347.

² Mexia, p. 144. The delegate was a brother of the bishop of Badajoz.

³ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, p. 347.

⁴ Cf. *ante*, pp. 48-49.

⁵ Mexia, pp. 131-136; Santa Cruz, i, pp. 217 ff.; Sandoval, i, p. 157; Gossart, p. 103, note.

and remain in Spain. It showed that the movement was as yet neither democratic nor anti-monarchical, but simply national in its aims. The leaders of the revolt in Toledo were of the ancient Castilian aristocracy. Pedro Laso de la Vega, who was afterwards to preside at the Junta of Ávila, was the brother of the poet, Garcilaso de la Vega, and related to the great house of Guzman.¹ Juan de Padilla, who stood beside him, was also of noble lineage, and his wife, Maria Pacheco, "the real man of the pair,"² who urged her husband forward, and was a "veritable flame of fire for the whole realm," was the daughter of the second Count of Tendilla, and the sister of the great Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, and of Antonio de Mendoza who was to be viceroy of New Spain. The Toledan clergy, also, at the outset, supported the revolution to a man.

The example of Toledo was followed, in the weeks that succeeded the Emperor's departure, by most of the cities of Old Castile. One by one they expelled the royal officials and proclaimed the 'Comunidad.' Clerical and aristocratic participation, in greater or less degree, is likewise everywhere evident. At Zamora the movement was headed by the bishop, Antonio de Acuña, whose fate was destined to be the strangest in all the ranks of the Comuneros. Only a handful of scattering and unimportant towns, like Simancas and Truxillo, remained loyal to Charles. In the South, on the other hand, the revolution made little progress. Murcia and Mula, it is true, raised the standard of revolt, not improbably on account of their proximity to the rebellion in Valencia; and Don Pedro de Giron, who coveted the duchy of Medina Sidonia, sought to stir up the rural districts for purposes of his own; but Cordova and Granada held completely aloof, and later formed a loyal union to raise forces

¹ Sandoval, i, p. 157.

² "Maritus mariti," as Peter Martyr calls her.

for the cause of the king. In Estremadura, too, the rebellion gained little headway; while in Navarre, it was overlaid by local factional feuds of ancient standing, and involved in the international issues between France and Spain.¹ What significance is to be attached to these geographical details, it were difficult to determine. Was it natural slackness and apathy that kept the Andalusians and Estremadurans from joining forces with the rebels? Or was it the greater distances between the southern and eastern towns that prevented the spread of the revolutionary fever to these regions? It is possible to argue from the data that we have at our disposal that those portions of the realm which had not come into actual contact with Charles were far less ill disposed towards him than those which had; it was the outlying, unvisited parts that failed to respond to the call to arms. If this argument holds,² it offers additional proof of the sorry figure that the king had cut on his initial visit to the peninsula. Everywhere he went, he had left the impression of a gawky, incompetent stripling, dominated by his greedy Flemish followers; but only those who had seen with their own eyes could realize to what depths of degradation the throne of the saintly Isabella had fallen. Others were not convinced of the necessity for revolt.

Union and coöperation between those cities which had committed themselves to the uprising were clearly indispensable to its success. Toledo, which had taken the lead in establishing a 'Comunidad,' came forward once more to plead for joint action by the revolutionists. On July 18,³ she despatched a letter to "all the cities"⁴ suggesting

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, pp. 155 ff.; Armstrong, i, pp. 82-84; Gossart, p. 105.

² Against this, it can of course be maintained that Valencia revolted because Charles had not gone there; but Valencia was not a part of Castile.

³ The date appears from Danvila, xxxv, p. 441. The text of the letter is given in Sandoval, i, pp. 196-197.

⁴ Sandoval's vague phrase "todas las ciudades" naturally excites a desire for more specific information as to the identity of those who received invita-

that they send representatives to a common council to be held at Ávila on the 29th to devise remedies for the evils with which the realm was afflicted. The invitation was promptly accepted. The delegates assembled at the appointed time and place, and lost no time in electing the Toledans, Laso de la Vega and Padilla, president of their Santa Junta and captain of its forces.¹ The effect of this action was virtually to create a rival government to that of the regent; it was a challenge to the authority of Adrian, which it was impossible to leave unanswered.

Adrian was by nature a conciliator and shrank from violent action. His letters to the Emperor about the progress of the revolt are filled with recommendations for compromises and redress of grievances;² and his first instinct, on hearing of the establishment of the Santa Junta of Ávila, was to have it transferred to Valladolid, where he could prevent it from getting beyond control. On the other hand,

tions: does he mean all the eighteen cities represented in Cortes? or does he mean all the cities which had already established 'Comunidades'? Most of the modern authorities incline to the first of these alternatives, and regard the proposed meeting at Ávila as, in effect, a gathering of the municipal estate of the Castilian Cortes, irregularly summoned in the absence of the king. The trouble with this theory is that Ciudad Rodrigo, which does not figure in the eighteen, sent delegates to Ávila (Häbler (*Hist. Zeit.*, xcv, p. 405) denies that Ciudad Rodrigo sent a delegate to Ávila, on the ground that it was not regularly represented in the Cortes; as this however is the very point at issue, his reasoning fails to impress), and that Cordova, Seville, Granada, and Jaen, which were regularly represented in the Cortes, did not. Under the circumstances it seems more reasonable to suppose that Sandoval's "todas las ciudades" meant all the cities which had raised the banner of revolt. The phrase in the letter itself, "Semejantes congre-

gaciones y juntas son por los fueros reprovadas," would indicate that the assembly was entirely irregular, and Mexia (p. 147) states that Toledo "acordó de procurar que se hiciesse junta general de las ciudades que tenían su opinion, y escribió cartas á todas ellas." An undated letter of Adrian to the Emperor indicates, moreover, that at this stage the aristocracy wanted to join in:

"Han me dicho que el duque de Infantazgo y el marques de Villena [both of them Mendozas and of kin to Maria Pacheco] tienen sus procuradores en la junta de Tordesillas y que desean confederarse con las comunidades, y que ellas lo recusan fasta que les entreguen en sus manos las fortalezas que tienen en sus tierras." R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-21, f. 337.

¹ Gossart, p. 107.

² These letters may all be found in Danvila in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 414-445, *passim*. They are dated July 6, 10, 13, 20, 24, and 28.

the royal authority had been so openly flouted in the various local uprisings that had taken place, that some form of military retaliation was indispensable. Segovia, the first to revolt, was selected for chastisement; and, in late July, the alcalde Ronquillo, with a thousand royal troops, most of whom had but recently returned from campaigning in North Africa and were consequently uncontaminated by the revolutionary spirit, was accordingly sent against it. The Segovians, however, were quite equal to the occasion. Aided by reënforcements from Toledo and Ávila, they repulsed the army of the crown. Ronquillo drew off in disorder, and called on Adrian for more troops.¹ These were at once despatched under the command of the king's chief military leader, Antonio de Fonseca, who determined to make assurance doubly sure by first possessing himself of a park of royal cannon at Medina del Campo. The inhabitants of that town, who had thus far held aloof from the revolt, regarded themselves as custodians of the king's artillery, and fiercely resented all attempts to deprive them of it.² Furious street fighting ensued. Some houses were fired; the city was swept by flames,³ and over 450 buildings, most of them filled with valuable merchandise, were burnt to the ground. Medina del Campo was the principal market town for all the region round about; its fairs were great events in the life of Old Castile,⁴ and the losses it had sustained affected the agricultural and commercial classes of all the neighboring region. It would be difficult to conceive of any other event more calculated to increase and spread the unpopularity of the king's government, than this apparently

¹ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 242 ff.

² A letter from Segovia, dated August 17 (Sandoval, i, p. 184), begged them not to give it up.

³ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 247 ff.; Sandoval, i, pp. 177-185, *passim*; J. Maldonado,

El Movimiento de España, tr. Quevedo, pp. 120 ff.

⁴ Cf. C. Espejo and J. Paz, *Las Antiguas Ferias de Medina del Campo* (1912).

wanton destruction of the economic nerve centre of the realm.¹

The burning of Medina del Campo occurred on August 21. Its first result was a rising in hitherto passive Valladolid, where the news was reported on the very day of its occurrence. An angry mob appeared in the street, and demanded the disbanding of the forces of Fonseca; he and Ronquillo fled to Portugal for their lives. Adrian was suffered — almost contemptuously — to remain at liberty; but all his hopes of coming to terms with the Santa Junta vanished in smoke, and thenceforth, as Sandoval significantly puts it: “those of the Comunidad called those of the Council tyrants, and those of the Council called those of the Comunidad traitors.”² But while the regent was powerless to give effect to his words,³ the Junta vindicated its authority in dramatic fashion. All that it needed was a legal pretext for assuming full control of the government. If only it could secure the adherence of the captive Joanna, it would be formally justified in any step that it might choose to take. Possession of the queen’s person was the first essential to the accomplishment of its desires; and the news that Adrian’s adherents had attempted, though unsuccessfully, to get her signature for certain documents confirming their authority,⁴ convinced the leaders of the Junta that there was no time to lose. On Wednesday, August 29, the very day of the uprising at Valladolid, Padilla, with the full force of the insurrectionary army, appeared before Tordesillas. They found the poor queen, closely guarded by the Marquis of Denia, whom she detested, whiling away the weary hours in the company

¹ Cf. C. Espejo and J. Paz, *op. cit.*, *passim*; Höfler, *Aufstand der castilianischen Städte*, p. 85, note.

² Sandoval, i, p. 205.

³ Höfler, *Aufstand*, p. 86; Gossart, p. 137, note, and references there.

⁴ Cf. A. Rodríguez Villa, *Juana la Loca*, p. 303, for an account of the affecting scene which this effort caused.

of her youngest daughter, Catharine. A faint realization of the state of the realm, which had apparently been afforded her by her previous interview with the adherents of Adrian of Utrecht, combined with her mental infirmities¹ to render her more than usually suspicious and sad. Padilla, dropping on one knee before her, strove to make her comprehend the reason for his coming, specially emphasizing his resolution to protect her from all injury, and to prevent her enemies from separating her from her daughter. The queen seemed pleased and thanked him; and then Padilla added: "Since certain cities of these your realms have united for your service and defence, and have sent their representatives here for that purpose, we beg you to declare how we may best accomplish these ends, and whether it be your pleasure that we remain here at your service." "Yes, yes," replied Joanna, "remain here and serve me. Tell me everything that is happening and punish the evil doers, and I shall be most grateful." Padilla thanked her in turn, and assured her that everything should be done in accordance with her desires, and then, justifying his action by the words which the queen had spoken, he summoned the Junta from Ávila to Tordesillas. The Marquis of Denia was speedily induced to depart. The revolutionists took possession of the castle and its royal inmate.²

Only one step more needed to be taken to complete the triumph of the rebellion. Verbal encouragement and sanction from the queen were all very well, but her signature to documents must be procured before Castile could be induced to recognize the legality of the popular cause. On Wednesday, September 24, twelve deputies of the rebel communes

¹ Gossart, pp. 222-236, gives an excellent summary of the controversy over Joanna's insanity.

² Santa Cruz, i, pp. 259 ff.; Danvila in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 469-472, and xxxvi, pp. 67-69; Sandoval, i, pp. 206-207.

resolved to put it to the test; it was the critical moment in the history of the revolt and perhaps, indeed, of Charles's rule in Castile.¹ Joanna received them in solemn audience. She listened with deep attention while two of them explained the condition of the realm, and protested that they were ready to serve her and recognize her as their leader and queen. She replied at length, with melancholy references to her family bereavements, to the lies that had been told her by the Marquis of Denia and to the cruel maltreatment to which she had been subjected. She thanked the deputies for their good intentions and expressed willingness to help them. But when it came to giving effect to her words, she suddenly drew back. Nothing would induce her to name the members of a delegation which she had asked the Junta to create to keep her informed of its proceedings. A request from Padilla that she sign the Junta's resolutions as if they emanated from her Council, elicited a stubborn refusal.² Was it merely a madwoman's whim, or did she faintly realize the gravity of the point at issue? The question has never been definitely answered and probably never will be; but it is certain that this failure to obtain the queen's signature marked the passing of the zenith of the revolution. Padilla and the rest did their utmost to conceal the defeat they had sustained, and outwardly their prestige continued to increase. It was generally believed that Joanna had recovered her reason and that she sympathized heartily with the revolutionists; and "as the voice of the Junta was most persuasive in its reiteration of the sweet name of liberty and of exemption from unjust taxation and evil rule,"³ there were many who rose and joined its banners. But this accretion in numbers was more than counterbalanced by the in-

¹ Cf. the letter of Adrian to Charles, November 1, 1520, printed in A. Rodríguez Villa, p. 331.

² Sandoval, i, pp. 208-211; A. Rodríguez Villa, *op. cit.*, pp. 316-319.

³ Sandoval, i, p. 250.

decision of the leaders, whose half-measures at this critical moment plainly showed that they realized that the queen's refusal to give them some tangible evidence of her adherence had cut the ground from beneath their feet.

On September 28, Padilla, with 1100 men, entered Valladolid and dispersed the regent's Council; Adrian himself, however, was suffered to escape, on October 15, to Medina del Rio Seco, and his personal belongings were courteously sent after him.¹ A zealous friar was despatched by the Junta to stir the flames of revolt in Palencia; his eloquence apparently was of considerable effect; nevertheless the loyalists in the town were suffered to seize and garrote him, "which," as Sandoval adds, "is the sort of thing that friars deserve and get, when they attempt to mix into secular affairs."² Meantime, in Andalusia, the few foci of revolutionary ardor were almost neglected. There had been outbursts of varying intensity, at Jaen, at Baeza, at Ronda, and at Seville. Skilfully utilized and combined they might well have carried the whole South for the popular cause; but the Junta was blind to its opportunity. The loyalty of Granada and Cordova prevailed. A line of demarcation was permitted to establish itself, which restricted the revolution to the older portions of Castile; and in February, 1521, the Andalusians united in the powerful royalist confederation of La Rambla.³

More significant even than the apathy of the Comuneros in taking practical measures to consolidate the position they had won, was their activity in constitutional theorizing and in the writing of notes. On September 25, their representatives swore to unite for the redress of the evils with which the realm was afflicted; they spoke of themselves as a regular

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, p. 260; Santa Cruz, i, pp. 346 ff.; Sandoval, i, pp. 211-213; Gossart, p. 120.

² Sandoval, i, p. 212.

³ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, pp. 160-216, *passim*; Mexia, pp. 214-215.

assembly of the Cortes of Castile.¹ Possession of the person of the queen led them on, moreover, to the assumption of executive powers. They got hold of the royal seals and appended them to their decrees. They ordered the members of the *Chancillería Real* to repair to Tordesillas for instructions. They asserted their claim to receive the royal revenues.² But instead of seeing, themselves, to the execution of these decrees, they sent messengers to Charles to request his approval. Counsels of caution prevailed at the very moment when a little recklessness was indispensable to success. Preservation of the fiction of loyalty to the throne was preferred to the seizure of the realities of authority. The instrument in which the Junta's demands to the Emperor were contained was despatched from Tordesillas on October 20. It took the form of a sort of *cuaderno* of petitions, coupled with a most comprehensive ordinance for reform.³ Conservatism, however, is the dominant note throughout. The evils of the times are almost invariably attributed to the foreign Flemings and the innovations and extravagances they brought with them. Remedies are to be found in the fulfilment of the royal promises at the Cortes of Valladolid and Santiago, and still more in a return to the good customs of the Catholic Kings. There are certain proposals for the limitation of the power of the crown, for the increase of that of the Cortes, and for rendering that body and the Royal Council more truly representative of the people of the realm; but save for the request that the national assembly should meet at stated intervals, independent of any summons from the king, there is scarcely anything for which some precedent cannot be found in the pages of the history of mediaeval Castile. The document con-

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, pp. 76 ff.

² Häbler, p. 93.

³ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 282 ff.; Sandoval, i, pp. 224-250.

cludes with an elaborate demand for the king's sanction and pardon for everything that the revolutionists had done without him and against him in his absence; in fact, the whole tone of the instrument reveals a palpable lack of self-confidence. To send it at all was a capital error; to phrase it so moderately was to invite a rebuff from the monarch to whom it was addressed.¹

Meantime, while rebellion was overrunning Castile, King Charles, after a brief visit to his uncle, Henry VIII, landed at Flushing on June 1, 1520, and trod once more the soil of his native land. Save for another brief interview with the English monarch at Calais, he remained in the Netherlands

¹ The Junta's memorial to the absent Emperor has been the subject of much discussion, especially among those historians of the Comuneros who have primarily been interested in the political theories of the revolutionists and have sought to prove that they aspired to set up a democratic regime at the expense of the absolutism of the crown. (On these cf. Häbler, "Zur Geschichte der kastilischen Comunidades," in *Historische Zeitschrift*, xcv, pp. 385 ff.) There can be little doubt that that side of the whole affair has been greatly exaggerated; in any case, the discussion of it lies outside the field of a work on the Spanish Empire. Yet it may not be amiss to remark that there is evidence that it was the more conservative portion of the revolutionists that finally drew up the memorial in the form in which it was actually sent. The extremists would gladly have gone further, as is shown by the first section of a draft of an ordinance for the reform of the government, of unknown authorship, which provides that after Charles's death no woman, nor any grandson or great-grandson not born within the realm, should ever succeed to the throne of Castile. But it is clear that this stipulation (*D. I. E.*, i, pp. 271-283) does not call for the exclusion of Charles and his mother in favor of the Infante Ferdinand, as Armstrong, i, p. 87, seems

to think; it was simply designed to prevent the recurrence, in the future, of the unsatisfactory situation which at that moment obtained. More drastic was a plan, of which there are vague hints in the documents of the period (cf. Gómara, p. 59, and Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, p. 762, citing a manuscript in the R. A. H., folio 190 vuelto, of vol. vi of *Misceláneas*) to marry Joanna to the unfortunate Duke of Calabria (cf. Vol. II, ante, p. 302), who had been a prisoner since 1512 in the lonely fortress of Játiva, but had been thought of as a candidate for the succession in Aragon after the death of Ferdinand the Catholic (cf. below, p. 127, note 2; Dormer, *Anales*, pp. 6-7; and Danvila, *Germania*, p. 147), and to proclaim him king. This programme, had it been carried out, would, of course, have meant the end of the rule of Charles; but it was not strongly pressed, and never had a chance of success. Moreover, it will be observed that even in this, the most extreme of all the projects of the revolutionists, the evil which it was sought to redress was that of an absentee, non-resident, foreign ruler. Limitation of monarchical authority was but incidental to the main aim of the Comuneros. What they really wanted most of all — even the most radical of them — was to preserve Spain for the Spaniards.

until the end of October, when he departed into the Empire to meet Martin Luther at Worms. Foreign affairs, especially the prospects of war with France, were his principal anxiety at this period, but he was kept constantly informed about the progress of the Castilian uprising by Flemish merchants, and by a series of piteous appeals for help from Adrian of Utrecht.¹ For many a long week the young king did not reply, at least to the regent, who bitterly complained, in a more than usually gloomy letter, dated at Valladolid on September 12, that he had heard nothing from his royal master since his departure, save a rumor, which had arrived by a Flemish ship, that he had landed safely in England.² The king's silence with reference to the Castilian outbreak is the more striking when contrasted with the multitude of letters and orders which he wrote in this period in connection with the realms of the crown of Aragon and their Italian dependencies,³ but there is no reason to believe that he underestimated the seriousness of the crisis; he was merely waiting for more information, before making up his mind what course to pursue. Sandoval tells us that he called Germans, Flemings, Italians, Aragonese, and Castilians into council, and that "their opinions were as divergent as their nationalities. The Germans said that he must go to the Empire, the Italians that he should visit Italy; the Flemings begged him to remain where he was; the Aragonese drew attention to the rising in Valencia; and the Castilians desired him to return to Castile. . . . But in the end the decision was made by a few, as is the custom of great sovereigns when

¹ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 271 ff.; Sandoval, i, p. 201; Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 373, 376, 382, 414, 422, 427, 434, 437, 442, 475-496; xxxvi, pp. 6, 7, 9, 17, 20. There is also an undated letter from Adrian to Charles (it was clearly written, however, at about this stage of the revolt) in *R.A.H.*,

Mss. Salazar, A-21, fol. 337, telling the Emperor that money had absolutely given out. The letters usually took between two and three weeks to reach their destination.

² Sandoval, i, p. 199.

³ Foronda, pp. 176 ff., *passim*.

difficult questions are to be settled, and it was resolved that he should proceed to the Empire for his coronation, and that he should thoroughly settle the affairs of Germany, so that he would not have to go back there every day. And it was also decided that the Emperor should write friendly letters to all the cities and towns of Castile, commanding some to return to their allegiance and thanking others for their loyalty, and urging and enjoining the aristocracy to support the members of the Royal Council, and promising all, on his royal word, that he would be back as soon as possible in Castile. For it was the feeling among the common people that the Emperor would never return to Spain, that led them to dare so much and attempt such follies.”¹ The Emperor and his counsellors also decided, as a sop to the popular feelings, to suspend the collection of the servicio voted at the Cortes of Santiago-Corunna, to confer no more offices within the realm on foreigners, and finally, as a bid for the support of the nobles, to associate Don Fadrique Enríquez and Don Iñigo de Velasco, Admiral and Constable of Castile, with Adrian of Utrecht in the conduct of the regency.²

The meeting at which these decisions were reached was probably held in the first days of September; at any rate the appointment of the Admiral and the Constable as co-regents with Adrian was announced to the city of Cordova by the Emperor in a letter dated on the fifth of that month at Brussels. This letter³ is apparently the first communication from the absent king on the subject of the revolt that has come down to us, and there is every reason to think that other epistles of a similar tenor were simultaneously despatched by him to the other cities of Castile. There

¹ Sandoval, i, p. 201.

² *Ibid.*

³ It is printed in *D. I. E.*, cxii, pp. 30-31.

followed a few days later a letter of instructions to Adrian¹ (which crossed his of September 12 to Charles) laying down a number of limitations to the authority of the regents. In the succeeding weeks Charles learned of the capture of Tordesillas and its results, and consequently was apprised of the extreme seriousness of the crisis; he made no change, however, in the policy he had adopted. It was a wise decision. His concessions were a proof that he did not ignore the Spanish point of view, yet they militated little if at all against the authority of the crown. His appeals to the loyalty of the Castilian aristocracy caused most of the grandees to rally to the regent, and ultimately served to turn what had started as a national revolt into a mere war of classes. And, finally, Charles was supremely fortunate in the moment at which these measures had been adopted. The revolutionary forces had already reached the zenith of their power. As there was no longer any serious opposition for them to overcome within the realm, the need for unity was in a large measure removed, and various lines of cleavage revealed themselves within their ranks. "The victory had been so easy, so complete, that they knew not how to use it."² It was at this critical juncture that the Emperor's instructions were received; from that time onward the fortunes of the monarchy rapidly revived.

The first of the Emperor's measures to show its effect was his appeal to the loyalty of the Admiral and the Constable. The former, who cared more for the preservation of his own estates than for the maintenance of the royal authority, and who hoped for a solution of the existing difficulties without an appeal to arms, held aloof from the scene of operations, in Aragon, and contented himself with writing letters to Valladolid to protest against the action of the revolutionists

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, p. 13.

² Armstrong, i, p. 87.

and to advise the city to return to its allegiance.¹ His counsels, for the time being, went unheeded, but they at least served to show that he was gravitating towards the crown. The Constable in the meantime was far more active. Established at Burgos at the outbreak of the revolt, he had been obliged, by the uprising of the citizens, to take refuge in Briviesca, where he received, in late September, the Emperor's letter appointing him co-regent with Adrian.² All his loyalty was aroused by the imperial message, and, convinced that the uprising could not be suppressed except by force, he set vigorously to work in the interests of the crown.³ He sent letters to the Admiral to beg for his assistance.⁴ He got in touch with the municipal aristocracy of Burgos, and with their aid, and by dint of some concessions, he succeeded in winning back the old Castilian capital to its allegiance. On November 1, he was able to return there and set up his headquarters.⁵ He summoned all the local nobility to rally to his standard, and collected funds and munitions from every available source. He was active in getting loans from Emmanuel of Portugal, and countered all the efforts of the revolutionists to obtain assistance from that quarter.⁶ Such energy was not without effect upon the more hesitant Admiral. His policy of negotiation had by this time broken down. The Comuneros were so confident of success that they refused to make any concessions, and by mid-November it was clear that war was inevitable. The regents' council reunited at Medina del Rio Seco, and the Admiral came in and took his place beside the cardinal,

¹ Sandoval, i, p. 262, and Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxv, pp. 234, 334-335.

² Sandoval, i, pp. 251, 252.

³ Sandoval (i, p. 253) distinctly states that if Charles had associated the Constable and the Admiral with Adrian before his departure, the revolt would never have occurred.

⁴ The two men were not on very friendly terms. Häbler, p. 103.

⁵ Sandoval, i, pp. 254 ff.; Häbler, p. 104; Gossart, p. 121; Salvá, *Burgos en las Comunidades de Castilla*, pp. 98 ff., 145.

⁶ Höfler, *Aufstand*, p. 130; Sandoval, i, pp. 263 ff.

though he continued his attempts to negotiate with the Comuneros for many weeks to come, and did not accept the title of co-regent until January 3, 1521.¹ The Constable's son, the Count of Haro, was placed in command of the forces of the crown.²

The growing power of the royalists soon manifested itself upon the field of battle. On November 30, the Count of Haro arrived at Medina del Rio Seco with upwards of 3000 men; after some deliberation, it was decided to launch them at once in a surprise attack on Tordesillas. Bickerings among the leaders of the Comuneros facilitated the attempt. Padilla, in high dudgeon at the promotion of Pedro Giron to the command of the revolutionary forces, had drawn off to Toledo with a large body of his adherents; and Giron, who was left behind, did not utilize his men to the best advantage. Haro reached the walls of Tordesillas without opposition and almost unperceived. In a five-hour combat the walls were breached and the city entered. The defenders fled, the town was sacked, and the queen-mother fell once more into the hands of the royalists.³ The importance of her capture was doubtless primarily negative; she welcomed the grandees with stately courtesy and appeared to rejoice at their return; nothing, however, would induce her to sign a document, any more than when she was in the hands of the Comuneros. She remained, as before, essentially a passive spectator of the combat, whose issues she was quite unable to comprehend. Yet the fact that her person was no longer in the hands of the revolutionists counted for much. It deprived them of their last hope of clothing their actions with a semblance of legality. From henceforth, they fell permanently back

¹ Häbler, pp. 106-109, 115.

³ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 368 ff.; Häbler,

² Gossart, p. 121, and references there. p. 108.

to the position of rebels against the authority of the crown.¹

While the royalists were gaining in power and unity, dissension became rife in the ranks of the Comuneros. The leaders of the Santa Junta after the storming of Tordesillas transferred themselves to Valladolid, which henceforth became the headquarters of the insurrection. But the Junta's authority was by no means so complete as heretofore. It found two other bodies holding their sessions at Valladolid, on its arrival — the *Junta de la Comunidad*, or municipal committee, which had seized power in the city at the time of Adrian's departure, and the ultra-democratic *Junta de las Cuadrillas* or local military council, elected by the different sections of the city and its suburbs, which had come into existence in the dark days of November. Both these bodies were radical and aggressive; and they saw in the waning prestige of the Santa Junta an opportunity for them to extend their authority from municipal to national affairs.² Particularly was this the case with the *Junta de las Cuadrillas*, whose military attributes gave it special prominence in the existing crisis; and it concentrated its efforts on an attempt to recall the popular hero, Juan de Padilla, to the supreme command of the revolutionary forces, from which the recent promotion of Giron had ousted him.³ The latter, summoned by the Santa Junta to the defence of Valladolid, was so unpopular with the masses that he was openly insulted and denounced as a traitor; he had never been enthusiastic in the revolutionary cause, and finally, on December 16, he deserted to the royalists.⁴ After his defection, the Santa Junta strove to place its president, Pedro Laso de la Vega,

¹ Gossart, pp. 122-123; A. Rodríguez Villa, *op. cit.*, pp. 339 ff.

² Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvii, pp.

94-111; Häbler, pp. 112-113; Gossart, p. 123, and references there.

³ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 421-422.

⁴ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, p. 669.

in the chief command; the *Junta de las Cuadrillas*, however, managed to carry the day for Padilla, who reached Valladolid with 2000 men on the last day of the year, "amid such a tumult of rejoicing as if God had come down from heaven."¹ Laso, like Giron, was unable to endure humiliation by the populace. He figured no more on the revolutionary side, but after striving for some weeks, from a midway position, to bring about the restoration of peace, he finally went over (March, 1521) to the adherents of the crown.²

The early months of 1521 were memorable for the activities of that most picturesque of the figures in the ranks of the revolutionists, Antonio de Acuña, the fighting bishop of Zamora. Partisan from the outset of the cause of the Comuneros, and animated apparently by the most radical ideas, he had hitherto wrought furiously, in most unclerical fashion, but with indifferent success, in the interests of the revolution in the country near his see.³ He now appeared at Valladolid at the moment of the defection of Giron, took his place in the war council of the Comuneros, reanimated the drooping spirits of his comrades, armed hundreds of priests as soldiers, and led a series of raids into the surrounding country. The deeds of this 'devil of a bishop,' described in a series of increasingly horrified letters⁴ from Adrian of Utrecht, were duly reported to Leo X by the Spanish ambassador at the Vatican; the Pope declared that he was a second Luther, and promised forthwith to depose him.⁵ But Acuña recked nothing of papal displeasure; if deprived of

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvii, p. 14; Höfler, *Aufstand*, p. 160. The supreme command was ultimately placed in commission; but ostensibly, at least, Padilla was the chief. Höfler, *Aufstand*, p. 166.

² Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvii, pp. 379 ff.; Häbler, pp. 123-124, note. His brother the poet, Garcilaso de la

Vega, had enrolled himself, from the outset, in the royalist forces.

³ Höfler, *Don Antonio de Acuña*, pp. 21 ff.

⁴ Notably those of September 23, 1520, and January 4 and 8, 1521; cf. Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, p. 669; xxxvii, pp. 11-12, 23.

⁵ Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 43, 47.

Zamora, he proposed to conquer Toledo. The opportunity for this perilous venture was certainly very tempting. The death, at Worms, on January 6, of the absentee archbishop, Guillaume de Croy, had left the primacy vacant; all Castile breathed a sigh of relief when the news was known. Designation of a successor by the Emperor was for the moment out of the question; and the French envoy at Rome actually urged the candidacy of the 'second Luther' on Leo as a means of embarrassing Charles.¹ But Acuña had more faith in immediate action than regard for decisions by Emperor or Pope, and there were many factors in the situation in Castile which urged him to strike a blow in his own behalf. He was too uncomfortable a colleague to coöperate effectively with the other revolutionary leaders at Valladolid; and he was especially irritated with Padilla, whose valorous wife, Maria de Pacheco, had been left virtually in command at Toledo when her husband had returned to the North. Under all the circumstances, Acuña was convinced that he could most effectively serve the cause of the Comuneros in the very spot to which his personal ambitions were driving him apace. One night, in the last week of February, with his body guard of fighting priests and a few hundred soldiers, he secretly left Valladolid.² His forces increased as his destination became known; but he suffered a discouraging repulse, in which he himself was twice wounded, at the hands of a contingent collected to oppose him by the Prior of San Juan;³ finally, on Good Friday, he entered Toledo fully armed and on horseback, with only two attendants. A crowd collected about him when his identity was revealed; he was borne aloft into the cathedral, seated on the throne, and solemnly proclaimed archbishop. Further than this, however, Acuña found it impossible to go. The clergy of

¹ Armstrong, i, p. 94.

² Höfler, *Acuña*, p. 55.

³ Häbler, p. 126.

Toledo refused to be bullied into giving him the sanction of canonical election, and the more sober spirits were thoroughly shocked by his unprecedented defiance of lay and ecclesiastical authority. The whole episode produced a profound sensation throughout Castile, and the ultimate effects of it weakened the cause of the revolution.¹

The Comuneros, however, had not yet been decisively beaten in the field; nay more, they had been encouraged by a brief return of fortune, at the time of Acuña's departure from Valladolid. War had by this time been formally declared by the opposing parties — by the royalists in the form of an imperial decree, dated at Worms on December 17² and published at Burgos two months later, proclaiming the Comuneros guilty of high treason, and specially designating the names of two hundred and forty-nine of their leaders — by the rebels in a reply from the Junta at Valladolid, denouncing the Constable, the Admiral, their counsellors and adherents.³ It was the psychological moment for Padilla to strike a blow, and he delivered it in the last days of February by storming and capturing the town and fortress of Torrelobaton, in the domains of the Admiral, about equidistant from Valladolid and Tordesillas. The Comuneros greeted the news of this success with the wildest enthusiasm, but they knew not how to reap the benefit of it. Instead of utilizing the demoralization of their foes to drive home another blow, they suffered their own forces to scatter before Torrelobaton and finally, on March 3, arranged with the diplomacy-loving Admiral for an eight days' truce.⁴ Though not strictly observed by either party, it redounded rather to the advantage of the royalists than of the Comu-

¹ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 422 ff., 453 f.; Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 58 ff.

² Gossart, p. 124.

³ Not November 17 as Häbler (p. 121) has it; cf. Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, pp. 777-785.

⁴ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvii, pp. 392-395.

neros. It gave them time to collect their forces for a decisive blow, while their enemies continued to waste their resources in further attempts to secure peace by negotiation, and in bickerings between the rival Juntas in Valladolid.¹

The two chief difficulties of the royalists were lack of effective military leadership and deficiency in artillery. The fall of Torrelobaton had been almost entirely due to the incapacity of the Count of Haro, and no cannon had been obtainable for the government since the burning of Medina del Campo.² But the energy and ability of the Constable were to rescue the royalists in their hour of need. Since November he had been obliged to remain at Burgos, chiefly to oppose a threatened invasion from Navarre, but partly in order to deal with the rebel Count of Salvatierra, who had espoused the cause of the Comuneros for his own selfish purposes, and had to be beaten³ and put to flight before the North was safe. Now at last, on April 8, the Constable was free to march southward and join his son. He had meantime collected a considerable train of artillery from Fontarabia; so that when the two divisions of the royalist armies united at Peñaflor on the twenty-first,⁴ they were by no means destitute of heavy guns, though still inferior in this respect to their opponents. In all other particulars, however, the crown forces were in far better shape. In numbers they were distinctly superior — some 9000 in all, against 7000, if the contemporary chronicler may be trusted; their cavalry counted six times that of their foes; their morale was excellent, and they looked forward eagerly to the fray. There were several preliminary skirmishes, generally favorable to the royalists;⁵ and the final combat

¹ Häbler, pp. 122–123.

² Höfler, *Aufstand*, pp. 193 ff.

³ Santa Cruz, i, p. 456; Häbler, p. 125.

⁴ Santa Cruz, i, p. 458.

⁵ Höfler, *Aufstand*, p. 212; Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvii, pp. 587 ff., 731 ff.; Mexia, pp. 234 ff.

took place on April 23 in the ploughed fields of Villalar, outside Toro. Like the battle of Mühlberg, which twenty-six years later was to settle the fate of the Schmalkaldic League, it was rather a rout than a battle. Drenching rains had converted the ground into mud, in which the heavy artillery of the Comuneros stuck fast; a few shots from the lighter cannon of the royalists, together with a charge of their well armed and disciplined cavalry, threw the rebels into confusion. They offered no resistance worthy of the name. Many of them tore off the red crosses which they wore — the badge of the revolution — and replaced them with the white emblem of the *grandees*; the rest scattered, panic-stricken, to the four winds of heaven. Only Padilla and a few other leaders stood their ground, and were captured, fighting valiantly against overwhelming numbers; to Don Alonso de la Cueva fell the honor of taking Padilla, who was badly wounded in the leg. Mexia puts the losses of the Comuneros at “five hundred and no more, because their enemies were merciful in victory; on the side of the royalists, fifteen or twenty ‘*escuderos*’ and a few more wounded.”¹ Seldom has a victory been more complete; nor, from the point of view of the absent Emperor, could it have come at a better time. Six days before it, he had been solemnly challenged by Martin Luther at the diet of Worms; three days after it, the Saxon monk had departed, under the protection of a safe conduct, to raise the standard of revolt against mediaeval church and Empire. Authority had been reëstablished in one portion of Charles’s far flung dominions at the very moment that defiance had been hurled at it in the other.

Villalar was a death blow to the revolution in the North. Padilla and two of his companions met death, with heroic

¹ Mexia, pp. 236–239.

courage, at the hands of the public executioner on the morning after their defeat,¹ but there for the moment vengeance ceased. Valladolid at once sent an emissary to sue for peace, who was favorably received; the other cities in the neighborhood speedily followed her example. A few of the revolutionary chiefs were excepted from the general amnesty which the government granted, but even against these the regents showed no inclination to proceed at once; retribution was postponed, by common consent, to the day of the Emperor's return.² Only in Toledo, where the 'devil of a bishop' and the widow of Padilla disputed the control, did the flames of revolt continue to burn. Thither converged some of the fugitives of Villalar; and they were inspired to continue the fight by the eloquence of Acuña, who, temporarily forgetting his grudge against Doña Maria, strove manfully to coöperate with her in organizing resistance. Provisions and munitions, however, were sadly deficient; the cathedral's treasure vaults were opened but yielded no funds; the besieging army, under the Prior of San Juan, was keenly on the watch to prevent the arrival of any kind of supplies; and on October 25 the city capitulated under favorable terms.³ Acuña, unable to endure the thought of capture or defeat, had previously escaped and striven to rejoin the French in Navarre; but he was caught, on the way, in the pass of Navarrete, and held for future punishment.⁴ Doña Maria, on the other hand, elected to remain at her post, in the hope of some further opportunity to revive the insurrection. It came at last, in February, 1522, with the announce-

¹ Mexia, p. 239; Maldonado, *op. cit.*, p. 263. It is worth noting that Mexia makes no mention of the two famous letters from Padilla to his wife and to the city of Toledo, which are printed in Sandoval, i, p. 356, and have been accepted as authentic by Robertson and other historians. It seems

likely, in fact, that they are apocryphal. Cf. Gossart, p. 128, note.

² Häbler, p. 129.

³ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxviii, pp. 573-585; Häbler, p. 163; Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 62 ff.

⁴ Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 68-69.

ment of the election to the papacy of Adrian of Utrecht, when a small boy, instead of cheering the hero of the hour, took occasion to cry "Viva Padilla" at the top of his lungs. Doña Maria was alert to take advantage of the incident; she harangued the crowd which collected about her to such good effect that a riot ensued and the streets of Toledo ran with blood. Night, however, put an end to the fighting, the insurgents finally agreeing to lay down their arms on condition that Doña Maria should be permitted to leave the city unmolested.¹ Mounted on a mule, in the garb of a peasant woman, with some large geese in her hands, either as Gómara says "to avoid recognition, for otherwise they would have beheaded her also,"² or, as is more probable, as a humiliation by her foes and a safeguard against further efforts on her part to stir up trouble, she made for the frontier of Portugal, where she lived out the rest of her days, as Sandoval says, "in exile, contempt, and perpetual misfortune."³ Whatever her faults, she had fought to the bitter end.

An unsuccessful revolution which has solicited the intervention of a foreign nation on its behalf is certain by that very act to lend added strength to the government against which it is directed; for it enables the established authorities to pose as the patriotic defenders of national independence. The attempts of the Castilian Comuneros to gain aid to their cause from the kings of Portugal and France furnish admirable illustrations of the workings of this principle.

Their dealings with Portugal may be very briefly dismissed. These began, it would seem, on October 24, 1520, with a letter from the Santa Junta in which the Comuneros

¹ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxix, pp. 41-42.

² Gómara, p. 66.

³ Sandoval, i, p. 360. On this paragraph as a whole cf. Santa Cruz, i, pp. 461 ff., 475 ff., 505 ff.; Maldonado, *op. cit.*, pp. 268 ff., *passim*.

gave a full statement of their side of the question at issue, protested that they were entirely loyal to their lawful sovereign, provided he would dismiss his foreign advisers, rectify crying abuses, and come to live in Spain, and finally begged King Emmanuel to write to the Emperor and acquaint him with their point of view.¹ What reply was vouchsafed to this request does not appear; but it is obvious from repeated statements in the letters of Adrian to Charles that the Portuguese monarch had no sympathy with the revolution. A month before the Comuneros had appealed to him, he had offered his help to Adrian at Valladolid; nine days afterward he had promised him a loan of fifty thousand ducats.² "I know not," wrote Adrian to the Emperor on November 13, "how your Majesty can adequately thank the king of Portugal for the paternal and intimate affection which he continually displays in the affairs of your Highness, both in regard to the Comuneros and to others of this kingdom, who certainly, if they should note in him any wavering or lack of love to your Majesty, would be far bolder to carry out their evil designs. But his loyalty checks and restrains them. It would be well that your Majesty should write to him most warmly, to give him thanks for what he has done, and to beg for its continuance."³ The regent did not exaggerate the importance of Emmanuel's good will; he must, indeed, have been immensely relieved at the turn things had taken. Two months earlier, when it was far from certain that Portugal would stand by him, the Constable had gone so far as to suggest to Charles that he should marry Emmanuel's daughter in order to secure the support of the king during the trouble in Castile.⁴ It was sound advice,

¹ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 329 ff.; Sandoval, i, pp. 264-268.

² Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvi, pp. 23, 288. The total amount actually

lent was apparently 51,369 ducats; cf. below, note 2 to p. 137.

³ Danvila, *loc. cit.*, p. 485.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

and was ultimately adopted; but so far as the immediate crisis went, there was not the slightest cause for alarm. Portugal's loyalty to the royalist cause steadily increased as the months went by; and if we accept the statement of the Portuguese chronicler, Osorio,¹ that the Comuneros finally threw caution to the winds and actually offered the crown of Spain to Emmanuel in return for his support, we may be sure that the proposal was rejected in no uncertain terms.

The story of the attitude of France towards the revolt calls for more extended comment. It had its roots in the diplomatic rivalry between Charles and Francis in the years immediately following the death of Ferdinand the Catholic, and was closely linked with the thorny question of Navarre.

The Albrets had never recognized the validity of the conquest of their kingdom by Ferdinand the Catholic; and the kings of France, whenever the international situation threatened war with the Spanish monarchs, put pressure on the Navarrese sovereigns to recover their heritage by force of arms. It was Francis I who stirred up Henri d'Albret to launch the expedition which was defeated at Roncal;² and though he was careful not to lend it any active support, he was deeply chagrined at its failure. In the next few years, however, matters took a more peaceful turn. The Francophile tendencies of Charles's Burgundian counsellors made possible the treaty of Noyon (August 13, 1516) with the French court, in which was inserted a special clause relative to the question of Navarre. By it Charles promised that as soon as he reached Spain he would receive ambassadors from the Albrets, and, after having learned what claims

¹ Hieronymus Osorius, *De Rebus Emmanuelis . . . gestis Libri Duodecim* (Cologne, 1586), fol. 344 v. A mass of unpublished material on the negotiations between Portugal and the

revolutionists in Castile awaits the investigator in the Torre do Tombo at Lisbon. Cf. K. Häbler in *Historische Zeitschrift*, xciv, p. 388.

² Cf. *ante*, p. 20.

they could lawfully advance to the realm from which his grandfather had expelled them, that he would give them satisfaction "according to reason and in such manner that they ought reasonably to be content."¹ For over a year after the treaty of Noyon, things remained, despite much negotiation, essentially in statu quo, save that the death of the queen mother, Catharine of Navarre (February 12, 1517), deprived her youthful son, Henri, of her high hearted and courageous support.²

Whether Charles or his counsellors were in earnest in their promise at the treaty of Noyon may well be doubted; but it is certain that in making it they had been characteristically oblivious of the Spanish point of view. On this the young king was to be speedily enlightened soon after his arrival in Castile. The sixty-fourth petition of the cuaderno of the Cortes of Valladolid (February, 1518) left no room for doubt upon this point. "Your Highness is already aware," so it ran, "that the realm of Navarre has been united to the Crown of Castile since the Cortes of Burgos in 1515."³ The bishop of Badajoz has told us . . . that your Highness is firmly resolved to keep it. We beg your Highness to guard it, as your Highness' predecessors have done. . . . If, in order to defend this conquest, it is necessary to risk our lives and our fortunes, we are ready to do so, since that realm is the principal key to this kingdom."⁴ Under the circumstances, Charles had no alternative but to yield. "We have always been firmly resolved to keep the said realm," so ran the royal response, "in view of our rights to it and of its importance to these realms of Castile. . . . We thank you for your offers of service in this regard . . . but we are certain that we shall not be obliged to make use of them, for

¹ Boissonnade, *Réunion de la Navarre à la Castille*, pp. 483-484.

² *Ibid.*, p. 498.

³ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 347.

⁴ *Cortes*, iv, p. 278.

our rights to Navarre are so clear that no one would dare to dispute our possession.”¹

Charles was indeed between the devil and the deep sea. The Navarrese delegates, agreeably to the provisions of the treaty of Noyon, were already on the ground, and were effectively supported by the French ambassador, La Roche-beaucourt; the young king must have had much difficulty in keeping secret from them what had occurred in the sessions of the Cortes.² During the next six months the matter hung fire, but the Navarrese delegates found it impossible to obtain any real satisfaction for their demands for the execution of the treaty of Noyon. A proposal for solving the existing difficulties by a marriage between young Henri d'Albret and one of Charles's sisters was skilfully evaded. The Navarrese ambassadors followed the king into Aragon, but without result, and finally departed, angry and discouraged, in August. They would have been more disheartened still had they known of an event, occurring on the twenty-second of that month, which plainly showed how the king's mind was working on the question at issue. This was the secret cession by Germaine de Foix, the widow of Ferdinand the Catholic, to Charles, at his request, of all her rights and claims to the realm of Navarre. These rights had already been recognized by France. It was obvious that Charles, who now possessed them, was resolved not to abide by the treaty of Noyon, though he might continue indefinitely to negotiate in order to avoid the responsibility for breaking it. On this, as on many other questions, the young monarch was coming around to the Spanish point of view.³

Everything now depended on the attitude of France. Hitherto, though she had counselled much and promised more, she had carefully avoided anything that savored of

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 278. ² Boissonnade, *op. cit.*, pp. 508-510. ³ *Ibid.*, pp. 520-526.

aggression on behalf of the Albrets. Charles, on his part, had every reason to wish to avoid a rupture with Francis I; and so far the French monarch had seemed willing to keep the peace.¹ The result was the initiation of a new series of conferences on the Navarrese matter between French and Spanish delegates, at Montpellier; but delays and procrastinations on both sides prevented the plenipotentiaries from meeting until May 3, 1519, and the temper of both parties, when the sessions began, precluded any real hope of agreement. The French were by this time thoroughly convinced that the Spaniards did not really intend to restore Navarre; the Spaniards were certain that the French were supporting the Albrets in order to make trouble for their sovereign; and the rivalry of Charles and Francis over the control of the Empire was daily assuming a more threatening aspect. It was also at this juncture that Charles married Germaine de Foix to the Margrave John of Brandenburg,² thereby preventing a union which had been projected for that much-sought heiress with the famous French soldier, Lautrec. No common ground was left to the rival claimants, and on May 10 the conference broke up. Clearly the question at issue could not be settled by diplomacy, and war was the only way out.³

The result of the imperial election (June 28, 1519) served at once to hasten the combat and to enlarge its scope; in Italy, in Germany, in Burgundy, as well as in the Pyrenees, the young Emperor found himself at odds with the king of France. It was in Navarre, however, that the fighting first began.⁴ In February, 1520, Francis deliberately chal-

¹ A 'treaty of universal peace,' comprehending all the sovereigns of Western Europe, was arranged October 2, 1518. Cf. *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, nos. 4468 ff.

² Cf. below, footnote 2 to p. 127.

³ Boissonnade, pp. 526-538.

⁴ Save possibly for the semi-independent aggressions of Robert de la Marck in Luxemburg.

lenged his rival by solemnly calling upon him to fulfil his obligations under the treaty of Noyon, and when Charles attempted to put him off with an evasive reply, he began to prepare for war. The opportunity was in all respects favorable. The first grumblings of the coming rebellion in Castile were already making themselves heard; the Emperor could not remain to suppress it; in Navarre, where the Spanish viceroy, the Duke of Najera, was bitterly unpopular, the majority of the inhabitants yearned for the return of the Albrets. There was talk of a new dismemberment of the Spanish realms, of undoing the work of the Catholic Kings, and even of placing Castile under the suzerainty of Navarre!¹ But Francis was unaccountably slow in collecting soldiers and guns. The return of Charles to the Netherlands had drawn off his attention to that quarter, and he spent most of the autumn of 1520 vainly trying to secure the alliance of Henry VIII of England. Not till the end of December, after the revolt of the Comuneros had passed its zenith, did the French king give definite orders for the levying of troops in Gascony. Henri d'Albret, in the meantime, was much more active; and though he could not think of invading Castile without the support of the king of France, he certainly succeeded in making trouble for the Duke of Najera in Navarre.² At the very moment that the viceroy was most in need of reinforcements in order to make head against the threatened peril, he was called on to send men and guns to the Constable at Burgos, for the suppression of the revolt of the Comuneros. "If it be expedient," wrote Charles on October 24, "to take care for the preservation of Navarre, it is even more so to bear aid in the pacification of Castile." A series of bitter letters passed between the

¹ Boissonnade, pp. 539-542.

² On the correspondence of the Duke of Najera during the period of the

Comuneros, cf. Boissonnade, p. 545, notes.

viceroy and the regents over this thorny question of the disposal of his military resources; but the urgency of Adrian and the Constable, supported by the injunctions of the Emperor, carried the day. Navarre was denuded of defenders, and the guns and men were sent southward.¹

On the subject of the direct relations between the king of France and the Comuneros, there is disappointingly little information, a fact which is probably explained by the pains that were taken to keep them secret. The French monarch was not blind to the opportunity afforded him by the revolt to strike a fresh blow for the recovery of the Albret realm. In the late summer of 1520, he sent 'suitable persons' into Castile, to effect the liberation of the Marshal of Navarre, who had led the unsuccessful invasion of 1516, and had been imprisoned ever since in the castle of Simancas.² Among these was Count Pedro Navarro, of North African fame, who, after leading the Spanish infantry in the battle of Ravenna, had gone over into the service of France, and was charged with the mission of determining whether Simancas could be mined.³ These envoys were also in-

¹ Boissonnade, pp. 543-545.

² Sandoval, i, p. 58. He committed suicide in his prison in 1523.

³ *R. A. H.*, Mss. Salazar A-19, fol. 249. Charles V to Adrian of Utrecht from Brussels, September 27, 1520 . . . "por otras nuestras vos hauemos scrito los auisos que tenemos de Francia de las diligencias que el Rey de Francia faze para librar al Mariscal de Navarra, como havreys visto. Despues somos aduertido mas particularmente y de parte muy cierta que el dicho Rey de Francia no solamente ha enviado para esto personas proprias en Castilla, mas aun para ello, y para poner mayor comocion y alteracion en los Reynos de la que hay. . . . Tambien tenemos auiso que el Conde Pedro Navarro por orden del Rey de Francia es ido dis-

simulado por las postas en esse regno para reconocer si la fortaleza donde esta el mariscal podria minarse, y que ha vuelto con la relacion que no se puede hacer. Pero juntamente con esto sabemos que el mariscal tiene inteligencia por medio de una mujer o fija del alcaide teniente de guarda del mariscal, por donde es auisado y da auiso de todo lo que quiere, y que por esta via tracta tambien de librarse." The undated reply of Adrian to this letter (*R. A. H.*, Mss. Salazar, A-21, fol. 337, says: . . . "En lo del mariscal he fablado secretamente y cierto no se halla que tales hombres sean venydos; pero con todo esto no dexare de proueer lo que conuiene sobre ello." Cf. also Charles to Adrian, September 27, 1520, in Salazar Mss., A-45, fol. 21.

structed to discover whether it would be possible to cause "greater commotion" in Castile than at present existed; and letters were written to various grandees, among them the Constable, to see if they could not be won away from their allegiance.¹ But Charles and Adrian were well informed of these proceedings, and nothing seems to have come of them; while the Comuneros, on their side, kept demanding that the French king send an army. Writing from Toledo, in November, 1520, Peter Martyr assures us that great efforts were being made in that city to bring about a French invasion of Navarre.² But Francis dared not face the risk when the decisive moment came, and a golden opportunity was allowed to slip away. Instead of sending a large force, adequately equipped, and at once, he despatched an envoy to the Junta at Valladolid in January, 1521, to offer a diversion by 800 lances in the Albret lands, provided he was promised "that no hindrance would be placed in the way of their entrance by that route!"³ It is perhaps not surprising that the French king was so hesitant. He well knew how dangerous it was for any monarch to aid and abet rebellion in the land of his neighbor;⁴ his attention at this juncture

¹ *R. A. H.*, Mss. Salazar, A-19, fol. 249. Charles to Adrian, September 27, 1520. "Y que [el rey de Francia] ha scricto a algunas p̄sonas principales sobre ello, entre los quales es el Condestable de Castilla . . . y que le [i.e., the Constable] rogamos que por seruicio nuestro si alguna carta le han dado o le dieren assi del dicho Rey de Francia como de otras personas sobre esta materia, como lo tenemos por cierto, nos la envie luego con propria posta; que nos le prometemos de no mostrarla ni usar della de manera que se pueda tener quexa alguna." The letter contains emphatic assertions that Charles is convinced of the Constable's loyalty; but in places it sounds as if the Emperor were shouting to keep his courage up. Adrian, in his reply (*R. A. H.*,² Mss. Sa-

lazar, A-21, fol. 337) attempts to reassure him. "El Condestable," so he writes, "me scriue que de flandes se deuen enbiar buenas piecas de artillerya, y que se procuren dyneros o de Inglaterra o de Portugal, y que esto se haga luego, antes que las fuerças destos crezcan. . . ."

² *Opus Epistolarum*, epp. dxcv, dcccxi. Höfler, *Aufstand*, p. 167, thinks that Pedro Laso de la Vega was cognizant of these negotiations, but cites no evidence to support his view.

³ Danvila, in *M. H. E.*, xxxvii, p. 204; Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 48-49.

⁴ Lorenzo Aleandri de' Galeazzi, writing on July 3, 1521, speaks of all the "troubles" of Castile being "stirred up by the king of France," but it seems probable that his judgment was affected

was chiefly directed to the north ; and he had been obviously impressed by the firm determination which Castile had already shown not to permit the retrocession of Navarre. Yet it is clear that such dallying was fatal to his own plans ; indeed it is probable that it saved Charles's throne. Had he struck, with all his might, at the time when the rebellion was at its climax, it would have been impossible to resist him. Attacking as he finally did, almost a month after Villalar, he was speedily and decisively beaten.

The invading army was ready at last, on May 10, 1521 ; it was commanded by André de Foix, sieur de l'Esparre, and it numbered 12,000 infantry (half of them Gascons), 800 lances, and twenty-nine pieces of artillery. At first it carried all before it, for the regents had not yet been willing to despatch reënforcements to the viceroy.¹ The first fortresses fell almost without a blow. While Najera went south to beg for help from Valladolid, the powerful Francophile faction of the Agramonts joined the invaders, and their rivals, the Beaumonts, dared offer no resistance. On May 19, Pamplona capitulated to l'Esparre, and ten days later Tudela followed suit. Less than three weeks had enabled the French to overrun the entire kingdom ; and when the news was brought to the Emperor at Brussels, he was so cast down that he could not eat, but left the table for a conference with the Duke of Alva.²

But if the invaders found it easy to conquer Navarre, they were entirely unable to retain it. They reaped the reward of the tardiness of their masters, for Castile was now at peace and could muster forces to expel them. L'Esparre, moreover, did not use his victory to the best advantage. By refusing the petition of the Navarrese to bring the young

by the position of international affairs at the time he wrote. *L. & P. Hen.* VIII, iii, no. 1388.

¹ Boissonnade, pp. 546 ff.

² Baumgarten, *Geschichte Karls V.*, i, p. 484.

king to Pamplona, he lent color to the report that the Valois sovereign had undertaken to conquer the realm, not for the sake of the Albrets, but for his own. He assumed all the powers and prerogatives of a reigning monarch, and irritated the Navarrese by his severity and exactions.¹ Furthermore, he neglected to consolidate his conquests. So confident was he in the position that he had won, that he not only sent home some of his Gascon troops, but even ventured to cross the Ebro with the rest, to lay siege to the town of Logroño. Ignoring the defeat of the rebels at Villalar, he imagined that by shouting for the 'Communes of Castile' he could win for himself a cordial welcome from the inhabitants. As a matter of fact, he did precisely the reverse. Najera had had time to put 4000 men into Logroño; the pride of the Castilian aristocracy, assembled within the walls, flamed out against the allies of the Comuneros whom they had overthrown. The invaders encountered a desperate resistance, and as rumors came in of overwhelming reënforcements, sent on by the Constable from the Castilian cities, l'Esparre began to realize that the tide had turned. News also arrived from Aragon to complete his discomfiture. The Cortes at Saragossa had promised aid to the Castilians; indeed an Aragonese detachment had already got in behind l'Esparre at Sangüesa, and threatened to cut off his retreat. Under the circumstances there was nothing for it but to retire as rapidly as possible. On June 11, he broke camp before Logroño, and began to withdraw into Navarre.²

Step by step, for the next nineteen days, the retreat continued. The pursuing Castilians, ably led by the Constable, steadily gained in spirit and increased in numbers; by the middle of June they counted almost 30,000 men. L'Es-

¹ Boissonnade, pp. 550-551.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 550-554, and F. J. Gómez,

El Sitio de Logroño en 1521 (Logroño, 1890).

parre neglected to concentrate his available troops, but took up what he believed to be an impregnable position, with the forces that he had, in the valley of the Ebro backed by the Sierra del Perdon. Realizing the futility of a frontal attack there, the Constable marched around behind him into the valley of Pamplona, and there, on June 30, between the villages of Noain and Esquiros, forced his foe to accept an unequal battle. For a time the skilful handling of the French artillery, coupled with the splendid dash of their infantry charges, gave l'Esparre the advantage; but a furious assault of the Castilian cavalry, which the Constable delivered in the nick of time, reestablished the Spanish front, enabled their hard-pressed infantry to reform, and finally made possible the capture of the enemy's cannon, which were promptly turned against them. From that moment, the battle became a rout.¹ The French left 6000 dead on the field; all their guns and a great number of prisoners were taken, among them l'Esparre, who had been temporarily blinded by a lance thrust in the visor of his helmet. In a few days more, the whole of Navarre was again in Spanish hands, and no serious effort to reconquer it was ever made again.² Nine years later the little corner of Ultrapuertos, north of the Pyrenees, was voluntarily ceded by Charles V to the Albrechts on account of the great expense of maintaining it; in 1589 it was united to France with the accession of Henry of Navarre. But the rest of the realm, which was incorporated into Castile, became gradually Hispanicized in the succeeding years. Charles had the wisdom to follow the precedents of Spanish history, and the example of Ferdinand the Catholic, and suffer it to retain a large measure of institutional autonomy.³ He was lenient in his dealings with those who

¹ Mexia, *Historia*, pp. 247-256; Sandoval, i, pp. 377-379. Cf. also Sánchez Alonso, *Fuentes*, nos. 2141, 2142, 2143.

² On this and the preceeding paragraphs, cf. Santa Cruz, i, pp. 466 ff.

³ Navarre continued to be adminis-

had fought against him, and Najera was replaced by a more popular viceroy, the Count of Miranda. In one sense the Navarrese annalist Aleson was correct in characterizing the battle of Noain as "the definitive sentence which blotted Navarre from the roll of nations," but in view of her past history and traditions and of the measure of local liberty which she was permitted to retain, one inclines to prefer the verdict of a more modern writer, that "the victory of the Spaniards was not that of one nation over another. Its sole result was the expulsion of a race of princes who were more French than Spanish. Nothing was changed in Navarre, save the advent of one more dynasty."¹

For the student of the development of the Spanish Empire, however, the struggle which has just been described for the possession of the little Pyrenean realm has a much deeper significance than the mere acquisition of a kingdom. It contributed, more perhaps than anything else, to the education of Charles's Castilian subjects in the policy to which their new sovereign's vast inheritance had now unavoidably committed them. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as we have already seen,² there had been a long and almost uninterrupted tradition of friendship between France and Castile. This had been broken, it is true, to a certain extent during the latter part of the rule of the Catholic Kings; still the wars with the French for the possession of Naples had been regarded hitherto by the mass of the Castilians as a *cosa de Aragon* — an affair of the eastern kingdoms. They had joined in them, perforce, because their queen was the wife of the Aragonese king; but down to the conquest and annexation of Navarre in 1512 and 1515, their interests were

tered by viceroys till 1808; and the viceregal title, reëstablished in 1814, did not finally disappear till 1833. By a law of August 16, 1841, Navarre was given the status of a province,

which she retains today; but certain remnants of her ancient institutional autonomy are still preserved.

¹ Boissonnade, p. 562.

² Cf. *ante*, Vol. I, pp. 132-139.

primarily elsewhere, at home, in North Africa, and in the Indies. Now, since the incorporation of Navarre with Castile, they had acquired a vital interest in the struggle with France which would be necessary to retain it. The request of the Cortes of Valladolid in 1518¹ gave dramatic evidence of this, as did the readiness with which the Castilians flocked to defend Navarre when the crisis came in 1521. Through Navarre they were brought to approve and support, with a measure of willingness which they would not otherwise have shown, the wars with France which violated their national traditions, but which the position and inheritance of the new sovereign rendered inevitable. It is true that for many years to come, they continued to show reluctance to go abroad to seek the foe. The union with Aragon was still too recent, and their tradition of isolation from the rest of Western Europe still too strong, for them to be reconciled at once to a policy of conquest beyond the Pyrenees.² Nevertheless the struggle over Navarre in 1521 marks an important stage in the imperial education of Castile. Henceforth, she was convinced that it was her destiny to fight France, in order to retain the realm that she had won. It was not a long step further to persuade her to acquiesce in the extension of that process to foreign battlefields, in order to make fresh conquests in other parts of Western Europe. She would thenceforth take the place which destiny had prepared for her as the chief instrument of her foreign ruler in the accomplishment of his imperial task.

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 95.

² When the French attack on Fontarabia was at its height in March, 1523, the English ambassador reported that "the great lords have been daily with the Emperor, some offering 500 men-at-arms at their own charge; and [Valladolid], Burgos, Medina, and many others have offered 2000 footmen for six months

or 1000 for a year"; two weeks later, when it had become obvious that the Emperor's attention was directed to more distant battlefields, we are told that "the zeal for the war has abated." Cf. *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, nos. 2879, 2908; also pet. 95 of the Cortes of 1523, *Cortes*, iv, p. 398.

One trivial incident of the war in Navarre was destined to have results more important than the winning of a kingdom — more lasting, in fact, than the Spanish Empire itself. Among the handful of cavaliers who vainly essayed to check l'Esparre's mad rush southward, at Pamplona, was a high born youth from Loyola in Guipuzcoa, by name Iñigo Lopez de Recalde; youngest of a family of thirteen, he had hitherto led the gay life of a soldier from a noble house, and had once been a page of Ferdinand the Catholic. Struck by a cannon ball on the battlements of Pamplona, he fell unconscious into the moat between the walls. One of his legs was shattered and the other badly hurt, and the military career to which he had ardently looked forward was thenceforth closed to him forever. But the prospect of a life of enforced idleness was unendurable to him; if he could not fight under the banners of Castile, there were other noble causes which he deeply longed to serve. His French captors treated him kindly, and after two weeks sent him home in a litter to Loyola. During his convalescence there, he read with increasing emotion in the lives of Christ and of the saints. Finally he became convinced that it was his duty to choose a new calling, and to devote himself henceforth to the advancement of the church. Of the consequences of that high resolve was born the Society of Jesus.¹

We have already noted the trouble that was brewing at Valencia at the time of the king's departure for the Empire: — the hatreds between the classes and the masses in which it originated, the vacillation of the departing monarch in his attitude towards the uprising, and finally his despatching, on April 10, 1520, of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Count of Melito, with instructions to put it down —

¹ The most recent biography of Ignatius is that of H. D. Sedgwick (New York, 1923).

peacefully, if possible, if not, by force of arms.¹ The way in which this revolt was further developed and finally suppressed, as well as the results which ultimately ensued from it, furnish an excellent illustration of the diversity of the problems with which the young Emperor was constantly confronted, in the far scattered portions of his vast dominions.

Mendoza reached Valencia on May 21. Any hopes which he may have entertained that his authority would be recognized by the masses were rudely dispelled by the reception which awaited him. He was not even permitted to proceed to the cathedral by the route which he had selected, but was obliged to follow one suggested to him by a weaver, who spoke in the name of the Germanía. Two weeks of this sort of treatment convinced the viceroy that there was no use in remaining in the capital. On June 6, he fled from Valencia in disguise, and after some days of aimless wandering betook himself finally to Játiva. At the time of his arrival he had reason to expect a cordial reception. A number of the aristocracy had gathered there, and the municipal representatives had invited him to come. Mendoza, however, was soon to learn that the power of the Germanía was by no means confined to the capital. The Thirteen brought pressure on the artisans of Játiva the moment they learned where Mendoza was. A series of clashes between his adherents and the mob convinced him that there was nothing to be gained by remaining in his new abode; and after a stay of a few weeks he took refuge in Denia, where he summoned all loyal men to rally to his standard. He now gave out that he proposed to abandon negotiation and proceed against the rebellion by force of arms, but the rapid series of changes of base, to which he had been involuntarily subjected ever since his arrival, did not augur well for his success on the field of battle.²

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 56.

² Danvila, *Germanía*, pp. 76 ff.; Häbler, pp. 135-139.

On the other hand, the policy of the Germanía was pitifully deficient in opportunism and statesmanship. Save for a few of the northerly districts on the Catalan frontier, it had the entire kingdom virtually in its control. Under the circumstances it should have made every effort to extend the revolt into Aragon and Catalonia, and above all to make common cause with the rebellion in Castile. But this, despite an unusually favorable opportunity, it signally failed to accomplish. The city of Murcia, though on Castilian soil, was economically in far closer touch with the Valencian towns than with the cities of the North. An informal sort of a Germanía had sprung into being there before the revolt of the Comuneros had fairly begun, and the movement extended itself to Lorca and Cartagena. Adrian despatched a Castilian alcalde to deal with this uprising; but his forces were wholly inadequate, and he was soon obliged to take refuge in ignominious flight. Foreseeing that a fresh punitive expedition would in all probability follow, Murcia sent messengers to Valencia to ask for aid; they were welcomed with enthusiasm, but nothing effective was accomplished to secure the coöperation desired. The result was that Murcia, whose rising had been opposed by the Castilian authorities, shifted over into an alliance with the Comuneros, who were threatened from the same source. For a time she sent her delegates to the Santa Junta, but she was one of the first to return to her allegiance; indeed her inhabitants were to lend useful aid in the suppression of the Germanía in the following year.¹

¹ A brief account of the attitude of Murcia can be found in Häbler, pp. 137-138. Fuller information may be derived from Santa Cruz, i, pp. 336, 440 ff., and Danvila's *Germanía*, pp. 120-121, 156-158. The battle of Orihuela, won on August 30, 1521, by the

Marquis de los Velez over the Agermanados of the south, really cut the last link between Murcia and the Valencian revolt. Cf. also A. Merino Álvarez, *Geografía Histórica de Murcia* (Madrid, 1915), p. 233.

In Aragon and in Catalonia the movement found even less support. An embassy from Valencia to Saragossa was informed that the Aragonese recognized but one authority, namely, the rule of the Emperor Charles; and Barcelona, though socially and industrially she had so much in common with Valencia, would give no aid to the rising in the South. Only in the Balearics did the *Germanía* succeed in producing a sympathetic insurrection, but distance and the intervening waters prevented effective coöperation between them. Spanish separatism had been the bane of many a monarch in the past, but on the present occasion it saved Charles's throne. Cleavages, social and national, were the ruin of all these revolts. Had all ranks of the population, in any portion of his dominions, stood loyally shoulder to shoulder until the end, or had the same class of malcontents in the different parts of the Iberian peninsula united their forces, the royal authority could scarcely have been maintained.

It was some time before Mendoza could put an army in the field. His conviction that the existing difficulties could only be settled by force of arms was not yet shared by his absent master, who continued through the autumn of 1520 and the early spring of 1521 to send special representatives to the heads of the *Germanía*, to see if it might not be possible to find a peaceful way out.¹ Not until the latter part of April was it evident that these negotiations could not succeed. The royal terms were not ungenerous; but the self-confidence of the *Germanía* had by this time mounted so high that it was increasingly deaf to reasonable appeals, and the situation was not improved by sundry sporadic outbreaks of violence in Valencia. The long delays which these peace proceedings imposed were highly unfavorable to Mendoza's

¹ Häbler, pp. 139-140.

military preparations. The Valencian royalists lost confidence in his leadership, and were slow to respond to his repeated calls for troops. The Germanía, in the meantime, sent an army against him. On July 14 it captured Játiva; with the death of its leader before the walls, the chief command fell to a cloth seller called Vicente Peris, who challenged the royalist forces by marching straight on their headquarters at Gandía.¹ Mendoza wished to retire without a battle, but his followers would hear of no retreat. In the combat that ensued on July 25 the royalists were soundly beaten. Their army was dispersed. Their leaders were at odds. Denia managed to hold out against the rebels, but Mendoza was unwilling to remain there. Against the wishes of the inhabitants and of his own adherents, he took ship and sailed for Peñíscola in the northern part of the realm, there to await reinforcements which would enable him to resume the offensive.²

In the North the king's cause had better fortune: for the excesses of the revolutionists had alienated the local aristocracy, who rallied unitedly to the support of the crown. A small detachment which the rebels had sent against Murviedro was badly beaten at Oropesa (June 30) by the Duke of Segorbe; and a rescuing party met the same fate at Almenara on July 18.³ The adherents of the Germanía did not make good soldiers. Discipline was woefully lacking, and of tactics and strategy they were ignorant. Meantime in the capital the aspect of affairs had greatly changed. The departure of the military forces of the Germanía had weakened the radical party there. The magistrates whom

¹ Mendoza had moved to Gandía from Denia in June, 1521. Häbler, p. 139, note.

² Santa Cruz, i, pp. 419 ff.; Danvila, *Germanía*, pp. 142-153; Ribés y San-

güesa, *Estudi Crític*, pp. 73-74, puts the battle at Gandía on July 30.

³ Santa Cruz, i, pp. 418-419. Ribés y Sangüesa, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-73, dates the fight at Oropesa on July 4.

they had left in office were anxious for peace, and their efforts in this direction were ably seconded by the viceroy's elder brother, Rodrigo, Marquis of Zenete, who had labored for reconciliation since the outbreak of the struggle. These efforts soon bore fruit in an invitation to the Marquis to come to Valencia, to assume the chief authority there pending the restoration of law and order. After consulting with his brother, Zenete accepted (July 4), and such were his popularity and skill in his new office that he soon succeeded in obtaining the voluntary resignation of the Council of Thirteen, which the Emperor had demanded as the price of peace. Mendoza was much encouraged by these favorable signs, and he strengthened his brother's hand in the capital by arranging for the return thither of the Infante Don Enrique, the natural son of Ferdinand the Catholic, who had an official residence in Valencia, and could be regarded as a quasi-representative of the royal family. On the other hand, the viceroy neglected no precautions to strengthen his military forces, for he rightly conjectured that battles were still to be fought.¹

While these events were occurring at the capital, the rebel army under Vicente Peris had moved northwest into the interior. It was in this portion of the kingdom that the estates of the nobility were chiefly concentrated, and these estates were largely cultivated by a Moorish rural population. It will be remembered that the edict of 1502, which provided for the conversion of all Moors remaining in Castile, had not yet been extended to the eastern kingdoms, where they were still permitted to continue in the enjoyment of their own customs and religion.² But they were deeply detested by the population of Valencia, partly on account of their faith, and still more on account of jealousy of their economic

¹ Häbler, pp. 142-145.

² Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 96.

prosperity and happiness. This animosity had been carefully nurtured by the leaders of the Germanía, with the result that when Peris's army arrived in the interior, it committed all sorts of outrages against the Moorish population. Many were murdered in cold blood. Others were robbed and forcibly baptized. Naturally those that escaped flocked eagerly to the standards of the nobility for protection and revenge, and the nobles themselves, who had lost so much good labor, became more hostile than ever to the revolutionary forces.¹ Now, if ever, the Germanía should have proceeded cautiously, but Peris was not the man to read the signs of the times. On hearing that the example of his soldiers had been followed in Valencia, and that an outburst against the Moors there had resulted in the forcible conversion of the local mosque into a Christian church, he rashly betook himself to the capital in hopes of regaining it for the Germanía. He received a vociferous welcome from the gilds, and succeeded in collecting some men and artillery, but on October 11 he was defeated by the Marquis of Zenete outside the walls, and forced to seek refuge in Játiva. This episode marked the end of the Germanía in the capital. Zenete soon severed it from the other centres of the revolution. He relentlessly punished all who resisted him, and the rest were only too glad to come to terms. The municipal elections gave an overwhelming verdict in favor of the return of the lawful authorities, and on November 9 Mendoza reëntered Valencia in triumph.²

The rebellion was now limited to Játiva and Alcira. Mendoza besieged these towns for a few weeks without success; then, yielding to a popular demand that an attempt be made to secure their submission by negotiation, he despatched his brother to confer with the representatives of the Germanía.

¹ Lea, *The Moriscos of Spain*, pp. 62-63. ² Danvila, *Germanía*, pp. 162-165.

Peris, however, had no faith in diplomacy. On the day of Zenete's arrival he managed to stir up a revolt in Játiva which resulted in the Marquis being temporarily made prisoner, while the others who had accompanied him were ordered out of the city. But Peris's triumph was very brief. Those who favored negotiation resented his interference. They were persuaded that the imprisonment of Zenete was a stain on their honor, and on February 9, 1522, the Marquis was permitted to return to his brother. Peris's prestige was destroyed by this blow. He left Játiva and reappeared in Valencia, where the power of his personality caused the populace to rush to arms. Overconfident in his ability to maintain a resistance, he refused a last offer to negotiate with Zenete, with the result that on March 3 the royalist troops attacked his dwelling. The house was fired and Peris was caught. On the morrow he and two of his chief adherents were quartered, while nine others of his followers were hanged. Outside the capital the resistance continued until the winter of 1523; a mysterious personality — *El Rey Encubierto*¹ — succeeded Peris as the leader of the rebels, and swore to avenge the death of his predecessor. But the mass of the population was weary of fighting. Sporadic outbreaks took place, but they became fewer and weaker as the months rolled by. At last the royalists could concentrate against Játiva and Alcira, and forced them, after a brief struggle, to lay down their arms.²

The course of the revolt in Majorca presents certain interesting peculiarities. It started, as we have already noted, in response to representations from the rebels of Valencia; but it also had deep roots in the previous history of the Balearics. The devastating strife which had been waged there,

¹ Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 11 ff.

² Santa Cruz, i, pp. 442 ff.; Danvila, *Germania*, pp. 167-181.

under John II, between the large landholders and the mass of the population¹ had engendered the bitterest feelings between the different classes of society; and though the war had ceased under the Catholic Kings, its legacy of hatred had remained undiminished. From the beginning of the rising, therefore, which started in Majorca in February, 1521, class lines were drawn far more definitely than in Castile or in Valencia. The workmen, artisans, and peasants were all intensely sympathetic with the movement; the nobility, officials, and richer burgesses united their forces to put it down. The rebels were unusually well furnished with arms, with which the Balearics in their exposed position were always kept plentifully supplied. And, lastly, even more than the Comuneros of Castile they had an excellent opportunity to secure aid from France. The Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria, who at this period commanded the French fleet, was continually cruising about in the waters near the island; but owing to lack of energy and foresight on one or both sides, he did not drop anchor in the bay of Majorca until July, 1522, after the revolt was well on the way to its decline. To the tardiness of the rebels in combining with the foreigner, both here and in Castile, a large share of the responsibility for the failure of both insurrections is unquestionably to be ascribed.

The main lines of the Majorcan revolt are not difficult to trace. When the first news of it was brought to Don Miguel de Gurrea — the Aragonese nobleman who represented the crown — he gave orders for the arrest of several of the ringleaders; but so impressive was the demonstration of popular wrath, that on the following day he was obliged to release them. The masses organized themselves with extraordinary rapidity. They chose as their leader, with the

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. I, p. 503.

title of *instador*, one of Gurrea's intended victims, a cloth merchant called Juan Crespi. A small council was associated with him for advisory purposes, while a larger one of twenty-six members maintained relations with the masses and the gilds. Emissaries were despatched to the other towns of the island, to secure their coöperation; finally, on March 16, 1521, they demanded and compelled Gurrea's resignation. In his place they selected a local nobleman, Don Pedro de Pachs, and dragged him in triumph from his country seat to the capital; but when Pachs, to show his disapproval of their conduct, withdrew at the first opportunity to the shelter of his domain, they pursued him relentlessly, besieged him in his castle, and finally, on July 29, murdered him there, with all the rest of the aristocracy of the neighborhood, who had flocked to him for protection. This episode unchained the worst passions of the populace. The aristocracy were obliged to flee for their lives, the viceroy seeking safety in the island of Iviza; even there he found it not altogether easy to maintain himself, though the insurrection was nowhere so powerful as in Majorca. When the revolution was at its height, it was master of that entire island save the town of Alcudia, whose natural defences, high walls, and ability to communicate by water with comparatively loyal Minorca, made it the principal refuge of nobles, officials, and the municipal aristocracy.¹

It was in fact before the walls of Alcudia that the power of the Balearic Germanía wore itself out. Throughout the winter of 1521-22, the town was regularly besieged by the rebel army; but the assaults upon the fortress were not successful, while the sorties by the defenders wrought havoc in the camp of their foes. The siege gradually degenerated into

¹ A. Campaner y Fuertes, *Chronicon Germanía*, pp. 121-123; Häbler, pp. *Mayoricense*, pp. 225-254; Danvila, 149-154.

a sort of land blockade, and the blockade in turn into a guard so lax that the defenders of the city were able to go out unharmed and reap their crops. But it was not till after Charles's return to Spain, in the summer of 1522, that the aristocracy and the constituted authorities ventured to assume the offensive. Four galleys and 800 men were despatched by the Emperor to Gurreea in Iviza, to serve as a nucleus for his adherents to rally around; with these Gurreea crossed over to Alcudia, and thence, in October, began to reconquer Majorca. After two months of costly guerrilla warfare against the small isolated bands into which the revolutionists had broken up, the siege of Palma was started in December. It was accompanied by many horrors, and lasted three full months, before the efforts of the bishop of the see were successful in arranging terms. It was doubtless owing to this clerical intervention that the conditions of surrender were not much harsher; for the aristocracy had suffered much and burned for revenge. Only the ringleaders and notorious criminals were tortured before being put to death, and the regular executions did not exceed twenty-five. The tale of the victims, as established from authentic sources, falls far below that given in the contemporary chronicles.¹

On July 16, 1522, after an absence of more than two years, Charles landed at Santander, and trod once more the soil of Spain.² A brief summary of his experiences since his departure is essential to a comprehension of the situation at his return.

Of the twenty-six months that had elapsed since he left Castile, Charles had spent more than sixteen in the Netherlands, nearly seven and a half in the Empire, and the rest

¹ Campaner y Fuertes, *op. cit.*, pp. 245-252; 296-297; M. Moragues Pro and J. Maria Bover, *Historia General*

del Reino de Mallorca, iii, pp. 471-537.

² Foronda, p. 205.

in England and on the sea. On October 23, 1520, he had been crowned King of the Romans at Aix-la-Chapelle, and on the following day he had assumed the title of Roman Emperor Elect.¹ His war with Francis I — the product of inherited rivalries in Burgundy and in Italy, and inevitable since his election to the Empire — had begun in earnest in the summer of 1521; in Flanders, on the Pyrenees, and in Lombardy the two great rivals had already come to blows. The days of the treaty of Noyon and of the Francophile counsellors of Charles's early years were now gone for ever. Chièvres himself had died at Worms on May 28, 1521, and his influence had steadily waned in the preceeding months.² In the diplomatic contest for allies, moreover, which had accompanied the outbreak of the war with France, Charles had on the whole come out victorious. Leo X was supporting the Imperialists in Italy when death overtook him on December 1. On January 9, 1522, Adrian of Utrecht was elected as his successor. England also was strongly anti-French. The Field of the Cloth of Gold (June, 1520) was a diplomatic fiasco, while Charles's two visits to England (May 26–29, 1520, May 26–July 6, 1522) and the intervening conferences at Calais and Bruges laid apparently firm foundations for an Anglo-Imperial alliance. And finally, on April 17, 1521, Charles had solemnly declared against Martin Luther at the ever memorable diet of Worms. On the twenty-sixth of the following May he had ordered the publication of the ban of the Empire against the Saxon monk and all his adherents.³

The feelings with which the Spaniards regarded these great events were doubtless mixed; but there can be little doubt that satisfaction was predominant. They intensely dis-

¹ Foronda, p. 184.

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, nos. 1226, 1318.

³ Foronda, pp. 170–204, *passim*; Nitti, *Leone X e la sua politica*, pp. 146–229, *passim*.

liked their monarch's absence, and they must have foreseen that it was bound to be repeated. As to the war with France their attitude has already been described. On the Pyrenees they supported it heart and soul, but in Italy and the Netherlands they tended to draw back; their imperial education was still too incomplete, and the Castilians were unquestionably more reluctant than the Aragonese. But the glory of having an Emperor for their sovereign was a telling argument to convince the grumblers. Charles had been crowned, and Charles had come back to them. Spain was the home of the King of Kings and the seat of the highest authority in the Christian world; the *Hispaniae Consolatio* had actually come true. And the condemnation of Luther was the climax of it all. Spain had not failed to let Charles know her wishes in this matter. On April 12, 1521, Adrian of Utrecht, the Admiral of Castile, and a number of the lords and prelates of the realm had written him an urgent letter, begging him to punish the Saxon heretic for his "poisonous errors," and to forbid the translation of his works into Spanish; on the two following days their example was followed by the Royal Council at Burgos and also by the bishop of Oviedo.¹ These letters did not reach Charles until after he had declared against Luther, though probably before he had issued the ban; but there was certainly great rejoicing among the Spaniards when the news of his decision was announced. Whatever his foreign responsibilities, their new sovereign was loyal to the faith, to his duty as temporal head of Christendom, and to the established tradition of his Iberian dominions.

Altogether Spain was far better disposed to think well of

¹ Cf. Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 1-2; Bergenroth, *Supplement* to vols. i and ii of the *C. S. P.*, *Spanish*, nos. 87, 88, 89. The absence of any signatures of the

representatives of the Castilian cities is doubtless to be explained by the fact that the war against the Comuneros was still in progress.

her young monarch when he returned in 1522, than when he first arrived in 1517. This favorable impression was also enhanced by the personal appearance of the king and his entourage. Chièvres was dead, and the hated Flemings had not returned; the king's chief adviser was now the Piedmontese Gattinara, with a vigorous anti-French policy in Italy, which the Spaniards, though they might not wholeheartedly approve of it, could at least understand.¹ They would of course have liked it better had he been one of themselves. They would have preferred it had he been interested less in Milan and more in Navarre; still the contrast to his predecessor was so agreeable that they were not disposed to complain. But what doubtless pleased them most was the change that they could observe in the king himself. He was no longer a puppet in the hands of his entourage, but a full grown man, with a mind of his own, and a will to translate his thoughts into deeds. "His Majesty," wrote the ambassador of his brother Ferdinand from Valladolid on November 1, 1522, "is very well, and hard at work as a result of the recent events. He takes much pleasure in jousting, to the delight of his court, and goes every afternoon to the tilting field. . . . It is said that he expects to reorganize his Council . . . and his household. . . . He has rendered justice on all hands, and those who were most guilty during the late troubles are being condemned every day."² A

¹ Gossart, pp. 191-195. The foremost modern authority on Gattinara is C. Bornate, who published *Ricerche intorno alla vita di M. Gattinara* at Novara in 1899, and found and edited, in vol. xvii, pp. 231-585, of the third series of the *Miscellanea di Storia Italiana* (Turin, 1915), the chancellor's autobiography, "Historia vite et gestorum per Dominum Magnum Cancellarium," which was believed to be lost. There is a full list of all the published writings on Gattinara on pp. 235-236 of the latter work.

² A. Rodríguez Villa, *El Emperador Carlos V y su Corte*, p. 72. Cardinal Wolsey, after the interview at Bruges in August, 1521, described Charles to Henry as "very wise and well understanding his affairs, right cold and temperate in speech, with assured manner, couching his words right well and to good purpose when he doth speak." *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 1515. Cf. also Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 37 ff., for an account of the "fisonomía y condiciones del Emperador" at this period.

pleasing change, unquestionably, from the gawky stripling of five years before; moreover, Charles had made a heroic effort to satisfy his Iberian subjects on another tender point; he had actually succeeded in learning a little Spanish.¹ On the other hand, it was evident that the returning monarch did not propose to tolerate insubordination. The attacks of the French in the Pyrenees and the despatch of a large detachment of Spanish troops to guard the Netherlands gave him two pretexts for bringing with him into Castile 3000 German landsknechts, with an impressive train of seventy-four pieces of artillery. Foreign soldiers and foreign cannon were henceforth often to be employed by Charles V to forestall and put down rebellion in his different dominions. Here was a sign which all Spaniards could read; their sovereign had returned with prestige and renown; he had shown an appreciation of the Spanish point of view; but he was also indisputably master of the situation.²

Charles was not disposed to be merciful to the leaders of the recent revolts. Adrian³ and the Admiral wanted him to issue a general pardon, but the Emperor was determined that the worst offenders must be punished.⁴ But he did not propose to share the odium incident to the executions. He had been fortunate in that the Comuneros had been put down during his absence, and made the most of it by remaining in the North, at Palencia, until after the bulk of the death penalties had been inflicted.⁵ He was present, however, on November 1 at Valladolid, at an imposing ceremony at

¹ P. Martyr, ep. dccxxxv.

² Sandoval, i, p. 417; Häbler, p. 168; Armstrong, i, p. 98.

³ Adrian, who had learned of his election to the Papacy at Vitoria on January 24, 1522, passed across into Aragon in March, and, after long delays, sailed for Italy from Tarragona in early August. Charles, on his arrival at Santander on July 16, sent a messenger

to the new Pope to request an interview before he left Spain, but Adrian excused himself on the ground of pressure of affairs at Rome. Gachard, *Correspondance de Charles-Quint et d'Adrien VI, passim*; Pastor, *History of the Popes*, ix, pp. 44-60.

⁴ Gossart, p. 144.

⁵ He took pains, however, to scrutinize every separate process, beginning

which the course and termination of the rebellion were formally proclaimed; of the 293 persons excepted from the pardon there announced, most of those not already executed were either banished or suffered confiscation of property in varying degrees.¹ The *cause célèbre* was that of the fighting bishop of Zamora, who awaited his sentence in the castle of Simancas. His clerical status rendered him immune from torture or the death penalty. Adrian at Rome even spoke of absolving him, and though Clement VII was more willing to take Charles's point of view in the case, there were long delays, and for a time nothing was done. But Acuña was not the man to await the pleasure of emperors or popes. His age — some sixty-five years — had by no means deprived him of physical vigor, and in February, 1526, he determined to make a bold dash for liberty. With a heavy stone and a knife which he had concealed about his person, he fell upon his jailer, who was conversing with him in his cell, and murdered him there before help could be summoned; another guard narrowly escaped the same fate, and Acuña had almost got away when he was finally retaken. This time the Emperor proceeded without leave from Rome, and ordered the immediate execution of Acuña by the garrote; but he was careful to seek papal absolution for what he had done, and abstained from the communion until after it had been accorded to him.²

The main grievances against the king which had produced the revolt were his impending departure, his foreign advisers and the favors which he had shown them in Castile, and,

with the lowly ones, "a sign that the rest will not be forgotten." A. Rodríguez Villa, *Carlos V*, p. 59.

¹ Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 15-16; Gossart, p. 146, and references there. Cf. also below, p. 229, note.

² Gossart, pp. 146-148; Höfler, *Acuña*, pp. 80 ff. Cf. also, for further details, B. M., Add. Mss. 28,575, fol. 163. Acuña apparently underwent the torture of the pulley, and was threatened with that of the rack on the day preceding his execution.

finally, his heavy taxation.¹ The position in which these three matters of divergence were left after the triumphant suppression of the rebellion may be gathered from a study of the text of the proceedings of a meeting of the Castilian Cortes which Charles summoned to Valladolid in July, 1523.

The mere fact that the king had returned was a partial answer to the complaints of his departure, and it was clinched by an elaborate harangue from the royal representative, in which the causes and results of Charles's journey into the Empire were fully set forth and the reasons for the war with France described in detail. The procuradores were made to feel that the king's absence had been unavoidable; they were flattered by the assurance that he regarded "these realms as the head of all the rest"² and that he was using their resources "not only to sustain the others which God had given him, but also to gain new ones and carry his pillars *plus ultra* for the advancement of the holy Catholic faith." They continued to express their regrets in future years whenever the situation rendered it imperative that he should leave them: "Your Majesty's protracted absence from your Spanish kingdoms," wrote the Admiral of Castile in 1531, "though indispensable perhaps for the safety of threatened Christendom, and the furtherance of your own political views, is a thing to which your Spanish subjects can hardly reconcile themselves."³ But as the years rolled by they gradually accepted what they were unable to prevent, and centred their efforts upon obtaining a suitable regent. "The remedy for all things, after God," run the words of a paper on the good government of Spain during a period when the Emperor was expected to be away, "since it is impossible for your Majesty to be continually in these

¹ Cf. the first paragraph of this Chapter.

² *Cortes*, iv, p. 366.

³ *C. S. P., Spanish*, iv, 2, no. 680. Cf. also *Cortes*, v, pp. 181-182.

kingdoms, is that you should leave in your place that person who may most worthily represent you.”¹

As to the foreign advisers, Charles certainly met his subjects half way. They were reassured by observing that he was no longer surrounded by Flemings. When they begged him to employ only Spaniards in his household, he answered that he had reserved for them a large number of places, when he had reorganized his suite on his departure from the Netherlands.² So crying had been the abuse on the occasion of Charles's first visit that it was many a long year before Castile was satisfied on this point. There was a small riot in Valladolid just before the opening of the Cortes, when some veterans, returning from the war in Valencia, “went through the street like men who had taken a town, crying ‘Spayna, Spayna! and death to all the Flemings’³”; and the cuadernos of the Cortes and the various state papers advert to the matter until the very end of the reign.⁴ But these later remonstrances were scarcely justified by the facts. Charles employed his Spanish subjects increasingly, both at home and abroad; indeed, at the close, the picture was reversed, for it was by Spaniards that he governed his other dominions. “Since it would be wrong,” replied the Emperor to the Cortes of 1523, “to separate the members which God has joined together in one body, we intend, as is reasonable, to be served conjointly by all the nations of our realms and dominions, preserving to each of them its laws and its customs.”⁵ On one subsidiary point Castile got no real satisfaction during the Emperor's lifetime; Burgundian

¹ Bib. Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, G-53, Ms. 1751, fols. 411-417.

² *Cortes*, iv, p. 366.

³ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 3087; A. Rodríguez Villa, *Carlos V*, p. 123; Gossart, p. 152.

⁴ *Cortes*, vols. iv, v, *passim*; Bib.

Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, E-31, Ms. 904, fols. 208-266, *passim*.

⁵ *Cortes*, iv, p. 366. After the death of his French confessor, Jean Glapion, in 1522, Charles invariably selected Spaniards to fill this important office. Gossart, p. 157.

magnificence replaced the time honored simplicity of the court of Ferdinand and Isabella. "Although your Majesty holds the Empire, and is lord of many great realms and seigniories," runs the petition of the procuradores of 1523, "we beg your Majesty to diminish your royal household in Castile and the pensions which are given therein, which are immense, so that the money which is thereby saved may be available for more necessary expenses and for the service of God and your Majesty."¹ The Emperor promised improvement, but nothing was done; the gorgeous display on the occasion of his son Philip's first visit to the Netherlands in 1548-49, and the bitter complaint about it from the Duke of Alva and the other Spaniards, show that the evil continued till the end of his reign. Its effect on the economic condition of the kingdom was exceedingly unfortunate. The court was constantly moving from place to place, and wherever it went, prices rose by leaps and bounds.² "The country is so expensive," wrote Richard Sampson, "that I cannot live on twenty shillings a day . . . and if the Emperor goes where he intends . . . the expenses will be double."³

"*Nervus belli est pecunia*, which he will not have without Spain,"⁴ wrote Sir Thomas Spinelly of the Emperor in August, 1520; and now the war had come in earnest. The Cortes of 1523 had been summoned to vote a servicio, exactly like those of 1518 and 1520; that was the main thing; all else was subsidiary. The Emperor was strong in the prestige of his recent victory, but the procuradores did not intend to give in without a struggle. Juan Rodríguez, representing Granada, arose to explain the attitude of his colleagues. After protesting the depth of his loyalty and love, he roundly

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 367.

² Bernays, pp. 398-399.

³ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 3157.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iii, app. 13.

declared that the late rebellion had been caused by the way in which the servicio had been voted at Corunna. "And we venture to say," he boldly continued, "that it would be well for your Majesty to summon us solely to deliberate and confer about the service of your Highness, and the welfare of your kingdoms, without making any mention of the servicio.

. . . Every one knows that the principal intention of your Majesty is to provide for and do good to your kingdoms, and that the replenishment of your treasury, for urgent necessities, is but secondary. . . . And we do not think that your Majesty can refuse this request on the ground that it is an innovation, . . . for the laws are subject to the will of kings who can make or unmake them. . . . Your Majesty is the living law who, under new circumstances, can make a new law or custom, or, on occasion, suspend an existing one without prejudice to your royal preëminence."¹

Charles was prompt with his reply. He would gladly have refrained from demanding the servicio, he said, had not his necessities, born of the late uprising, rendered it imperative. "Yesterday," he continued, "I asked you for funds; today I want your advice. Which seems to you better, that you should grant me the servicio at once, on my promise not to dismiss you until I have replied to and provided for everything that you justly ask me, and that I should do so of my own free will; or that I should first reply to the petition which you bring me, and have it said that I do so in order to get the servicio? You know that the custom has been to grant this first; thus it was done under my royal predecessors. . . . Why try to establish an innovation with me? And since many evils have brought me to this necessity, you, like good and loyal subjects, will remedy them by doing your duty as I expect you to do."² For several days more

¹ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 355-356.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 357-358.

the dispute continued; but the Emperor was not to be denied. In the end the procuradores voted an extraordinary subsidy of 400,000 ducats, payable in three years.¹

It was a notable victory for Charles, and a great blow at the liberties of Castile. Had the constitutional precedents been the other way, the outcome might well have been different. From that moment onward Spain was definitely established in the place which Spinelly had attributed to her in 1520 — she was to be the source of supply for the Hapsburg Empire. How far she could flatter herself that that Empire was Spanish was a point on which men have disputed ever since. Certainly it was more nearly so at the end of Charles's reign than at the beginning, but in the meantime the peninsula had been drained dry for many causes in which it cannot be said to have been vitally concerned. The revolt of the Comuneros had not been absolutely fruitless. Charles learned to respect his Spanish subjects as he had not done before. He listened henceforth to their wishes, and gratified them when he could. On the whole it may be fairly said that he used his victory with moderation. Politically and financially, however, it had left him so much the master of the situation that the destinies of the Spanish people, at this most critical stage of their development, were placed almost without let or hindrance in the royal hands. In the eyes of the student of constitutional liberties, this was unquestionably a great misfortune, and goes far to explain the sufferings of the succeeding centuries; but those who are chiefly interested in Spain's imperial development may well question whether she would have been capable of taking full advantage of her opportunities, had the power not been wholly in the Emperor's hands. With

¹ Colmeiro, *Introd.*, ii, p. 117. The procuradores returned to the charge in 1525, but without result. *Cortes*, iv, p. 407.

all his faults and the foreign burdens which he imposed, he gave Spain a larger vision of her possibilities than she had ever been able previously to obtain.

The punishment and final consequences of the Valencian Germanía present certain interesting contrasts with those of the Comuneros. Even more than in the case of the Castilian insurrection, Charles was resolved to deal with the problem from a distance; it will be remembered that he had not had time to visit Valencia at all during his first visit to the peninsula; and after his return he kept away till 1528, when he went there to be sworn to as king by the estates of the realm.¹ More than four years before this the rebels had felt the weight of his displeasure; even the fact that Charles had at one stage encouraged the masses to revolt against the aristocracy did not avail to mitigate the severity of the sentences. His representative on the spot in the work of retribution was Germaine de Foix, who was appointed viceroy of Valencia on October 20, 1523.² On January 19, 1524, the chiefs of the Agermanados were arrested in their beds, and a large

¹ Foronda, p. 308.

² Germaine had married the Margrave John of Brandenburg on March 17, 1519. They had been present at Charles's coronation at Aix-la-Chapelle in 1520, and had returned with the Emperor to Spain in 1522. The Margrave, who had by this time become thoroughly Hispanicized, was made captain general of Valencia at the same time that Germaine was made viceroy, and died there July 5, 1525, probably from an attack of fever, though there were rumors of poison. In the spring of 1526 Germaine married, as her third husband, Ferrante of Aragon, Duke of Calabria, that son of Frederic of Naples who had been captured by Gonsalvo de Cordova at Taranto in 1502 and in defiance of a solemn promise to the contrary had been sent a prisoner to Spain. (Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 299,

302.) Ferdinand the Catholic had given orders in his will that Ferrante be released and handed over to Charles, but as the latter had not visited Valencia during his first stay in the peninsula, the Duke had remained in a sort of honorable confinement at Játiva. During the Germanía he had given ample proof of his loyalty to the Emperor by refusing various offers that were made him by the rebels, and still more by declining to consider the marriage which the Junta of Avila planned to arrange for him with Joanna the Mad. Cf. *ante*, p. 79, note. Charles was only too glad to reward him with his liberty, the hand of Germaine, and the title of viceroy of Valencia, which he held till his death in 1559. For details cf. Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 35-36; C. von Höfler, in *Abhandlungen der Bayerischen Akademie*, historische Klasse, xix, pp. 308-337.

number of the guiltiest of them were quartered. More permanently important were the fines and confiscations. Since the revolt had been rather in the nature of a social war than of a political rebellion against the royal authority, the government preferred rather to mulct than to slay; and the great wealth of the Valencian cities doubtless served as another inducement in the same direction. So overwhelming, however, were the king's financial exactions, and so ignorant were the authorities of the simplest economic laws, that the result was the impoverishment of one of the fairest of the Spanish realms. And the effect of the royal demands was all the more disastrous because they were made at the very moment when Valencian agriculture — the chief source of the prosperity of the kingdom — was temporarily and most unexpectedly paralyzed by an unforeseen consequence of the late rebellion.¹

We have seen that the Moorish inhabitants of Valencia — for the most part agricultural laborers on the great estates — had almost without exception opposed the revolt; that a number of them were slain, and others forcibly baptized, wherever the Germanía got the upper hand. When the pressure was removed, these unwilling converts naturally returned to the faith of their fathers; and a situation was thus created for which there had been many precedents in Spanish history, a situation of which the Inquisition was prompt to take advantage. Baptism, whether compulsory or not, was indelible. The enforced converts were at last within the pale of Christian authority. A new field of activity was thus opened to the Holy Office, which, if skilfully cultivated, might be ultimately made to result in an extension of the edict of 1502 from Castile to the Eastern Kingdoms.²

¹ Danvila, *Germanía*, pp. 181 ff.; Adolf Ebert, *Quellenforschungen aus der Geschichte Spaniens* (Cassel, 1849), pp. 219–221.

² Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 96; Lea, *Moriscos*, pp. 67 ff.

Some years elapsed, however, before the Inquisition was able to carry this ambitious programme into effect. The institution had not been in a flourishing condition since the death of Queen Isabella in 1504. The Archduke Philip had been notoriously lax in his attitude towards unbelievers. Ferdinand was certainly no enthusiast for persecution. Charles and Adrian had been very moderate. The Holy Office was not incited to activity from high quarters, and there was a palpable lack of fuel to feed the flames. Even in Valencia there promised to be many difficulties. The traditions of that region were averse to intolerance; the nobles, needing the labor of their Moorish tenants, were certain to oppose; even the Valencian clergy were not unanimous in their support. Everything really depended on the attitude of Charles. Fanatic by nature he emphatically was not; moreover in 1518 he had solemnly sworn to abide by the promise of Ferdinand the Catholic not to extend to the Eastern Kingdoms the edict of 1502. On the other hand, he was profoundly conscious of his responsibilities as temporal head of Christendom; he had openly declared against heresy at Worms, and had sanctioned the burning of Lutherans in the Netherlands.¹ In the year 1524 he applied to Pope Clement VII for license to transgress his oath of six years before; and the desired permission was immediately granted, though it was not until he heard of the great victory of Pavia that Charles decided to avail himself of it. Some signal act of faith was obviously demanded of him as an evidence of his gratitude to God for this 'crowning mercy'; and it was by the 'purification' of the realms of the Crown of Aragon that the Emperor elected to perform it. On November 3, 1525, all the Moors of those kingdoms were given the naked alternative of accepting Christianity or

¹ Cf. below, p. 401, note.

being exiled; and they were discouraged from making the latter choice, by the usual regulation that they must depart from some distant port, and by the granting of a wholly inadequate time in which to reach it. As was the case with Castile in 1502, the edict was virtually a sentence of conversion or death.¹

It is no wonder that the edict encountered resistance. The more vigorous of the Moors retired into the mountains, where they kept up a continuous guerrilla warfare for some months; whether owing to lack of skill or reluctance to fight, the local Spanish troops were unable to put them down, and the work had finally to be accomplished by Charles's German landsknechts.² The suppression of the revolt kept Valencia in an uproar; after it was over there was no one left to till the fields, and agriculture for the time being was brought to a standstill. Foreign trade had also suffered cruelly of late, owing to the results of the discovery of the New World; the wealth of the cities was being seized by insatiable crown agents, and the mass of the Valencians were hard put to it to find a living. Bitter indeed must have been the thoughts of the old men, who could look back to the days of splendor and prosperity in the reign of Alfonso the Magnanimous. If Charles realized the situation, he took little pains to remedy it. No part of his Iberian dominions had such grounds for complaint of him as Valencia; not improbably for that very reason it was the one that he elected to ignore. It is not without significance that after his recognition by the Valencian Cortes of 1528, he visited the kingdom only once in his whole life — in the month of December, 1542.³

The rising of the Valencian Moriscos, like all the other

¹ Lea, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-88; Armstrong, i, pp. 102-104.

² Lea, *op. cit.*, pp. 89 ff.

³ Foronda, pp. 532-533.

rebellions which we have examined, had its connection with the activities of Charles's foreign foes, and therefore a direct bearing on the development of the Spanish Empire. Hitherto Charles had not been able to give much attention to the Turkish peril, owing to the pressure of his other affairs. The war with France and his responsibilities in Spain, in Germany, and in the Netherlands had demanded all his time. He had delegated the defence of Hungary to his brother Ferdinand, and, despite the reiterated protests of his Iberian subjects, he had taken but little pains with the fortification of the Spanish coasts. Barbarossa, on the other hand, had become increasingly active. He was constantly improving his position in North Africa; and in response to the prayers of the Valencian Moriscos that he aid them to escape to the Barbary coasts, he launched numerous expeditions against the southern shores of Spain. The climax of these raids came in 1529, and was enough to show Charles that the growth of the power of the infidel in the Mediterranean constituted a problem which he could no longer afford to ignore. It was but another instance of the Emperor's being brought round to an appreciation of the Iberian point of view.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

See note to the preceding chapter, and add :

Sources. — Manuel Danvila y Collado, *Historia Crítica y Documentada de las Comunidades de Castilla* (Madrid, 1897-99, 6 vols. being vols. xxxv-xl of the *M. H. E.*), is a huge compilation of documents on the subject in question, thrown together without any semblance of order, method, or distinction between what had previously been published and what had not, marred by numerous inaccuracies of transcription and dating, and interspersed with historical summaries by the author of the events of each succeeding month of the revolt. In the absence of anything better on the same scale it is still indispensable; but its statements cannot be accepted without verification (cf. Morel-Fatio, *Historiographie*, pp. 7-9). L. P. Gachard, *Correspondance de Charles-Quint et d'Adrien VI* (Brussels, 1859), is valuable chiefly for the year 1522. The contemporary Latin manuscript account of the revolt of the Comuneros by the priest Juan de Maldonado, who witnessed many of the scenes he describes, was translated into Spanish and published at Madrid in 1840 by J. Quevedo, under the title of *El Movimiento de España, ó sea la Historia de la Revolución conocida con el nombre de las Comunidades de Castilla*. Indications of other source material on the Revolt of the Comuneros may be found in Constantin von Höfler, "Zur Kritik und Quellenkunde der ersten Regierungsjahre K. Karls V," in *Denkschriften der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Vienna), phil.-hist. Classe, xxv, pp. 291-372; xxviii, pp. 155-300; xxxiii, pp. 1-206; and in Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2077-83.

Later Works. — Most of the older histories of the revolt of the Comuneros, such as Antonio Ferrer del Rio's *Decadencia de España, primera parte, Historia del Levantamiento de las Comunidades de Castilla* (Madrid, 1850), have been superseded by Constantin von Höfler's *Der Aufstand der castillianischen Städte gegen Kaiser Karl V.* (Prague, 1876), and by Konrad Häbler, "Zur Geschichte der kastilianischen Comunidades," in *Historische Zeitschrift*, xcv (1905), pp. 385-434 (practically everything in this last article is incorporated in the author's *Geschichte Spaniens*, 1907); both these monographs, however, leave much to be desired. Antonio Rodríguez Villa, *La Reina Doña Juana la Loca* (Madrid, 1892), is invaluable for those parts of the uprising in which the queen was concerned; and Constantin von Höfler's *Don Antonio de Acuña* (Vienna, 1882) is useful. There are also a host of monographs on local phases of the revolt, of which Anselmo Salvá,

Burgos en las Comunidades de Castilla (Burgos, 1895), is one of the best; the titles of others may be found in Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2096-2101 and 2107-21. On the Valencian uprising, Manuel Danvila y Collado's *La Germanía de Valencia* (Madrid, 1884), though by no means wholly satisfactory, is still far less inaccurate than his *Historia de las Comunidades*, and virtually supersedes the account on pp. 45-221 of Adolf Ebert's *Quellenforschungen aus der Geschichte Spaniens* (Cassel, 1849). E. Ribés y Sangüesa, *Estudi crític de les Germanies en relació ab la Història de Castelló* (Castelló, 1921), though needlessly exclamatory, and principally concerned with the history of the revolt in a single locality, is useful as an index of Valencian feeling. The appropriate pages of H. C. Lea, *The Moriscos of Spain* (Philadelphia, 1901), are also valuable for certain phases of the rising. For the Balearic revolt I have relied chiefly on the account of the Majorcan chronicler Juan Binimelis (1538-1616), which is printed on pp. 225 ff. of A. Campaner y Fuertes, *Cronicon Mayoricense* (Palma de Mallorca, 1881), and to a lesser degree on that of Gerónimo Alemany on pp. 471-537 of vol. iii of the *Historia General del Reino de Mallorca* edited by M. Moragues Pro and J. M. Bover (Palma, 1840-41, 3 vols.).

CHAPTER XXIII

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

THE internal history of Spain under the Emperor Charles V is curiously barren of dramatic events, after the suppression of the two great rebellions at the beginning of the reign. The constitutional and economic aspects of the period, on the other hand, are of far reaching importance. They illustrate from beginning to end the difficulties of reconciling Charles's duties as Emperor and head of the house of Hapsburg with his responsibilities as monarch of the Spanish kingdoms, as most of his Iberian subjects originally conceived of them. That another open conflict was avoided, and that the complaints grew fewer as the reign went on, are a tribute to the Emperor's sagacity and tact. The position he had inherited was beset with difficulties. It was a marvel that he managed as well as he did. But the same facts also go to prove that Spain's imperial education was steadily progressing. More and more did she feel the thrill of world power; wider and wider grew the horizons of her ambition. Her rôle in the whole matter was doubtless predominantly passive. She was not asked to share the responsibility, so much as to vote the necessary funds. Her greatness was rather thrust upon her than deliberately striven for and attained. Nevertheless she gloried in it, accepting it as her high destiny with characteristic fatalism, seeking now no longer to limit and restrain her sovereign, but only to Hispanicize his originally Hapsburg point of view. And in

this final endeavor she met with a fair measure of success. The full fruits of her efforts were not gathered until the succeeding reign, but the Emperor grew steadily closer to his Spanish subjects, and finally retired to the peninsula to die.

Charles took every opportunity to cultivate and strengthen these imperial aspirations. His subjects had seen only the darker side of his rule on the occasion of his first visit to the peninsula; he now proposed that they should realize its glories. The contemporary authors describe in glowing terms "the exceedingly imposing court and assembly of magnates"¹ which he held at Toledo in the summer of 1525, on the occasion of the meeting of the Cortes of Castile, just before King Francis was brought a prisoner to Madrid. Thither came ambassadors from France "to treat of the liberation of their King," from England, from Portugal, from Russia, and the Italian states; there were the papal legate and the Grand Master of Rhodes with forty knights commanders; there were representatives of the Moorish kingdoms of North Africa and even legates from the distant Shah of Persia, "in such wise that the Court of the Emperor was one of the most notable that was ever held by Prince of Spain."² Spectacles such as this could not fail to impress the mass of the people. Their longings for a return to the simple ways of the Catholic Kings were temporarily forgotten in their pride at such a display of imperial power. Had they realized what was happening at the same time in another quarter of the globe, their enthusiasm would have been greater still. It was in the preceding November that Francisco Pizarro set sail on the voyage of discovery which was to lead to the conquest of the great empire of Peru; the wealth of the Incas was soon to be available, to support the position of Spain in Western Europe. In many ways

¹ Gómara, p. 72.

² Sandoval, i, p. 492.

the year 1525 saw Charles's power at the pinnacle of its greatness.

In one respect the Emperor's views of his position and policy had now veered around into full accord with the desires of Spain. From the time of his first visit in 1517, he had been constantly besought to marry in the peninsula; and the Cortes of 1525 ventured to express the hope that his bride would be his cousin Isabella, the sister of the king of Portugal.¹ Hitherto Charles had responded noncommittally to these requests. Indeed, under the circumstances he could hardly have done otherwise, for he had been almost continuously betrothed to one princess or another, since the days of his infancy in the Netherlands. First it had been Mary Tudor, who afterwards wedded Louis XII; afterwards Claude and later Louise of France; then, with the English alliance of 1522-23, it was Mary, the daughter of Henry VIII, who was later to marry the Emperor's son Philip, and reign for five sorrowful years in England. But the English alliance had grown much weaker of late. Henry VIII had been tardy and inefficient in the war; he and Wolsey were plainly disturbed by the completeness of the Emperor's triumph at Pavia; in midsummer of 1525 it became clear that the marriage of Charles and Mary would have to be given up. The whole course of events had shown Charles the danger of any permanent entanglement with either France or England. Whichever was neglected would be sure to bear a grudge; the political situation shifted almost every day; clearly it was the part of wisdom to keep his hands free. On the other side, the advantages of a Portuguese marriage were daily becoming more obvious. Besides satisfying the desires of the Spaniards, whom he wished to please, it would be the logical continuation of the

¹ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 262, 365, 405; Sandoval, i, p. 496.

policy of Ferdinand and Isabella. It would be another step on the road to that Pan-Iberian unity which, despite all the bickerings and hostilities of the past, the mass of his subjects had not ceased to desire.¹ Moreover, it would be most advantageous from a financial point of view. The Portugal of John III was far richer than that of Emmanuel the Fortunate. The treasures of the Orient poured incessantly into Lisbon; and when the marriage of Isabella and the Emperor was finally arranged, the bride's dowry was fixed at 900,000 ducats.² The wedding took place at Seville on March 10, 1526; and the inscriptions on the seven triumphal arches which were erected for the occasion reflect Spain's high hopes of the lasting benefits that it was expected to confer.³

The spring, summer, and autumn months which followed his marriage were probably the happiest of Charles's whole life. His union with Isabella had been dictated by policy, not affection; in fact, he wrote to his brother Ferdinand that he wedded her to get her dowry and an acceptable representative when he had to be away.⁴ But the Emperor was to be more fortunate in his marriage than he knew; for besides the financial and political advantages, he had the additional satisfaction of falling in love with his wife. His

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 93; and J. Vales Failde, *La Emperatriz Isabel* (Madrid, 1917), pp. 76-78, 129.

² Of this sum, however, it was provided that Charles should only get 682,898 ducats; from the original 900,000 were deducted 165,733 ducats, still unpaid, on the dowry of 200,000 of Charles's sister Catharine, who had been married to John III in 1524, and 51,369 more which had been lent by King Emmanuel to the Emperor to help him in the suppression of the Castilian Comuneros. In the 682,898 ducats, moreover, were included 23,066 ducats which Isabella had inherited on the

death of her mother. Cf. draft (dated October 24, 1525) of the "Contrato de casamiento entre Partes," etc. (Copie): Ms. in Bib. Nat. Paris, Fonds Baluze, Manuscrits, vol. 159, folios 336 ff. I can find no authority for the statement in Sandoval, i, p. 545, and Häbler, p. 201, that 400,000 ducats were subtracted from the 900,000 because of Charles's debts to Portugal; but it seems that the Emperor finally accepted the rich jewels which his bride brought with her, in lieu of a part of the cash. Cf. *R. A.*, viii (1878), pp. 323, 344, 365.

³ Sandoval, i, pp. 546-548.

⁴ Armstrong, i, p. 157.

nature was not romantic. The cares of state weighed ceaselessly upon him and left scant space for the development of his affections. But he yearned for sympathy, loyalty, and devotion, and these Isabella afforded him in full measure. Though slight and pale, she bore herself like an Empress; her head and her heart were both in the right place; she was, as a contemporary justly observed, "of the sort that men say ought to be married."¹ Certainly she was an ideal companion for Charles. Though he had married her in part to get a regent in his absence, he was to find it unexpectedly difficult to bring himself to leave her side. Most of their honeymoon was spent at Granada, where they took refuge from the great heats of the valley of the Guadalquivir. It was the first time that Charles had visited Andalusia, and he gazed with wonder and delight on what he saw. The news from France was increasingly disquieting, and finally in December he had to return to the North, but he never forgot those happy days on the Alhambra hill, "so that though he was well satisfied with all the cities of his kingdom, it was Granada that gave him the most pleasure of all."²

It was but natural that the reign of Charles should bring with it extensive changes in the administration of the Spanish dominions. In the first place, he personified the union of the crowns as Ferdinand and Isabella had never been able to do. He was neither primarily Castilian nor Aragonese. If his visits to the western kingdom were more prolonged, those that he paid to the realms of the crown of Aragon were more frequent.³ It was from them that he received the

¹ Gómara, p. 107. Sampson, the English ambassador, reported to Wolsey as early as August, 1524, that "hyrre worde and dyvyse is this — *Aut Caesar aut nihil*." *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 578.

² Sandoval, i, p. 554.

³ Not counting his final return to die at Yuste, he visited the realms of the Crown of Aragon eleven times and Castile only ten; he spent just under five years in the former and almost precisely eleven in the latter.

most sympathetic support in the many difficult problems which confronted him in Italy and the Mediterranean, just as it was to the Castilians that he turned for the affairs of the Indies. He regarded Spain as a whole in a way that his predecessors had never done. He did not contemplate a fusion of the different kingdoms that composed it; but there is plenty of evidence that he sought to diminish the dissimilarities, and to improve one realm in the light of the others.

Not only was it natural that the idea of Spanish unity should be measurably advanced by the reign of Charles V; it was also inevitable that the new sovereign should regard all his Spanish dominions as forming a part of a still larger whole — the far flung possessions of the house of Hapsburg. But he did not attempt to give effect to that conception until the very last — till he was flushed with his triumph over the Lutherans in the Empire. He saw that his possessions naturally fell into two different groups, a Northern and a Southern, a German and a Spanish; and after his first hard lesson in 1517–20, he comprehended the difficulties and the dangers of combining them. For more than a quarter of a century after his return in 1522, one is conscious that he felt constrained to keep them apart;¹ the emphasis falls first on the South and then on the North, according to the demands of the political situation; but the perilous experiment of a closer combination was not repeated till 1548, when Prince Philip was called to Germany for the succession in the Empire, and his cousin Maximilian went as regent into Spain. One observes the same thing in Charles's political appointments, though here there is a slight preponderance in favor

¹ Though, *per contra*, the handing over of Charles's Austrian domains, in February, 1522, to his brother Ferdinand may be taken to indicate, as explained below,

p. 225, that the Emperor had already resolved, at that early date, ultimately "to draw the Netherlands into the orbit of Spain."

of the Spaniards. His representatives in the Empire and the Netherlands — his brother Ferdinand, his aunt Margaret, and his sister Mary — had all lived in the peninsula and been subjected to its influence; while his Italian and Mediterranean possessions were kept exclusively in Spanish hands. Separate administration for the two great groups into which his dominions were divided, with alternating emphasis, but a tendency to favor Spain, seems to have been the keynote of Charles's policy down to 1548. A closer examination of the methods and details of his government will furnish numerous illustrations of this underlying principle.

It was during the period of Charles's second visit to the peninsula that Spain first came to occupy the centre of the stage. Everything combined in these years to give her the predominance. It was the period of Charles's longest stay in the peninsula, the period of his marriage and the birth of his son, the period of monarchical triumph after the suppression of two dangerous rebellions. The focus of political interest was the war with France, which was being fought, in some measure, by Spanish veterans; and the scene of the greatest battles and of the Emperor's most notable triumph was in that Italy where the Spanish power was gradually attaining the upper hand. The Emperor's chief adviser was the Piedmontese Gattinara, whose hatred of the French made him favorable to Spain, and who also took a lively interest in problems of internal government, as is proved by his famous "Instruction" of 1523.¹ The growing menace of the sea power of Barbarossa was another factor to keep Charles's attention in the South, while the startling revelations of the wealth of the Indies afforded a fresh demonstration of the importance of his Iberian dominions. By

¹ E. Gossart, *Charles-Quint, Roi d'Espagne*, pp. 191 ff., 236 ff: also above, p. 119, note 1.

the time that he departed in August, 1529, for his coronation at Bologna by Pope Clement VII, the bitter memories of his first visit to Spain must have been wellnigh obliterated. Spain had given proof of her loyalty and power. She had served and supported him far more effectively than his Northern dominions.

In 1530, however, there came a change. Gattinara died in June of that year,¹ and his successor as chief minister² was the Burgundian Nicolas Perrenot de Granvelle, who was primarily interested in the affairs of Central Europe, and is even said to have striven to make Charles live in the North. During the next twenty years,³ in which Granvelle's influence steadily increased, the Emperor was most of the time absent from Spain. The centre of political interest had shifted to the North, to the campaigns against the Turk on the Danube, and France in the Netherlands, and still more to the struggle against the Lutherans in the Empire.⁴ It was therefore almost inevitable that Spanish affairs should fall into the background, but Charles took great pains to see that they were not neglected. Moreover he was resolved to have Spanish advice, and obtained it from his secretary, Francisco de los Cobos, who enjoyed his fullest confidence throughout most of his reign. To all intents and purposes, he was as powerful as Granvelle. "The Emperor has two principal counsellors, and in fact only two, who transact all the business of all his states, Cobos and Granvelle," wrote the Venetian Navagero in 1546;⁵ "Cobos is the

¹ At Innsbrück. Cf. Henne, *Charles-Quint en Belgique*, v, p. 113.

² Though not as chancellor; cf. Gounon-Loubens, pp. 142-143.

³ He died at Augsburg, August 28, 1550, and was succeeded by his more famous son.

⁴ It would be interesting to know at what stage of his career, if at all, Charles

made the remark which was attributed to him and quoted in 1573 by Juan de Zúñiga for the benefit of Philip II, that in order to win kingdoms, he found it best to reside in Italy; to retain them, in Flanders; and to lose them, in Spain. *D. I. E.*, cii, pp. 67 f.

⁵ Cited in Gounon-Loubens, p. 144, note.

guardian of your Majesty's honor and secrets and knows how to accomplish what your Majesty leaves undone," declared the Emperor's confessor in 1530.¹ "All the affairs of Italy, the Indies, and Spain passed under his hand for many years," wrote another contemporary who knew him well.² None of Charles's other secretaries attained such influence as Cobos; we are specifically told that he overrode the Fleming, John Lalemand, who personified Burgundian influence at the Emperor's court; and his ascendancy is good evidence of the importance Charles attached to the Spanish point of view.³ One very unamiable characteristic which Cobos shared with Granvelle was his extraordinary venality. "Neither of them is of very noble birth," wrote the vigilant Navagero, "but both have been nourished and made great by their master, in such wise that with their greatness they have acquired wealth; Cobos has an income of perhaps 70,000 ducats."⁴ "He took presents right and left, whereby he became excessively rich," wrote Gómara, in a characterization at the time of his death; "he even took away offices and benefices and pensions from those to whom the Emperor wished to give them, in order to bestow them on those whom he himself appointed . . . and at last even the Emperor got wind of it."⁵ He did not accompany Charles on his last journey into the Empire, but died at Úbeda, his birthplace, in 1547.

Since Charles's position and responsibilities were primarily international, it is natural to inquire how far the great system of councils, which had been established in the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella,⁶ was given any influence in

¹ *Briefe an Kaiser Karl V von seinem Beichwater* [G. de Loaisa], ed. G. Heine (Berlin, 1848), p. 355.

² Gómara, p. 136.

³ Cobos was able to marry his

daughter to the grandson of the Great Captain. Gómara, p. 136.

⁴ Cited in Gounon-Loubens, p. 144, note.

⁵ Gómara, p. 136.

⁶ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 111 ff.

non-Spanish affairs. The councillors were naturally anxious to offer their opinions, and the Emperor did not discourage this tendency; he was even willing to delude them on occasions with the semblance of an authority which he had no intention they should actually possess. For this purpose he made use of the body of *grandees* — highest in rank but by no means in importance — which came to be known as the Council of State. Under Ferdinand and Isabella it had been amorphous and irregular, but in 1526 Charles gave it definite existence, “to discuss the most important matters concerning the government of Spain and of Germany”; its members at this time were Alonso de Fonseca, archbishop of Toledo, the Chancellor Gattinara, Count Henry of Nassau, the Dukes of Alva and Bejar, and the bishops of Osma and Jaen.¹ That a body so composed should be asked to treat of German affairs seems extraordinary. It is barely possible that Charles really wanted to try the experiment, but far more probable that he was merely seeking to flatter the magnates; at any rate when he found that the new body only served to arouse the jealousy of those who were not included, he promptly dismissed it, five months later, at Valladolid. The Council, however, did not go out of existence; it is even said that Charles subsequently referred to it as “the knowledge, power, and understanding, the eyes, hands, and feet of the monarch, since it aims to preserve the obedience of the Holy Catholic Roman Church and of the Pope who presides over it, the observance of religion and of the Catholic Faith and the defence of the one and of the other, universal justice and order, the maintenance of the peace and tranquillity of kingdoms; sometimes making war, when it is expedient, by attacking the foe, or if occasion demands by repelling his assaults, and

¹ Sandoval, i, p. 555.

at others by concluding peace.”¹ But the attribution of such extensive powers cannot fail to arouse suspicion of their genuineness. In the conduct of war the Council was not without influence; the Consejo de Guerra, to which contemporaries refer, was probably at this stage simply the Consejo de Estado, sitting in a military capacity, or else a committee of some of its members, reënforced, on occasion, by the addition of certain generals.² But in other respects the Council was largely a sham. It was a means of conferring a social distinction, for its members could boast that they were in constant attendance upon the monarch and accompanied him on his journeys into Italy and the Empire; but it was utterly lacking in political authority. The men who composed it³ were far too narrow in their outlook to be useful as advisers in international affairs; *non tali auxilio* was Hapsburg supremacy to be maintained in Western Europe. The decisions were made by the Emperor and his chief ministers; if the Council of State was consulted at all, it was merely asked to ratify what the monarch had already done.⁴

With the Council of Castile or Consejo Real, on the other hand, we have an entirely different situation. It inherited from the Catholic Kings a reputation of high authority and great efficiency; it had dealt with every phase of the government of the Western Kingdom. In the reign of the Emperor, it might have been expected to rise higher still, for Charles's frequent absences gave it an unusual chance to gain independence of the crown. That it proved incap-

¹ “Discurso de Antonio Álvarez de Toledo sobre los Consejos,” in Bib. Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, E-31, Ms. 904, folio 99.

² *Ibid.*, f. 102, and also ff. 208-166, *passim*; also Colmeiro, *Curso*, p. 559. The *Consejo de Guerra* did not defi-

nitely attain separate existence till 1714.

³ In 1556 these were the younger Granvelle, seven Spanish grandees, and the President of the audiencia of Valladolid. Gómara, p. 158.

⁴ Gounon-Loubens, pp. 141 ff.

able of taking full advantage of this opportunity was due to Charles's determination to keep the power in his own hands, and to the lack of initiative of the councillors whom he appointed.¹

The question of its composition was obviously of the first importance; in fact the Comuneros, at the height of their power, recognizing the nature and extent of its authority, essayed to transform it into a semi-representative institution. They planned that it should contain one member from each of the thirty-two bishoprics of Castile, each member being appointed for life by the king from a list of three elected in the diocese; each member was to be a *letrado* of proved ability and character, and at least forty years of age.² But these far reaching schemes naturally failed of realization, and the Council survived on its ancient footing. The Emperor on his return sought information concerning its membership, and obtained it from his confidant, the chronicler Carvajal, in a document which has been preserved.³ The Council at that period numbered no less than sixteen — a president, the archbishop of Granada; fourteen councillors; and a fiscal — three more than were prescribed by the Cortes of 1480. The aristocratic element was even smaller than before. Save for the archbishop, who was of the Rojas and Manriques, only one — Alonso de Castilla — belonged to the higher nobility; a few of the rest were hidalgos, but most of them were of much lower origin; the *letrado* and man of affairs were in general predominant. Illegitimate birth was no disqualification for

¹ The Consejo Real resided continually in the Western Kingdom. What was designated as the Council of Castile in the "train which the Emperor intends to bring to England" in 1522 (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 2288), was in reality just a group of Castilian advisers — Cobos, García de Padilla, and Carvajal

being the most important — who represented the Council at the imperial court. Cf. Gounon-Loubens, pp. 141, 178, and references there.

² *D. I. E.*, i, p. 273; Gounon-Loubens, p. 172.

³ *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 122-127.

membership, but lack of *limpieza* was a serious drawback; the ancient prejudices in regard to this latter point persisted, undiminished, throughout the sixteenth century. Carvajal gives us precious details concerning the personalities of the different councillors. Two of them in his opinion were too old for their jobs; two others were of such character that he felt they should be gotten rid of; in regard to the rest his comments were generally favorable.

The Emperor diminished the number of members of the Council; it is impossible to follow the process in detail, but at the end of the reign it was scarcely half as large as at the beginning. The Cortes of 1551 registered a vigorous protest. "The councillors are so aged and infirm at the time of their appointment," runs the initial petition of the Cortes of 1551,¹ "that they cannot perform the work that is laid before them. And, moreover, your Majesty takes two of them with you when you are absent from these realms, so that with these absences and indispositions there are usually present but six or seven." During the whole of Charles's reign, the presidency remained in the hands of ecclesiastics. Juan de Tavera, archbishop of Santiago, followed Antonio de Rojas, archbishop of Granada, in 1524; fifteen years later he was succeeded by Hernando Valdés, archbishop of Seville, who in turn gave way to Antonio de Fonseca, bishop of Pamplona: not till the latter's death in 1557 was the office again conferred upon a layman, Juan de Vega, Señor de Grajal, who had already won distinction as ambassador to the Vatican, and later as viceroy of Sicily.²

¹ *Cortes*, v, p. 497.

² "Breve, curiosa y ajustada Noticia de los Presidentes de Castilla": Bib. Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, no. 10923, vol. 38, folios 193-198. Gómara, p. 127. There is some discrepancy between the different authorities, as to whether Fonseca or Valdés came first,

and also over the dates of their tenures (cf. A. Martínez Salazar, *Memorias del Consejo*, pp. 54-55); despite certain chronological inconsistencies, the official lists give the priority to Fonseca, but the more modern authorities (e.g., Gounon-Loubens, p. 174) incline to take the other view.

All of these were thoroughly reliable men, but none had any great ability or initiative. They would conscientiously fulfil any order they received, but they were entirely incapable of striking out a line of their own. The sum total of these details is extremely significant. The Emperor did not propose to have any rival to his authority, especially when he was obliged to be absent from Castile. At all costs the Council must be kept subordinate to the monarchy; docility was preferable to originality or leadership. It was a principle that Charles applied in all sorts of different places; most unfortunately it was to be inherited and intensified by his successors, and the effect upon the Spanish Empire was little short of disastrous. It deprived the nation of experience of imperial responsibility; it imposed duties on the king which should have been delegated to others; it goes far to explain why Spain so easily went to pieces when pitted against rivals of freer development.

If Charles guarded the crown against the independence of the Council, he took no pains to protect the other organs of the body politic from conciliar encroachments. The Council was, after all, far closer to the monarchy than any other institution in Castile; and the Emperor tended, if anything, to increase its responsibilities so long as the royal authority remained unchallenged over all. The Council had always far more work than it could do, as is abundantly proved by the petitions of the Cortes. "We beg your Majesty," runs the *cuaderno* of 1528,¹ "that the Consejo restrict itself to the administration of justice and the government of these realms, because its preoccupation with other matters renders it incapable of appreciating the afflictions of the republic." The accumulation of untried suits was the worst grievance of all. It had for a long time

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 450.

been the established custom that in civil cases of the highest importance, an appeal could be carried from the audiencias to the Consejo, if the appellant would deposit 1500 ducats, to be forfeited in case the former verdict was confirmed. But the Council had apparently taken cognizance of many other suits besides — far more in fact than it had opportunity to hear — and the Cortes complained again and again. "We beseech your Majesty to command the Consejo not to deal in the future with ordinary suits but to send them on to the audiencia," so runs the request, which in one form or another incessantly reappears.¹ The Emperor's replies were generally favorable but insufficiently specific, and the arrears of business continued to pile up. There was also much criticism of the character and industry of the councillors. Charles was asked to see that they were on hand during the hours of business; to forbid them to hold any other salaried office, or to marry their daughters to those who brought suits before them; and to invalidate all decisions bearing less than four signatures.²

As a foreigner, Charles found it specially necessary to get advice on the assignment of crown pensions, the distribution of the royal patronage, and the exercise of the pardoning power. All these matters would ordinarily have been settled by the monarch in consultation with his most intimate advisers; but Charles, on his first arrival, knew Castile far too little for this; so he naturally sought guidance from the Consejo Real. Since it was obviously unnecessary to consult all the members, it soon became the practice to hand

¹ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 387, 450, 528-530.

² *Nueva Recopilacion*, lib. ii, tit. iv, *passim*; *Cortes*, iv, p. 380. A number of interesting details in regard to the procedure of the Council are preserved in a document in the archives at Simancas (*Diversos de Castilla*, no. 1958). There is a copy of it in the Harvard

College Library. The *Memorias... del Consejo* by A. Martínez Salazar (1764) and the *Práctica del Consejo Real* by Pedro Escolano de Arrieta (1796) are only indirectly useful for this period; they describe the institution as it had developed under the Bourbons.

over all such questions to a committee composed of the president and three or four other councillors; such was the origin of the *Camara Real de Castilla*.¹ Ordinances of 1518, 1523, and 1528 define its functions. It was, in effect, nothing more than a section of the Council of Castile, occupying a position in relation to it similar to that of the *Consejo de Guerra* in relation to the *Consejo de Estado*. It referred all contentious points to the Council of Castile, and in case of an appeal against any of its decisions, the matter in question remained in suspense till the parent body had pronounced final judgment.

A document is preserved in the National Library at Madrid² which sheds valuable light on the activities of the *Consejo Real*, and the attitude of Spain towards the policy of Charles. It is entitled "Advice which the *Consejo* at different times has given on general affairs"; it covers the years 1528-49 — a period when the Emperor was often away. Most of it is concerned with internal matters — delays of justice, clerical abuses, excessive pensions, taxation, loans, inflation of prices, reforms of the coinage, local *fueros*, hunting rights, and the breed of horses. The old dread of the foreigner continually crops out; it manifests itself chiefly in ecclesiastical affairs, and is involved with the national relations to the Pope and his nuncios. "We have seen the letter," writes the Council in 1541, "which the Marquis of Aguilar, your ambassador at the court of Rome, has written to your Majesty in regard to the proposal of his Holiness in Consistory, concerning the laws and *pragmáticas* of these realms, providing that foreigners shall hold no benefices or pensions, and concerning the bulls of Sixtus and of other illustrious pontiffs in favor of those

¹ Gounon-Loubens, p. 175.

Bib. Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, E-31, Ms. 904, folios 208-266.

² "Pareceres que en diversos tiempos el consejo ha dado en cosas generales":

born in these kingdoms; and that his Holiness proposes to issue a bull of general revocation, on the plea that other Christian princes have done prejudice to the authority of the see apostolic, in the matter of provision to benefices. . . . We are truly amazed that such things can be . . . for it can be truthfully averred that nowhere in Christendom is there such a respect for the Holy See as in these kingdoms . . . and it would be well that his Holiness should be plainly and immediately informed, that no such injustice should be permitted to take place in this most fortunate period of the reign of your Majesty, whom God has made greater than any of your predecessors, and so faithful a defender of the Holy See." "We have examined," runs the 'advice' of 1546, "his Holiness's declaration of the fourth of May of the present year in regard to the power of the nuncios who are sent here, and it seems to us most injurious. The enforcing of it will cause many suits and vexations for the subjects of your Majesty who have been provided with benefices, and have spent their money for the sending of the bulls and the graces. . . . Your Majesty would do well to write to his Holiness, that this declaration should be void and of no effect."¹

The Council's attitude towards the Cortes is also noteworthy. It evidently regarded them solely as a means of obtaining money, and recognized the nullity of their political power. On April 6, 1532, Charles wrote to the Council to ask its advice about summoning the national assembly to provide funds for the war against the Turks. "We have considered at length your Majesty's proposal," came back the cautious reply, "and we well know your Majesty's zeal for the service of God and the defence of the Christian faith,

¹ For an account of Charles's policy in this matter cf. Gams, *Kirchengeschichte von Spanien*, iii, 2, pp. 161 ff.

but in the calling of the Cortes there are certain inconveniences of which your Majesty is well advised." Thirteen years later, when the Emperor repeated his request, the Council was more specific. "Since the remedy and aid which are afforded to your Majesty by the Cortes is simply through the servicio, which falls on the working man and tax-payer, and since . . . we are poor by reason of these lean years and the heavy floods and the ordinary and extraordinary servicios which we must pay till 1548 . . . all this seems a just cause for not asking for another, which it will be impossible to pay . . . ; and therefore it seems best to the Council to postpone the summoning of the Cortes until your Majesty's return."

But the Council did not restrict its advice to matters within the realm; it not seldom expressed its mind about foreign affairs. It gave its opinion about the plan that Charles should settle his differences with the king of France by a personal encounter; it was certain that the "Emperor had responded to the challenge in such wise as to satisfy the honor and state of his royal and imperial person, and as a gentleman of noble lineage was bound to do"; and that the king of France had failed to do likewise, "since he was plainly and openly seen to refuse to fight."¹ It took a lively interest in the relations with Portugal in the regions of the Canaries and the West African coast, and in the maintenance of the navigation acts of the realm against Holland and Zeeland. It expressed its disapproval of a request of the Venetians to traffic with the Moorish states of the Barbary coast; "to trade with the infidel is a disservice to God, and many Christians have been taken and imprisoned thereby; since your subjects in this realm have been for-

¹ Other opinions of the Consejo on this matter may be found in *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 49-58.

bidden to go thither, it seems just that the same should be done in this case.”¹ The dread of Lutheran contamination is extraordinary. The Emperor is begged in 1531 to command that “books from Germany . . . be not brought and sold in these realms, and that the corregidores and other learned persons examine such as are already here in the hands of the printers and booksellers.” The Council, in the same year, seeks to dissuade Charles from visiting the Empire; it recognizes “the holy desire and Catholic piety that inspire his royal heart,” and hopes that he may be the means of confounding the authors of “such poisonous innovations, opinions, and heresies, with devilish and damnable purposes,” but it holds his plan of going into Germany to be “most perilous and doubtful, and very uncertain in the events that it may bring forth”; it confidently asserts that “these realms are your Majesty’s principal home, your safest seat, and surest abode, which can render your Majesty better and more powerful aid than any other part of the world in the accomplishment of your high designs.” It was horrified at the thought of any compromise with heretics, such as was not seldom proposed in the middle of the reign. “We beg your Majesty not to admit them to the faith, under any condition or pretext whatsoever, nor in any way to dissimulate or indirectly to give them countenance.”

Much less can be learned of the Council of Aragon, which in theory performed for the Eastern Kingdoms the same functions that the Council of Castile fulfilled in the Western. It had been instituted, it will be remembered, by Ferdinand the Catholic on November 19, 1494; and Charles, in a decree dated April 20, 1522, at Brussels,² confirmed the

¹ The procuradores, however, took just the opposite view, and begged that the Barbary trade might be thrown open to Castilians. Cf. *Cortes*, v, p. 549.

² Bib. Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, C. C. 85, sueltos, 18722³³. Ferdinand’s *pragmática* of 1494 is quoted, *in toto*, in that of Charles.

organization which his grandfather had set up. In both documents the Council is commanded to restrict its activities to the administration of justice, and is forbidden, in general terms, to deal with other matters without the express permission of the crown; the sovereign obviously regarded it as a court of highest appeal for the regions concerned, while the Council sought to extend its authority into political affairs. How far Charles succeeded in checking this last tendency, it were difficult to determine; certainly while the cosmopolitan Gattinara was at the head of the Council of Aragon, it is hard to believe that it can have limited itself entirely to the administration of justice. A kindred problem, on which there is also little light, is that of the territories which came under its jurisdiction. There is no direct evidence in the *pragmáticas* of 1494 or of 1522 that its authority reached into the *tierras de allà mar*; yet on the other hand Sicily had been incorporated with the realms of the crown of Aragon since 1460; and there is a passage in Pulgar¹ which leads one to believe that Sicilians took part in the Council's deliberations. There was also apparently an Italian — one Jacopo da Bologna — among its members in 1522;² and it will furthermore be observed that it was not till the year 1555 that a 'Council of Italy' was formally set up "and definitely separated from that of Aragon."³ The sum total of all these details would seem to indicate that the Council of Aragon exercised a somewhat wider influence during the Emperor's reign, both in the nature and the territorial extent of its authority, than would be deduced from a strict interpretation of the *pragmáticas* of 1494 and 1522; with the material which is at present at our disposal, it is unfortunately impossible to be more

¹ Cf. Vol. II, *ante*, p. 116.

³ Danvila, *Poder Civil*, ii, p. 217;

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 2288 (pp. 968-969).

Colmeiro, *Curso*, p. 559, note.

specific. In contrast to the Council of Castile, it was not always resident in Spain,¹ but accompanied the Emperor on his different journeys, a fact which bears out the theory that its functions were more cosmopolitan than would at first appear.

There is occasional reference in the documents of the period to the Emperor's Consejo Privado — or Privy Council — and a manuscript in the National Library at Madrid² explains what it was and why it was so called. This document is a translation, made after the Emperor's death, of two ordinances drawn up by him, the first at Middleburg in the Netherlands, January 23, 1517, appointing his aunt Margaret as regent of the Low Countries, and establishing a Council to help and advise her; the second at Brussels, October 1, 1531, proclaiming the selection of his sister Mary as her successor and giving further instructions in regard to the said Council. Its composition was almost exclusively Flemish; and it was thus natural that it should come to be called 'privy' by the Spaniards, since none of them was aware of what was transacted therein. As it was resident in the Netherlands, they knew little or nothing about it, but since it referred all doubtful matters directly to the Emperor, he generally kept certain Netherlanders in attendance upon him, to get the benefit of their advice when the situation demanded it; and it would appear that the name of Consejo Privado was applied by the Spaniards to this group as well. The Consejo de Flandes did not emerge till after the Emperor had abdicated and Philip had assumed control; its advent was the signal for the beginning of a new policy, and the placing of the Low Countries under Spanish administration.³

¹ "Consejo de los Reynos de la Corona de Aragon que reside en nuestra Corte" is the phrase in the ordinance of 1522.

² Bib. Nac. Madrid, Sección de Manuscritos, G-53, Ms. 1751, folios 425-435.

³ Danvila, *Poder Civil*, ii, p. 218.

The history of the Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms, particularly those of Castile, in the reign of Charles V, has been the subject of much recent discussion among historians.¹ The Castilian Cortes met at least fifteen times² during the reign; the General Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon six times at Monzon; those of the county of Catalonia twice; and those of Aragon and Valencia once each. The Emperor's pressing financial needs, for the support of his wars on land and on sea, were doubtless the chief reason for the frequency of these meetings, and gave the popular representatives an opportunity of expressing their views, which it is probable that Charles would otherwise have been unwilling to accord them. Yet it is only fair to add that the Emperor strove to make the best of the situation with which he was confronted. He realized that there was much good

¹ The *Cortes de los Reinos de León y de Castilla* gives the text of the cuadernos of the Cortes of the Western Kingdoms and a number of other documents in regard to the sessions; it is of course the most important of all the sources available. As yet there is nothing comparable to it for the realms of the Crown of Aragon in this period; one has to rely on the contemporary authorities, and on the summaries and citations of occasional manuscripts in the works of the more modern writers. Sandoval, Colmeiro, Coroleu y Pella, and Danvila are all valuable; the latter, as always, should be used with extreme caution. The most recent writers on the financial side of the Castilian assembly are K. Häbler, *Wirtschaftliche Blüte Spaniens und ihr Verfall* (1888), *Geschichte der Fugger'schen Handlung in Spanien* (1897), and *Geschichte Spaniens unter den Habsburgern*, Erster Band (1907); F. de Laiglesia, *Estudios Históricos* (1908); and Isaac Bernays, "Zur inneren Entwicklung Castiliens unter Karl V.," in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, i (1889), pp. 381-428. The first two take the line that the Emperor had far reaching and beneficent schemes for

giving the Cortes a larger share in the administration of the government, which were brought to naught by the inability of the procuradores to appreciate them. Bernays, on the other hand, holds the Emperor in large measure responsible for the decline of the popular liberties which indisputably took place. His criticisms of Häbler's first work are severe and for the most part convincing; Häbler makes no effort whatsoever to refute them in his subsequent books, in which he reiterates his former opinions, though modifying his methods of expressing them. There is much to be said for his point of view, which is also substantially that of Laiglesia; but both writers assert so much more than the documents prove, that it is often impossible to accept their conclusions. Unless further material to confirm them is forthcoming, the strictures of Bernays must be treated with respect.

² This does not count the session of 1524 at Valladolid, which the Real Academia regards as a continuation of that of 1523. Danvila (*Poder Civil*, ii, p. 63) treats it as a separate assembly.

other than financial, to be derived by an absolute sovereign from the meetings of a representative body; this is clearly demonstrated by the history of his government in the Netherlands, where he used the States General "as a symbol and practicable basis for common action"¹ by the united provinces. In Spain he could improve one assembly in the light of another, and bring the heterogeneous institutions of the peninsula into some sort of alignment. Above all he could rearrange the collection of the subsidies, in such wise as to make the national representatives share the odium of the taxation which he was forced to impose. A parallel may be drawn here to the parliamentary history of the reign of his contemporary Henry VIII, who, having found after twenty years' experience that he could not get on without the national assembly, kept it almost constantly in session from 1529 to 1547, and thus committed the English nation to the great changes of those momentous years. Where the parallel fails is in the ultimate results. While the Parliament in England took advantage of the situation to fortify its authority beyond the possibility of overthrow, the Cortes had been so enfeebled by the developments of the previous half century, and were so generally deficient in political sagacity, that the end of the reign found them far weaker than the beginning.

In the realms of the crown of Aragon, one is struck with the frequency of the sessions of the General Cortes of all three kingdoms, and the rarity of those of the estates of each of the component parts. The former met just twice as many times as in the preceding reign; the latter less than one-third as often. The obvious explanation of this is that Charles was too busy to visit all three capitals, and saved time by summoning the representatives of the three realms

¹ W. Stubbs, *Lectures on European History*, p. 26.

to their traditional meeting place at Monzon.¹ But it is also natural to suppose that he hoped to find in the General Cortes of the three Eastern Kingdoms, just as in the States General of the Netherlands, a useful means of combating separatism. It will be remembered, moreover, that the General Cortes were general only in name — a juxtaposition, but not a fusion of the three separate assemblies — and that one of them not seldom refused what the other two were willing to accord,² so that the Emperor had to deal, to all intents and purposes, with three different bodies. Like many of his predecessors, he was to find it wellnigh impossible to make headway against the accumulated weight of long centuries of Spanish tradition.

In dealing with the Cortes of these Eastern Kingdoms and attempting to induce them to vote him funds, Charles was forced to observe all the elaborate regulations by which their rights and privileges were traditionally safeguarded, and their liberties protected against the encroachment of the crown.³ Nowhere else in all his dominions did he encounter the same measure of constitutional opposition; but he made no serious effort to overthrow or evade it, though his patience was often severely tried.⁴ As an offset to this difficulty, he had reason to expect that the position, traditions, and commercial leanings of the Eastern Kingdoms — more especially, of course, of the principality of Catalonia — would render them more alive to the necessities of his foreign policy than could be expected of proverbially self-centred Castile. It was primarily through the realms of the crown of Aragon that Charles had fallen heir to his Mediter-

¹ Cf. here Bofarull, vii, p. 62.

² As, e.g., in 1528; cf. Häbler, p. 216. The different assemblies also often retired to their respective capitals to finish their deliberations. *Ibid.*, p. 221, note.

³ Cf. *ante*, Vol. I, pp. 460–462, 481–484.

⁴ A. Rodríguez Villa, *El Emperador Carlos V y su Corte*, pp. 804 ff.; Häbler, pp. 266–267.

anean responsibilities. They were near the seat of the Italian wars. Catalonia and Valencia were exposed to Turkish raids. But the Emperor was to discover that these cosmopolitan influences were of little consequence when weighed in the balance against the preservation of the national privileges. The sums that he could extract from the General Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon were never large, and one-third of the amount voted was almost invariably set aside for internal purposes. In 1528 the Aragonese voted him 200,000 pounds of Barcelona, the Valencians 100,000 pounds, and the Catalans, who felt that their privileges had been infringed, nothing at all. In 1533 the sum total was about 550,000 ducats, and there seems no evidence that the subsequent sessions made larger grants.¹ And in order to obtain even these comparatively modest amounts, the Emperor was forced to subject himself to conditions which most of his fellow sovereigns would have regarded as intolerable: long continued sojournings in unattractive spots, sanctioning of much legislation of which he wholeheartedly disapproved, incessant repetitions of promises to respect the *fueros*. The constitutional arrangements of the Eastern Kingdoms were in fact a glaring anachronism in the monarchical atmosphere of the sixteenth century. That Charles took such pains to avoid collisions with them is at once a proof of his need for funds, and a tribute to his tact and to his respect for tradition.

And yet despite all such vexations and delays, the Emperor was fully alive to the strong points of his East Spanish subjects; in fact it is impossible to resist the conviction that he

¹ Häbler, pp. 216-230, *passim*. Häbler, p. 221, note, says that at the end of the reign the regular subsidy was 100,000 for Valencia, 200,000 for Aragon, and 300,000 for Catalonia. According, however, to Danvila (*Poder Civil*, ii,

pp. 80 ff., 91 ff., 108 ff., 128 ff., 137 ff., 149 ff.), it would seem that the Catalan grant was more often 200,000 and that the Aragonese sometimes failed to contribute.

found them, in some respects, more congenial than the Castilians. They had not revolted against him in his absence in any way comparable to the rising of the Comuneros; their cosmopolitan traditions gave them a far wider outlook; Charles felt that they might be brought to a sympathetic comprehension of his policy, in a way that was impossible for the representatives of the Western Kingdom.¹ Even out of the constitutional prerogatives of the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon, Charles recognized that it might be possible for him to derive advantages. Claims to control connote the assumption of responsibility, and the burden of raising and collecting the taxes was a responsibility of which the Emperor was heartily tired. In the Eastern Kingdoms the *Diputados de las Cortes* relieved him of a large share of this onerous function; and the provision that one-third of the sums regularly granted should be devoted to the purposes of internal government, and consequently be left in the hands of the Cortes, suggested the introduction of certain changes in Castile. It is needless to add that he had not the slightest intention of giving to the representatives of the Western Kingdom any such measure of control over the granting of subsidies as had been inherited by the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon. In Castile he had virtually the right of arbitrary taxation; and realizing what an enormous advantage this was to the crown, he was by no means minded to part with it. But if, by the adoption of a few of the arrangements with which he had become acquainted in the Eastern Kingdoms, he could modify the methods of collecting the funds, he might both educate and gratify his Castilian subjects, and at the same time improve his own financial condition. He would rid himself of a host of dishonest tax-farmers, whose extor-

¹ Häbler, p. 230.

tions and speculations were a disgrace to the realm. He would comply with some of the most oft repeated requests which had been addressed to him, since his accession, by the Cortes of the Western Kingdom. He might even hope to win popularity for himself and sympathetic comprehension of his financial and political needs.

It was with the Cortes of Toledo in the year 1525 that Charles determined to try such an experiment. The relations between sovereign and assembly were unusually cordial. Both were naturally elated by the great victory of Pavia. The Emperor was soon to relieve the anxieties of his subjects by marrying the Infanta Isabella of Portugal, and the procuradores, to show their gratitude, voted Charles an extraordinary grant of 150,000,000 maravedis.¹ The time was ripe for an attempt to get into closer touch with the representatives of the realm, to devise new means to promote the common welfare; and Charles essayed to accomplish these ends in two different ways. In the first place he gave permission to the procuradores to elect two of their number as a *Comisión Permanente*, on the model of Aragon, to remain at his court and watch over the fulfilment of his promises to the Cortes; and 200,000 maravedis were voted by the procuradores to defray the expenses of this new body.² In the second he offered to abandon the *alcabala*, or tax on sales — whose blighting effect had been recognized for years past and whose yield had been regularly sold to the tax-farmers — and also the *tercias*, or clerical contribution, in return for a so-called *encabezamiento*, or general tax on individuals, to be collected by the different cities of the realm, which in turn were to pay definite sums to the crown.³ He placed the amount of these sums so high

¹ Danvila, ii, pp. 67-68.

² Cortes, iv, p. 413; v, pp. 507-509; Danvila, ii, p. 68.

³ This was not a new experiment.

There had been many doubts about the wisdom and fairness of the *alcabala* in

that the Cortes for the time being declined his proposal; but most of the cities made separate contracts with the government, so that the arrangement went into immediate effect for the greater part of the realm. Charles had shown his willingness to meet the representatives of the nation halfway, but he did not intend to have his revenues diminished; in fact, in the form in which his offer was first made, he expected that it would result in substantially increasing them.

Further light upon the Emperor's policy and aims in regard to the national assembly of the Western Kingdom is afforded by the history of the Cortes of 1527. These were summoned to Valladolid for February 12; and this time Charles invited the representatives of the nobles and the clergy to take their places beside the procuradores of the cities. This had not occurred, save on formal occasions, since 1480; Charles obviously desired to see if the two upper orders could be induced to bear their share in contributing to his needs, but the specific purpose for which he asked support awoke no response in the hearts of the assembly. It was primarily for a Turkish war that Charles desired funds; but it was also plainly obvious that his attention was directed rather to the Danube valley and the

the time of the Catholic Kings; in the year 1494 it began to be the practice to exchange it for a lump sum to be collected and paid in by the cities (Bernays, p. 392). Isabella, who was quite conscience-stricken about the *alcabala*, desired in her will that this new expedient be continued; it was apparently in vogue at the time of Charles's first visit to the peninsula and so popular that a contemporary document (B. M., Egerton Ms. 2084, fol. 53, cited in Bernays, p. 392, note) informs us that "now all do with good will what they could not be bribed to do before," and Charles promised the Cortes of 1518 that it

should remain (*Cortes*, iv, p. 265). The tax-farmers, however, offered him a better price for the restoration of the *alcabala*, and in 1519 Charles yielded to their requests. The Cortes naturally demanded that the *encabezamiento* be reestablished; throughout the period of the Comuneros it was called for again and again (*Cortes*, iv, pp. 323, 394), but it was not until 1525 that the Emperor took the matter up. It was one of the duties of the *Comisión Permanente*, to which reference has just been made, to collect the amounts of the municipal contributions (*Cortes*, v, pp. 507-509).

Hungarian plains than to the waters of the Mediterranean and the shores of North Africa. His brother-in-law, King Louis, had been slain at Mohács; his brother, Ferdinand, was at the end of his resources; it looked as if the Sultan would advance, without let or hindrance, to Vienna. But all this was too remote to be of interest to Castile. It was in vain that Charles insisted that it was identically the same enemy that threatened the Iberian shores and the North African presidios — a menace to Christendom and the traditional foe of Spain. No one of the assembled estates could be made to see it in that light.¹ The nobles asserted that if the Emperor went in person to the war, their lives and their property were at the service of his Majesty, but they would not consent to be taxed like *pecheros*. The attitude of the clergy was only slightly more encouraging. The Order of St. Benedict offered 12,000 *doblones*, and the Military Orders one-fifth of their *encomiendas*. The bishops said that Charles could take the church plate if he would, but that if he did so, he would be taking it from God and not from them. The municipal representatives were the worst of all. They pointed to the poverty of the land, and to the extraordinary subsidies which they had granted in 1525, as proofs of their inability to contribute. They reverted to their numerous unsatisfied grievances; and finally the Emperor "sent them home to spend Easter," without having received a single penny or giving them an opportunity to draw up a *cuaderno*.² It was a bitter disappointment, from which he did not recover for many a day. Castile was not yet so loyal to the new dynasty as to be willing to bear aid to the non-Spanish part

¹ The royal "proposición" to the Cortes was made on February 11, 1527, "después que el Turco venció y mató al Rey de Hungría"; it is in R. A. H., Mss. Salazar, A-40, fol. 138.

² Colmeiro, *Introd.*, ii, pp. 142-144; Sandoval, i, p. 609; M. and M., ix, pp. 187-189.

of his dominions. The upper orders stood out firmly for their privileges, and Charles did not repeat the experiment of summoning them until eleven years later, when the situation had entirely changed.

In the interval, however, he made some progress in the matter of improving the methods of Castilian taxation. It was naturally in the yield that he was primarily interested; but he was quite willing to accede to any reasonable demand which would serve to distribute the burden more fairly and give the nation an appreciation of his needs. The root of the difficulty, as he plainly perceived, lay in the exemption enjoyed by the nobles and the clergy. He knew, however, that it would be impossible to abolish it by compulsion, and his experience with the Cortes of 1527 showed that the privileged orders were for the present unwilling voluntarily to relinquish it; he was, therefore, thrown back upon the subsidiary problem of the *alcabala*. The Cortes of 1528, 1532, and 1534 had done fairly well by him in the matter of *servicios* — 200, 184, and 204 *cuentos*¹ respectively — all of the money to be paid in before the end of 1537, and on the last of these occasions the question of the *encabezamiento* was once more taken up.² To the usual petition that it should be generally established, Charles responded favorably. He offered to permit the realm to collect by *encabezamiento* the equivalent of the *tercias* and the *alcabala*³ for ten years to come, and also to give back annually the sum of 20,000 ducats,⁴ in consideration of the way in which his

¹ A *cuento* was a million maravedis, i.e., 2666⅔ ducats (cf. note 1 to p. 32, above). It was the standard unit for grants by the Cortes.

² Danvila, *Poder Civil*, ii, pp. 75, 88, 104; Häbler, pp. 211, 230.

³ It is important to notice that no other of the regular imposts were to be included in this arrangement — neither "almoxarifazgo ni servicio y montazgo,

ni puertos de los tres obispados, ni almadrauas, ni mineros, ni la renta de la seda del reyno de Granada, ni auize, ni agueta, ni otras semejantes cosas que no se suelen encabeçar a pueblos." *Cortes*, iv, p. 606.

⁴ Apparently this offer was less advantageous to the realm than that which Charles had made in 1525; on that occasion he had offered to give up 40,000

revenues had increased, and of the amounts which under the old system had been appropriated by the tax-farmers. It was not until more than two years later that this proposal was finally accepted and went into effect. Long negotiations were necessary before the contracting parties could be brought to an agreement; and the arrangement did not become operative until the beginning of 1537, though it was thereafter prolonged until 1556 and 1561.¹ The royal revenues did not suffer by the change. It was calculated when the new plan was proposed in 1534 that the crown would derive from it 300 *cuentos* a year; and at the end of the reign it yielded about 334. On the other hand, Charles had shown his readiness to rectify a national grievance; he had done something to restrict the extortions of the tax-farmers, and he had handed over to the municipalities the problem of getting the funds.

The proceedings of the Cortes of 1537 are in no sense notable. The procuradores granted a *servicio* of 204 *cuentos*, and drew up a *cuaderno* of 151 petitions, of which 53 were definitely granted and thus became the law of the land.² But there is a significant sentence in the speech from the throne³ which struck the keynote of the programme which Charles was to try to put through in the succeeding year — a final attempt against the exemption of the privileged orders. The dangers to which the realm was exposed from France and from the Turk — so the Emperor pointed out — were common dangers which could only be put aside by common efforts; it is clear that he meant — even if he did not directly say so — that the *pecheros* alone could not

ducats. But the cities were by this time so completely at the mercy of the tax-farmers that they were willing to accept far less favorable terms than they had demanded before. Cf. Bernays, pp. 393-394.

¹ Bernays, p. 394; Danvila, v, p. 247.

² Colmeiro, *Introd.*, ii, pp. 176 ff.; Danvila, ii, p. 104.

³ Danvila, v, pp. 256 ff.

possibly bear the burden, and that the nobles and the ecclesiastics ought also to contribute. In 1538 he put this idea to the proof, and summoned the whole body of the higher clergy of the realm, and ninety-five representatives of the Castilian aristocracy, to be present with the *procuradores* at a meeting of the Cortes at Toledo in October. It was made perfectly clear that the occasion was unusual; the *corregidores* were even ordered to see to it that the *poderes* borne by the municipal representatives were unlimited, "because the present business is very different from that which has been treated in other Cortes, since it has to do with the remedying of the affairs of these realms and of our service in general."¹

The *proposiciones*, or speeches from the throne,² which were read to the estates by the royal representatives, deal only in general terms with the necessities of the government; but much more can be gleaned from the records of the subsequent proceedings. The total annual revenues of the realm were more than a million ducats, twice as much as was necessary to defray the regular expenses. But apparently the royal treasury was so drained by special demands and the alienation of the *Patrimonio Real* that not only was the balance exhausted, but a considerable deficit created as well;³ besides, the Emperor had contracted floating debts which amounted to more than the annual revenues of Castile. These conditions could not

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 17-36; 'Cossas' in line 3 of p. 24 is clearly a misprint for 'Cortes.'

² There were two of these, one for the prelates and nobles and one for the *procuradores*. The three estates sat separately, the Emperor sternly opposing all attempts of the nobles and municipal representatives to deliberate in common (Danvila, ii, pp. 113-114). The nobles, on their part, entirely re-

fused to admit to their sessions a secretary whom Charles had attempted to impose upon them; when this unfortunate individual appeared at the door of the hall where they were meeting — the Sala Capitular of San Juan de los Reyes — they all shouted at him "Get out, we don't need any secretary here." *Cortes*, v, p. 56.

³ Häbler (pp. 283-284) gives numerous figures, but fails to cite any authorities.

be permitted to continue if the government's credit was to be saved. Consequently Charles proposed that the two upper orders should sacrifice their privileges and join with the procuradores in voting him a *sisá*, which should bring him in 800,000 ducats a year.¹ This *sisá* was a tax on articles of food. It had been already used in the cities as a means of collecting revenue, but this time it was Charles's intention that all men should contribute to it, irrespective of their condition. He promised that he had no intention of levying it permanently, but merely as a means of relieving his present necessities; in view, however, of the past history of Castilian finance, this assurance was regarded by the Cortes with justifiable distrust.²

We know nothing of the debates on the royal proposal in the estates of the clergy or the commons; but the diary of one of the nobles, who took an active part in the deliberations of the aristocracy, has fortunately been preserved to us.³ There was never the slightest chance of their consenting to the *sisá* in the form which Charles had proposed it; on that point they were unanimous from beginning to end; but they apparently nominated a committee of ten of their own number to draw up a statement of their views and convey it to the Emperor.⁴ One of these ten, the Duke of Bejar, who was also a member of the royal Hacienda and therefore alive to the Emperor's needs, ventured to suggest that a tax on exports be levied to redeem the alienations of the Patrimonio Real, that the floating debt be officially repudiated by a law of the realm, and that the Pope be asked to excommunicate in future any one who should traffic in liens on the national resources.⁵ But only a trifling minority supported

¹ Albèri, *Relazioni degli ambasciatori Veneti*, serie i, p. 300.

² *Ante*, Vol. I, p. 249; Bernays, pp. 388-389; Häbler, p. 285.

³ *Cortes*, v, pp. 46-95.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

this proposal; the mass of the nobles were solely interested in killing the *sisá*; and as soon as the Emperor had assured himself of this, he dismissed them in no very gracious terms on February 1.¹ The clergy in the meantime had shown themselves more complaisant. They had voted before Christmas to satisfy Charles's demands, only stipulating that papal consent would be necessary to give validity to their decision;² but as the procuradores followed the example of the aristocracy and emphatically refused to sanction the *sisá*, the Emperor saw that the plan must be given up.³ The traditional privileges of the nobility had nullified all his efforts; without aristocratic support the clerical offers would not avail, and neither of the two upper orders was ever summoned to the Cortes again.

The procuradores, however, still remained; and Charles was resolved to make one more trial there before acknowledging that he had suffered defeat. Even though his scheme of taxing the two upper orders had perforce been abandoned, he realized that a great improvement could be effected by a change in the imposts that were paid by the third estate; he hoped as usual both to increase the royal revenues and to simplify his own problem by leaving a larger share of the collection and administration of the finances in the hands of the national representatives. He therefore proposed that the regular *servicio* — of 100 *cuentos* a year — be handed over to the realm, which in return should shoulder the burden of the regular national expenses, including the navy and Doria's fleet, the household, courts, and councils, the army and the garrisons on the frontier and in North Africa; while he promised with the aid of the rest of the royal revenues from Castile and the

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 94–95.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 95–96.

³ It would appear, however, that he

continued to cherish hopes that it might some day be established. Cf. Armstrong, ii, pp. 77–78.

Indies to pay his debts and meet all extraordinary demands.¹ From the Emperor's point of view this plan was most advantageous. The regular expenses which the nation was asked to assume were wellnigh thrice as great as the amount of the *servicio*,² and he hoped that his offer to permit the nation to manage its own financial affairs would so gild the pill that the *procuradores* would swallow it; but the latter were on their guard, and stoutly refused. After consulting with their constituents, they³ voted, over and above the *servicio ordinario* of 100 *cuentos*, an *extraordinario* of 450 more, 250 of the total to be paid in at once and the rest before the end of 1542;⁴ further than this, however, they would not go. Moreover, in order even to secure this grant, Charles had to promise that the *encabezamiento* should be prolonged for ten years more (1547-56) after its first term had expired, and to agree not to alienate any more of the royal domain.⁵ Altogether it had been a discouraging experience. The reëstablishment of the *encabezamiento* had been indeed a solid gain; it had benefited the royal treasury and also pleased the nation; but that after all was but a small result for fifteen years of constant effort. The other five Cortes of the reign — at Valladolid in 1542, 1544, 1548, and 1555, and at Madrid in 1551 — voted 450 *cuentos* each, the regulation form of the grant being 100 *cuentos* of *servicio ordinario* for three years and 150 of *extraordinario*, which was usually to be paid in at once; moreover an extra four *cuentos* were generally granted for the *procuradores* and

¹ Bernays, p. 389. Sandoval and Häbler fail to perceive that this proposal to the *procuradores* had nothing whatsoever to do with the *sisá*, but was an entirely independent matter; in fact it was not contemplated until after the *sisá* had failed.

² Cf. Bernays, p. 389, note 3.

³ Save for Burgos, Salamanca, and

Valladolid, which stood out against any extra grant. Danvila, ii, p. 116.

⁴ Cortes, v, pp. 101-102. Apparently the usually trustworthy Bernays has gone astray in estimating the *extraordinario* at only 150 *cuentos* (p. 390).

⁵ Cortes, v, pp. 224, 733; Bernays, p. 390.

"gastos de las Cortes."¹ The larger amount voted in 1538 is doubtless accounted for by the fact that the Cortes, having defeated the Emperor's two main contentions, were not unwilling to hand him some sort of a consolation prize.

We have hitherto considered the Castilian Cortes solely in their tax-voting capacity. It was primarily in this light that the Emperor and the Consejo² regarded them, and by the latter part of the reign the procuradores themselves had come around to the same point of view. Their request, in 1544, not to be summoned oftener than once every three years, "on account of the great costs and expense,"³ was a virtual abdication of their traditional place in the body politic. Their right to petition for the enactment of legislation should not, however, be wholly ignored. It was not, assuredly, of great practical importance, for if their requests were displeasing to the monarch, he was not obliged to accept them, nor, if he did so, to put them into execution. The number of times the same petition reappears is perhaps the most striking of all the features of the proceedings of the Cortes, and bears witness to the futility of their claims to legislation.⁴ The fact that they asked that the *autos acordados* of the Consejo Real and the other tribunals be printed and made generally available⁵ is an indication that they realized that the legislative authority was passing out of their hands; moreover, they were soon to lose even the precious right which they had inherited from earlier times, that no law or ordinance which had been enacted in the Cortes could be formally revoked without their consent.⁶

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 258, 331, 480, 573-574, 625-626, 705.

² Cf. *ante*, p. 150.

³ *Cortes*, v, p. 328.

⁴ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 645-647; v, pp. 670-675; Danvila, ii, pp. 147, 154.

⁵ *Cortes*, v, p. 630; Danvila, ii, p. 155.

⁶ *Cortes*, v, p. 677; Danvila, ii, p. 156. Cf. also "Control by National Assemblies of the Repeal of Legislation," by the present writer, in *Mélanges d'Histoire offerts à M. Charles Bémont*, pp. 437-458.

And yet it is instructive to glance at the *cuadernos* as a record of the national aspirations and desires; in fact it is probable that they give a far truer picture than could be drawn from the proceedings of a national assembly today. The *procuradores* were innocent of parliamentary tactics; they made no effort to compromise or circumvent; since the royal replies were but "yes" or "no," there was nothing to be gained by concealing their real feelings. They said just what they thought of the policy of the foreign dynasty which fate had placed upon the Castilian throne. Their words are an accurate reflection of the national attitude.

It is not to be expected that the Castilian Cortes should have occupied themselves to any great extent with the course of foreign affairs. Such matters were invariably left in the hands of the monarch in all the countries of Western Europe at this period; the national assemblies were far too ignorant to deal with them. The attitude of the *procuradores*, like that of their constituents, towards all the great world developments with which they had so suddenly been thrown into contact, was in the main passive. God had sent Spain an Emperor — the temporal head of Christendom — for her king; it was obviously His intention to make her the chief instrument of His will; it was merely her duty to accept this high mission, and to see to it that the preëminence which He had granted her was maintained. That Charles had a host of non-Spanish possessions mattered nothing in their eyes; these possessions were remote, disturbed, and honeycombed with heresy, a debit rather than a credit item in the general account; it was Spain, save for the very first, that wholeheartedly supported the Emperor; it was Spain — and in particular Castile — that paid his bills. It is consequently no matter for surprise that the first petitions of the *cuadernos* of 1537, 1538, 1542, 1544, and

1548, a period when Charles was most of the time absent, demand that he should reside continually in the peninsula, and make his Spanish realms the centre of his dominions. It is the same request as in the days of the Comuneros, but the language in which it is couched is very different. Jealousy and suspicion were the keynote in the early days; now it is rather fear lest his "royal and imperial person be placed in difficulty, danger, and peril" in these distant journeys, and desire "that he should remain and repose in these realms that so ardently love and long for him, and imitate the ways of his glorious ancestors the Catholic Kings"; or assurance that "his Majesty possesses in these realms many subjects that can abundantly satisfy any necessities which may arise in other lands" and "good captains such as there have ever been in Spain . . . who have done mighty and memorable deeds in similar circumstances in the service of their king." Charles's response in every case is evasively affirmative. He protests that "the necessities of Christendom have been the sole cause of his absences, and that his Majesty desires nothing so much as to remain and repose in these kingdoms."¹

It is also evident that the procuradores were far more interested in Charles's wars against the Turks and the Lutherans than in those against the king of France. On the Pyrenees, indeed, they were ever ready to fight, as witness their solicitude for the fortifications of Fontarabia;² but they apparently recked little of the course of the struggle in Italy or on the frontier of the Netherlands, and in 1544 and 1548 they bluntly asked Charles to condescend to make peace with Christian kings.³ Against Barbarossa, on the other hand, the procuradores were continually urging him

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 104, 223-224, 304.

² *Cortes*, iv, pp. 398, 578; v, p. 627.

³ *Cortes*, v, pp. 304, 365.

on. There are incessant demands for the fortification of the southern coasts,¹ and, down to the Tunis campaign of 1535, constant requests for vigorous action in North Africa. "We beg your Majesty," runs the fifth petition of the *cuaderno* of 1523, "to labor by all possible means to make peace with all Christian kings and war with the Infidel."² The forty-fourth petition of the *cuaderno* of 1525 is still more specific. "We ask that your Majesty keep up the fortifications of North Africa," so it reads, "and see that the garrisons are well paid, for this will redound to the service of God, and do great hurt to the unbeliever."³ The naval and commercial sides of the Turkish struggle naturally command a large share of the *procuradores*' attention, for Barbarossa's piracies rendered it almost impossible to trade in the Western Mediterranean during the early part of the reign; moreover he constantly raided the Spanish ports and carried off captives and booty.⁴ There is an interesting request in 1528 that Spanish ships be better furnished with cannon, "since it has been often observed that though there are more men in the ships of Spain than in those of her foes . . . the Spaniards have to surrender because the others have more artillery and ammunition . . . the which does not happen to the ships of Portugal or of other nations."⁵ All these different items may be adduced to prove that the Castilians were still chiefly interested in such matters as traditionally or geographically lay close to their doors. Charles found it difficult to induce them to support the Turkish campaigns on the Danube, and there is nothing in the *cuadernos* about the Schmalkaldic wars; but there are

¹ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 385, 668; v, pp. 252, 543.

² *Ibid.*, iv, p. 367.

³ *Ibid.*, iv, p. 424.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 385, 562.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iv, p. 472. Interesting information as to the artillery on the Spanish ships of the period is given on pp. 329 ff. of C. Fernández Duro's *Armada Española*, vol. i.

many instances of a provinciality equally striking among the enlightened nations of today, when the means of communication have been so tremendously improved that the Antipodes are far less remote than was Germany from Castile. And there are plenty of evidences scattered through the cuadernos that the outlook of the Castilian was broader than before. In 1532 Charles was asked to diminish the number of suits before the courts by adopting the law "which is in force in certain seigniories of Italy and elsewhere, that cases between relatives within the fourth degree be settled and compromised by arbitrators *por una via de derecho*." ¹ Six years later he is asked to "forbid entirely the game of cards and dice, as has been done in the kingdom of Portugal"; ² and, in 1548, to seek the advice of the experts in irrigation, "who are to be found in Aragon and in Valencia and in part of Navarre and in other places." ³ Such requests would hardly have been heard in the days of the Catholic Kings. The Castilians were beginning to get ideas from abroad.

The cuadernos, however, are of course primarily valuable for the light they shed on internal affairs; more than nine-tenths of the petitions they contain concern themselves with matters within the realm. The three principal subjects of complaint — which occupy far more space than all the rest put together — are the defects and delays in the administration of justice, clerical abuses and the giving of benefices to foreigners, and the impoverishment of the realm through the economic policy of the crown. Each of these topics will be subsequently taken up by itself; it therefore remains to consider in the present section a number of minor details which cannot be classified under any one head.

One of the commonest demands is that the legislation of

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 538.

² *Ibid.*, v, p. 136.

³ *Ibid.*, v, p. 469.

the realm be codified and printed "in one volume so that there shall be nothing superfluous and no contradiction."¹ There was apparently much ignorance about the laws of the land, not only among the people at large but also on the bench and in the bar; "those ordinances which were selected by Dr. Montalvo were faulty and ill chosen, and for this reason the judges give various and divergent sentences, and do not know the laws under which all cases must be tried," so runs petition 56 of the cuaderno of 1523.² A subsequent paragraph asks that the *Partidas* be republished, with corrections and additions to bring them up to date. There are also several requests that the "ancient chronicles and histories of this realm be collected and printed," since it is "profitable and pleasant" to know of "the great deeds done by the kings of Castile, of glorious memory, both in war and in peace . . . so that they will not be forgotten."³ The procuradores begged for a pension of 400 ducats for Florian de Ocampo, who "of his own natural inclination has written for twenty-eight years on the history of Spain . . . which is one of the most principal provinces of the world, whose inhabitants have wrought mighty deeds, not only in the wars of the Carthaginians, Romans, and Goths, but also since the coming of the Moors and in the recovery of the same by the Christians, from the time of King Pelayo to that of the

¹ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 382-383, 546-547; v, pp. 323, 367, 547, 628-629.

² *Ibid.*, iv, p. 382. The task of making such a collection was successively intrusted by Charles to Don Pero Lopez de Alcozer, to Dr. Guevara, to Dr. Escudero, and to the licentiate Arrieta; all of the first three died before they could complete the work, and the last named was so busy with the affairs of the Consejo Real that he had not sufficient time to make any real progress. *Cortes*, v, p. 628. A special collection of *pragmáticas* and *capítulos de Cortes*

between the years 1523 and 1544 was made by the licentiate Andrés Martínez de Burgos, a native of Astorga, and was published at Medina del Campo in 1547; but apparently it was entirely unsatisfactory, for in the following year the Emperor forbade the sale of it, and ordered that all the copies that could be found be seized and brought before the Consejo Real, which should determine what measures ought to be taken therein. Danvila, ii, p. 203.

³ *Cortes*, iv, p. 382; v, p. 154.

final restoration by the Catholic Kings, Ferdinand and Isabella, who are in glory ; and since for lack of authors these things are no longer remembered.”¹ But there were other works of which the procuradores wholly disapproved. In the very same cuaderno in which they commended Ocampo they drew attention to “the great harm that has been done in these kingdoms to men, boys, young girls, and others through the reading of books of lies and vanities like *Amadis [de Gaula]* and all the works that have been patterned thereon . . . for the youths and the young women spend their idleness over these . . . and the more they give themselves up to those vanities, the more they draw away from the true and holy Christian doctrines and remain fascinated with that affected manner of speech.”² They therefore demand that no such books be printed in the future, and that those copies already in existence be collected and burned.

The Cortes gave much attention to educational problems. They were insistent on the desirability alike of admitting to colleges and seminaries of learning such candidates as could prove Christian descent for four generations back, and of excluding those who could not ; and they begged Charles to see to it that the line was fairly drawn.³ They desired that occupants of the professorial chairs at Salamanca and Valladolid “be given but a temporary tenure, as in Italy and elsewhere, and not elected for life, since life tenure is a cause of many evils . . . for those who have got the chairs take no interest in study or the care of their students,” whereas a temporary appointment “would cause them to work for the increase of their salaries and larger classes . . . to write and to see to it that their students should hold disputations and otherwise exercise themselves in letters.”⁴

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 700-701.

² *Ibid.*, v, pp. 687-688.

³ *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 556, 647.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iv, p. 470.

They ask that the degrees of Toledo, Seville, and Granada and of the other universities of the realm be given the same status as those of Salamanca, Valladolid, and Bologna; that the curriculum at Alcalá be brought up to a similar standard, and that the expenses of the higher education be reduced.¹ After hinting broadly that many *letrados* had obtained degrees by easy methods in foreign universities, and at those recently established within the realm, and were claiming exemption from taxation on that ground, they demand that such exemption be henceforth granted only to those who have graduated after "rigorous examination" from Salamanca, Valladolid, and Bologna.² The students also gave food for anxious thought. The Cortes were concerned at the way in which they contracted debts, and the national assembly strove to protect them and their parents from legal action by their creditors. "Since fathers and mothers send their sons to the universities, and carefully provide them with food and clothes and books, and the students, on the pretext that they need to purchase these things, seek to get money by loans or by pawning their books and effects and then gamble it away or spend it for other evil purposes and are thereby distracted from their studies," the procuradores beg that it be forbidden "to imprison students for such debts, or to take their clothes, their rooms, or their books" and that "their parents be not held for the payment of their indebtedness."³ Most serious of all was the state of medical knowledge; the realm was apparently infested with quacks. Charles was assured that many of the doctors then practising were "untaught idiots"; and that the apothecaries are seldom present in their shops, but leave behind them incompetent persons "who mix up the drugs

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 641.

² *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 619-620; v, pp. 689-690.

³ *Ibid.*, v, pp. 230, 530, 669.

and make other mistakes, from which great harm results for those who take the said medicines.”¹ He is asked to see to it that no one be permitted to practise without a thorough examination and the degree of bachelor of arts, and that that degree be not given save at a university where the recipient has studied medicine for the full four years; to oblige surgeons and doctors to prescribe in Spanish “clearly and without signs or abbreviations, in order that patients may know what they are getting, and for the avoidance of the evils which arise from lack of such information.”²

The procuradores were also greatly concerned over the march of luxury and reckless expenditure.³ They felt that the royal court was the seat of these evils; they resented its establishment “after the Burgundian fashion . . . at great cost and excessive waste sufficient to conquer a kingdom,” and were constantly demanding a return to the custom of Castile, “which is suitable, very ancient, and less expensive.”⁴ There are numerous outcries against the abuses of purveyance and forced entertainment.⁵ “We have often begged your Majesty to give orders,” runs the cuaderno of 1542, “that your courtiers pay a reasonable price for their lodgings . . . for in this wise your Majesty’s court will be better satisfied, and the householders will receive it willingly”; “it often happens to a poor woman who has nothing but a place in a doorway and a bed of cloths, which she has collected as a dowry for her daughter, that the guests who are imposed on her ruin her bed and destroy it.”⁶ Gay clothes and carriages were another

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 138, 421.

² *Cortes*, iv, pp. 379, 563, 640–641; v, pp. 138, 421, 560, 658.

³ On this paragraph cf. J. Sempere y Guarinos, *Historia del Lujo en España* (Madrid, 1788), ii, pp. 22–54, *passim*.

⁴ *Cortes*, v, pp. 627, 731; Gómara, p.

139; Bernays, p. 398, and references there; and above, pp. 123–124.

⁵ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 451–452; v, pp. 320, 541.

⁶ *Cortes*, v, pp. 227–228; cf. also Danvila, ii, p. 152, for the corresponding legislation in Aragon.

fertile source of complaint. "We have seldom observed," declared the procuradores in 1555, "that men follow the good customs which are brought to these realms from abroad, but that they immediately adopt the bad ones, as for example is the case with the coaches and litters which have lately appeared . . . and daily so increase in luxury and expense that a whole fortune is needed for their upkeep; . . . and when people of dignity and importance adopt these fashions, experience shows that every one wants to follow their example; . . . and such is the insolence with which they bear themselves, that coaches and litters and all their following have been seen to pass by the Holy Sacrament in the streets without a single obeisance; . . . moreover, there have occurred countless terrible accidents through people's rushing and confusion, through the frightening of horses and mules, and the falls of their riders."¹ Charles is besought to forbid these coaches and litters, and thereby "to do a service to God, from which these realms will derive profit, contentment, and pleasure."²

Other scattering petitions throw an interesting light on the national customs. The right to bear arms was the subject of much discussion.³ Apparently the royal officials were constantly interfering with this privilege in the most arbitrary manner; it was probably their intention merely to increase the safety of the streets at night, but their actions affronted the pride of Castile. Both swords and daggers were permitted by law — the former to be of a standard size — as late as 1551;⁴ four years afterwards, however, the procuradores apparently recognized that daggers were very dangerous, "since they are a weapon which the

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 688-689; also pp. 550, 557-558.

² *Ibid.*, v, p. 689; cf. also Sandoval, i, p. 134.

³ *Cortes*, iv, p. 382; v, pp. 137, 255, 307, 550, 661.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, pp. 307, 550.

upper classes can scarcely handle without killing, and the lower classes, when they have them, will slay if they are insulted, whereas, if they lacked them, they would let the insult pass"; the *procuradores* therefore requested that they be henceforth forbidden, and likewise pistols (*arcabuzes pequeños*) "with which men do murder secretly."¹ Efforts to mitigate the harsh penalties of earlier days were occasionally made. "Since those who are condemned by the Hermandad to be shot with arrows are shot alive, without first being strangled, and this seems to be inhuman, and sometimes causes a lingering death, we beg your Majesty to give orders that no one shall be shot with arrows without first being strangled, since this is the custom with heretics."² The *procuradores* were also much disturbed about the gypsies. They were forbidden by law to reside in the realm; but apparently they obtained special licenses to remain "and rob the fields and destroy property and wound and slay any one who hinders them; and injure and deceive all those who traffic with them; and have no other means of making a living."³ Gambling was also rife throughout the realm. There are constant requests in the early part of the reign to enforce the *pragmáticas* against cards and dice, and to increase the penalties on those who infringed them.⁴ But one also infers that false accusations of gambling were not seldom preferred against innocent persons, for in 1542 and in 1551 Charles is asked to give orders that the authorities shall only take cognizance of cases where the gamblers are caught in the act, or where the loser prefers a specific complaint. It was likewise requested that there should be

¹ *Cortes*, v, p. 661; cf. also Gounon-Loubens, pp. 233-234.

² *Cortes*, iv, pp. 561, 563-564; cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 102-103.

³ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 437, 515, 618-619; v,

pp. 558-559. There are also petitions for their expulsion in Aragon: Danvila, ii, p. 140.

⁴ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 383, 460; v, pp. 136, 250, 306, 542-543, 681-682, 704.

no penalty on games for stakes of less than two reals, "for it is the poor people who pay, and the rich are never fined or punished."¹ The reign, moreover, witnessed at least one of the innumerable vain attempts in Spanish history to stop the bull fight. "Since it is notorious that bull fighting often causes men's deaths and other misfortunes," runs the petition of the procuradores in 1555, "we beg your Majesty to give orders that this pastime be stopped, or else to change it so as to make it less dangerous."² The royal reply was a refusal to make any innovation. By this time the Emperor had come to know his Spanish subjects even better than they knew themselves.³

The records of the Cortes of the realms of the crown of Aragon are not yet available in such form as to make any thorough analysis possible; but much may be inferred from the contemporary chroniclers and from the summaries of the different sessions in later books. Since the claims of these assemblies to a real share in the legislative power were considerably more firmly established than those of the Cortes of Castile, their meetings were at once more businesslike and less interesting to the historian. They did not waste so much time in hit-or-miss petitions about any sort of grievance that might come into their heads, but concentrated on those whose redress they were able to compel. Despite the comparative cosmopolitanism of these eastern kingdoms — especially the county of Catalonia — they are curiously reticent on the subject of Charles's foreign policy; only when the war was brought to their very doors did they seem

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 599; a *pragmática*, regulating the amount of the stakes and the methods of play, was put forth at Valladolid, November 22, 1553. Cf. Danvila, ii, p. 177. A real was 34 maravedis.

² *Cortes*, v, p. 665.

³ Charles himself is said to have killed

a bull with a lance-thrust from on horseback in the square at Valladolid, on the occasion of the official celebration of the birth of Philip II. Cf. N. Fernández de Moratín, "Carta Historica sobre . . . las Fiestas de Toros," in *B. A. E.*, ii, p. 142.

to take any interest — as at the time of the French attack on Perpignan in 1542, or of the Moorish raids on the Valencian coasts.¹ There was a great outburst against the conferring of ecclesiastical benefices upon foreigners. It reached its climax in 1533 when Charles presented Cardinal Doria for the archbishopric of Tarragona; from the royal reply, the lists of incumbents, and the fact that similar complaints almost never reappear, one infers that the national representatives succeeded in making their point.² The Catalans were naturally much concerned about their commerce; in fact, their enthusiasm for the suppression of the Moorish pirates is probably chiefly attributable to their desire to avail themselves of the right which had been granted them by Ferdinand the Catholic to traffic in certain commodities with the North African ports; in 1519, 1533, and 1537 they demanded and apparently obtained confirmation of this privilege.³ It is also interesting to observe that they requested Charles to continue to prohibit the importation of foreign cloths into Naples and Sicily, save at a duty of twenty per cent. Apparently they regarded themselves as competent — at least in economic affairs — to legislate for the *tierras de allà mar*.⁴ But by far the greater part of their activities were exclusively concerned with internal matters; the same thing holds true of the Cortes of Valencia, and to an even greater extent of the Cortes of Aragon. Administration of justice, infraction of the *fueros*, salaries of officials, and the preservation of economic resources are the principal topics which interested the pro-

¹ Danvila, ii, pp. 87, 129. There was also some enthusiasm for the conquest of Algiers, the headquarters of the Barbary corsairs. *Ibid.*, ii, p. 142.

² *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 91–94, 130.

³ *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 47, 93, 109. In Castile the Cortes petitioned to the same effect

in 1551 (*Cortes*, v, p. 549), and were told that the Emperor would consult with the Consejo; to judge from the views of that body as expressed in its *pareceres* (cf. *ante*, p. 151) its advice must have been emphatically in the negative.

⁴ Danvila, ii, p. 110.

curadores, and the constitutional arrangements which they had inherited from the Middle Ages made it usually possible for them to enforce their views. The results of their absorption in these things were unfortunate. The realms of the crown of Aragon occupied, after all, a small portion of the Iberian peninsula, and it was only by developing their Mediterranean activities that they could hope to withstand the preponderance of Castile. Charles made many an effort to turn them in this direction, but without any really permanent success. At the end of the reign they were left with the forms of their constitutional liberties and little else besides; under Philip even these were in large measure to be abrogated, and the Castilianization of the peninsula was virtually complete.

It is doubtful if any feature of the Emperor's government was more unsatisfactory to his Spanish subjects than the administration of justice. The *cuadernos* are filled with criticisms and complaints of it; in all the judicial hierarchy, there was apparently not a single court which was successfully discharging its functions. Yet the Emperor had the loftiest conceptions of his duties as the highest judge in the land. He made no important changes in the system which he had inherited from the Catholic Kings, and which had been justly regarded as one of the greatest glories of their reign. He constantly sent his royal agents to visit the different tribunals of the realm, to report on their activities, and to suggest reforms.¹ The fundamental difficulty was really twofold. In the first place, the Emperor's numerous absences rendered it impossible for him to administer justice in person with the regularity which had become customary in the previous reign, and had taught all men to

¹ Danvila, ii, pp. 205-206.

respect the law. The judges lacked the constant inspiration of the royal example, which had accomplished so much under the Catholic Kings.¹ In the second, the very accessibility of the tribunals, coupled with the increase in population² and the complications incident to the rule of the new dynasty, produced an accumulation of suits which the courts could not possibly handle, so that at the end of the reign there was confusion from top to bottom.

Since it was impossible to remedy the first of these difficulties, the Spaniards concentrated on the rectification of the second. It was in Castile that the evil was chiefly felt; the judicial arrangements of the realms of the crown of Aragon were, relatively speaking, adequate to meet the changed conditions. The trouble began, as we have already had occasion to notice, at the top of the ladder, in the Consejo Real. In 1532 the procuradores begged for the establishment therein of a separate chamber to hear ecclesiastical cases and civil suits of the highest importance: *pleytos de mil y quinientos*, as they were commonly called.³ Charles responded favorably, but the recurrence of the same petition in 1548 and in 1555 shows that the promise was not fulfilled; the *Sala de Mil y Quinientos* was not set up until a later day.⁴ There were also unfulfilled requests for a special *sala* to have charge of residencias.⁵ The Chancillerías, next below the Consejo, were similarly inadequate to their tasks. The two principal tribunals, at Valladolid and Granada, and the subsidiary one in Galicia which had been set up in 1486,⁶ were by no means sufficient for the purpose. In 1544

¹ Cortes, iv, p. 384. "That it may please your Majesty to hold . . . public court certain days in the week as was the custom of the Catholic Kings." Charles promised to do so, but obviously did not keep his word; cf. Cortes, v, p. 145.

² On this cf. Bernays, pp. 425-428.

³ Cortes, iv, p. 529, and *ante*, p. 173.

⁴ Cortes, v, pp. 420, 634-635; Antequera, p. 390; Danvila, ii, p. 432.

⁵ Cortes, v, pp. 634-635.

⁶ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 122, and Gounon-Loubens, pp. 204-205.

and in 1551 the *procuradores* demanded that another be established at Toledo, "since there are many who cannot leave their homes in winter and have no one to send to represent them . . . and since Valladolid and Granada are so far off, and the first named is so cold in the winter time that men abandon their cases, or else, if they pursue them, spend more than the value of the suit."¹ The royal replies were evasive, but the petition was so obviously justifiable, that in January, 1556, a new Chancillería was actually set up; the residence that was finally selected for it was, however, not at Toledo but at Seville.² The *procuradores* also strove to increase the personnel of the tribunals already in existence. In 1528 they begged the Emperor to add another *sala de oidores* to each Chancillería Real, "since there are now so few judges that suits cannot be heard without great delays, and there are some cases which have been waiting these fifteen and twenty years . . . and since such delays, even if good sentences are finally given, are even more harmful and prejudicial than if bad ones were given and it were done promptly."³ Things must indeed have come to a pretty pass to bring Spaniards to prefer such a petition as this. The Emperor responded with the perennial formula — that he would consult with the Consejo and see what it was best to do — but the additional *sala* was not created. Indeed from the fact that ordinances had to be issued in 1532, 1537, and 1542, confirming the organization of each Chancillería in four *salas*, with four *oidores* in each, which had been set up by the Catholic Kings, one would infer that the Emperor had some difficulty in even main-

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 307-308, 499.

² *Nueva Recopilacion*, lib. iii, tit. ii, leyes 1 and 10. It would appear that this audiencia of Seville was rather the resuscitation of an older court — the so-called Audiencia de los Grados,

which antedated by many years the Chancillería of Granada — than a new creation. Cf. Gounon-Loubens, pp. 204-205.

³ *Cortes*, iv, p. 477.

taining the arrangements which he had inherited from his predecessors.¹

There is more material on the lower stages of the judicial hierarchy than on the upper. The *Actas de Cortes* are particularly rich, for the doings of the corregidores and alcaldes came under the immediate observation of the procuradores.² The corregidores reached the height of their power in this and in the succeeding reign, but the municipalities were not always satisfied with the character and ability of the men who were appointed, or with the manner in which they discharged their functions. In 1525 Charles was assured that "one of the chief causes for the recent rebellion had been the defects of the corregidores and their assistants, who had got their jobs at the solicitation of individuals." He is accordingly begged "to provide rather for offices than for persons, and to command that the said corregidores be lawfully graduated *letrados* who have studied the prescribed ten years, and that they remain continuously at their posts."³ The precedents for a short tenure, inherited from the Catholic Kings, were apparently disregarded.⁴ In the higher tribunals, many of the magistrates held office for life; if the term for the corregidores was theoretically limited, they were not seldom reappointed, a practice which evoked bitter complaint.⁵ The residencias also failed to work satisfactorily. The *pesquisidores*, who had charge of them, "took as much time about their business as if they were corregidores"; Charles was begged to command them "to be brief and not to exceed three months, since the cities have need of their corregidores, who are gentlemen."⁶ Most of the

¹ *Nueva Recopilacion*, lib. ii, tit. v, ley 3; Gounon-Loubens, p. 205; also Vol. II, p. 123, of the present work.

² *Cortes*, iv, pp. 407, 436, 454-455, 573; v, pp. 122, 315, 510-512, 635 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, iv, pp. 407, 454, and v, p. 122.

⁴ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 123.

⁵ *Cortes*, v, pp. 243, 315; cf. also the request (*Cortes*, iv, p. 507) that no man be permitted to hold more than one office.

⁶ *Ibid.*, iv, p. 436; cf. also Gounon-

complaints about these local officials are concentrated in the early part of the reign, when Charles was much of the time resident in Castile. Whether conditions improved as the years went by, or whether, during the later periods of the Emperor's absence, the *procuradores* desisted from preferring petitions whose futility they recognized, it is impossible to say; but it seems probable that matters grew worse rather than better. Charles's responsibilities were so great that some things had to be ignored, and since his preoccupations were primarily international, it was local affairs that were bound to suffer. Moreover, the financial temptations to appoint unworthy men were doubtless so strong that he was unable to resist them.

Several special details deserve passing notice. It was the custom in criminal cases to oblige the delinquent to testify under oath; this naturally often resulted in perjury, and the Cortes begged Charles to abolish the practice, but the Emperor refused to sanction any innovation.¹ Another request, that the servants of *alguaciles* be not admitted as witnesses, received a similar response.² False accusations by malicious persons were also not infrequent; in 1537 the Emperor was requested to give orders that any one who entered a complaint should pay the costs of the ensuing trial, unless the accused should be proved guilty.³ He was also asked to forbid the judges to appropriate any part of the fines they imposed to their own use.⁴ There were numerous conflicts of jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical tribunals, whose influence was gradually waning; the concentration of authority in the hands of the crown served to fortify the independence of the secular courts.⁵ But the

Loubens, ch. viii, *passim*, and Jerónimo Castillo de Bovadilla, *Política para Corregidores*.

¹ *Cortes*, v, p. 647.

² *Ibid.*, v, p. 515.

³ *Ibid.*, iv, p. 642.

⁴ *Ibid.*, v, p. 647.

⁵ *Ibid.*, v, pp. 247-248.

Spaniards were too loyal and respectful to the church to follow as far along this road as their monarch wished to lead them, and they showed it by their defence of the right of asylum. They begged Charles to command his judicial officers to respect the churches and sanctuaries, to forbid them to break in or take any one out, and to force them to pay out of their own pockets for any damage which should arise from such causes in the future. The Emperor promised amendment, but the recurrence of the same request in 1563 would indicate that matters remained exactly as they were.¹

In the realms of the crown of Aragon Charles did little to alter the existing judicial arrangements. His authority was so much more restricted there than in Castile that he had little temptation to initiate reforms. Outward modifications were consequently very slight; on the other hand, the pristine vitality ebbed rapidly away, owing to the shift of the centre of interest into Castile; institutionally speaking, the Eastern Kingdoms were gradually turning into an old curiosity shop. Even the Justicia succumbed to the general trend; the resignation, in 1547, of Lorenzo Fernández de Heredia, in favor of the royalist favorite Ferrer de la Nuza — permitted by the Cortes in defiance of the law — was ominously significant of approaching ruin.² Several changes which were made in the Justicia's advisers seem to indicate that the institution was not working satisfactory. The council of five legists appointed by the crown, which had been imposed upon the Justicia by Ferdinand the Catholic, was increased to seven in 1518, and then, ten years later, abolished; while the number of the Justicia's lieutenants was raised to five, to be selected by the king from a list of sixteen, who were chosen by the Cortes. There

¹ *Cortes*, v, p. 515; Gounon-Loubens, p. 213; also Vol. I, p. 179, note 2, of the present work.

² Danvila, *Poder Civil*, ii, p. 138.

were also frequent appeals from the Justicia's court to the royal audiencia — a practice by no means pleasing to the representatives of the nation, who strove to facilitate the reappeal of some cases from the audiencia to the Justicia on the plea of *contrafuero*.¹ The Cortes, in fact, labored heroically throughout the reign to observe the forms of all the ancient liberties, but the revival of institutional energy was a task beyond their powers. The kingdoms that they represented were falling steadily into the background; Charles respected the great traditions which they had inherited from the Middle Ages, but he knew that Castile was the real source of his power. The diminishing significance of the realms of the crown of Aragon in the fabric of the Spanish Empire is naturally reflected in the history of their internal development; and it was to prove increasingly difficult to maintain institutions whose practical importance had become so slight.

The financial and economic history of Spain under the Emperor is an exceptionally difficult topic, on which much has been recently written, though the last word is very far from having been said. New material is rapidly accumulating, and the conclusions of the older writers are being constantly upset. Efforts have been made, by the Emperor's admirers,² to show that Spain was strengthened rather than weakened, at home as well as abroad, by his administration, that he introduced no disastrous financial innova-

¹ Danvila, ii, pp. 41-42, 81-82, 94-99, 108, 140-141, 150-151.

² Of these the most prominent are K. Häbler, *Geschichte Spaniens unter den Habsburgern* (Gotha, 1907) and *Die Wirtschaftliche Blüte Spaniens im 16. Jahrhundert und ihr Verfall* (Berlin, 1888); and F. de Laiglesia, "Organización de la Hacienda en la primera mitad del Siglo XVI"; "Las Rentas del Imperio

en Castilla"; "Las Deudas del Imperio"; "Los Gastos de la Corona"; "Los Caudales de Indias en la primera mitad del Siglo XVI"; "Incautación de metales preciosos en la primera mitad del Siglo XVI"; "Una crisis económica en 1552"; all of which are published in volume ii of his *Estudios Históricos* (Madrid, 1918).

tion, and that his reign coincided with the period of Spain's greatest economic prosperity; they place the beginning of her decline, in those respects, in the time of Philip II. But their arguments have been pretty conclusively refuted by those who have taken the other side.¹ After all, the common sense of the situation would imply that it was impossible that Spain should be subjected to the terrible drain which Charles's foreign responsibilities and increasing wars inevitably caused, without showing the effects of it. Sandoval tells a story which will bear repetition in this connection. The Emperor, it appears, got lost while out hunting in the woods near Toledo, and finally, meeting a peasant who failed to recognize him, fell into conversation. The peasant said that he had lived to see five kings in Castile, and when asked which of them he considered the best and which the worst, replied that Ferdinand the Catholic was unquestionably the one, and the present sovereign the other. Pressed to give his reasons for his disapproval of the Emperor, he answered that Charles had abandoned his wife and children to go off to Italy, Flanders, and the Empire, that he had carried off with him all his revenues and the silver and gold of the Indies, and, not content with these, that he was ruining the poor farmers by his taxation.²

The first problem that presents itself in connection with the economic history of the reign is naturally that of the organization of the central financial body of the kingdom of Castile. In the early part of the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, as we have already seen,³ the collection and administration of the royal revenues had been placed in the hands

¹ Notably by I. Bernays, "Zur inneren Entwicklung Castiliens unter Karl V.," in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, i (1889), pp. 381-428, and by Cristóbal Espejo, "Sobre Organización de la Hacienda

Española en el Siglo XVI," in *La Revista de Cultura Española*, vi (1907), pp. 403-428; vii (1907), pp. 687-704.

² Sandoval, ii, pp. 275-276.

³ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 133 ff., and works there cited.

of two Contadores Mayores and two Contadores Mayores de Cuentas; and as their duties became increasingly arduous as time went on, there were added to them, before the Emperor's accession, a number of other officials, with special functions of their own. Among these was the *Relator*, a sort of general bookkeeper and accountant, two, and later three *Porteros*, who drew up the agenda for each *Contaduría* every day, a special officer to look after the revenues from the silk manufacture of Granada, and, most important of all, five *Veedores*, who saw to the payment of the troops.¹ In view of all the new questions and complications which arose with the accession of Charles, it was obvious that this organization needed centralization and development; and when the Emperor returned to Castile after the defeat of the Comuneros, he at once gave his attention to the problem of reform. By a cedula of January 1, 1523, at Valladolid,² he gave to a committee of six persons, of whom the Count of Nassau was first, the task of superintending and systematizing the work of the Contadurias, and of the functionaries associated with them. This committee was to meet every day in the royal palace, and go over every detail of the royal revenues; it was to bring the Contadurias, which hitherto had been almost autonomous, and exceedingly jealous of any interference by the Consejo Real, into close subordination to the crown. It has been maintained that this body was merely a temporary and exceptional means of centralization and superintendence, made necessary by the confusion which resulted from the revolt of the

¹ A full account of all these may be found in C. Espejo, in *Cultura Española*, vi (1907), pp. 408 ff. On the Veedores, cf. also Antonio Blázquez y Delgado Aguilera, *Bosquejo Histórico de la Administración Militar Española* (Madrid, 1891), pp. 31 ff.

² Cf. text in Laiglesia, ii, pp. 43-47. The day and month are not given in the document, but Espejo (*op. cit.*, pp. 414-415) deduces them, very skilfully, from internal evidence.

Comuneros, and that it did not essentially alter the system of the Contadurias inherited from the preceding reign; it has been asserted that the name of Consejo de la Hacienda cannot properly be given it during the lifetime of Charles V; and it is fair to add that that title does not officially appear in the laws of the realm until the time of Philip II.¹ On the other hand, it was constantly referred to by the Emperor himself under that name, from the very date of its inception; it continued its sittings and gained steadily in authority and prestige; and it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion of a more recent writer² that its advent marked a great change in the financial system of Castile. It certainly brought the collection and administration of the revenues far more closely than before under the eye of the crown, and paved the way for measures at which Spaniards, if left to themselves, might well have balked. The appointment of the Count of Nassau as president³ is highly significant, though he only held office for two years. He had been 'Chef et Surintendant des Finances' in the Netherlands, and Charles obviously preferred him to any native magnate. In this matter, at least, his Hispanicization was incomplete.⁴

Under the direction of this reorganized Exchequer, the royal revenues were enormously increased. It is, in fact, generally admitted that Charles drew at least three times as much from Spain at the end of his reign as at the beginning.⁵ By far the larger portion of the burden fell on Castile; the sums derived from the Eastern Kingdoms were doubtless somewhat greater in 1555 than in 1520, but in general it was Charles's policy, financially as well as otherwise, to let

¹ Laiglesia, ii, pp. 20 ff.; cf. also Gounon-Loubens, pp. 275 ff.

² Espejo, pp. 416 ff.

³ In fact, at least, if not in name; Espejo, p. 415.

⁴ Full details in regard to the person-

nel of the Consejo, the Contadurias, and the subsidiary offices are given in Espejo, pp. 421-428, 687-704. It is fair to say that few if any other non-Spanish names appear.

⁵ Bernays, pp. 395-397.

them alone.¹ Of the different sources of the increase in Castile, the first, and one of the most important, namely, the *servicios* voted by the *procuradores*, has already been mentioned;² we have also followed the establishment of the *encabezamiento* in lieu of the *tercias* and the *alcabala*. The revenues from the Indies, which first began to assume large proportions in the late forties and the fifties, will be taken up in detail in another place. It remains for us to consider briefly here certain other sources from which the royal treasury derived its increased funds.

I. Revenues from the Orders of Military Knighthood. The process of annexation which had been begun by the Catholic Kings was completed early in the Emperor's reign, when Pope Adrian VI, by a bull of May 4, 1523, declared that they were forever united with the Crown. The annual yield of the three Orders has been estimated at about 75 *cuentos*;³ but the Emperor was soon after obliged to hand over their administration, and the revenues derived from it, as well as that of the quicksilver mines of Almaden, which belonged to the Order of Calatrava, to the great Augsburg banking house of the Fuggers, partly as a repayment of loans for the bribing of the imperial electors in 1519, partly as security for a further advance.⁴

II. Revenues from the church. When, in 1519, Leo X granted Charles a tenth of the clerical income, there was a terrible outcry; but in 1532 the proportion was raised to a quarter. In 1539, after it had become obvious that Charles's plan for the establishment of a *sisá* could not

¹ Häbler, *Wirtschaftliche Blüte*, pp. 114-115. We have already considered (*ante*, p. 158) the sums Charles derived from the Cortes of the Eastern Kingdoms.

² The complaints on this subject began in the 1520's and continued till

the end of the reign. Petitions 4 and 12 of the Cortes of 1528 are typical. Cf. *Cortes*, iv, pp. 450, 455.

³ Häbler, *Wirtschaftliche Blüte*, p. 114.

⁴ Häbler, *Die Geschichte der Fugger'schen Handlung in Spanien*, pp. 75 ff.

succeed, the clergy voted him one-half their income, the so-called *medios frutos*, for the years 1540-42; and this proportion was continued until the very end of the reign, sometimes with the approval, and sometimes against the positive command of the Pope.¹

III. A general increase of the rates of taxation on Spanish industries and raw material, and on the movement of cattle and of commodities from one part of the realm to another. The revenues from *servicio y montazgo* rose,² as did those from salt pits and from the silk manufactures at Granada; and in general it may be fairly said that the dues were imposed primarily with the idea of filling the royal coffers, and not seldom in such fashion as to do the greatest possible harm to the economic welfare of the nation as a whole.³ The difficulty of collecting these revenues caused the government to farm them out to financial agents whenever possible.

IV. The sale of all sorts of rights, privileges, and offices. Such sales had not been unknown in the previous history of the realm, but they certainly had never before reached the proportions which they now attained. Patents of nobility, legitimations of natural children, sinecure posts of influence and authority, were constantly granted in return for funds. More significant still was the recent development of the system of so-called *juros*. These were originally royal grants of annuities out of the state revenues, conferred by the monarch as a mark of favor. But under the Catholic Kings the custom had arisen of using them as a means of obtaining money. *Juros* were sold for lump sums of from

¹ Bernays, pp. 394-395, and references there.

² Klein, *The Mesta*, pp. 275 ff. Cf. also Gounon-Loubens, p. 281, note.

³ C. Espejo, *Rentas de la Agueta y*

Habices de Granada (Valladolid, 1918), and "La Renta de Salinas," in *R. A.*, tercera época, xxxviii-xl, *passim* (1918-19); also Gounon-Loubens, pp. 280 ff., and Bernays, pp. 402-423.

ten to fifteen times the annual yield; the purchaser, in return, receiving the right to get his interest, at a high rate, directly from the tax collector, before the sums received were turned over to the royal treasury.¹ This not altogether admirable system of mortgaging the future attained enormous proportions during Charles's reign; what was even worse, the necessities of the government not seldom obliged it to forbid the payment of the interest; the national credit consequently declined, and there was much gambling and speculation in bad *juros*.² Every one recognized the evil, and various plans were proposed for bringing it to an end,³ but the necessities of the government preserved and increased it. In 1504 the Crown's outstanding debts to the holders of *juros* (the so-called *juros al quitar*) amounted to eighteen cuentos. In the following year they had risen to nineteen and a half. In 1539 they had reached ninety-nine. After that date it is almost impossible to distinguish the *juros al quitar* from other financial obligations of the crown of Castile, but there is every reason to believe that the amount of them continued to increase even more rapidly than before.⁴

The way in which the system of *juros* developed during the Emperor's reign is indicative of the increasingly precarious state of the royal finances. But the sums for which, under this system of *juros*, he became indebted to his Spanish subjects, were trifling in comparison with those which he came to owe to foreign bankers. Large sums were advanced to him by the great financial houses of Florence and Genoa;

¹ Häbler, *Wirtschaftliche Blüte*, p. 115.

² Häbler, *op. cit.*, p. 116, and Bernays, pp. 400-401, disagree about the course of the rate of interest on the *juros* during the reign. It seems reasonable to suppose that, if anything, it went up.

Cf. also Ehrenberg, *Zeitalter der Fugger*, ii, p. 155.

³ C. Espejo, *Arbitrios propuestos por el Bachiller Reina para amortizar los juros* (Valladolid, 1907).

⁴ Bernays, p. 401, and references there, especially to Lafuente, xii, pp. 499 ff.

larger still were the sums which he borrowed from the Fuggers and Welsers of Southern Germany. His relations with the Welsers were largely concerned with the affairs of the Indies, and may therefore be more conveniently considered in the second part of the present volume; but the Fuggers appear at almost every stage of his financial career, and at the time of his abdication they had acquired a strangle hold on the revenues of Castile. They had established themselves in Lisbon during the first decade of the sixteenth century and plied a thriving trade there; one of their representatives accompanied Charles on his first visit to Spain in 1517, and in all probability remained there when the king returned to the Netherlands; in 1519, as we have already seen, they advanced him large sums for the purposes of the imperial election.¹ From that moment onward Charles's dependence on them steadily increased. For every new loan, they managed to possess themselves of one after another of the sources of royal revenue;² on the heels of the grandmasterships followed greater or lesser portions of the *alcabala*, the *servicio*, the *cruzada*, and the revenues of the Indies. The rate of interest they demanded steadily rose, in proportion as the royal credit became less and less secure; in 1540 it was ordinarily fourteen per cent; moreover the Fuggers were not ashamed to force the government to antedate by several months the contracts that they made, so that the amounts they received were substantially increased.³ The Cortes, of course, were loud in their complaints, as soon as they

¹ Häbler, *Geschichte der Fugger'schen Handlung*, pp. 43 ff.; also B. Greiff, *Was Kayser Carolus dem V^{ten} die römisch küniglich Wal cost im 1520 Jar* (Augsburg, 1869).

² At any rate this was the ordinary method of procedure, and the instrument by which it was arranged was termed an *asiento*. Occasionally the Fuggers would advance smaller sums,

as for example ambassadors' salaries, without security, under the name of a *credito* or *socorro*. Häbler, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 ff.

³ Häbler, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Bernays, p. 402, and references there; C. Espejo, "El Interés del Dinero en los Reinos Españoles", in *Archivo de Investigaciones Históricas*, i, 5 (May, 1911) pp. 393-417; i, 6 (June, 1911), pp. 489-534.

realized what was taking place.¹ To their natural dislike for the procedure in question was added their traditional detestation of foreigners, and their conviction that the revenues of their native land were being carried outside the realm.² But no attention was paid to these remonstrances as long as the Emperor remained upon the throne. His son was indeed to make a heroic effort in that direction in June, 1557, when his father was in retirement at Yuste; but Castilian credit was unquestionably at a far lower ebb at the time of Charles's abdication than it had been since the days of Henry the Impotent. The amount owed the Fuggers by the government in Spain alone, quite apart from the obligations to them which Charles had incurred in other lands, was probably well over 2,000,000 ducats, and the sums which it owed to other similar houses at least 5,000,000 more.³

It was indeed a sorry ending. In a well known "Memorial de las finanzas de España en los años 1560 y 1561," Philip II affirmed that all the state revenues were alienated and that their redemption would cost 20,000,000 ducats;⁴ while a seventeenth-century historian, Matías de Novoa, asserts that the Emperor's debts at his abdication amounted to no less than 60,000,000 escudos.⁵ At the other extreme, an ardent defender of Charles's financial policy, basing his conclusions on an account of the state of the Hacienda in 1554,

¹ *Cortes*, v, p. 253; cf. also Bernays, p. 402, note 1.

² Spanish financiers did their utmost, at the close of the reign, to oust the Fuggers from the position they had won, both in Castile and in the Low Countries, and to keep the Spanish revenues in Spain; notable among them were Francisco Eraso and Juan de Curiel de la Torre. Cf. Ehrenberg, *Zeitalter der Fugger*, ii, pp. 149 ff.

³ Ehrenberg, ii, p. 155.

⁴ Pacheco y de Leyva, "Relaciones Vaticanas de Hacienda Española del Siglo XVI," in *Cuadernos de Trabajos* of the Escuela Española de Arqueología e Historia en Roma, iv, pp. 49, 54-55; Bernays, p. 401, and references there.

⁵ That is, 52,800,000 ducats. Pacheco y de Leyva, *op. cit.*, p. 49, and references there; *D. I. E.*, lxi, p. 414. On Novoa cf. *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, xxxviii, pp. 1363-64.

and the estimated expenses for the next three years, reduces the total of the national indebtedness to 4,329,435 ducats;¹ but the methods by which he arrives at his conclusions do not serve to inspire confidence. And finally we have another financial report of uncertain date from the reign of Philip II,² stating that whereas at the time of writing no less than 40,000,000 ducats were needed for the discharge of the royal obligations, the deficit in 1560 was but 13,000,000; from which the writer deduces the incompetence of those who had administered the royal finances in the interval. Among such widely scattered alternatives it is perhaps rather futile to try to make a choice, but in general there is good reason to believe that the estimates of Philip and of the *contador* who referred back to the situation as it existed in 1560 are the most nearly correct; that the deficit, in other words, at the end of the Emperor's reign was between 13,000,000 and 20,000,000 ducats.³ There can be no question that the debt accumulated with terrible rapidity in the latter years of the reign, when Charles was constantly absent and occupied about other affairs. That he had seen grave financial

¹ Laiglesia, ii, pp. 119-190, *passim*.

² Bib. Nac., Madrid, Sección de Mss., Cod. 12179, ff. 29-42. It seems probable, though not quite certain, that the author of this report was the *contador* Francisco Almaguer (or possibly "Malagon"; the name is almost impossible to decipher) who wrote the account of 1554 referred to above. A few passages from this manuscript have been printed by the late Enrique Pacheco y de Leyva, *loc. cit.*, iv, pp. 53-54; and a photograph of the entire manuscript is in my possession. The paragraph referred to above runs as follows; "Y si se dize que segun las ocasiones que se han offrescido, no se ha podido escusar de buscar dineros con mucho daño, se responde que esto tambien es insuficiencia pues les ha faltado providencia para estar preue-

nidos, pues tantos y tan grandes Estados como su M^d tiene siempre estan en ocasion, y nunca mayores los ha hauido que en el estado presente en que se trata del desempeño, y paresce que se puede hazer siendo menester para el oy mas de quarenta Millones, y no siendo menester hasta el año de sesenta otra vez que se trato del mas de treze, donde se conuence la insuficiencia de los que la han administrado, pues era mas facil con providencia estoruar el daño, que no quitarlo despues de hecho." Fol. 31 and 31v.

³ Further light is thrown on this topic from another angle by H. Lonchay, "Étude sur les Emprunts des souverains belges au XVI^e et XVII^e siècles," in Académie Royale de Belgique, *Bulletins de la classe des Lettres*, 1907, pp. 921-1013.

trouble ahead in 1543 and in 1548 is made clear by passages in his instructions to Philip.¹ But those were the days of his triumphs and renown; when the tide turned against him in the early fifties, his credit inevitably suffered, and the condition of the Hacienda became infinitely worse. And, finally, we cannot doubt that the damage was primarily due to the expenses of Charles's foreign wars and to the outside responsibilities which Spain had been forced to assume as a result of the Hapsburg inheritance. We have seen that the Emperor was probably getting from Spain, at the end of his reign, about three times as much money as he derived from her in the beginning, and yet there is little evidence that his purely Spanish expenses had been substantially increased. Petitions for raises in the salaries of state and court officials were constantly refused; the royal guards received 80 cuen-tos (or 213,333 $\frac{1}{3}$ ducats) in 1504; in 1560 Philip estimates their pay at "over 200,000 ducats." Doria's fleet did not come into the reckoning until after 1528, and the North African presidios were relatively unimportant until after 1530; yet it is interesting to observe that while 339,000 ducats are set aside for these purposes in 1543, the corresponding estimate seventeen years later is only 21,000 more — an almost negligible increase. And yet, with all his larger loans and taxation, the Emperor found it impossible to meet his obligations. The tale of his inability to pay his troops is highly significant, a sad harbinger of the even worse conditions which were to obtain under his son. Not once did the soldiers get their money on time. At the end of 1535 Charles was one whole year in arrears. In 1543 he agreed to pay his troops one-half of what he owed them; and it was not until 1550 that they received what was due them for the last half of 1547.²

¹ Cf. Laiglesia, i, pp. 43, 55 ff., 72, 96.

² Bernays, p. 397, and references there.

Admirers of the Emperor have maintained that the real source of his financial difficulties was the rise of prices which was such a noteworthy feature of the sixteenth century; one of them has even gone so far as to pretend that the increase of taxes during his reign was more than counterbalanced by the contemporaneous fall in the value of money, and that Charles should consequently be regarded as having rather diminished than augmented the burdens of Spain.¹ But this contention can be easily refuted. In the first place, it has not yet been positively proved that there was any general rise of prices in Spain until the decade following 1540,² when the gold and silver of the Indies first became available in considerable quantities. It is in the year 1548 that the change begins to evoke universal comment and complaint.³ Now Charles's financial difficulties, though they did not reach their maximum until the end of the reign, began at a much earlier date. In 1523, the year when the royal accounts were first carefully examined, it was evident that to pay outstanding bills it would be necessary to draw upon the revenues of 1524, and that to meet any sudden or exceptional demand the royal patrimony would have to be mortgaged or sold.⁴ In 1536 no less than 80 *cuentos* had to be borrowed on the next year's account.⁵ The chief definite evidence now available of a rise in prices during this earlier period is that which resulted from the occasional presence, in the different cities of the realm, of Charles's spendthrift Burgundian court. The complaints on this subject, as we have already seen, were loud and constant;⁶ they reached their climax in the period just after the war of the Comuneros, when the resulting

¹ Häbler, *Wirtschaftliche Blüte*, p. 117.

² Gounon-Loubens, p. 299; Bernays, pp. 423 ff.; cf. also C. Espejo, *La Carestía de la Vida en el Siglo XVI* (Madrid, 1921), *passim*.

³ Gómara, pp. 138-139; *Cortes*, v, pp. 440-441; Bernays, pp. 423 ff.

⁴ Gounon-Loubens, p. 274, note.

⁵ Lafuente, xii, p. 501.

⁶ Cf. p. 124, above, and Bernays, p. 398, and references there.

devastation, and the concentration of large bodies of troops for the war in Navarre, rendered the situation particularly bad in the north-central portion of the realm. The grumblings of the ambassadors of Henry VIII of England, who sent back to their monarch the most appalling accounts of the difficulties in the way of gaining adequate subsistence with the salaries they received, might also make the casual reader believe that the 'price revolution' had already arrived.¹ But large allowance must be made for ambassadorial exaggerations, and for the notorious miserliness of the Tudor monarch's payments; above all, it must be remembered that the conditions described were local rather than national in their scope.² The court to which the ambassadors were attached, and which was the primary cause of the conditions of which they complained, was ambulatory; and the character of the country was so highly diversified, that it is impossible to draw any general conclusions from the situation that obtained wherever the court happened to be. There can be no doubt that the rise of prices served materially to enhance the Emperor's difficulties during the last ten or fifteen years of his reign. It was certainly one of the chief reasons why conditions grew so much worse, so very rapidly, at the close; but it cannot be advanced as an adequate excuse for his increased demands, or even regarded as a primary factor in causing the debacle; that responsibility must be borne by the Emperor's foreign wars and dynastic inheritance. Even the Burgundian court, which was the chief cause of such rise in prices as occurred during the early part of the reign, was the direct result of Charles's non-Spanish traditions.

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, ii, nos. 3937, 79, 3122, 3244; iv, nos. 356, 458, 780, 4146, 4228; iii, nos. 2661, 2774, 2878-827, 1378.

² Bernays, pp. 423-425.

A few words may be added at this point in regard to the general economic conditions in Spain under Charles V. The Emperor's measures in this respect have been vigorously defended, and the theory advanced that his reign marked the most prosperous period in the country's development;¹ naturally the advocates of this view have been driven to the conclusion that the whole blame for the terrible decline which was evident to all observers by the end of the sixteenth century should properly be made to fall on the shoulders of Philip II. But a more critical examination of the available evidence makes it clear that a large share of the responsibility should be attributed to Charles. His main object throughout was to derive revenue from Spain, and a large proportion of his edicts on matters economic were chiefly put forth in order to serve that end. Occasionally he would attempt to salve his conscience by following the suggestions which were offered by the procuradores for the amelioration of the conditions for which his exactions were in large measure responsible; but in general these suggestions were so ignorant and so self-contradictory that their adoption did more harm than good. The Spanish economic problem was unusually difficult, and Spanish economic knowledge distinctly below the average; when one couples these facts with a ruler whose viewpoint, in such matters at least, remained rather dynastic than national till the very end, one ceases to wonder that the country suffered.

In matters of agriculture and pasturage, the Emperor followed the example of the Catholic Kings, who, while by no means neglecting the interests of the tiller of the soil, tended on the whole to favor the grazier and the herdsman at his expense.² This policy had yielded good results in the

¹ As, e.g., by Häbler, in his *Wirtschaftliche Blüte*.

² Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 136-141; Bernays, pp. 409, note, 410.

preceding reign; but under Charles, after the devastations of the revolt of the Comuneros, the effects on Castilian agriculture were little short of disastrous. Many of the peasants were unable to get their land under cultivation again, and the crops were inadequate and of inferior quality. The Cortes of the succeeding years were loud in their complaints, to which the government partially and occasionally paid heed; but it is abundantly clear that no real remedy was found.¹ In 1541, Damianus a Goes, a notable enthusiast for Spain and the Spaniards, asserts that for twenty-five years past there had been unceasing importation of foreign grain into Northern Castile.² The natural result of this was a rapid rise in the cost of foodstuffs, which Charles in 1539 attempted to check by fixing the maximum price of a bushel of wheat at 240 maravedis. But when he found that this and similar measures threatened to cut down his own income, he promptly drew back. In 1548 he commanded the tax-farmers to turn over one-half the corn which they derived from the lands of the Military Orders to the municipal storehouses at cost price; but two years later, when it was pointed out to him that the enforcement of this ordinance would inevitably result in less advantageous contracts with his banking friends, he reluctantly permitted it to fall into desuetude.³

The Mesta, on the other hand, continued to receive the most powerful protection from the Crown. The eighty years from 1476 to 1556 mark the very climax of its prestige, and it was stronger, on the whole, at the end of that period than at the beginning.⁴ The main reason for this was doubt-

¹ Cortes, iv, pp. 380, 509; v, pp. 423, 440-441, 443-444, 457, and others cited in Bernays, pp. 404-406, notes.

² In Schott, i, p. 1169.

³ Bernays, p. 407, and references

there; also Häbler, *Geschichte der Fugger'schen Handlung*, cap. iv.

⁴ Klein, *The Mesta*, pp. 329-330; and Colmeiro, *E. P.*, ii, pp. 164 ff.

less Charles's financial needs. He had discovered, early in his reign, that the Mesta could be made to contribute funds far more quickly and in greater quantities than the tillers of the soil; in fact, he had levied a special subsidy on it in 1519, for the purposes of the imperial election.¹ The lesson thus learned he never forgot; and he cherished the Mesta to the end of his days as one of the most reliable sources of royal revenue.

The legislation of the reign in regard to horses and mules is interesting and significant. An ancient law of the *Partidas* decreed that caballeros should ride on horseback, as "honor and tradition demanded";² but of recent years the use of mules had become increasingly popular. The Catholic Kings had vainly tried to check the new tendency, which seems to have increased with the incoming of Burgundian fashions, and in 1534 the Cortes took up the subject vigorously. It was felt that the nation was growing effeminate; there was a terrible shortage of mules for labor in the fields; and the upshot of the matter was that the Emperor put forth an elaborate *pragmática*,³ obliging caballeros to observe the law of the *Partidas*, threatening them with the death of their mules if they continued to ride them, and forbidding the export of horses from Castile. It seems clear that at first this *pragmática* was pretty strictly observed (we are even told that "certain mules paid the penalty in Valladolid and in other towns for justice' sake"⁴); but so many horses were lost in the disastrous expedition against Algiers in 1541 that in the following year the Emperor granted numerous exemptions from the law.⁵ These exemptions multiplied in the succeeding years; they were sold by the Crown at the profitable price of fifty ducats apiece;

¹ Klein, p. 280.

² *Partida* ii, tit. xxi, ley 10.

³ *Cortes*, iv, pp. 626-633.

⁴ Gómara, p. 98.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

and finally, the Cortes of 1548 asked Charles to annul the *pragmática* of fourteen years before, since it accomplished little good and was productive of much evil.¹ The Emperor's reply was to extend the exemption already granted, but not to abolish the law; the increased use of coaches and litters also operated to diminish horseback riding, and fifty years afterwards Sandoval complained that 'the men of the realm had become like feeble women, and that it was to be feared that the day of judgment which God had threatened was near at hand, when the chiefs of the nation should become feminized, as it had been in the last days of the mighty Goths, when Spain was lost to the infidels.'²

On the side of industry and manufacturing there is a different tale to tell, but one even more unfortunate for the economic development of Spain. Here the policy of Charles is in sharp contrast with that of his predecessors, who had striven, with considerable success, to protect and foster the national industries, by forbidding the importation of goods produced abroad. In so far as it is possible to ascribe any general trade policy to the Emperor (the oscillations between extremes are so numerous throughout that it is exceedingly difficult to discern any general trend), it is that of encouragement of foreign manufactures, provided they paid the duties imposed. Whether this was done with the idea of gaining more revenue from his customs houses, or with some vague idea of binding the different portions of his scattered Hapsburg dominions more closely together by stimulating the commercial intercourse between them, it is impossible to say; certainly it is difficult to agree with those who have seen in his measures any evidence of a nascent appreciation of the beauties of free trade.³ It is only

¹ *Cortes*, v, pp. 367-368.

² Sandoval, ii, p. 134.

³ As, e.g., Häbler, *Wirtschaftliche*

Blüte, pp. 11, 53; cf. also Bernays, pp. 420-421.

too evident that Spanish industry suffered as a result of his rule. Ferdinand and Isabella, discerning that the large quantity and excellent quality of Spanish wool offered exceptional opportunities for the manufacture of cloths, had done their utmost to protect that industry from foreign competition,¹ and with such success that in 1513 Guicciardini, who spoke in the most derogatory terms of Spanish industry in general, was obliged to confess that there had recently been a marked improvement in that particular line.² But by the middle of the Emperor's reign there are evidences of a change for the worse. In 1537, in 1542, in 1548, and in 1552 the Cortes complained that the quality of Spanish cloths had deteriorated; and at the same time we learn that the importations from Flanders were increasing; in 1545 Bruges alone took 500,000 ducats out of Spain in return for the woollen goods which she sent there.³ And when, owing to the rise in prices in the latter part of the reign, the poor people complained that they could not afford to buy the finer quality of cloths, in the production of which Spain excelled, Charles commanded that only the cheaper sorts be manufactured in the future, thus dealing a heavy blow to the industry in Spain, which was incapable of competing, in fabrics of inferior grade, with the cloth industries of foreign lands.⁴ With the silk industry of Granada, which had been taken over from the Moors in 1492, and favored and encouraged by the Catholic Kings, the situation was even worse. Not only did Charles permit the importation of foreign silks, against the expressed desires of the Cortes,⁵ but in 1546 he rearranged and increased the tariffs on the

¹ Bernays, pp. 410-411, and references there.

² *Ibid.*, p. 411.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 412.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 403, note, 412-413. Two of the most important centres of the

cloth manufacture in Spain produced annually only 5000 pieces, while Bruges alone made between 90,000 and 100,000.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 414, note 7, 415; also Cortes, iv, pp. 548, 663.

exportation of raw silk and manufactured goods from Granada into Castile and into foreign countries in such fashion that the raw material could actually be obtained more cheaply by Genoese traders than by the Spaniards themselves.¹ In 1557 we learn from the Venetian ambassador that Granada is crowded with foreign merchants who are making large fortunes out of the silk trade; in the following year Luiz Ortiz, in a report to Philip II, declares that Toledo has lost the greater part of her silk manufacturing establishments.²

In other branches of economic life there are evidences of a similar state of affairs. In 1537 the Cortes complain of the bad quality of shoes, and of the evil results of the export of iron ore to France.³ In 1548 they declare that foreign merchants are buying up all the wool, silk, iron, steel, and other commodities in Spain, so that the home industries are completely ruined, and all the profits are carried off to other lands; Spain is significantly described as having become an "Indies for foreigners"; and ten years later it is asserted that owing to her poverty "other nations regard her inhabitants as barbarians and treat them even worse than Indians."⁴ Making all due allowance for inevitable exaggerations, these statements cannot be taken to indicate anything but an economic decline. The blame is increasingly laid, as the reign progresses, on the foreign merchants and bankers, and the facilities that had been granted them for gaining control of the national resources. The 'big business' interests which they represented were able to accommodate themselves to, and even derive profit from, the rise in prices and con-

¹ Bernays, pp. 415-416; cf. also Espejo, *Rentas de la Aguelá y Habices de Granada*, *passim*.

² Bernays, p. 416, and references there.

³ Cortes, iv, pp. 654-655, 665-666.

This last is the more remarkable in view of the fact that in 1537 Spain and France were at war.

⁴ Cortes, v, pp. 425, 436-437; B. M., Ms. Egerton 2056, fol. 246, cited in Bernays, p. 417, note 4.

sequent fall in the value of money ; but for the unorganized mass of the population of Spain the development in question was little short of disastrous. Despite all the silver and gold that streamed in from the Indies, there was a notable lack of currency in Castile. Prohibition of the export of the precious metals was of no avail ; as early as 1524, before the American revenues were available in any considerable quantity, it was complained that the king of France paid a large share of the expenses of the armies with which he was fighting Spain with the gold which he managed to derive from Spanish lands.¹ Yet after all it would have been surprising if the result had been very different. Castile was the only one of the Emperor's possessions where his power was sufficiently firmly intrenched to enable him to levy imposts without serious opposition, and to regulate trade in such fashion as best suited his own financial needs ; it was inevitable that it should be the first one to be called upon to pay the cost of Hapsburg imperialism. Its own economic past had been so checkered and uneven that the Emperor felt neither the support nor the restraint of any firmly established traditions. In return for his steadily growing approximation to the Spanish point of view in matters religious and political, he probably felt that, in economic affairs, he had the right to utilize the country for his dynastic ends.

The sixteenth century is the greatest period in the history of the Spanish army. The reforms and reorganization initiated by Gonsalvo de Cordova had reached full fruition by the time of the accession of Charles V ; and the Emperor also had the great advantage of being able to build upon the principles of national military service first enunciated in the *pragmática* of 1496, and subsequently developed by Cardinal

¹ B. M., Addit. Mss. 9930, fol. 175, cited in Bernays, p. 421, note 1.

Ximenes in the *alistamiento* of 1516.¹ At the same time every effort was made to surround the profession of arms with a halo of glory, and to make it seem a privilege rather than a burden to embrace it; to preserve mediaeval ideals while adopting modern organization.² But unfortunately this latter aim proved impossible of realization, at least in the lower ranks, save possibly in those bodies of troops which were retained in Spain for purposes of defence; for the greater part of his foreign wars the Emperor was obliged to rely upon mercenaries, recruited in the ordinary fashion, and characterized by the same merits and defects that have always been displayed by that class.³ His problem was greatly complicated by the fact that so many German and Italian troops were enrolled in his armies. They were separately organized and led, and as far as possible kept apart from the Spaniards, whom they disliked; but their presence gave the imperial forces a certain aspect of heterogeneity, which Charles, with all his efforts, was never quite able to overcome.⁴ Yet it cannot be doubted that constant and intimate contact with soldiers of other lands was a most important element in the broadening of Spain's outlook which is so marked a feature of the Emperor's reign; militarily as well as politically, economically, and intellectually,

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 156; also pp. 18-20 of the present volume; also Clonard, *Historia Orgánica de las Armas Españolas*, iii, pp. 147 ff., and Rengifo's *Memorial* on pp. 136-141 of the same.

² One would like to credit the statement in Clonard, iii, p. 155, note, that the name of *guzman* applied to those who voluntarily enrolled themselves and did not wait to be compelled to come, is derived from the German *gut Mann* or 'good man.' Etymologically speaking, however, it seems impossible.

³ Sample commission in Clonard, iii, pp. 331, and tables of pay, *ibid.*, iii, pp. 157-158.

⁴ An official *relacion* of the infantry and cavalry in the imperial forces, dated at Seville, July 10, 1536, places the former at 59,833, and the latter at 7320; it would appear that the artillery is included in the latter category. Of these, 9850 were designated as "Spanish Infantry", 24,080 as German, and 25,903 as Italian (this doubtless includes the Spaniards resident in Sicily, Naples, and Milan); the bulk of the cavalry is described as "de todas naciones." Needless to add, these forces were never concentrated in one place. Clonard, iii, pp. 326-329, citing a document in Simancas, legajo 34, Estado.

the tradition of her isolation was being rapidly broken down.

Military tactics and strategy underwent no important modification during Charles's day. Save for certain notable improvements in the arts of intrenchment and fortification, which were made during the reign of Philip II, the methods of Gonsalvo de Cordova maintained their supremacy until the time of Gustavus Adolphus. A change in the matter of military organization, however, is to be noted, with the appearance of the so-called *tercios* in the year 1534. These were new divisions of the Spanish infantry, so named, it is said, because at the outset they numbered 3000 men, each one of them composed of twelve companies, each of which in turn was 250 strong.¹ The *tercios* make their first appearance in Italy, where they were named after the region in which they were quartered — as, e.g., the *tercios* of Lombardy and of Naples; but no foreigner was ever admitted under any circumstances to their ranks, a fact which goes far to account for the pride with which the Spaniards regarded them.²

The reign of the Emperor is the last great age of the Spanish military hero of the old traditional type, the dauntless warrior whose feats of individual prowess were discussed throughout the land, like those of the popular toreador of today. Some of them had the good fortune to be advanced to the highest positions, and to leave large fortunes behind them, like Antonio de Leyva and Fernando de Alarcón, who guarded Francis I; but the popular favorites were those

¹ Clonard, iii, pp. 156–157, and footnotes. Since the proportions within the *tercio* were exactly the same as those of the ancient *coronella* of the time of the Great Captain, the numbers in every case being reduced by one-half, it seems reasonable to conclude that the chief reason for the creation of the new

unit was that the *coronella* had proved too unwieldy for effective service.

² Clonard, iii, pp. 156 ff.; R. Brunet, *Histoire Militaire de l'Espagne* (Paris, 1886), pp. 115–116; A. Blázquez y Delgado Aguilera, *Bosquejo Histórico de la Administración Militar Español* (Madrid, 1891), pp. 23 ff.

who never attained the most exalted ranks, and were distinguished rather because of their physical strength and unflinching courage, than on account of their abilities as strategists or tacticians. Of these probably the most famous were Juan de Urbina and Diego García de Paredes, both of whom had won laurels in the armies of the Great Captain, but lived on, respectively, to 1529 and 1533. Men loved to tell how Urbina, when Lautrec was besieging Milan with the army of the League, happened to pass, quite alone, by a spot where a fellow countryman was being assaulted by five Italians, and called on him for help; how Urbina went to his rescue, and how "the five Italians turned their faces to him after having knocked over the Spaniard, and at first pressed him very hard, but soon afterwards two of them left him to return to the fallen man, who was getting up, and then Juan de Urbina slew two of the three who remained to fight with him, and with the partisan of one of them put to flight the others, who were killing the soldier and were in fear of being slain also. He gathered up their arms as a proof of his victory, and returned to Milan, wounded in the breast by a stroke of a partisan, and with a knife-thrust in the cheek, and another small cut in the sword-hand, and so covered with blood that he was unrecognizable."¹ Paredes, it would appear, was even more remarkable. He fought "eleven duels in closed lists and won them all, which no other man has done in our day and generation." . . . "When the Emperor was going to Piacenza from Genoa he threatened the Count of Nassau, who, at the command of the Emperor, was drawing up the troops, and had wanted to put him out of the squadron of the knights because he was not properly armed. The Count complained, but his Majesty told him that that was Diego García de

¹ Gómara, p. 87.

Paredes, who was worth more without arms than another man would be with them. In Soria he broke a pimp's head with a bench, and threw another into the fire, and two women afterwards, so that one of them died; also two low fellows who were laughing at him and asking for the food his servants had cooked for a gentleman. On one occasion, when he was in a tavern on his return from the Turkish war near Vienna, a number of others attempted to eject him from it, but he defended the inn against them, and wounded and even slew some of his opponents." "On many occasions," as the contemporary chronicler naïvely confesses, "he completely lost control of himself, a fact which explains his failure to attain to greater dignities," but his irregularities doubtless served to increase rather than diminish his popularity with the masses.¹

In naval affairs the period of Charles V witnesses a number of significant changes, most of them in the matter of the construction of ships.² In the first place, the necessity of carrying cannon, and various demands of transatlantic navigation, served materially to increase the size of the vessels. The heavy galley, propelled by oars, which in the fifteenth century had on the whole tended to lose ground in favor of lighter ships, recovered its ancient preëminence, and was built on larger lines than before;³ the still heavier galleon or galleasse, destined primarily for voyages to the Indies, and depending solely on sails for its propulsion, also began to make its appearance. The foremost figure of the Spanish navy of the time was probably the elder Álvaro de Bazán, whose fame was subsequently to be overshadowed

¹ Gómara, pp. 96-97.

² The two standard authorities on this topic are C. Fernández Duro, *Armada Española*, i, pp. 323 ff.; and Gervasio de Artífano, *La Arquitectura*

Naval Española (Madrid, 1920), i, pp. 57 ff.

³ A notable feature of the capitanas of this period was their gorgeous ornamentation; cf. Fernández Duro, i, p. 324.

by that of his still greater son and namesake.¹ He it was who most clearly foresaw that the ships of the future were destined to depend on sails, and who first rightly estimated the effects that the discovery of the New World was bound to have on the maritime development of his native land. But Álvaro de Bazán by no means stands alone. Side by side with him are a host of naval architects and inventors, of whom the most prominent was perhaps Blasco de Garay. In 1539 this man sent a *memorial* to the Emperor, outlining eight different naval inventions, of which the first and most significant was a plan for the propulsion of ships by paddle wheels turned by human agency. It appears that this experiment was actually tried, and it was found that in calm weather a vessel of 350 tons could be made to cover one league per hour in this fashion, and that it could turn around in half the time that was required by a regular galley. We also hear of schemes for armor plate, for floating batteries, for diving bells, and even for marine camouflage, all highly rudimentary, no doubt, but indicative of keen interest in naval affairs, as is also the large and diversified outpouring of naval literature during the period.² One accompanying development, due primarily to the increasing importance of the Indies, and secondarily to the reliance which the Emperor placed on Andrea Doria for warfare in the Mediterranean, was the rapid decline of the naval importance of Barcelona and Valencia, and the corresponding increase of that of the cities of the Atlantic coast. Not only do the maritime energies of Seville and Cadiz expand apace; the ports of Cantabria, Asturias, and Galicia follow suit; they furnish the fleets to transport the Spanish armies to the Netherlands and to the Empire, and revive the

¹ The best account of both men is to be found in A. de Altolaguirre y Duvalé, *Don Álvaro de Bazán* (Madrid,

1888), and in C. Fernández Duro, i, *passim*.

² Fernández Duro, i, pp. 328 ff.

pristine glories of this earliest of all the homes of the Spanish navy.¹ It was only one of a number of auguries of the beginning of the transference of the centre of Spanish imperial power from Aragon to Castile, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, from the Old World to the New.

The Emperor's reign sees a further development in the broadening of Spain's literary and artistic horizon which had begun in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. It was from Italy that most of the new impulses came, but German and Flemish influences are also discernible, and the relationships between the courts of Spain and England served to make each country better acquainted with the other's intellectual life. Very notable is the change in the attitude of other European nations towards the capabilities of the Spaniards in these directions. Boccaccio had called the Castilians "semi-barbari et efferati homines," and Lorenzo Valla had spoken of the Aragonese as "a studiis humanitatis abhorrentes,"² but now in the sixteenth century the attitude is completely changed, and Spanish scholars are universally held in higher esteem. Juan Luis Vives, the Valencian philosopher, was called to the University of Louvain as professor of belles-lettres before he was thirty years of age; he was invited to England by Henry VIII, made tutor to the Princess Mary, and later elected a Fellow of Corpus Christi College, Oxford. Four years afterwards his opposition to the divorce of Catharine of Aragon deprived him of the royal favor, and in 1528 he retired to Bruges, where he lived most of the time till his death in 1540. He, Budé, and Erasmus, were called the triumvirs of the republic of letters in the sixteenth century; and it was said that while the other two

¹ Fernández Duro, i, p. 326; Artífano, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 66 ff.; also below, pp. 628-629.

² J. Fitzmaurice-Kelly, *History of Spanish Literature*, p. 131.

surpassed him in wit and in learning, Vives excelled them both in the soundness of his judgment.¹

The period has been described as characterized by a mania for founding institutions of higher education.² Cardinal Ximenes's great university at Alcalá had pointed the way, and its two leading lights, Antonio de Lebrija³ and Lucius Marineus Siculus, spread the enthusiasm for learning throughout the length and breadth of the land. Sometimes the new foundation was attached to one of the older universities — as, for instance, Alonso de Fonseca's Colegio Mayor in Salamanca; more often it was set up independently, in some new place, so as ultimately to draw down upon itself the jealousy and bitter hatred of the older institutions, which could not bear to see their classes suffer as a result of the increased resort to colleges of more recent origin.⁴ The Society of Jesus signalized itself by its zeal in the cause of education before the end of the reign, the first Jesuit college in Spain being founded by St. Francis Borgia, who subsequently became the third general of the order, at Gandía, his birthplace, in 1546. Modern subjects and humanistic methods came in on all sides, to the prejudice of the scholastic ones, and the Emperor was glad to encourage the new tendencies.⁵ Intellectual Spain was now thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the Renaissance.

¹ The literature on Vives is abundant. The most important works by him and about him are to be found in the bibliography at the end of A. Bonilla y San Martín, *Luis Vives y la Filosofía del Renacimiento* (Madrid, 1903). The latest biography is that of Foster Watson (Oxford, 1922).

² Vicente de la Fuente, *Historia de las Universidades en España*, ii, pp. 104 ff.

³ Or, as he is usually called, Antonius Nebrissensis (1441?–1522), a sort of universal genius, especially famous for his knowledge of Latin and of Hebrew, and one of the principal collabora-

tors on the Complutensian Polyglot. Cf. P. Lemus y Rubio, in *R. H.*, xxii, pp. 459–508; xxix, pp. 13–120. It is worth mentioning that his statue and that of Vives are placed on the steps of the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, together with those of Isidore of Seville, Alfonso the Learned, Cervantes, and Lope de Vega.

⁴ This matter led to a vigorous quarrel over academic titles and degrees, which was taken up by the Cortes. Cf. *ante*, p. 176; and *Cortes*, iv, pp. 619–622, 641; v, p. 146.

⁵ Häbler, p. 418.

It is in the realm of literature that the Italian influence is most conspicuous. Andrea Navagero, the Venetian ambassador at Charles's court, became acquainted, in 1526, with the Barcelonese poet, Juan Boscán (d. 1542), introduced him to the new school of Italian poetry, and encouraged him to work for its adoption in Spain. As Boscán's native tongue was Catalan and not Castilian, he would have found this a difficult task to accomplish unaided; but fortunately his intimate friend, the poet, Garcilaso de la Vega, brother of the popular hero in the revolt of the Comuneros, had also become a convert to the new style of writing, and loyally seconded the efforts of Boscán. The verses of both poets were published, in a single volume, in the year 1544, and from that date onward the triumph of the fashions of the Italian Renaissance was definitely assured.¹ On the side of the drama the works of Juan de Encina, Bartolomé de Torres Naharro, and Gil Vicente mark the transition period between the older ecclesiastical plays and the 'comedias de capa y espada' in which the Spaniards were soon after to attain their greatest fame. Since Torres Naharro lived most of his life in Naples, and since Gil Vicente was a Portuguese who preferred to write in Spanish, it is easy to account for the foreign influences which so greatly accelerated the change; but after the new ideas had once taken root, Spanish dramatic talent and originality convincingly asserted themselves, and laid the foundations for a national dramatic

¹ It is worth noting that the famous Baldassare Castiglione was sent by Clement VII as papal nuncio to Spain in 1524, and reached Madrid in March, 1525, just in time to witness the rejoicings over the news of the battle of Pavia. Castiglione remained in Spain until his death at Toledo on February 7, 1529; and he gave *Il Cortegiano*, which was published at Venice in April, 1528, its final revision at the

imperial court. The English envoy reports that "two days before [his death] the Emperor gave him the bishopric of Ávila, worth about 1200 ducats annually" (*L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 5277), and the statement is confirmed by Contarini (Sanuto, *Diarii*, i, col. 62); but his name does not appear in the official lists of the occupants of the see. Cf. Julia Cartwright, *Baldassare Castiglione*, ii, pp. 220 ff., *passim*.

style which constitutes one of the glories of the peninsula. The Sevillan, Lope de Rueda (1510 ?-65), is the foremost figure in the movement; he has been justly described as the father of the Spanish theatre.¹ The astounding success of the *Lazarillo de Tormes*,² which was first published at Antwerp in 1553, marks the corresponding victory of the modern novel of real life over the mediaeval romance of chivalry.

The development of historical writing during the reign is perhaps, for the student of political affairs, the most interesting of all. Italian models were doubtless carefully studied, as is abundantly proved by the life and works of the imperial biographer, Alfonso de Ulloa;³ but what chiefly inspired the Spaniards to write so much more and so much better history than they had ever done before was the consciousness of the greatness to which they themselves had attained, and the desire to perpetuate the memory of it for the benefit of posterity. The increasing importance of the office of royal chronicler in Castile (which had existed since the end of the fifteenth century, if not before⁴), and the foundation of corresponding positions for Aragon and the Indies, bear witness to the Emperor's zeal for the encouragement of historical writing;⁵ and his ability to draw the line between the literal truth and the flattering eulogies from which most of his appointees were unable to turn aside, is attested by his ironical remark on the commentaries of Luis de Ávila, that though Alexander's achievement surpassed his own, he was less fortunate in his chronicler.⁶ The list of

¹ Cf. Emilio Cotarelo, "Lope de Rueda," in *R. A.*, tercera época, ii, pp. 150 ff., 466 ff.

² The question of the authorship of this famous work will very likely never be finally settled; but there is good reason to believe that Hurtado de Mendoza wrote it, after all.

³ On Ulloa cf. Morel-Fatio, pp. 123-143.

⁴ On this point cf. Morel-Fatio, pp. 13-14.

⁵ Cf. here Cirot, *Les Histoires générales d'Espagne entre Alphonse X et Philippe II* (Paris, 1904), and Morel-Fatio, *passim*.

⁶ Fitzmaurice-Kelly, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

historical writers whose names add lustre to the reign is far too long to enumerate here; some of the most eminent of them did not attain the coveted position of royal chronicler at all; but the progress of history, as well as that of poetry, prose, and the drama during the period, is amply sufficient to justify the statement that the first half of the sixteenth century marks the beginning of a new era in the development of Spanish literature.

In painting and sculpture the reign of the Emperor in Spain has few products of exceptional value to boast of, though many Spanish artists crossed over to Italy and studied under the direction of the great masters there. But in architecture there is another tale to tell; the age of Charles V witnesses the final evolution, out of the long conflict between 'Mudejar,' Italian, and German Gothic influences which had raged during the preceding century, of a distinctively Spanish style, the plateresque, so called because the fineness of its ornamentation recalls the work of the *platero*, or silversmith. Its first great name is that of Enrique de Egas, a good specimen of whose art is the Hospital de Santa Cruz at Toledo, and close beside him stands his son-in-law Alonso de Covarrubias, who is seen at his best in the monuments at Alcalá. The fondness for elaborate decoration increased as the reign advanced: it was by Alonso Gonzalez de Berruguete (1486-1561) and Diego de Siloé (1500-1563) — the former really rather a sculptor than an architect, and the latter the son of a sculptor¹ — that the fashions begun by Egas were developed. The Emperor's own interest in building is attested by the architectural

¹ His father and teacher was that Gil de Siloé to whom we owe the magnificent tombs of John II and the Infante Alfonso in the Cartuja de Miraflores near Burgos. For further

details cf. *Spanish Architecture of the Sixteenth Century*, by A. Byne and M. Stapley (New York and London, 1917).

monuments with which his name is connected in almost every Spanish city where he remained for any length of time. The magnificent though unfinished palace on the Alhambra hill is perhaps the most famous case in point, though its style is much more distinctively Italian than that of most of the great edifices of the reign.¹ At Cordova, in the year 1523, the cathedral chapter, in spite of the opposition of the town council, secured permission from Charles, who had not then visited the spot, to construct a Christian church, in the plateresque style, in the very centre of the great mosque of the Abd ar-Rahmans, thereby necessitating the removal of sixty-three of the beautiful columns that upheld the roof, and the destruction of a large portion of the elaborately carved and painted ceiling which formed the chief glory of the building. But when the Emperor, for whose praises the chapter ardently longed, finally came to see the result of its handiwork in 1526, he was visibly taken aback, and exclaimed: "You have built what you or others might have built anywhere; but you have destroyed something that was unique in the world."² Whatever else Charles V may or may not have been, he was unquestionably reverent of the past.

¹ Cf. Byne and Stapley, pp. 299 ff.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Sources. — The foregoing chapter is based, to a greater extent than any of the others, on manuscript material. Most of the documents cited therein were found in the Sección de Manuscritos in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, and among the Spanish transcripts in the British Museum. Perhaps the most valuable of these is the "Pareceres que . . . el consejo ha dado" (Bib. Nac. Madrid, E-31, Ms. 904, folios 208-266), from which quotations are given on pp. 149-152. Next in importance after these manuscript sources come the fourth and fifth volumes of the *Cortes . . . de Castilla* (Madrid, 1882, 1903), which have yielded a rich harvest; the *Códigos Antiguos de España* (ed. Marcelo Martínez Alcubilla, Madrid, 1885-86, 2 vols.), the *Documentos Inéditos*, and other standard collections, cited in the bibliographical notes to Chapters IV, V, XI, XII, XIII, and XIV. The published documents on more special topics, such as the "Relaciones Vaticanas de Hacienda Española del Siglo XVI," ed. Enrique Pacheco y de Leyva, in vol. iv of the *Cuadernos de Trabajos* of the Escuela Española de Arqueología é Historia en Roma (Madrid, 1918), pp. 45-124, or the "Cartas de Martín de Salinas," ed. A. Rodríguez Villa in *El Emperador Carlos V y su Corte* (Madrid, 1903), are indicated in the footnotes to the pages where they are cited.

Later Works. — The best general account of the social and constitutional history of Castile in this period is still that of Jules Gounon-Loubens, *Essais sur l'administration de la Castille au XVI^e siècle* (Paris, 1860); a really remarkable product of the period in which it was written. For the economic side I have found the article of Isaac Bernays, "Zur inneren Entwicklung Castiliens unter Karl V.," in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, i (1889), pp. 381-428, by far the most useful. Though written for the purpose of refuting the main thesis of Häbler's *Die Wirtschaftliche Blüte Spaniens im 16. Jahrhundert* (Berlin, 1888), and therefore over-contentious in spirit, it is the work of a most painstaking scholar, based on the sources, and impressive in the exceptional completeness with which its every statement is supported. Of the more special monographs which I have utilized for isolated topics the most important are Juan Sempere y Guarinos, *Historia del Lujo en España* (Madrid, 1788, 2 vols.); Konrad Häbler, *Die Geschichte der Fugger'schen Handlung in Spanien* (Weimar, 1897); Richard Ehrenberg, *Das Zeitalter der Fugger* (Jena, 1896, 2 vols.); and Cristóbal Espejo, "Sobre Organización de la Hacienda Española en el Siglo XVI," in *Cultura Española*, vi, pp.

403-428, and vii, pp. 687-704; *Arbitrios . . . sobre amortizar los Juros* (Valladolid, 1907); "El Interés del Dinero en los Reinos Españoles," in *Archivo de Investigaciones Históricas*, año i, no. 5 (May, 1911), pp. 393-417; *Rentas de la Aguela y Habices de Granada* (Valladolid, 1918); "La Renta de Salinas hasta la Muerte de Felipe II," in *R. A.*, tercera época, xxxviii (1918), pp. 47-63, 220-233; xxxix, pp. 37-52; xl (1919), pp. 91-114; and *La Carestía de la Vida en el Siglo XVI y Medios de abaratarla* (Madrid, 1921); everything from the pen of Señor Espejo is well worth careful perusal. Other monographs are indicated in the footnotes.

CHAPTER XXIV

WARS WITH FRANCE AND ASCENDANCY IN ITALY

THE main interest, as well as the chief difficulty, in studying the foreign policy of Spain under the Emperor Charles V, is to determine precisely how the nation was affected by the almost enforced expansion of her influence and responsibilities which resulted from her being merged in the inheritance of the Hapsburgs. As the richest and most powerful of Charles's far flung dominions, it was inevitable that she should be called upon to shoulder the heaviest part of the burden of their maintenance; and whenever the foe was a heretic or an infidel, her ancient traditions served as an added reason for placing her in the forefront of the conflict. Whether she gained or lost in the process is a problem over which men have disputed ever since. The verdict depends in the first place on the degree to which one believes that the Emperor's point of view, dynastic at the outset, became Hispanicized in the course of his reign. It will be determined, in the last analysis, by the measure of outside responsibilities which Spain, at that stage of her development, is thought to have been capable of advantageously assuming. Increased external prestige is obvious on every hand; but the constant use of Spanish soldiers and Spanish resources for objects not primarily Spanish is equally apparent, while the attitude of the contemporaneous Spaniards in regard to these outside enterprises varies between ungrudging approval and reluctant and compulsory acquiescence.

Throughout his life, Charles was confronted with three different enemies — France, the Turk, and the German Protestants — and it was largely with Spanish troops and Spanish treasure that he fought them all. The wars with France occupy the forefront of the picture and will therefore be considered in the present chapter.

There were four main causes for Charles's hostilities with the contemporary French kings. First came the ancient rivalry over the inheritance of Charles the Bold — the Burgundian lands which had been divided between the Valois and the Hapsburgs. Next there was the bitterness of feeling over the result of the imperial election of 1519; Francis I, when he learned of his defeat, took the news calmly, but obviously realized that war was inevitable.¹ Thirdly, there was the contest for the hegemony of Italy — the contest that had begun with the raid of Charles VIII on Naples in 1494 — the contest in which France had hitherto been opposed by Spain under Ferdinand the Catholic. And lastly, there was the quarrel for the possession of Navarre — torn from the Albrets in 1512, and incorporated into Castile despite the protests of Louis XII and Francis I. Over and above these four immediate reasons there was also the fact that the realm of France divided Charles's dominions into two separate halves — a geographical fact bound to make for trouble.

Now, of these different causes of the wars with France, only two — the contest for supremacy in Italy and the quarrel over Navarre — can fairly be called in any sense really Spanish. With Burgundian and imperial affairs Spain had only become recently and artificially connected, through the accident of the Hapsburg inheritance; she could not reasonably be expected to take a very lively interest in them. Moreover,

¹ Mignet, *Rivalité de François I^{er} et Charles-Quint*, i, pp. 211 ff.

even the Italian rivalry, as it presented itself to the mind of contemporaries, must have seemed not so much Spanish as Aragonese. The mediaeval traditions of Castile were, as we have several times pointed out, emphatically Franco-phile;¹ the union of the crowns had been too recent, and the tie that it had created too loose, to permit the western kingdom as yet to forget its inherited friendships in any very enthusiastic support of projects for the aggrandizement of the Aragonese portion of the Spanish Empire. The Navarrese quarrel was indeed exclusively a *cosa de España*: both parts of the peninsula had an inherited interest in it, more especially Castile, owing to the events of the preceding decade. When the war was carried to that frontier, all Spaniards were ready, almost eager, to fight. Castile took the lead, and Aragon supported her; witness the story of the repulse of the invasion which followed on the heels of the revolt of the Comuneros.² But the conflict of 1521 marked the last serious flare-up of the struggle in that quarter. The subsequent efforts of the French to recover Fontarabia were but trifling episodes.³ The real scene of the war had shifted to Lombardy, which to most of Charles's Iberian subjects still seemed very remote. On January 11, 1530, the Emperor wrote to his brother Ferdinand from Bologna, that in Spain they detested every expenditure that he had made from that kingdom for the sake of Italy.⁴

The war opened, moreover, in such a manner as to emphasize those phases of the struggle which were outside the Spanish horizon. Charles had left Spain in May, 1520, ostensibly to be crowned at Aix-la-Chapelle, but really to make certain of the alliance of Henry VIII of England, in-

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. I, pp. 132 ff.

² *Ante*, pp. 101 ff.

³ Boissonnade, *Réunion de la Navarre à la Castille*, pp. 557 ff.

⁴ "En Espagne ilz aborissent tout ce que j'ay despendu de ce reaulme pour ceste Italie." Lanz, *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V.*, i, p. 368.]

dispensable for success against France on the Flemish frontier. That he had gone at all was a bitter grievance to his Spanish subjects; that he had gone for a purpose in which they were really not concerned served to irritate them still more. Their discontent, moreover, was by no means alleviated by the course of events after the fighting began. Hostilities opened in the spring of 1521 with a raid on Luxembourg by Robert de la Marck, who, after wavering for several years between the rival camps, had decided, for the time being, in favor of the Valois; the French king was not entirely averse to having such an unstable ally, for it was easier, when it should prove convenient, to disavow him. The aggressions of de la Marck provoked counter-attacks from the imperialists under the Count of Nassau and Franz von Sickingen, who sought vainly to wrest Mézières from the guard of the heroic Bayard. In June Charles left the Diet of Worms and took the field in person; a little later Francis also collected his forces and relieved Mézières; with the rival sovereigns in battle array the war had now begun in earnest. Charles concentrated his efforts on Tournai, which for centuries had eluded the grasp of Burgundian dukes and Flemish counts; and though his attention was distracted by the necessity of going off, in August, to Bruges, to negotiate with Wolsey about the details of the English alliance, his generals in the end proved equal to the task.¹ The place was exceedingly strong; Francis advanced, with a superior force, only to throw away, through an excess of caution, an admirable opportunity to crush the army of his rival under the walls of Valenciennes. Finally, on December 3, Tournai capitulated to the imperialists and was permanently annexed,

¹ Mignet, i, pp. 247-248, 259, 263-264, 272-275; Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, iii, pp. 93-94; A. Chuquet, *Études d'Histoire*, i, pp. 1-34, "Bayard à

Mézières" (Paris, 1903); W. Busch, *Cardinal Wolsey und die englisch-kaiserliche Allianz* (1886).

though as a separate province, to the rest of Charles's domains in the Netherlands.¹ Hapsburg dynastic interests had certainly been advanced, but Spain apparently had been temporarily forgotten.

Yet if the Spaniards had been able to see into the mind of their young sovereign, they would have learned that the Netherlands were less remote from them than they seemed. The capture of Tournai was shortly followed by the first of a long series of events which were ultimately destined to bring the Iberian and Burgundian portions of Charles's inheritance into the closest contact, to the lasting misfortune of both. On February 7, 1522, at Brussels, Charles signed a convention by which he handed over to his brother Ferdinand the Austrian domains of the house of Hapsburg. It was the first note of warning, so to speak, of the division of his vast inheritance which he was finally to consummate at the time of his abdication; the first evidence of his intention "to draw the Netherlands into the orbit of Spain" and of the Spanish Empire. The imperial suzerainty over the Burgundian lands lasted on, in theory at least, until 1648, 1678, and the wars of the French Revolution; but for all practical purposes it grew steadily weaker after 1522. It was henceforth clearly Charles's aim to transfer the Netherlands into an outpost of the Spanish power in Northern Europe.² Nor is it difficult to see why he acted as he did. The Burgundian and the Spanish portions of his inheritance were the only ones that he had yet really seen and got to know. They were, moreover, the only ones in which the government was really in his own hands. It was but natural that he should wish to bring them into a closer and more effective union, just as it

¹ Henne, *Charles-Quint en Belgique*, ii, pp. 386 ff.

² Pirenne, iii, pp. 91 ff.; Baumgarten, *Geschichte Karls V.*, ii, pp. 112-

113; F. B. von Bucholtz, *Geschichte der Regierung Ferdinand des Ersten*, i, pp. 156 ff.; also B. M., Add. Mss., 28, 573, fols. 48-49.

was natural that, in the midst of so many conflicting duties and responsibilities, he should desire to hand over the remoter Austrian lands to some one else. And the war with France, on which all his energies were now concentrated, served as a final and compelling reason for the step which he had taken. With Spain and the Netherlands in intimate and effective coöperation, he could catch his enemy between two fires. Thus was the power of the Spanish Empire given its first foothold in a region where it was ultimately to suffer one of its most disastrous and significant defeats.

Meantime, the imperial diplomacy had been proceeding with marvellous success, and in a manner which insured the continuation and expansion of the area of the conflict. The alliance with Henry VIII of England, considered at the time of Charles's visit to that monarch in May, 1520, was virtually concluded at the time of the deceitful conference of Calais in August, 1521. The terms were arranged in a manner favorable to Charles, who, though disappointed at the various delays which Wolsey managed to impose, got a definite promise of an English invasion of France.¹ With the papacy also, Charles's envoys were equally fortunate. Ever since the imperial election of 1519, when Leo X had discovered the futility of attempting to prevent the election of the Hapsburg by supporting the candidacy of Francis I, the Pope had been gravitating towards an alliance with Charles. On May 8, 1521, a secret treaty for a joint offensive had been concluded between them, and on the fourth of the following June Leo had specifically granted Charles the right — indispensable in view of his Aragonese inheritance — to transgress the ancient papal constitution forbidding the union of Naples and the Empire in a single hand.² The

¹ W. Busch, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

² R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-20, fol.

event had been hastened by the misgovernment of France in the Milanese, where every one united in desiring her expulsion; the smaller states to the south of it were also eager to lend a hand. In the summer of 1521 a force of over 20,000 men was collected under Prospero Colonna; most of them were Italians and Germans, but there were 2000 Spaniards sent on from Naples, and Hernando de Avalos, Marquis of Pescara, and Antonio de Leyva held minor commands.¹ By the middle of November the French had been virtually driven out of Lombardy; only the citadel of Milan, and a few other strong places, remained in their hands. The war had blazed forth again on the ancient battleground. Italy once more was the centre of the stage, and with the influence of Gattinara increasing every day, it was destined to remain so for some time to come. Spain, and especially Castile, was certainly not enthusiastic about the Italian war; still it was less alien to her traditions and her interests than the struggle in Picardy and on the confines of the Netherlands.

Less than two months after the French had been expelled from the Milanese, Leo X died,² and the choice of his successor became the question of the hour. In the ensuing conclave the more prominent candidates were one after another excluded, and the choice finally fell, to the horror of the Roman populace, on Charles's 'barbarian' tutor, Adrian of Utrecht, regent of Spain, the only Dutchman that was ever Pope. It was not Charles's influence that elected him, for the Emperor could not have known of Leo's death in time to exert any pressure upon the cardinals; it was rather

213, makes it June 3; but cf. also F. Nitti, *Leone X e la sua Politica*, p. 434; Pastor, *History of the Popes*, tr. Kerr, viii, p. 36, and references there.

¹ Mignet, i, pp. 281-282.

² Juan Manuel, the imperial representative at Rome, wrote Charles (December 2, 1521) that he had reasons

for believing that Leo had been poisoned; cf. R. A. H., 'Salazar Mss., A-21, fol. 340. The Pope's last moments were cheered by the news of the recovery of Parma and Piacenza for the Holy See, which perhaps had been his chief object in entering the war.

weariness on the part of the electors, skilfully utilized by Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, and a lurking feeling that in view of the history of the preceding half century, it would be well to choose a Pope for his piety and exalted character, and above all, for his freedom from local political bias or entanglement.¹ Adrian accepted his election with great diffidence and real regret, as a duty imposed upon him by the inscrutable wisdom of God ; but at the beginning of his pontificate he showed firmness on the question of the hour. Personally friendly to Charles, he refused to promise him immediate support against the king of France. Neutrality between the two great rivals was apparently to be his policy, and France was encouraged to attempt recovery of the Milanese.

A new expedition was despatched into Lombardy, under the Maréchal de Lautrec ; but it was inadequately supported in the matter of funds, and suffered defeat at the hands of Prospero Colonna at Bicocca in the end of April.² This time the results were even more decisive than before. The French retreated in confusion ; the Sforzas were reëstablished in Milan ; Genoa also was captured by Colonna and pillaged by the Spaniards,³ and the imperialist Adorno was elected Doge. Charles, moreover, was by this time back in Spain, gathering in the fruits of the victory over the Comuneros. The diplomacy of the preceding years had already begun to bear fruit. Henry VIII promised to invade Picardy in the summer of 1523 ; in June of the same year, the Venetians, who had hitherto half-heartedly supported France, went over, for the time being, to the imperialists ; and in August the new Pope, finding that his earlier policy of neutrality had failed to produce the results he desired, succumbed to the general trend and joined the coalition against the French. Most important of all, the allies were

¹ Pastor, ix, pp. 12-31.

² Mignet, i, pp. 316-326.

³ Gómaras, p. 67.

encouraged by the news of the treason of Charles, Duke of Bourbon, Constable of France, his desertion of his liege lord, the king of France, and his reception into the ranks of the imperialists. This great noble, whose domains covered a large portion of South Central France, had been so irritated by various injuries at the hands of his master that a promise of marriage into the royal house of Spain, together with a large dowry, induced him to place himself at the disposal of Charles V.¹ The circle of Francis's foes seemed absolutely complete; and this time their avowed object was not merely the expulsion of the French from Italy, but the invasion and dismemberment of France herself.

But the allies were destined to experience that rare defensive strength of France, which, demonstrated again and again in the centuries to come, has recently proved the strong bulwark of western civilization. The English invasion of Picardy, under the Duke of Suffolk, was little more than a raid. The imperialist contingent soon deserted, and in December the English retired to Calais, discouraged and resentful. An attack which Charles had promised to deliver in person in the region of Narbonne and Perpignan was shifted at the last moment to the frontiers of Navarre, doubtless because Castile, on which the Emperor had to rely for men and supplies, was less averse to fighting in that quarter. But even with this advantage Charles was unable to accomplish much. Spain complained that the expedition was "for the benefit of England."² "Whereas [the Emperor]

¹ Mignet, i, pp. 342-390. Many new facts concerning this period have come out in the correspondence of the Abad de Najera with the Emperor, published (Madrid, 1919) by E. Pacheco y de Leyva under the title of *La Política Española en Italia*, vol. i, 1521-1524. Plans were apparently made in 1524 to get Bourbon into touch with four or

five hundred Spanish soldiers who had fled to Montpellier for fear of being punished for their participation in the revolt of the Comuneros, "para que abriesen a los nuestros una puerta de Narbona." R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-31, fol. 474.

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iii, no. 3532.

believed," wrote Sampson, the English envoy, from Pamplona, on November 12, "to have now here in a readiness over ten or twelve thousand Castilian footmen, at the most he hath scarcely found five thousand . . . and, Sir, when this army shall be in any readiness, God knoweth."¹ The town of Bayonne was the Emperor's original objective, but the winter snows blocked the passes, and he had to content himself with recapturing Fontarabia, which had been in the hands of the French since 1521.² "I make no doubt," he wrote to his brother Ferdinand in March, 1524 — and the tone of the letter sounds as if he were boasting to keep up his courage — "that you will be glad to hear of the recovery of this place . . . for it is a great advantage to me to have in my control such a powerful city, so necessary to my realms of Castile and Navarre, and so advantageous for doing harm to our enemies in Guienne."³ In the meantime the Duke of Bourbon had barely escaped to Genoa, while his accomplices had been arrested and his lands seized by the crown of France. If anything, the realm had been strengthened by his treachery. Its treasury and its territorial integrity had benefited by the ensuing confiscations; the national feeling was deeply stirred; and men rallied around their king, who was certainly not deficient in personal courage and charm, and could still occasionally arouse himself from the pursuit of his pleasures to a sense of his duties and responsibilities as a monarch.

Francis, however, was, for the moment, more intent on the recovery of the Milanese than on the preservation of his own realm. Always a lover of show and ostentation, he hoped to distinguish himself by another Marignano.⁴ At the time of Bourbon's treason, he had been about to lead another

¹ *State Papers*, vi, p. 192.

² Mignet, i, pp. 275, 464-465.

³ Lanz, *Staatspapiere*, i, p. 95.

⁴ Mignet, i, p. 434.

army into Lombardy. The bulk of it, in fact, was already there, and he ordered its leader, the Admiral Bonnivet, at once to win back the territory which had been lost. His forces were probably larger than those of the imperialists, and at first he met with some measure of success. The tide, however, soon turned against him. The death of Adrian of Utrecht (September 14, 1523) had been followed, in December, by the election of Giulio de' Medici, who took the name of Clement VII; as he owed his choice in some measure to the influence of Charles V, he was obliged, for the time being, not to break with the imperialists.¹ Charles's military forces, at the same time, were strengthened and their leaders changed. Prospero Colonna had died in the end of December and was replaced by Lannoy, viceroy of Naples, who came up from the south with over 4000 Spanish troops;² the Duke of Bourbon was made lieutenant-general with the supreme command. Under them the Marquis of Pescara, and his nephew, the Marquis del Vasto, were steadily gaining in ability and prominence; they were not always the most docile subordinates, but Bourbon knew how to get the best out of them, and the Spaniards whom they commanded, though probably never more than one-third of the imperialist armies, were the decisive element in the victories of the ensuing months.³ Against these forces Bonnivet could make no headway. In the spring of 1524 he was obliged to retire once more into Provence, the imperialists, under Bourbon, following hot on his heels. The Chevalier de Bayard, 'sans peur et sans reproche,' who had fought in the famous combat at Trani in the winter of

¹ Pastor, ix, pp. 231 ff.

² Mignet, i, pp. 459-461; Charles had about 7000 Spaniards in all in his forces. Cf. also T. Juste, "Charles de Lannoy, vice-roi de Naples, et Charles-

Quint," in *Bulletins de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, série 2, xxiv, pp. 374-403.

³ Mignet, i, p. 491; ii, pp. 27-45, *passim*.

1502-03, and had knighted Francis I on the field of Marignano, lost his life in protecting the rear guard of the French.¹

Again France was placed on the defensive, and again the invader was destined to be repulsed. In August Bourbon advanced to the siege of Marseilles, and wrote urgently to Henry VIII and Charles V to support him by simultaneous invasions in the North and across the Pyrenees. But the Tudor monarch, irritated by what he was pleased to regard as the treachery of his ally, refused to budge; and meantime the expedition which the Emperor had prepared on the frontiers of Roussillon was so slow in getting under way that he finally countermanded it and offered Bourbon a subsidy instead. Marseilles, moreover, resisted stoutly; it was plentifully supplied; its defences were in excellent repair, and its garrison was full of ardor and enthusiasm. A vigorous cannonade made a breach in the outer walls, but the inner fortifications were so strong that the German, Spanish, and Italian portions of Bourbon's army successively refused to deliver an assault; finally, on September 29, the imperialist general broke camp and retreated, slowly and in good order, through the pass of Susa into Lombardy.²

But the period of see-sawing was nearing its end. A climax of most dramatic nature was rapidly approaching. The eyes of the French king were still on Milan; he had even assured the Pope that he would invade it again, at the moment that Bourbon was advancing on Marseilles.³ When the imperialists withdrew, he kept his word; in October, 1524, he led his army across the Alps. At first, fortune seemed to smile upon him as it had done in his great campaign of 1515. The skies were clear for his crossing the mountains. The imperialists retreated before him when he

¹ Mignet, i, pp. 477 ff.; also Vol. II, p. 304, of the present work.

² Mignet, i, pp. 513-526.

³ Mignet, ii, p. 2.

reached the plains below. He was able to occupy Milan without opposition. Meantime, the bulk of Bourbon's forces retired to Lodi, twenty-two miles to the southeast, while a detachment of some 6000 men, mostly Germans, under the Spanish general, Antonio de Leyva, occupied Pavia, fifteen miles farther west. This town is situated on the left bank of the Ticino, flanked on the east by a swift-running brook, and protected on the north by the enclosed park of Mirabello; its walls were strong and high and in good condition. On October 28 Francis began to besiege it, but his first attack was a miserable failure, and he soon sat down to starve it out. November, December, and most of January were passed in disastrous inaction — an army of over 30,000 immobilized by a garrison of less than 6000 — while the bulk of the imperialists at Lodi, discouraged by lack of pay, and by rumors of the defection of their Venetian and papal allies, were given time to recover their badly shattered morale.

By the latter part of January, Bourbon, Lannoy, and Pescara decided to move on Pavia and force the French to raise the siege; in early February the two armies had established contact. The French were drawn up in the park of Mirabello, in such fashion as to derive the greatest amount of protection from the walls that enclosed it. For three long weeks the imperialists sought to distract their attention by a series of petty skirmishes, and succeeded so well that de Leyva, under cover of a false attack from Pavia itself, was able to replenish his supply of munitions and to send out one of his captains to consult with the imperialist generals. The numbers of the two armies were by this time probably nearly equal, for the French had been weakened by the recall of several thousand Swiss, and by the departure of a considerable force which had been despatched to make a feint

on Naples ; they probably numbered rather less than 25,000. The imperialists at Lodi were reckoned at 23,000 men and 800 'lances,' but were certainly less numerous by the time they reached Pavia. In cavalry and in artillery the French were unquestionably superior.

On February 23 the imperialists decided to risk a battle. On the night of the 24th-25th, they sent forward a few detachments to breach the walls of the park of Mirabello in three different places ; the soldiers wore white shirts in order to be able to recognize one another in the dark. They did their work effectively and in perfect order. At dawn the entire army began to enter the park. The French artillery tore great holes in the advancing ranks ; but the imperialists, thanks to their excellent discipline, were soon drawn up in battle array inside the walls. At that moment the French king, foolishly abandoning the intrenchment which he had constructed with so much care, led forward his men at arms to the charge ; by so doing he masked the fire of his own artillery, thus depriving himself of the chief advantage he possessed. So precipitate, moreover, had been his attack that many of his heavy-armed troops were unable to follow, and he soon found himself almost alone in the midst of his foes. Pescara showed himself a worthy disciple of Gonsalvo de Cordova by the skill with which he mingled his horsemen with his arquebusiers. At the critical moment de Leyva made a sortie from Pavia and attacked the French camp. In a few hours the battle had virtually ended and given place to individual combats, of which the most important and dramatic raged around the person of the king of France. Wounded in one arm, and surrounded by his foes, he fought valiantly on, refusing to surrender to one of the followers of the Duke of Bourbon, who had recognized him and begged him to yield ; in the end he gave his sword to

Lannoy, who arrived on the scene just in time to save his life. Over 6000 of his army had been left dead upon the field, among them many of the noblest names of France. The king wrote to his mother from his prison in Pizzighe-tone that "naught was left him save his honor and his life."¹

In some respects the battle of Pavia marks the climax of the career of Charles V. Certainly it was by far the most dramatic of his victories. It had been won on his twenty-fifth birthday,² against an army which had been generally expected to be victorious. It had ended by leaving his most powerful enemy a helpless prisoner in the hands of the imperialist generals, and France undefended against the Emperor and his allies. Moreover, things had worked out in such fashion that Spain came in for the lion's share of the glory,—possibly for a somewhat larger share than she actually deserved.³ The Spanish detachment in the imperial forces formed less than one-third of the entire army, and had been recruited entirely from Naples and Sicily; Charles had not yet been able to send a single man across from Spain.

¹ The standard account of the battle of Pavia is still that of K. Häbler in *Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte*, xxv, pp. 513-525 (1885); in the first three pages of this account, the author mentions the principal sources, and estimates the works of the older historians. To the list there given may be added: Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 94 ff.; M. García Cerezeda, *Tratado de las Campañas del Emperador Carlos V*, vol. i, pp. 112-148; Francesco Taegio, *Le Siège et Bataille de Pavie* (Geneva, 1893) (this is a modern French translation of an invaluable account of the battle written in Latin by an eyewitness, and extensively used by Mignet); the accounts in the *Diarii di Marino Sanuto*, xxxvii-xxxviii (published in 1893, after Häbler wrote); the seventeenth-century manuscript "Historia Anónima del Emperador Carlos Quinto," fols. 46 ff., in the

Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, sección de Manuscritos, 1760; and Bonardi, "L'assedio e la battaglia de Pavia," in vol. i of *Memorie e documenti per la storia di Pavia e suo principato* (1895); this deals chiefly with the siege. Cf. also Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2155-2169, *passim*. It has been well said that Francis's generalship at Pavia was faulty in two respects: (1) he failed to leave his trenches and overwhelm the Imperialists at the moment that they entered the park and were unprepared for an attack; (2) he failed to remain there after his foes were drawn up in battle array, when he should have awaited their assault behind his defences. Cf. Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, v, 2, p. 36, note 1.

² Or, at least, on what was then generally reckoned to have been; on this point cf. Gómara, p. 1, note 1.

³ Cf., e.g., Gómara, p. 71.

The Spaniards themselves took little interest in the Italian campaign. More concerned with the defence of the Pyrenean frontier, they blamed the insistence of the Piedmontese Chancellor Gattinara for the fact that most of the fighting was being done in Lombardy.¹ They naturally asked themselves what advantage they could hope to derive from the struggle there, rightly anticipating that even if Charles were victorious, he could not ignore the claims of the Sforzas. Yet, on the other hand, it is not difficult to see why the battle was generally regarded as a victory for Spain rather than for any of the other countries over which Charles ruled. It had been fought in a war whose origins were in large measure Franco-Spanish; in the Italy over which the two nations had struggled intermittently for more than thirty years. The Spanish contingent in the imperialist army, though small, had done the most effective fighting of the day, and Pescara was unquestionably the most brilliant of its leaders. And, finally, the monarch whose generals had been victorious was residing in Spain when the battle was won; it had come in the most Spanish period of his reign, when the rest of his vast responsibilities had been suffered to fall into the background. Once more Spain had been singled out as the child of fate; greatness, at every turn, was being literally thrust upon her. Foreign lands, and an imperial title, had already fallen into her lap, almost without her having to strike a blow for them; and now came the glory of having gained the greatest military victory of the age, when she had, if anything, disapproved of the campaign in which it was won.

Spain received the news of the victory with the utmost calmness. There was almost no outward evidence of joy or exultation. This was doubtless largely due to the ex-

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, nos. 671, 788, 827.

ample of the young king, whose demeanor in his hour of triumph excited the admiration of the English ambassador. The news reached him at Madrid on March 10, but "there was no semblance in him of arrogancy or change of manner to joy effusely . . . but he referred everything to God. With this, Sir," continues Sampson, "and divers other good words in so great a thing to have such singular moderation, *nullo fastu, nulla arrogantia, nulla prorsus effusa ab indecenti leticia, aut vultu, aut gestu, aut verbo aliquo*, I think myself more to have learned, and much better at all times to have moderation present and in good remembrance, than be all the letters, words, or books that ever I have or shall read."¹ But there were other reasons than Charles's "accustomed gravity" to explain the way he took the news. He was keen enough to see that the moment of his great victory was really one of imminent danger, and that the completeness of his triumph had roused the jealousy of the rest of Europe. The waverings of the Pope and the Venetians before Pavia had given him his first warning; though both of them ostensibly fell into line again shortly afterwards, it was only too easy to see that they did so from motives of fear rather than of loyalty. The other Italian states were also up in arms. After Pavia they had most of them been forced by Charles's victorious generals to recognize a sort of imperial protectorate, and what was worse, to contribute funds. In Milan itself, Girolamo Morone, Sforza's chancellor, concocted a plot to free the duchy from the presence of foreign troops. He counted on having the support of Pescara, who, not underestimating the extent of his own services, was exceedingly jealous of the honors heaped on

¹ Sir Henry Ellis, *Original Letters*, series i, vol. i, pp. 263-264. The contrast with the way in which the news was received in London by Henry VIII

(Jacqueton, *Politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie*, p. 92) is amusing and instructive.

Lannoy ; but the Spaniard, after having learned the extent of his designs, reported the plot, arrested the chancellor, and shut up the duke himself in the citadel of Milan.¹

But the most ominous cloud on the horizon was England. Henry VIII, despite various experiences of being left in the lurch by continental allies, still professed himself anxious for a joint invasion and partitioning of France. But Wolsey had always striven to restrain the king's martial ardor, and to make him alive to the dangers of imperial preponderance. Even during the months before Pavia, he had managed to keep in close touch with the French government. The secret agent and go-between was a Genoese merchant, Passano — or John Joachim, as he was generally called ; but de Praedt, the imperial ambassador, suspected what he was about, and lost no time in reporting to Charles.² When the news of the Emperor's victory arrived, the cardinal was naturally more than ever alarmed. Before any reversal of England's foreign policy could be possible, it would be necessary for him to convince the king of the error of his ways. This, however, was not so difficult as it had been before. Correspondence between the two sovereigns in regard to a joint invasion of France had quickly revealed the divergences of their points of view. Both advanced extravagant proposals, while each began to accuse the other of seeking to avoid all the trouble and expense, and at the same time to monopolize all the glory and advantage. In May it became clear that Charles had abandoned all thought of marrying the Princess Mary, and was resolved to seek

¹ Pastor, tr. Kerr, ix, pp. 289 ff. Pescara died soon afterwards : Gómara, p. 73. Cf. also C. Giodà, *Girolamo Morone e i suoi Tempi* (Turin, 1887), dh. vii ; and A. Rodríguez Villa, *Italia desde la Batalla de Pavia hasta el Saco*

de Roma (text and summaries of important letters) (Madrid, 1885).

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, pp. xix-xx. The sequel to this affair — Wolsey's intercepting of de Praedt's letters — is told in detail on pp. xlvii-1 of the same.

the hand of the Infanta of Portugal.¹ The keystone of the alliance of 1522 was thus removed. There was, indeed, no formal breach, and each side continued to give the other fair words; but it was only too obvious that all cordiality had departed. Meantime, Wolsey drew close to Francis's mother, Louise of Savoy, who was acting as regent in the absence of her son, and cleverly utilized the situation for his own advantage. The transference in June of the captive king from Italy to Spain increased the cardinal's anxiety to come to terms. Might not the Emperor be planning to extort from his prisoner the promise of an alliance to be directed against England? By the month of August, Wolsey had gained his point. A defensive treaty was signed between England and France, in which Henry VIII promised to do his utmost to effect the prompt deliverance, on reasonable conditions, of the 'Most Christian King' from his captivity at Madrid.²

The system of alliances which the Emperor had built up two years before had, in fact, broken down, and Charles was fully alive to the dangers of his position. Everything now depended on the outcome of his dealings with his royal prisoner, who, after prolonged delays and an unusually eventful journey, finally reached Madrid on August 14.³ That he must be speedily released and sent home was obvious from the outset. Europe would never permit him to remain a prisoner for long; even in Spain his gracious and gallant manners had won him an admiration and popularity "more, perhaps," as the Venetian ambassador significantly reported, "than some people would wish."⁴ The only question

¹ Jacqueton, *op. cit.*, pp. 98 ff.; *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, pp. lii-lxvi; J. Vales Failde, *La Emperatriz Isabel*, pp. 76 ff.

² Jacqueton, *op. cit.*, pp. 125-127.

³ A. Champollion-Figéac, *Captivité*

du Roi François I^{er} (*Coll. de Documents Inédits*, 1847); *D. I. E.*, xxxviii, pp. 404 ff.

⁴ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, p. c, and references there.

was how severe should be the conditions of his restoration to liberty. For five long months the Emperor deliberated, while every day news poured in of the ominous condition of foreign affairs, the restlessness of Italy, the hostility of the Turk, the progress of the German Lutherans, and of the Anglo-French entente; of the marvellous way in which France had gathered herself together under the regent, Louise of Savoy, in spite of the defeat and imprisonment of her king. Meanwhile, Charles's treatment of his royal captive excited the wonder of all men; certainly the like had never been seen before. Francis cherished the illusion that he was to be entertained as a royal guest, but was speedily undeceived; he was confined in the great tower of the castle in Madrid. Disappointed that Charles did not immediately respond to his request that he pay him a visit, he fell dangerously ill; and the Emperor was persuaded to grant permission to Marguerite d'Angoulême to come and comfort her brother in his captivity. "Being young and a widow," reported the English ambassador, somewhat maliciously, "she comes, as Ovid says of women going to see a play, to see and to be seen, that, perhaps, the Emperor may like her, and also to woo the Queen Dowager of Portugal for her brother, which no one else dares do without the Emperor's knowledge. Then, as they are both young widows, she shall find good commodity in cackling with her to advance her brother's matter; and if she finds her inclined thereto, they will help each other."¹ Two months later, the king's illness had advanced so fast that on September 18 he was thought to be dying, and Charles was sent for in hot haste from Toledo. In an affecting interview he assured Francis that he was 'his good friend and brother and hoped that he would continue to be so.'² The same strange mixture of

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 1485.

² *Ibid.*, iv, introduction, p. cv.

kindliness and severity was maintained till the very end. The two monarchs "had oftentimes alone in secret very long discourses. They went together in one coach to a castle half a day's journey from thence, where was queen Eleanor, whom the King contracted. And yet, notwithstanding all these great signs of peace and amity, he was no less straitly guarded than before, without having any more liberty; so that at one and the same time he was embraced as a brother, and guarded as a prisoner."¹

The conditions of the king's liberation were not finally settled until January 14, 1526. They had been the product, on Charles's side at least, of much anxious thought, and the subject of prolonged negotiation with the different representatives of Francis. The knottiest point was Charles's territorial demands; for, despite all the clouds on the political horizon, the Emperor was resolved not to let his captive go without requiring the cession of the duchy of Burgundy. That he should have insisted upon this has often provoked surprise. He must have known how deeply the Burgundians were attached to France, and how unlikely it was that a stipulation of this sort, extorted from a captive monarch, would ever be observed after he had regained his freedom.² On the other hand, he could not bring himself to forego all territorial reward for the great victory that he had won, and there was certainly no other place in Western Europe where he could claim it with a greater show of merely asserting his traditional rights. As a Netherlander, he had never ceased to regard the duchy as the lawful property of the house of Hapsburg,³ and as Spain and the Netherlands were hence-

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, p. cxvii, note, quoting Guicciardini. Cf. also Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2176-84, *passim*.

² On this cf. H. Hauser, *Le Traité de Madrid et la cession de la Bourgogne à*

Charles-Quint: Étude sur le sentiment national bourguignon en 1525-1526 (Paris, 1912). Cf. also Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2187-88.

³ In the eyes of the Hapsburgs, it had of course been stolen by Louis XI.

forth to go hand in hand, its acquisition would be most valuable from the Iberian point of view. To the union of his captive with his widowed sister, Eleanor, he could not openly consent without breaking his pledge to Bourbon, 'who had been allured out of France only by hope of that marriage,' and had recently arrived at Madrid to assert his rights; but when the Duke had had the Emperor's necessities explained to him, "he at last said with his tongue, he was content; — whether he was in his heart or not."¹ The other stipulations — the abandonment by the French king of all his claims to Italy, and of his overlordship of Flanders and Artois, his assumption of the Emperor's debts to Henry VIII, and his cession of his two sons as a pledge of the fulfilment of the treaty — made comparatively little difficulty, and on March 17 Francis was conveyed to the banks of the Bidassoa. In midstream a large boat lay at anchor, and to it the French king was rowed out, with six Spaniards; while his sons, with six Frenchmen, simultaneously approached it from the other bank. Apparently not a word was spoken while the exchange was being effected, but the moment that Francis trod the soil of his own realm, the Spanish ambassador, acting on instructions, approached and demanded the ratification of the cession of Burgundy. The king, however, possibly dreading recapture, was in mad haste to be gone. Waving the ambassador aside, he mounted a horse and rode off to St. Jean-de-Luz, and then to Bayonne. When the Emperor heard of it, he speedily sent orders that Eleanor, who had expected to follow Francis within a few days, should be detained until further notice at Vitoria.²

The scene on the Bidassoa portended much. It was plain

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 1928.

also Edward Hall's *Chronicle*, pp. 710–

² Cf. A. Champollion-Figeac, *Cap- tività du Roi François I^{er}*, pp. 510–513; 711 (edition of 1809).

that Francis did not intend to observe the treaty of Madrid ; nor does it appear that any one expected him to do so. Charles had, on the whole, made a not excessive use of his victory ; but moderate though it was, it had been far too much for the rest of Europe, now thoroughly alarmed at the overwhelming preponderance of the house of Hapsburg. Through the early months of 1526 the French king temporized. On the ground of a secret protestation that without the consent of the local estates he had no right to alienate a French province, made in the presence of witnesses on the day before he signed the treaty, he continued to postpone the cession of Burgundy. On May 16 Lannoy wrote to the Emperor that he did not believe that it would ever be given up.¹ In the meantime, the attitude of the foreign powers grew steadily more favorable to the king of France. His relations with Henry VIII became more cordial every day. The Italians longed to be rid of the imperial soldiers. The Pope, at those rare moments when he had the courage to speak his mind, poured forth furious invectives against the ambition of Charles V. Finally, on May 22, at Cognac in Angoulême, a treaty was made between Francis, Clement, and the Italian states, "to put an end to the wars which were devastating Christendom" — or, in other words, to liberate Italy from the tutelage of Charles V, and reestablish the balance of power in Western Europe. Each of the high contracting parties promised its contingent, and it was expected that the king of England would take the title of Protector and Preserver of the League.² As far as this, however, Henry was not yet prepared to go. Wolsey still desired to preserve the appearance of amity with the Emperor, and had certainly no wish to be actively involved in another con-

¹ Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, v, 2, p. 50.

² J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, iv, 1 (1726), pp. 451-455.

tinental war. On the other hand, it was obvious that the new combination had the cordial good wishes of the English government; for the position of the Emperor was still far too strong to suit either the cardinal or the king.¹

In December Charles returned from his honeymoon at Granada to a very different sort of task from that which he had anticipated six months before. He had hoped, after the treaty with Francis, to go over to Italy and be crowned by the Pope; to pass on to Germany and deal with the Lutherans; and, finally, to concentrate his forces against the Turk. Instead, all these weighty matters had to be indefinitely postponed, and he was obliged to take up the sword for the retention of what he had already won. His anger was particularly violent against the Pope, whose utter untrustworthiness was now fully revealed. He realized, moreover, that Clement was the weakest link in the chain of his foes. No one of the other confederates could be so easily cowed into submission by a show of force. On the other hand, he well knew that it would not do for him to be officially involved in any open act of violence against the pontiff, for the papal office was still sacred in men's eyes, however great the personal unworthiness of some of its recent occupants. What share Charles actually bore in the brutal attack — a sort of dress rehearsal of the vast tragedy of the succeeding May — which was delivered on the nineteenth of September by the Colonnas and Moncada, it will probably never be possible to determine. He asserted, it is true, with the utmost emphasis, that he was guiltless of all blame, and the leaders wrote him that they had acted on their own responsibility; but there are other passages in his correspondence which must necessarily arouse one's doubts.²

¹ Cf. Jacqueton, *La Politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie*, pp. 254–290.

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, pp. cxxxiii–cxxxviii, *passim*; also *D. I.*

In any case, he was not deterred from the pursuit of his own aims by the outcry that went up from the kings of England and of France. Moncada had imposed a truce on the Pope, but Clement promptly disavowed it the moment that his enemy withdrew, and Charles made preparations for war in earnest. He wrote to his brother Ferdinand to send down into Italy an army of Germans under the Lutheran George Frundsberg, and despatched Lannoy from Cartagena with a fleet of 30 sail, 3000 picked Spaniards, and the landsknechts he had brought with him into Spain in 1522.¹

The news of these preparations frightened Clement. Every day came in alarming reports of the concentration of the imperialist forces under Bourbon at Milan. The Pope's allies, moreover, were absolutely useless. Francis promised much, but accomplished nothing. Henry VIII remained true to his policy of abstention. The Duke of Urbino, who led the Italian levies, was so hopelessly lacking in energy and courage that the classic dictum of Julius Caesar was modified to suit his case; "Veni, vidi, fugi," was a just description of his activities. In late February Bourbon and Frundsberg joined forces at Piacenza — 12,000 German mercenaries, 4000 Spaniards, 2000 Italian volunteers, and 5000 lances — and slowly began to move toward Rome.² There were constant mutinies for lack of pay, and the advance was signalized by every sort of violence and crime. On March 16, the Pope, in abject terms, signed a humiliating truce with the imperial representative; but the news of it failed to halt the onrushing tide. "Furious as lions," the invaders swept down upon the Eternal City, their numbers swelled by a

E., xxiv, pp. 59 ff., 448 ff.; and A. Rodríguez Villa, *Italia desde la Batalla de Pavía, passim*.

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, pp. cxl ff.; also *C. S. P., Spanish*, iii, 1, pp. 952, 967, 1026; Pastor, ix,

p. 324; Clonard, *Historia Orgánica de las Armas Españolas*, iii, pp. 215, 221-222.

² *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, introduction, p. clvii.

host of renegades, who, foreseeing untold opportunities for plunder and rapine, were only too glad to be absorbed into the ranks. On Saturday, May 4, the army was in front of Rome; on the sixth, in a murky fog, it delivered the assault. Bourbon was slain in an attempt to scale the walls, but his death never halted the progress of the attack; indeed it only served to render the results of it the more horrible by eliminating the few vestiges of discipline that remained. For more than a week, the city of the Caesars was given over to horrors far more awful than those of barbarian days. Lust, drunkenness, greed of spoil, and, in some cases, religious fanaticism, combined in truly hellish fashion to produce the worst outburst of savagery in the annals of the period. "They strewed on the ground the sacred body of Christ, took away the cup, and trod under foot the relics of the saints to spoil their ornaments. No church nor monastery was spared. They violated nuns, amid the cries of their mothers, burnt the most magnificent buildings, turned churches into stables, made use of crucifixes and other images as marks for their harquebusses. It is no longer Rome, but Rome's grave (*non Urbs, sed bustum Urbis*). They dressed the old wooden crucifix, revered by all nations, which stood on one of the seven altars of St. Peter's, in the uniform of a lanzknecht. St. Peter and St. Paul, who have lain so many years buried under the altar of St. Peter's, never suffered such indignities, even from those who made them martyrs."¹ The Pope found a precarious refuge in the Castle of St. Angelo, and later in Orvieto, but he did not regain liberty of action for many months to come.

The inevitable war of words at once burst forth — it has not entirely ceased today — as to how far Charles was

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 3200; published accounts of the sack may be found in R. A. H., Mss. Salazar, A-40, 11, *passim*. A number of other un- folios 408 ff.

responsible for this crowning outrage.¹ All Western Europe made haste to express its horror, and the Emperor was prompt to absolve himself of all blame. His information was at best from two to three weeks late, and he could not possibly have foreseen the lengths to which his soldiers would go; on the other hand, one cannot doubt that he intended to teach Clement a lesson, and in view of the character and composition of his army, he must have been perfectly well aware that it was bound to be severe. There seems to be no evidence of any wavering of Spain's loyalty to her young master because of what had occurred. The news was kept quiet as long as possible,² and men generally put the responsibility on Bourbon and Frundsberg. After Pavia, Spain had not been permitted to exult; after Rome, if she was horrified, she made no sign. She was still almost a passive spectator of the deeds of her young Caesar.

The course of the war during the next two years was neither particularly interesting nor decisive. In the spring of 1527, the lines of the alliance of France and England were again more closely drawn, and on January 22, 1528, the heralds of Francis and of Henry VIII presented themselves before the Emperor at Burgos and bade him defiance. Thereafter ensued that solemn farce — the proposal that Charles and Francis should settle their differences by mortal combat. Each one accused the other of cowardice and broken faith. There were interminable exchanges of *cartels* and *défis*; but

¹ The contemporary Spanish historians of course lay the blame on Bourbon, cf., e.g., Gómara, p. 215; "hizo aquella empresa de su caueça." The attitude of Armstrong, i, pp. 172 ff., is sane and sensible; and he gives an excellent bibliography in a footnote. Cf. also the curious poem of Vasco Díaz de Frexenal in A. Rodríguez Villa, *Italia desde la Batalla de Pavía*, pp. 223-234. There are two interesting letters of

Juan Perez to the Emperor (July 1 and August 4, 1527) on the differences between the Spaniards and Germans at Rome, and the need of a general who could keep them in order. One is given by A. Rodríguez Villa, *Memorias para la historia del Asalto y Saqueo de Roma* (Madrid, 1875), pp. 234-236. The other is in R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-41, fol. 67.

² Cf. *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 3181.

neither was so Quixotic as to enter the lists. Charles, on the whole, had the best of the argument. It was impossible to answer his repeated assertion that his rival had broken the treaty of Madrid; and he showed how thoroughly he believed in his case by the efforts that he made to have the correspondence generally known. There is a curious touch of modernity in the advice which he received from the Duke of Infantado, whom he had consulted as to the line of conduct most expedient for him to pursue: "Such differences ought not to be left to be decided by the fortune of arms; they depend solely on the existence and authenticity of treaties, and on the verdicts of men of honor and knowledge, consulted on the points at issue. It is certainly clear that a sane judgment is sufficient to terminate this dispute; which a duel could never do."¹ Ordeal by battle was a thing of the past; even the Spanish aristocracy was willing to acknowledge it.

Meantime, the king of France had despatched a fresh army into Italy under Lautrec, who at first carried all before him. He reconquered the Milanese,² reëstablished the authority of France in Genoa, and then, passing down the Adriatic coast, entered the kingdom of Naples. In a few weeks all the smaller cities of the realm had opened their gates to him; and in April, 1528, he sat down to besiege the capital, blockaded from the sea by Filipino Doria, who at the same time won fresh laurels for himself and his family by defeating and slaying Don Hugo de Moncada in a spirited action off Capo d'Orso between Amalfi and Salerno.³ But in July, just as the city was about to surrender, the blockading squadron

¹ *D. I. E.*, i, p. 92, note; Lavissee, *Histoire de France* v, 2, p. 57. For other references on this affair cf. Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2218-22.

² Save for the city of Milan, which

held out under Leyva. Cf. Formentini, *Il ducato di Milano*, p. 336.

³ April 28, 1528; cf. Fernández Duro, *Armada Española*, i, pp. 143-147.

was suddenly called off,¹ and the fleet that was sent on from France to replace it was utterly inadequate to continue its work. Lautrec's army was wasted by plague; its leader succumbed to it on August 15, and his incompetent successor, the Marquis of Saluzzo, was overwhelmed by the imperialists at Aversa on August 28. In the following year, a fresh expedition, under the Count of St. Pol, failed even more conclusively than its predecessor; it got, in fact, only as far as Landriano, in the Milanese, where it was utterly defeated on June 21. It was clear that the imperialists were still masters of the peninsula. The League of Cognac had proved too feeble to resist them, and Francis began to think seriously of peace.

Two incidents of the struggle that was drawing to a close were of greater significance in the history of the Spanish Empire than the actual course of the war itself. The first was the winning over of Andrea Doria, and explains why Naples had been preserved to the imperialists. The great Genoese admiral had alternately fought, in his early days, for Naples, for Rome, and for his native land, but since 1512 he had been in the service of the French.² He had not, however, been altogether happy in the employ of Francis I. He had been irregularly and inadequately paid, and treated with disdain by French generals and statesmen; there had also been a bitter quarrel over the town of Savona, where the French were installed to the prejudice of the Genoese.³ Doria can scarcely be called an ardent patriot; rather did he long for honor and authority for himself, and aspire to the naval domination of the entire Mediterranean; and these he was now firmly convinced he should never obtain at the

¹ The reasons for this will appear in the next paragraph.

² Save for a brief period in that of Clement VII.

³ Petit, *André Doria*, p. 111, insists that Francis was prepared to give Doria satisfaction on this point.

hands of the king of France. Charles, who was in desperate need of ships, approached the admiral at the opportune moment. In July, 1528, Andrea Doria passed over to the imperial service.¹ He got generous terms for his change of sides. The supreme command of the fleets of Spain, and of all other vessels that fought in conjunction with them; rights and privileges for his native Genoa, whose freedom was recognized under imperial protection; financial concessions and other rewards, were granted in the treaty which he made with the Emperor. But there is no question that he was worth the price. In the first place, his desertion served to relieve Naples; for he lost no time in summoning his nephew, Filipino, who commanded the blockading squadron there, to abandon the siege and come to meet him at Gaeta. In the second, it made communication between Spain and Italy far safer and easier than it had ever been before. The transfer of troops, hitherto almost impossible, became from henceforth comparatively simple and frequent; and Genoa, which was now, for the most part, subjected to Spanish influence, proved an asset to Charles of the most vital importance. It furnished him a port in the north of Italy, the lack of which had hitherto seriously hampered his operations in Lombardy. And, finally, the fact that Doria had gone over to the Emperor had an important effect on the contemporary struggle against Barbarossa and the Turks. The admiral remained loyal to the Emperor and his successor to the day of his death in 1560; and it was largely through his assistance that the infidel was held in check. The command of the Mediterranean trembled in the balance down to the battle of Lepanto in 1571; but if Doria had remained on the side of the king of France, Spain

¹ The text of the treaty by which this was arranged is given in Fernández

Duro, *Armada Española*, i, p. 364; cf. also Laiglesia, i, pp. 121-156.

would have had to surrender it before the struggle had fairly begun.

If the winning of Andrea Doria served to give Spain a navy, an event was simultaneously preparing in a very different quarter of Europe, whose ultimate results were, some sixty years later, to deprive her of it. Charles had watched with growing anxiety the steadily increasing intimacy of Henry VIII and Francis I; and in the summer of 1527 he found out that there was a special reason for it over and above the dictates of political expediency. The failure of Catharine of Aragon to produce a male heir caused the Tudor monarch grave misgivings about the future of his dynasty. The charms of Anne Boleyn had attracted his attention; before long it became evident that he intended to get a divorce. As a divorce could not legally be secured save from Rome, and as the Pope was virtually a prisoner of the Emperor, who would be bound to resent any maltreatment of his aunt, it was clear that Henry must find means to exert strong pressure upon Clement to grant his desires; and the obvious way was to draw near to Francis, who was also anxious to effect the Pope's release. It is probable that the rapprochement of France and England had worried the Emperor much less than the "great matter" which had given rise to it; for the war was being fought in Italy and the Mediterranean, where the Tudor monarch could not effectively intervene. But the divorce project was of ominous portent; it added one more to the already long list of Charles's cares and responsibilities in foreign lands. He was in honor bound to stand by his aunt, who was determined to fight her cause tooth and nail. He knew, on the other hand, that the king would not retreat. How momentous were to be the ultimate consequences, no one could then have dreamed; but it was already clear that friction and dis-

trust must ensue in a quarter where, six years before, Charles had had amity and alliance — that a cordial friendship was to be replaced by a smouldering quarrel. And so the sordid matter pursued its unedifying course. The arguments of the king for the annulment of his marriage were based on the flimsy plea that the bull of dispensation for it, granted by Julius II, had not specifically mentioned the consummation of Catharine's first marriage with his brother Arthur; but this plea was effectively met by the queen, who was able to prove that the brief of the bull in question had dealt with the matter at issue in no uncertain terms.¹ The Emperor, committed to the cause of his aunt, did all that was humanly possible to aid and protect her. The Pope procrastinated, owing to the political situation; he dared come to no decision till he could be certain of the issue of the war. By the late spring of 1529 this was no longer in doubt. The imperialists were triumphant in Naples and in Milan; despite all the importunities of the Tudor monarch, Clement dared not offend the victorious Emperor. The legate Campeggio was instructed to adjourn his court at Blackfriars; the trial of the case was 'advoked' to Rome; and in August the cup of Henry's bitterness was filled to overflowing by the news that Francis, from whom he had hoped so much, had settled his differences and made a treaty with Charles V.

Peace on the Continent had, in fact, been inevitable, since the desertion of Doria and the defeats of the French at Aversa and Landriano. The French king was weary of war. The Emperor's presence was essential in Germany, not only to deal with the Lutheran problem, but also to repel the advance of the Turks. Charles paved the way for an understanding with Francis by coming to terms with Clem-

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 322; also J. Gairdner, "New Lights on the Divorce of Henry VIII," in *English Historical Review*, xi, pp. 673-702; xii, pp. 1-16, 237-253.

ent VII. In June, 1529, a treaty was signed at Barcelona, in which Emperor and pontiff agreed to unite for the pacification of Italy and the repulse of the infidel. Clement regranted to Charles the investiture of Naples; Charles promised to restore the Medici in Florence.¹ In the meantime, negotiations were opened with France, the conduct of them being intrusted to Louise of Savoy and Margaret of Austria, who met at Cambray to carry them to a conclusion. Agreement was facilitated by the fact that Charles now recognized that his demand for Burgundy was impossible of fulfilment. His concessions in that quarter made the French more willing to abandon their claims to the North of Italy. Francis assumed Charles's debts to Henry VIII, and paid an enormous ransom for the delivery of his two sons. They were handed over in the following year, as their father had been in 1526, on the Bidassoa, amid precautions reminiscent of those of four years before, plainly showing that distrust had not vanished even though a treaty had been signed. Finally, the French king married his rival's sister, Eleanor of Portugal, who was welcomed in her new realm as one of the authors of the peace and the pledge of its preservation.²

Surprise has sometimes been expressed that the brilliant French historian, Mignet, ended his great work on the *Rivalry of Francis I and Charles V* with the peace of Cambray, instead of carrying it to the death of the French monarch. But the more one studies the period in question, the more one is convinced that he was entirely right in cutting off the story in 1529. The peace of that year marks the end of an epoch in the relations of the two monarchs; the struggle that followed was of an entirely different nature from that which had gone before. Moreover, this impres-

¹ Mignet, ii, pp. 437 ff.

² *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 444 ff.

sion is certain to be accentuated if one envisages the period from the standpoint of Charles as king of Spain. Sandoval tells us that just before he embarked for Italy at Barcelona, he cut his hair, which, in deference to ancient Spanish custom, he had hitherto worn long, despite the fact that in the rest of Western Europe men had generally begun to clip it close; and that his followers, out of loyalty, felt bound to imitate his example, though they were so grieved at the necessity for it that many of them wept.¹ The episode may be regarded as indicative of greater things. Since 1522 Charles had been continuously resident in the peninsula. His attention had been focussed on his Iberian dominions and the extension of Spanish power in the West of Europe. One thinks of him first and foremost as king of Spain. After 1529 his attention is distracted by his duties and responsibilities in Germany and elsewhere; he appears in the role of Emperor rather than in that of an Iberian monarch, and all sorts of other elements come into play.

The period preceding the peace of Cambray is also differentiated in another important respect from that which follows. It has been well said that after 1529 the territorial unity of France was no longer threatened, or at least was threatened to an infinitely less degree than it had been before.² We have seen that after 1522 it was the Emperor's intention that Spain and the Netherlands should march hand in hand. The obstacle to this project was the intervening realm of France, and down to 1529 the Emperor never entirely abandoned the idea of shortening the land route between his two sets of dominions by territorial acquisitions at the expense of his rival. It crops out in the extravagant proposals which he exchanged with Henry VIII for a joint invasion and partitioning of France. It was in the back of

¹ Sandoval, ii, p. 50.

² Cf. Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, v, 2, pp. 67-68.

his mind when he negotiated with Bourbon. It is revealed, most plainly of all, in his demand for the duchy of Burgundy in the treaty of 1526. The eagerness of Gattinara to win Milan, and the fact that the war was almost wholly waged in Italy, should not blind us to this other most important phase of the Emperor's ambitions. By 1529, however, it was abundantly clear that, for the time being, at least, there was no possibility of its realization. France had been solidified by the acquisition of the Bourbon lands. The divorce project threatened to turn England's friendship into hostility; and when the Emperor dropped his demand for the duchy of Burgundy, it was tantamount to an admission that he had ceased to hope to win French soil. Henceforth, if he was to have territorial reward for his victories over his rival, he would take it in Italy and not in France.

One final reflection on the results of the war down to 1529 must occur at this point to all students of the Spanish Empire. Apparently Charles had started out with an immense preponderance. He had enjoyed the alliance of England and of the Pope, and acquired soon afterwards that of the greatest of the French feudal lords. He could draw on the military resources of the Empire and the Netherlands, as well as those of Spain and of Naples; the Mexican silver mines were beginning to yield him revenue. Moreover, he had won the majority of the victories. He had met his only repulses when invading French soil; at Bicocca, at Aversa, at Landriano, his generals had been successful; while at Pavia they had gained an overwhelming triumph, whose dramatic effect had been enhanced by the capture and imprisonment of his rival. And yet what had he to show for it at the end? Practically no territorial gains, only a few trifling financial and political concessions. More

ominous still, the whole edifice of alliances, which he had been at such pains to build up in the early twenties, had by this time crumbled and fallen to the ground. With the papacy he was still ostensibly on good terms, but that was only the result of political necessity; he knew well that he could not count on the continuance of Clement's friendship if the situation should make it advisable for the pontiff to draw close to France. Bourbon was dead; the result of his treason had ultimately redounded to the benefit of the French king, whose domains had been increased by the ensuing confiscations. Worst of all was the right-about-face on the part of the king of England. In a measure, that catastrophe had been the result of the divorce — a bolt from the blue which no one could have foreseen; but Charles realized that under the guidance of Cardinal Wolsey England had been preparing to desert him at least as early as 1525 — long before the situation was complicated by Henry's matrimonial woes. So threatening was the Emperor's preponderance in the eyes of the greatest and most modern of all the statesmen of the age that he violated a political tradition of centuries' duration, and sought to come to terms with England's hereditary foe, for fear of being overwhelmed by the power of the house of Hapsburg. In the face of all these developments, the Emperor had made peace — not, as he once hoped, as a victor dictating terms, but rather on a basis of *uti possidetis*; for it was not, after all, much better than an even split.

What has been said of the Emperor applies equally to Spain. Though the Spaniards had not been enthusiastic over all phases of the war with France, Charles's long residence among them had identified them with it in men's minds, and its issue was popularly laid at their door. Spain had fallen heir to the glories of Pavia, but she also fell heir

to the jealousy and suspicion which the Emperor's victories aroused. Half a century earlier she had counted for almost nothing in international relations. She had been regarded as outside the current of European affairs, shut off behind the Pyrenees, with a life of her own sharply differentiated from that of her neighbors. Then suddenly, under the Catholic Kings, she had become a first-class power, able to speak on even terms with England and with France. And now, even more suddenly still, as a result of the position and inheritance of her young sovereign, she actually threatened the independence of her neighbors, and seemed destined to become the centre of an empire more mighty than that of Charlemagne. The rapidity of the transformation rendered it all the more alarming. Would it not be necessary for all other governments to combine against her, in order to preserve the national individuality of the states of Western Europe? The need for the maintenance of a balance of power, as a corollary of the preservation of the separate existence of the different states, was, of course, not as yet at all generally understood; Cardinal Wolsey was really an exponent of it before its day. But Europe was clear that Spain threatened to become too powerful; that any further extension of her dominions would constitute a great danger; indeed, it is probable that she exaggerated the peril, for the maintenance of such an empire was a task beyond Spain's powers. Be that as it may, Europe's fears had been aroused and were not to be completely allayed for a century to come, — not, in fact, until long after the Spanish Empire had become a ghost of its former self. Charles was doubtless aware of the feeling that had been stirred up, but the position he had inherited and was determined to maintain rendered it impossible that he should waver in his course; and Spain, as the chief

instrument of Hapsburg imperialism, was obliged to pay the price of her young master's resolve.

We can pass on more rapidly now. The period from 1529 to 1547 — from the peace of Cambray to the death of Francis I — is all that need claim our attention for the present; for the struggles of Charles V with Henry II may be more conveniently considered in a subsequent chapter. Of those eighteen years there were less than five of actual warfare — a much smaller proportion than in the period before Cambray; moreover, a large portion of such fighting as did occur took place on the frontiers between France and the Netherlands; the conflict was rather European than Spanish in its implications. And yet, though the nature and scene of the struggle were more remote, the use of Spanish gold and Spanish soldiers increased as the reign progressed. Never before had so much money been sent out of the realm. Had not Charles had a series of fresh windfalls during this period, as a result of the conquest of the Empire of the Incas, his treasury could not possibly have stood the strain. The Emperor took 8000 Spanish soldiers to Italy in 1529; he had at least 11,000 in the force with which he invaded Provence in 1536; between 6000 and 8000 of them served in the armies which he launched against Picardy from the Netherlands in 1543 and 1544. Spanish troops formed the backbone of the forces which accompanied him on the Danube campaign of 1532; it was largely with Spaniards that he won the battle of Mühlberg in 1547.¹ It was in this period that the Spanish pikeman became a familiar figure all over the West of Europe, and the tactics of the Great Captain gained the fame they so richly deserved.

On the other hand, though the interests of Spain were

¹ Gómara, pp. 102, 116, 119; Clonard, iii, pp. 337 ff.; Lafuente, xi, p. 467; Pacheco y de Leyva, *La Jornada de Viena* (Madrid, 1909).

often frankly sacrificed, during these years, to the advancement of the house of Hapsburg in its various non-Spanish capacities, one cannot help feeling that the Emperor had taken to heart the oft expressed desire of his Spanish subjects for 'peace with Christian Kings.'¹ He fought far less and negotiated far more than in the period before the peace of Cambray; indeed, it is not too much to say that, whenever it was possible honorably to do so, he strove to avoid an appeal to arms. He frankly recognized the impossibility of realizing the ambition which had animated him in his earlier years, — territorial aggrandizement at the expense of France; never before in his entire career had his aims appeared to be so completely defensive. Even in Italy he would have gladly renounced the acquisition of more land, had it been possible in return to maintain the peace he so much desired. That he failed to do this was due to Francis I, "always obsessed with the desire to recapture Milan," and to a series of unfortunate deaths which brought to naught Charles's schemes for solving by a compromise the great question of its disposal;² but the Emperor's own attitude was far less aggressive than it had been. Though resident in Spain less continuously than before 1529, he seems after that date to have become even more sympathetic to the Spanish viewpoint. In foreign affairs the Hispanicization of his outlook begins really to manifest itself after he had left the peninsula.

¹ Attention may be called here to an interesting but anonymous "*Parecer sobre la pasada de S. M. a Italia, 1529*," in Madrid (R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-44, fols. 1 ff.), and a nineteenth-century copy of it in London (B. M., Add. Mss. 28579, fols. 332-336). The tone of the '*Parecer*' is defensive throughout; fear is expressed for the safety of Charles's person and reputation; and the accent is on Naples rather than on Milan.

² Also, perhaps in some measure to the death of Gattinara (June 5, 1530). Cf. E. Gossart, *Charles-Quint, Roi d'Espagne*, pp. 193-194, 209. On the other hand, it is fair to say that in 1523 Gattinara found the Emperor too much under the influence of soldiers (not Spanish ones; cf. p. 140, *ante*) who desired to annex Milan. Gossart, p. 203.

The Milanese question was not the only one that presented itself when Charles crossed over from Barcelona to Genoa in early August, 1529. The details of the treaty with Clement in the previous June remained to be worked out, and the advance of the Turks in Hungary made it essential that Emperor and Pope remain on friendly terms.¹ The negotiations with Venice, Ferrara, and Mantua, the expeditions against Perugia and Florence, and the imperial coronation at Bologna (February 24, 1530),² were all carried out in a manner which showed that, though there was no love lost between them, both Clement and Charles realized that they could not afford to quarrel. As to Milan, "the fountain head of the troubles of Italy,"³ the treaty of Barcelona had not been at all definite; and it was obvious that at first Charles wished to avoid the necessity of giving the investiture of it to Francesco Sforza. He could not forget the past faithlessness of the duke, nor the way in which he had made common cause with the king of France. The Emperor was doubtless sorely tempted to keep Milan in Spanish hands; and the gouty veteran, Antonio de Leyva, who had held it for him, despite the gravest difficulties, during the critical period of the war, was clamoring to be rewarded for his services with a title which would have made him Charles's permanent representative there.⁴ But the establishment of a Spanish ruler in Lombardy, however valuable as a bulwark to Naples and Sicily, would infallibly have put all Italy up in arms, and definitely invited a new French intervention; it would have been a contradiction of the principle of "peace with Christian kings," to which

¹ Pastor, x, p. 85.

² On this cf. G. Giordani, *Della Dimora in Bologna del Pontefice Clemente VII. per la Coronazione di Carlo V. Cronaca* (Bologna, 1842).

³ Pastor, x, p. 57.

⁴ De Leva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo Quinto*, ii, pp. 577 ff.

Charles, at all costs, was at present resolved to adhere. At one time the Emperor thought of giving the duchy to Alessandro de' Medici, who was later to marry his natural daughter, Margaret, and thus placing upon the family of his new ally the responsibility for its defence; but the objections of Clement rendered this solution impossible, and Charles was finally brought to see that the investiture of Sforza was inevitable.¹ Having made up his mind, he accepted the unwelcome solution with good grace. Francesco, who had not been officially included in the general peace, was trembling in his shoes when the Emperor sent for him to Bologna, and must have been much relieved by the kindly reception that awaited him. Save for the growlings of old de Leyva, everything passed off very pleasantly. On December 23, Sforza was formally invested with the duchy, at the price of 300,000 ducats; and he further agreed to pay Charles 500,000 more in annual instalments during the next ten years.² Thus peace had been preserved and Spanish troops and treasure saved, but only, as it proved, for a time.

During the next few years the relations of Charles and Francis fall into the background. The Emperor was chiefly occupied during this period with the Lutheran problem, and with fighting the infidel on the Danube and at Tunis. The attitude of England, where the divorce was finally put through, in the teeth of the censures of Clement, also claimed a large share of his attention. But the differences between Hapsburg and Valois were too deep seated to be forgotten; their enmity might slumber, but it did not sleep. Italy, as before, was the chief bone of contention. While Charles was busy in the Empire and in Spain, Francis strove to recreate for himself an Italian clientèle. He maintained a

¹ Pastor, x, p. 86.

² Cronaca del Soggiorno di Carlo V

in Italia dal 26 Luglio 1529 al 25 Aprile 1530, ed. G. Romano, pp. 140 ff.

garrison at Mirandola, and negotiated with petty princes and Genoese exiles. He sought to win the services of the most famous condottieri.¹ Most important of all, in the year 1533 he succeeded in regaining the alliance of the Pope. Clement was still in terror of the preponderance of Charles, and longed to enhance the reputation of his house by making a royal marriage for his niece, Catharine. Francis fully shared the Pope's dread of the Hapsburgs, and was the more willing to offer one of his sons as a candidate for Catharine's hand, because Charles wished to marry her to Francesco Sforza and thus bind the Medici to support him in Milan. In October, Clement and the French king had an interview at Marseilles. The marriage of Catharine de' Medici and the future Henry II was celebrated there on the twenty-eighth, and a common policy laid down with regard to the North Italian states.²

Less than a year later (September 25, 1534) Clement died, and his successor, the Farnese, Paul III, stoutly refused to take sides in the Hapsburg-Valois conflict. For ten long years he succeeded in maintaining strict neutrality. Francis was deprived of most of the advantage that he had won in 1533, but he continued his intrigues with the different Italian states.³ He induced the rulers of Monaco and Saluzzo to place themselves under his protection. He strove to induce the Venetians to declare themselves against Charles V.⁴ Clearly he had determined to pick up the Italian quarrel once more, whenever he could hope to do so with any reasonable prospect of success. The Emperor saw the danger and prepared to meet it. The crux of the situation was, as always, Milan; and Charles took fresh

¹ Lavissee, v, 2, p. 83.

² *Ibid.*, p. 77; Pastor, x, pp. 218-219.

³ Pastor, x, p. 326; xi, p. 35, and references there.

⁴ Romanin, *Storia di Venezia*, vi, pp. 13-21.

measures to bind Francesco Sforza to the house of Hapsburg. He paid him a state visit in March, 1533, and arranged for the duke's marriage with his niece, Christina of Denmark; the wedding was celebrated in May, 1534.¹ But at the same time he continued to use every effort to avoid a renewal of the war. In August, 1534, he sent the Count of Nassau as ambassador extraordinary to the king of France to seek a peaceful solution of the difficulties that confronted them. But Francis was in no mood for compromise. He insisted on his rights to Genoa, Asti, and Milan. The utmost that he would do was to consent to the postponement of the enforcement of the last named until Francesco Sforza should die.²

Under all the circumstances, the death of the duke, which occurred quite unexpectedly on November 1, 1535,³ inevitably meant the renewal of the war. The last descendant of the native dynasty was gone, and Milan reverted to Charles as an imperial fief; but the king of France was resolved not to permit him to enjoy it or to settle the succession on any candidate of his own. Charles was in Sicily, on his way back from the capture of Tunis, when the event occurred, but he had already crossed over into the kingdom of Naples before he heard the news. It must have been exceedingly unwelcome to him, for he cherished designs of repeating his recent success against the infidel on a much larger scale in the ensuing years, and even of leading an expedition against Constantinople. But the state of affairs which he found on his arrival in Italy made impossible the realization of this "great ideal of his life." Much to his

¹ Not May, 1535, as Cecilia M. Ady, *History of Milan under the Sforza*, p. 244, has it.

² Lavissee, v, 2, p. 83; *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, vii, no. 1060.

³ The date is given wrongly in most of the books as October 24. Cf. Formentini, *Dominazione Spagnuola in Lombardia*, p. 43, and the document there cited.

regret, he was forced once more to take up the sword against his Christian rival. Francis had begun to prepare for war the minute he heard of Sforza's death. His envoys at Rome strove to work on the Pope's fears of a Spanish supremacy in the Italian peninsula and win Paul III to the support of France; it was only by a wise mixture of firmness and conciliation that the Emperor was able to checkmate these designs. In February, 1536, the French king invaded Piedmont and Savoy, which was virtually the equivalent of declaring war on Charles; for Savoy was, in theory, at least, a fief of the Empire, its duke was an ally and connection of the Hapsburgs, and besides, the conquest of his territories would bring the French king once more within striking distance of Milan.¹

Meantime the Emperor continued to labor for the now hopeless cause of peace. A "Discours sur la Disposition de l'Estat de Millan," drawn up by Granvelle after the death of Sforza, indicates the concessions which he was prepared to make.² He had every right, and many inducements, so Granvelle points out, to keep it for himself, but "for the good of Christendom, and to prove the truth of his reiterated assertion that he did not want any more land, no, not even in Italy," he was willing to consider a plan of handing it over to some one else, and even, under certain conditions, to one of the sons of his rival. Henry, Duke of Orleans, the candidate of Francis I, who was to become Dauphin through the death of his older brother on August 10, 1536,³ was certainly inadmissible from the Hapsburg point of view. He was the husband of Catharine de' Medici, and had claims on Florence which would be the "ladder and bridge that would

¹ Lavissee, v, 2, pp. 88-89.

² Weiss, *Papiers d'Etat du Cardinal de Granvelle*, ii, pp. 395 ff.

³ It was even believed in France that

the Dauphin Francis had been poisoned at the instigation of de Leyva and of the Emperor. Lavissee, v, 2, p. 90, note 3.

enable him to pass into Naples"; but his younger brother, Charles, Duke of Angoulême, if married to the widow of Francesco Sforza, or even to the Emperor's natural daughter, Margaret,¹ might be considered, provided his father would give fresh assurances for the maintenance of peace. But Francis was unwilling to accept this suggestion. By the time that Charles reached Rome (April 5, 1536) the French troops were already in Turin. So the Emperor, as a last resort, and a final attempt to avoid a war, reverted to the expedient that had been proposed in 1528. Vindicating his conduct in a long speech which he delivered in Spanish on April 17, in the presence of the Pope, the cardinals, and the ambassadors of the states of Western Europe, he offered to settle his differences with Francis in single combat, the stakes of the duel to be Burgundy against Milan.²

The French king, however, saw no reason to accept this challenge.³ His armies had been two months in the field at the time he received it; he had got the initiative and believed that he could win the war. Charles was now convinced that it was no longer possible to avoid an appeal to arms; and if, despite all his efforts, a conflict was to be inevitable, he was resolved to teach his rival a lesson not easy to forget. The Emperor planned a quintuple attack upon the country of his foe.⁴ The principal assault was to be delivered against Provence. The Emperor and Antonio de Leyva were to lead it, with an army of over 20,000 men.⁵

¹ Weiss, ii, p. 407: "considéré que quant à ladite fille, elle n'est de soy et en sa personne obligée à parfaire le mariage cy-devant traicté . . . d'entre elle et le duc Alexandre [de Médicis]"; cf. *ante*, p. 261.

² Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 332 ff.; Pastor, xi, pp. 247-249, and references there.

³ Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 358, ff.

⁴ The most recent monographs on this war are those by Lino Chiesi,

La Guerra in Piemonte (Reggio nell' Emilia, 1889), and by R. Bergadani, *Alba e le guerre in Piemonte dal 1537 al 1559* (Alba, 1912); cf. also F. Decrue, *Anne de Montmorency aux armées du Roi François I^{er}*, pp. 253-289; Clonard, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 341 ff.

⁵ Gómara, p. 102, makes it 22,000, and Sandoval, ii, p. 229, 60,000. Cf. also Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 397 ff.

Henry of Nassau was to invade from the Netherlands with a Burgundian force of similar proportions. A Spanish army in Catalonia was to threaten Narbonne; Ferdinand promised a diversion in Champagne; and Andrea Doria was to ravage the Mediterranean coasts.

But the result of these preparations fell far short of expectations. The French army, declining an engagement in the field, retreated before the Emperor's invading forces, systematically devastating the country through which it passed. The Emperor got as far as Aix, where death deprived him of the services of de Leyva. Discouragement, lack of provisions, and reports of a hostile attack on Genoa convinced him, by the middle of September, of the necessity for retreat.¹ Nassau, in the meantime, had been repulsed before Péronne; the German princes kept Ferdinand from collecting the army that he had promised; the Spaniards in Catalonia failed to accomplish anything; and Doria's raiding operations were generally ineffective. In November the Emperor crossed from Genoa to Barcelona, discouraged and worn out. The campaign of the ensuing year was even more inconclusive. There was a series of sieges and skirmishes in Piedmont. A French invasion of the Netherlands was defeated. Instead of Doria's ravaging Provence, Barbarossa raided Apulia as the ally of the king of France. It is probable that this last operation indirectly contributed to bring the war to a close. It revived all Charles's enthusiasm for a campaign against the Turks; and was a chief cause of the triple alliance of the Pope, the Emperor, and the Venetians against the infidel, which was concluded in the middle of September.²

¹ Cf. his letter to Henry of Nassau, printed in Lanz, *Correspondenz*, ii, pp. 248-252; cf. also *Receuil des lettres de Charles-Quint qui sont conservées dans*

les Archives du Palais de Monaco, ed. L. H. Labande (Monaco, 1910), pp. 96 ff.

² Pastor, xi, p. 272.

The struggle with France was to all intents and purposes over, before the league against the Turk was actually signed. If it was evident that it was impossible for Charles and Francis to remain at peace, it was equally plain that they were incapable of waging any war that would lead to any definite result. A truce signed at Bomy (July 30, 1537) put an end to hostilities on the Netherlands frontier; another, at Monzon (November 16, 1537), stopped the fighting in Italy and the South of France; both provided for the maintenance of the status quo pending the settlement of terms of peace.¹ But the arrangement of such terms proved almost impossible. Conferences held at Leucate (December, 1537-January, 1538) served only to produce a prolongation of the truce. The famous triple interview of the two sovereigns and the Pope, which occurred at Nice in the following June, resulted in temporarily despoiling the duke of Savoy, two-thirds of whose states were occupied by Francis, and almost all of the rest by the Emperor; the truce was also prolonged for ten years; but the fundamental problem of Milan remained untouched. One month later the two rivals met again at Aigues-Mortes; they exhausted themselves in protestations of affection; they dined and wined together, and even shared the same bedroom.² Outwardly, moreover, these marks of friendship continued for two years to come. In the autumn of 1539 Charles was invited to cross France on his way to suppress the insurrection at Ghent, and was entertained at Paris with every mark of cordiality and respect.³ But all this time the Milanese

¹ Decrue, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 310, 330-333.

² Cf. Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2242-44, for the most recent monographs on this interview.

³ Cf. Decrue, pp. 370 ff., and Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2246-47, for details. The seventeenth-century "Historia Anónima del Emperador Carlos Quinto" in

the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, Ms. 1760, fol. 149, says: "Mando el Rey fuese recibido en Paris el Cesar con mas pompa que su persona en la primera entrada. Fue assi, y estuvo en el siete dias, gastando las en negocijos y fiestas, pero no sin algun cuydado de ser detenido, por entenderlo aconse-

question remained unsettled ; and as long as that sore spot was unhealed, the peace lacked the first requisite of permanence.

Ever since the truces of Bomy and Monzon, the disposition of the duchy had been under discussion. Many solutions had been proposed, but none had proved acceptable. In the spring of 1540, after the Emperor had left Paris, he made a final effort to arrive at a settlement, by offering his daughter, Mary, to the French king's youngest son, Charles, with Milan as a dowry, on condition that the duchy should never revert to the crown of France.¹ But the influences surrounding the French king were strongly anti-imperialist. Montmorency, the sole advocate of peace with the Hapsburgs, was tottering on the verge of disgrace. By June it was clear that Charles's proposal could not succeed ;² and on October 11 the Emperor finally recognized it by conferring Milan on his Spanish son Philip, to hold as a fief of the Holy Roman Empire.³ The outcome may well have caused surprise both to friends and to foes. It was certainly a violation of the traditions of the duchy, whose affiliations were Austrian and imperial, not Iberian. It was to Ferdinand, not Philip, that it would have been natural to give it ;⁴ but the exigencies of the immediate situation demanded that it should be handed over to Spain. The reservation of the imperial overlordship served to disguise the suddenness of the change ; it gave Charles a chance to assert his own authority in Milan until Philip should be old enough to assume the government himself ;⁵ but with these excep-

jaun algunos al Rey y en particular Madama d'Estampes su privada."

¹ Decrue, pp. 391-392 ; *L. & P. Hen.* VIII, xv, nos. 40, 222, 315, 457, 480, 543, 597, 674, 676. There was an alternative proposal that Mary's dowry should be the Low Countries, in which case Francis was to restore Savoy.

² Decrue, p. 393.

³ Dumont, *Corps Universel Diplomatique*, iv, 2 (1726), pp. 200-202 ; Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Granvelle*, ii, p. 602.

⁴ Weiss, ii, pp. 395 ff.

⁵ That Charles actually did this will be made clear in the succeeding pages.

tions it meant almost nothing at all. Spain had a vital interest in the fate of the duchy, because of her territories in Sicily and in Naples. Spain alone had the necessary men and money for its defence. It was consequently to Spain that Charles resolved that it should go. Both in the North and South of Italy she was now firmly established; and the destinies of the peninsula were almost completely in her hands.

Renewal of the war with France was henceforth inevitable, and the French king was furnished with a fresh pretext for declaring it by the murder, in July, 1541, of his agents, Fregoso and Rinçon, as they were descending the Po on their way to Venice and Constantinople. The Marquis del Vasto, who represented Charles in Milan, knew the nature of their errand and was determined to arrest them. Whether he authorized his soldiers to kill them is more difficult to determine. Charles officially denied all responsibility for the deed, but took pains to add that if Rinçon, who was Spanish born and a traitor to his country, had fallen into his own hands, he would certainly have been punished according to his deserts.¹ The war that ensued during the next two years was in some respects reminiscent of the struggle of the early twenties. Henry VIII, for the last time, abandoned his neutrality, and furnished a diversion of great value to the Emperor by crossing the Channel and

Cf. also *Constitutiones Dominii Mediolanensis* (Novara, 1597), p. 156; *Memorie Storico-Diplomatiche degli Ambasciatori . . . di Milano*, ed. A. Salomoni (Milan, 1806), pp. 92 ff.; P. Verri, *Storia di Milano* (ed. of 1834-35), ii, pp. 351 ff. There were two subsequent confirmations and extensions of the investiture of 1540, on July 5, 1546 (Dumont, iv, 2, pp. 311-313) and on December 12, 1549 (cited in a document of the year 1579; cf. Dumont,

v, 1, pp. 334 ff.); but the Emperor still continued to exercise sovereign authority in the duchy at least as late as 1552 (cf. Dumont, iv, 3, pp. 47 ff.), and Milan continued to be regarded, theoretically at least, as a fief of the Empire, down to the period of the Napoleonic wars. But for practical purposes, it was Spanish after 1540.

¹ Lavissee, v, 2, pp. 107-108; Lanz, ii, pp. 324-327; Gómara, pp. 110-111, and references there.

besieging Boulogne. Francis was once more in alliance with the Scots. Not only was there fighting on the Netherland and Italian frontiers; the struggle flared up again in the region of Roussillon. But the war had another feature which was entirely its own. Both its immediate cause and its subsequent course served to give it, from first to last, a distinctly Turkish complexion. The alliance of the king of France with the infidel was now in full swing. Barbarossa coöperated with the Duke d'Enghien in besieging Nice, which still held out for the duke of Savoy. The Turkish fleet passed the winter at Toulon, and departed in the following spring with a huge cargo of Christian slaves, and the French accepted full responsibility for their allies' misdeeds.¹

From a strictly military standpoint, the French carried off most of the honors in this final trial of strength between Charles V and Francis I. The Emperor was turned back at Landrecies (November, 1543), in an attempt to reach Paris by marching down the Oise. The victory of the Duke d'Enghien over the Marquis del Vasto at Cerisoles (April 14, 1544) was hailed throughout France as a second Marignano. But this triumph failed to yield any tangible result. The French were unable to penetrate the Milanese, and meantime the political situation developed favorably for the Emperor. The duke of Cleves, who was the principal ally of the French king in the Empire, had his lands overrun, and was forced to sue for peace (September, 1543). The Anglo-Scottish war, from which Francis had hoped so much, degenerated into a series of Border raids. The attention of the Turk was distracted from the West by difficulties at home and by the prospect of a new campaign against the Shah.² Despite all his victories, the French king was even

¹ Lavissee, v, 2, pp. 108-117.

² N. Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, iii, pp. 116 ff.

further from the attainment of his ends in the summer of 1544 than when the war began, and Charles, whose chief desire for the moment was to have his hands free to fight the Lutherans, seized the first favorable opportunity to terminate the conflict. On September 18, 1544, he signed peace at Crespy. Francis gave up his claims to the Netherlands and Naples, and promised to abandon the Turkish alliance. Both sides agreed to restore all territory occupied since the truce of Nice. On the vital question of the disposition of Milan, Charles showed once again his willingness to compromise. Despite the fact that he had conferred it on Philip, he now reverted to a modified form of the proposal that he had made to Francis in 1540. He agreed that the French king's youngest son, now Duke of Orleans, should either marry one of his nieces, the daughters of his brother Ferdinand, and take Milan; or else his own daughter Mary, and be given Franche Comté.¹ But the choice between these interesting alternatives was never to be made; for on September 8, 1545, the Duke of Orleans died. "Though the Emperor was sorry for it," as a contemporary chronicler sagely remarked, it "was no bad thing for him."²

Once more the hand of fate had intervened to solve a question which war and diplomacy had been unable to answer; after 1545 there was no longer any doubt that Milan would go to Spain. The majority of Spaniards were not enthusiastic for its acquisition, and Charles had recently shown that he appreciated their point of view; destiny, however, it was impossible to defy. The fag end of the war with Henry VIII kept Francis fully occupied until the summer of 1546; and death overtook him in the following March, before he could revert to his Italian designs. Under

¹ Sandoval, ii, pp. 374, 377-379; de Leva, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 527 ff.; *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, xix, 2, no. 249.

² Gómara, p. 122.

his son and successor the scene of interest shifted to the Netherlands and the Empire, and Lombardy was undisturbed by attacks from the French. We have therefore to study the beginnings of the system of government that the Emperor set up in the territory which fate had united to the Spanish Empire.

The problem presented by the acquisition of Milan was unlike those which had arisen from the annexation of Sicily and Naples. The inherited traditions were entirely different; and the military side of the question, which, in the southern dependencies, was not necessarily always prominent, assumed from the outset the first importance in the Milanese.

When the Spaniards entered into possession of the duchy, they found the political power divided among various claimants. Since the days when the Visconti had established their rule, the prestige of the ducal authority had stood exceedingly high; Milan was the typical Italian tyranny. Down to the end of the fifteenth century, two advisory bodies — the Secret Council and the Council of Justice — had assisted the duke in the performance of his functions; but when the French gained possession in 1499, Louis XII had united these two councils into a so-called Senate, which he invested — on the model of the Parlement of Paris — with the authority of rejecting or confirming the ducal laws, and thus erected into a bulwark of popular liberty.¹ The more absolutist principles of the government of Francis I served temporarily to push this Senate into the background, but its authority was by no means dead when the Spaniards came in, and Charles was to make good use of it. The spirit of communal independence and liberty, in-

¹ Ranke, *Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa*, 2d ed. (Berlin, 1837), i, pp. 291-292.

herited from the great days of Legnano and the Lombard League, had not utterly departed in the sixteenth century; but the municipal councils, through which it had made itself felt, were by this time mere shadows of their former selves; reduced in numbers, and dominated by the aristocracy, their practical importance was slight. Another ancient tradition — that of the authority of the archbishop — had also been suffered temporarily to fall into desuetude; of the four prelates who held that office between the years 1520 and 1560, only one — Arcimboldo, from 1550 to 1555 — ever entered his see!¹ In the days of Carlo Borromeo there was, indeed, another tale to tell, but that saintly prelate did not take up his office until the Emperor had been for two years in his grave.

Charles was obliged, by the political situation, to intervene in the government of Milan long before it was formally turned over to his son. After Pavia, his generals and soldiers were, in fact, in control there, the investment of Francesco Sforza being postponed until December, 1529. During the intervening years the military aspect of the whole affair came naturally to the fore. Leyva, Pescara, and Bourbon were the heroes of the hour; the last named, in 1526, was made lieutenant-general of the Emperor in Italy, and, in his capacity as head of the imperial troops, found himself practically supreme over the civil authorities in Milan.² When Sforza was invested with the duchy in 1529, Leyva remained there as head of the troops, and was doubtless, for all practical purposes, more powerful than the duke; when Sforza died in 1535, his authority was complete.³ After Leyva's death in the following year, a

¹ Gams, *Series Episcoporum*, p. 797.

² M. Formentini, *Il Ducato di Milano* (Milan, 1877), pp. 334-346, and references there.

³ M. Formentini, *La Dominazione*

Spagnuola in Lombardia (Milan, 1881), pp. 47 ff., and documents nos. 1-5 in the appendix; Ranke, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 289 ff.; Gómara, p. 103.

double system of authority was once more set up, the Cardinal Marino Caracciolo being invested with the civil, and the Marquis del Vasto, the nephew of Pescara, with the military power; the former, however, was but a tool in the hands of his colleague, and when he died, in January, 1538, the military and civil authority were once more reunited in the hands of Vasto, who was given the title of imperial governor, and remained in Milan till his death in 1546.¹ After a brief interim appointment, he was succeeded in the same year by Ferrante Gonzaga, who had already proved his loyalty as viceroy of Sicily,² and he, nine years later, by the Duke of Alva. The names of these appointees are enough to prove how all-important the military qualifications of the governor of Milan were held to be. Leyva, Vasto, and Alva were all first-class soldiers; Gonzaga was perhaps not quite their equal in this respect, but his appointment is explained, in part on the ground of the Emperor's personal fondness for him, and in part by the advisability of choosing an Italian in order to conciliate local feeling during the early years of the Spanish regime.

There are many other evidences of the importance of the military element in the administration of the Milanese. By an ordinance of the year 1536 it was made the headquarters of one of the four great *tercios* or divisions of the Spanish military machine; the army of 'alta Italia' was the name it soon came to bear.³ In contrast to the garrisons at Naples and other strongholds in Italy, the infantry was entirely composed of picked Spanish troops, and the Italian foot-soldier was rigidly excluded; only in the cavalry, which was comparatively unimportant, were the Lombards represented. In 1560 an ordinance of Philip II reduced the infantry to

¹ Formentini, *Dominazione*, pp. 56-62. On Vasto cf. Gómara, pp. 126-127.

² On Gonzaga in Sicily and Milan,

cf. Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2233, 2280; Armstrong, ii, pp. 170 ff., 353-355.

³ Clonard, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 321 ff., 426.

3000 men, which may be regarded as its normal strength in time of peace; during the troublous times that had gone before its numbers were naturally very much larger. Moreover, all the governors spent large sums in fortifications. The capital was the chief object of their care, and the walls and bastions with which Gonzaga surrounded it evoked the admiration of the representative of Ferrara.¹ But the other cities of the duchy were not neglected. Como, Cremona, Lodi, Tortona, Novara, and Alexandria had their defences strengthened and their garrisons increased. Whether attacked by France, by the Swiss, or by the neighboring Italian states, whether threatened by local uprising or invasion from abroad, Milan henceforth could effectively defend itself.

When one turns from the military to the civil side, one is confronted with a great variety of conflicting testimony. The average Italian historian is loud in his denunciations of the entire Spanish regime.² He holds it almost exclusively responsible for the decline of civic virtue, and exhausts himself in lurid descriptions of the cruelties of the Spanish troops and the hard-heartedness of the Spanish governors. But if one examines the whole problem from the Emperor's point of view; if one studies his correspondence; and, above all, if one separates the period of Charles V from those of his immediate predecessors and successors, one is certain to conclude that this verdict is much too harsh. The change from the rule of the French and the Sforzas to that of Spain could not, in the nature of the case, be effected without stern measures, and it was inevitable that a certain amount of misery should ensue. On the other hand, there is not the slightest evidence that Charles or his representatives took

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 288 ff.; Formentini, *Dominazione*, pp. 95 ff.

² Formentini is typical in this respect. The verdict of the Venetian ambassador

Badoero in 1557 is more moderate; cf. L. P. Gachard, *Relations des Ambassadeurs Vénitiens* (Brussels, 1855), p. 69.

delight in wanton cruelty or adopted any repressive measure that was not dictated by considerations of safety. If we bear in mind that Charles did not wish to take Milan, and that he would have greatly preferred to dispose of it by a compromise, we shall approach the problem in a much saner frame of mind. When at last it became evident that the fates were against him, he accepted the duchy and the responsibility of maintaining it, but he did not enter upon his new inheritance in any spirit of wantonness or revenge.

The sources for the study of Charles's policy in Milan are the Nuove Costituzioni which he promulgated by a decree of August 27, 1541, during a visit to the duchy,¹ and, still more important, the Ordini di Vornatua in regard to the Milanese Senate and magistrates, which he issued at Worms on August 6, 1545.² Certainly one looks in vain, in these documents, or elsewhere, for any evidence of a desire on the part of the Emperor to abrogate any of the ancient liberties or privileges.³ On the contrary, he seemed to be most anxious to confirm them. When the Duke of Bourbon was his representative in Milan, he was ordered to renew the prerogatives of the Senate, which had been so scandalously abrogated by Francis I. In 1545 Charles enjoined the members of the Senate to take special pains to see that

¹ Cf. *Constitutiones Provinciae Mediolanensis* (Milan, 1617), pp. 2 ff.

² Ms. copy in the Bibliothèque Nationale, at Paris, Fonds Espagnol, no. 143; also printed on pp. 26-28 of the *Ordines Excellentissimi Senatus Mediolani ab anno MCDXC. usque ad annum MDCXXXIX.*, edd. Angelus Stephanus Garonus and Joannes Petrus Carlius (Milan, 1743). There are numerous verbal differences between the Ms. and the printed edition. I have followed the former.

³ The argument by which Formentini, *Dominazione*, pp. 70 ff., seeks to prove that the "Habeatque idem Senatus

auctoritatem Constitutiones Principis confirmandi, infirmandi, et tollendi" in the *Nuove Costituzioni* shows that Charles intended to diminish the power of the Senate is scarcely convincing. There is no evidence that the Senate, during the Emperor's lifetime, ceased to enjoy the privilege of refusing to ratify the minor appointments of the governor, or of conducting an inquiry into the conduct of outgoing officers; cf. Ranke, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-294. This last function was in fact so analogous to the Spanish *residencia*, that the natural tendency of Charles would have been to confirm it.

nothing, not even a royal edict or a governor's command, should prevent them from strictly observing the letter of the law, even though the matter touched the royal treasury ;¹ and there are plenty of proofs that these precepts were lived up to in practice. It is true that he kept the appointment of the senators in his own hands, and insisted that three of them should be Spaniards, but as the senators were irremovable, he lost all control over them the moment they entered office. Moreover, when his representatives in the Milanese got involved in disputes with the Senate, or attempted to exercise illegal influence over its members, he vigorously upheld the latter's rights. "If the governor represented the supreme authority, the Senate was to stand for equity and justice."² Vasto and Gonzaga were both favorites of Charles, but the complaints of the Senate led to the removal of both. *Sindicatores*, sent over by the Emperor to examine into the rights and wrongs of each case, dealt with Vasto so harshly that it is said that he died of shame ; while Gonzaga was deprived of all his offices.³

These last facts may suggest that the action of Charles's representatives in the Milanese did not measure up to the good intentions of the Emperor who sent them out. The temptations were indubitably severe ; the military atmosphere led naturally to arbitrariness ; and the long time that it took to communicate with Spain often made it necessary for the governors to act on their own initiative. And yet, when compared with the French administration which immediately preceded it, and with that of Philip II by which

¹ The Ordini di Vormatia read : "Volemo che detto Senato intenda che la nostra Intentione non sara di pregiudicar in ponto alcuno al dritto delle parti, ne alla administrazione della giustitia, posto ancora che fossero scritte in fauor del nostro patrimonio et cose della camera. . . ."

² Ranke, p. 294.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 294-295 ; Formentini, pp. 85-86, 110-113. It is fair to add that William of Orange, in his famous "Apology," attributed the disgrace of Gonzaga to the hatred of Granvelle.

it was followed, the period of the Emperor was not unfortunate for the Milanese. Its worst feature was unquestionably its financial exactions. Special and illegal imposts were levied on the plea of military necessity. The regular sources of the state revenues were sold.¹ The towns, in default of anything like a national assembly, were obliged to make large contributions, which averaged perhaps 300,000 ducats a year. Measured by modern standards, all this was doubtless exceedingly bad; but whether it was any worse than the average contemporaneous condition elsewhere, is more than doubtful. Certainly the Milanese were not the sort of people to understand or coöperate with a policy of sound finance. Their wastefulness is attested by the accounts of the farewell dinners and ceremonies accorded to Ferrante Gonzaga by his friends and adherents on the occasion of his final departure from the duchy.² Ranke rightly points out that the contribution from the Lombard communes indirectly served to keep alive the embers of their ancient independence; for, in theory, at least, they had the right to refuse it, and the consciousness that they possessed that power prevented the loss of their self-respect.³ Last of all, one must never forget, in estimating the early years of the Spanish occupation of Milan, that no territory could possibly change hands, as the duchy had done, at least five times since the beginning of the century, without suffering violence to its social and constitutional structure. The new regime did not have a chance to get fairly started in the days of Charles V. Many of its worst faults were inevitable for the time being, and ought to have been eliminated in the calmer years that were to follow.

¹ Formentini, pp. 78-79, 82, 88 ff., 99 ff.

² Formentini, pp. 110-111, 376-383; appendix, doc. no. 70.

³ Ranke, p. 344.

A detailed description of the various wars of the petty Italian states in which Charles, during the last twenty-five years of his reign, was, in one way or another, involved, has no place in a history of the Spanish Empire. Yet it may not be amiss to indicate briefly some of the principal stages of their progress, and, above all, to summarize the situation which obtained at the time of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559. The story shows, if nothing else, how completely the imperial overlordship of Italy was a thing of the past, and how the peninsula, at the time that Charles gave way to Philip, had become, to all intents and purposes, a dependency of Spain.

The important question of the title to Florence was suddenly raised in January, 1537, by the murder of the first duke, the Emperor's son-in-law, the wretched and tyrannical Alessandro de' Medici.¹ Charles might perhaps justifiably have appropriated it for the Hapsburgs, for Alessandro had left no near relative to succeed him; but, anxious as ever to show "that he did not want any more land, no, not even in Italy," the Emperor settled it on Cosimo delle Bande Nere, a distant cousin of the murdered duke. The choice was unpopular, and Cosimo had to fight for his throne against the representatives of the older Medicean line and the Strozzi. But his own relentless energy and severity, and a detachment of imperial troops which was placed at his disposal, enabled him to win the victory over all his enemies.² His gratitude to the Emperor bound him firmly to the Hapsburg cause, and the tie was further strengthened by his marriage, in 1538,³ to the daughter of the Neapolitan viceroy, Pedro de Toledo, one of the ablest and most trusted

¹ De Leva, *Storia Documentata*, iii, pp. 221 ff.

² Cf. H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, v, chap. ii, for details.

³ Adriani, *Istoria de' suoi Tempi* (ed. of 1583, Florence), p. 60.

of Charles's representatives in Italy. In 1545 the centre of interest shifted to the North, where the Pope, on a pretext of more than doubtful validity, had invested his bastard, Pier Luigi Farnese, with Parma and Piacenza.¹ The Emperor at the moment was too busy with the German Protestants to retaliate vigorously against this high-handed proceeding; but when Pier Luigi began to intrigue with the French, and lent aid to the conspiracy of the Fieschi in Genoa, he saw that it was no longer possible to hold his hand. In September, 1547, Pier Luigi was murdered in a rising of the Piacenzan nobles, which had been stirred up by Ferrante Gonzaga, with the Emperor's full consent. Charles's stipulation that the tyrant should not suffer any personal injury can scarcely be regarded as absolving him from blame, for he must have known that passions were too strained to permit a revolt without the shedding of blood.² He was prompt to take advantage of what had occurred. Piacenza was annexed to the duchy of Milan, and was not restored in the Emperor's day; while Parma was finally conferred on the Pope's grandson,³ Ottavio, whom Charles had sought to bind to the Hapsburgs nine years before by giving him his illegitimate daughter, Margaret, the widow of Alessandro de' Medici, in marriage. In Italy, as well as in the rest of Europe, the Emperor lived up to the matrimonial policy on which had been founded the greatness of his house.

In 1552 there was an uprising in Siena. French intrigues, fear of annexation by Florence, misconduct of the Spanish garrison, and the requirements of Charles's representatives at Rome, combined to produce a serious revolt.⁴ The vice-

¹ Armstrong, ii, p. 77.

² *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 177-179; de Leva, *op. cit.*, iv, pp. 355 ff.

³ Usually spoken of as the Pope's 'nephew.'

⁴ A contemporary Spanish account of this revolt, by Antonio de Montalvo, was translated into Italian by his son and published in Turin in 1863, by C' Riccomanni, F. Grottanelli, and L.

roy of Naples was commanded to restore order, but death overtook him before he could accomplish his purpose, and Cosimo de' Medici was called upon to take his place. Cosimo accepted the task the more eagerly, because of his desire to get Siena for himself. A ruthless and devastating struggle began, and continued until April, 1555, when Siena was starved out. Doubtless the Florentine hoped to be at once invested with the conquered lands; but in this, for the time being, he was doomed to disappointment. The Emperor granted Siena to his son, Philip, and Philip did not turn it over to Cosimo till 1557, when he needed help in his war against Paul IV.¹ Even then Philip retained in his own hands the coast towns of Orbitello, Porto Ercole, Monte Argentaro, Porto San Estefano, and Talamone — the Stato dei Presidii, or Presidios, as they were called — each of them garrisoned by Spanish troops, whose commanders were appointed by the viceroy of Naples.² These seaports were of course doubly valuable to Spain, as long as there was any possible doubt of the loyalty of Genoa. Cosimo was given the rest of the Sienese territory, with the addition of Porto Ferrajo, to hold as a fief of Spain, and on condition of bearing military aid to his Spanish overlord, whenever the Presidios should be attacked.³ The net result of the Sienese war was thus enormously to strengthen Spain's hold on Italy.

Banchi. The best brief modern account is that of L. Romier in *Les Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion*, i, pp. 322 ff., where other important authorities are cited. Cf. also Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2268, 2284, 2285, 2286.

¹ H. E. Napier, *Florentine History*, vol. v, chaps. iii and iv, *passim*.

² A Spanish garrison was also apparently maintained, almost continuously, after 1548, in Piombino; and another, after the early seventeenth century, in Porto Longone, on the island of Elba, down to the period of the War of the

Spanish Succession. The very complicated story of the political vicissitudes of these territories in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries may be found in A. M. H. J. Stokvis, *Manuel d'Histoire*, iii, pp. 825-827, and in A. Amati, *Dizionario Corografico dell'Italia*, iv, pp. 169-170; vi, pp. 184, 501-502.

³ See the stipulations in J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, v, i (1728), pp. 10-13. The fief was to be a "feudum nobile, ligium, et honorificum" (p. 11).

Charles had transferred to himself, in his capacity as Spanish king, and also to his Spanish son, who succeeded him, all the authority that he had once possessed there as Emperor, and had added much more besides.

It has been well said that the Emperor's ideal for the administration of Italy was "a loose federation of viceroys and princes,"¹ but Spanish overlordship was to be the keynote of it all. Considering all the difficulties, he had succeeded pretty well. In Sicily, Naples, and Milan, Spain's power was supreme; in Tuscany and most of the smaller states, her influence was unrivalled. Venice, of course, needed constant watching; Savoy was a source of anxiety until Emanuel Philibert was restored;² and the *Patrium Petri* could be a thorn in Spain's side, as the war of 1556-58 between Paul IV and Philip was abundantly to prove. But these states were so situated that, even under the worst conceivable circumstances, it was virtually impossible for them effectively to combine. So strongly, indeed, were the Spaniards intrenched, that they felt they could afford to leave the French in Mirandola, which remained, for years to come, their sole outpost in the Italian peninsula. Some other small places they preferred to maintain in complete independence, as possible checks on their own viceroys and allies. Florence, for instance, was not permitted to annex Lucca for fear of undue extension of the power of the Medici. Altogether, Charles's reign had served, almost without his having intended it, to Hispanicize Italy. The acquisition of Milan had rendered Sicily and Naples safe. The winning of Doria and the annexation of the Presidios made communication with Spain easier and surer than ever before. Military preponderance and marriage alliances cemented the whole structure from Cape Passaro to the Alps.

¹ Armstrong, ii, pp. 168, 291.

² At the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis, 1559.

One of the chief reasons why Charles had been so successful in Italy is to be found in the unusual abilities of the men who represented him there. He could give only a small portion of his time to Italian affairs, and was obliged, from first to last, to depend, in large measure, upon others. On the whole he was fortunate in the selections that he made. In the early years of his reign he chose his men primarily for their military qualifications. Moncada 'the Unlucky,' viceroy of Sicily and Naples, Leyva, Pescara, and Alarcón, the heroes of Pavia, were first and foremost soldiers; their contemporaries, Cardona and Lannoy, "stern and reserved, not only for a Fleming, but even for a Spaniard, if he had been one,"¹ were able to give a good account of themselves on the battlefield. But even in this first period, we are constantly encountering examples of another type, the keen, enterprising, resident diplomatist, who unearths important secrets, and sends home precious information; such was Fernando Marín, abbot of Najera, "a man of great abilities and unusual veracity, whose numerous reports are a model of prudence and discretion";² such was Aloysius de Cordova, Duke of Sessa, who represented the Emperor at the court of Clement VII during the period of the formation of the League of Cognac.³ The latter part of the reign is the age of the administrator and statesman. Pedro de Toledo, who was viceroy of Naples from 1532 to 1553, was by far the ablest man that ever held that post; "a gambler, a heavy eater, and very arrogant," he "brought to Naples the high Spanish ideal of justice and police," "exercised his powers to the utmost, and so fulfilled his duties well."⁴ Neither Vasto nor Gonzaga in

¹ Thus Gaspar Contarini, the Venetian ambassador to Charles's court, cited by T. Juste in série 2, vol. xxiv, p. 378, of *Bulletins de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*.

² Cf. Pacheco y de Leyva, *Politica Española en Italia*, i, p. xxxiii.

³ Cf. *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, no. 2289, for an episode which casts an interesting sidelight on the relations of this man with the Pope in the end of June, 1526.

⁴ Gómara, pp. 149-150; Armstrong, ii, p. 169. A less flattering portrait of the viceroy is drawn by Roger Ascham

Milan was his equal; in the latter case one cannot help feeling that personal affection was the chief cause of the appointment.¹ More competent by far was the Duke of Alva, who succeeded Gonzaga in Milan for a brief period in 1555-56, and was subsequently given the viceroyalty of Naples. Though his name was to become a byword for tyranny and oppression in the Low Countries, whither he was sent, under Philip II, to execute a predetermined policy, he showed, in his earlier years, both in Italy and in the Empire, that he was capable of caution, conservatism, and conciliation; he was, moreover, an excellent soldier.² Perhaps the greatest of them all, and certainly one of the most notable men of genius of the Spain of the sixteenth century, was Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, whose fame as a man of letters³ was ultimately to eclipse his reputation as a soldier and diplomatist. Born in 1503, of the ancient Castilian aristocracy, he fought at Pavia and Tunis, and in 1537 was sent to England to try to negotiate a marriage between Henry VIII and the widowed duchess of Milan.⁴ After a year in the Netherlands, he became the resident ambassador of the Emperor at Venice, and subsequently represented him at Trent and at Rome.⁵ Contemporaries held him largely responsible for the outbreak of the Sienese war, and in 1554 he was recalled to Spain, where the accession of Philip II put an end to his diplomatic career.⁶ But in the earlier period, when his influence was at its height, he was "really a sort of Spanish viceroy of Italy"; masterful,

in his "Report and Discourse of Germany," in *The Whole Works of Roger Ascham*, ed. Giles (London, 1864), iii, pp. 23 ff.

¹ Armstrong, ii, pp. 170-171, 353-354.

² Armstrong, ii, pp. 170-171; Laiglesia, i, pp. 84-85.

³ Cf. note 2 to p. 216 above.

⁴ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, xii, nos. 696-1314.

⁵ Cf. "Cartas de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza (1544-1570)," ed. R. Foulché-Delbosc in *Archivo de Investigaciones Históricas*, ii (1911), pp. 155-195, 270-275, 537-600; and "Huit Lettres de Charles-Quint à Mendoza (1547-1552)," ed. R. Foulché-Delbosc in *R. H.*, xxxi, pp. 132-168.

⁶ Gómara, pp. 147-148; Armstrong, ii, pp. 282-286.

haughty, and dominant, the personification of the qualities for which Spanish diplomacy was becoming famous.

The best of these names are an interesting evidence that this hitherto Aragonese portion of the Spanish Empire was gradually beginning to become Castilianized; and the process was to be carried further in the succeeding reign. It was an unlooked-for outcome. Down to 1529, when most of the fighting had been done, Castile had hung back from the Italian campaigns; and in the later years, when there was less war and more diplomacy, the Emperor constantly showed that he had begun to share the reluctance of his Castilian subjects to assume any fresh responsibilities in Italy. But before the close of the reign, Castile had attained a position which forced her to shoulder most of the burden of maintaining Spain's Italian possessions. The influx of American gold and silver was the outstanding factor in the situation. Spinelly's famous phrase of 1520 could now be modified into "*Nervus imperii est pecunia*, which he cannot have without Castile." It was a significant example of the way in which the different parts of the Spanish Empire affected one another. The wealth of the Indies committed the defence of Italy to that portion of Spain which had least interest in retaining it.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

See notes at the end of Chapters XIX, XX, and XXI, and add :

Sources. — Beside the standard collections and chronicles, indicated elsewhere, the *Papiers d'état du Cardinal de Granvelle*, ed. Charles Weiss in the *Collection de Documents Inédits sur l'Histoire de France* (1841-52, 9 vols.); the *Captivité du Roi François I^{er}*, ed. A. L. Champollion-Figeac in the same series (1847); the *Diarii di Marino Sanuto* (Venice, 1879-1903, 68 vols.); the *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato*, ed. E. Albèri (Florence, 1839-63, 15 vols. in three series); the appropriate volumes of the *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII*, ed. J. S. Brewer and James Gairdner; *El Emperador Carlos V y su Corte según las Cartas de Don Martín de Salinas (1522-1539)*, ed. A. Rodríguez Villa (Madrid, 1903); *Italia desde la Batalla de Pavía hasta el Saco de Roma*, by the same (Madrid, 1885); *Memorias del Asalto y Saqueo de Roma*, by the same (Madrid, 1875); and *La Política Española en Italia: Correspondencia de Fernando Martín, Abad de Nájera, con Carlos I*, ed. Enrique Pacheco y de Leyva (vol. i, 1521-1524, Madrid, 1919), are all valuable. A number of other original documents and relations, too special to be inserted here, are mentioned in the footnotes to the pages where they belong.

Modern Works. — Of these the best is still in my opinion the *Rivalité de François I^{er} et de Charles Quint*, by F. A. Mignet (Paris, 1876, 2 vols.); unfortunately it stops with the year 1529, and thenceforth there is no general guide of equal value. Close beside it stands Giuseppe de Leva's *Storia documentata di Carlo V in correlazione all' Italia* (Venice, 1863-94, 5 vols.), a most painstaking work, based on the original authorities, and indispensable for the period as a whole. The appropriate volumes of Ludwig von Pastor's *History of the Popes* (excellent English translation, ed. R. F. Kerr) will be found most useful not merely as an account of pontifical policy, but also as a survey of general conditions; and the footnotes contain a wealth of detailed bibliographical information. Among the more special works I have found most useful are F. Nitti, *Leone X e la sua Politica* (Florence, 1892); W. Busch, *Drei Jahre englischer Vermittlungspolitik, 1518-1521*, (Bonn, 1884), and *Cardinal Wolsey und die englisch-kaiserliche Allianz, 1522-1525* (Bonn, 1886); G. Jacqueton, *La politique extérieure de Louise de Savoie* (Paris, 1892); F. Decrue, *Anne de Montmorency à la cour, aux armées et au conseil du roi François I^{er}* (Paris, 1885); L. Romier, *Les origines politiques des Guerres de Religion* (Paris, 1913-14, 2 vols.);

Leopold von Ranke, *Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa* (Berlin, 1837-39, 4 vols.); and M. Formentini, *Il Ducato di Milano* (Milan, 1877), and *La Dominazione Spagnuola in Lombardia* (Milan, 1881). A large number of other monographs, less frequently utilized, are cited in the footnotes to the appropriate pages, either by name or by the numbers under which their titles appear in Sánchez Alonso.

CHAPTER XXV

WAR WITH THE INFIDEL

ONE of the most notable features of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries is the constant outcropping of belated enthusiasm for a revival of the crusades. Historians, for the most part, have been inclined to belittle the genuineness of these outbursts. They point out, with justice, that they furnished a most convenient pretext for the raising of funds and the collection of armies, to be employed for very different purposes, and much nearer at home. They also make it clear that, in fighting the infidel, it was now no longer a question of the recovery of the Holy Sepulchre, but rather of protecting the states of Western Europe; the advance of the Turks had converted the struggle from a war of aggression, inspired by a holy purpose, into a measure of defence, dictated chiefly by political necessity. Yet it would be unfair to maintain that the spirit of Peter the Hermit and of St. Louis had utterly departed. In France, it is true, one seeks for it in vain; for the political interests of the 'eldest sons of the Church' dictated friendship rather than enmity with the Moslem world, and in the first half of the sixteenth century political considerations took the precedence of religious ones. But in other countries, where the conditions were different, the mediaeval ideals were by no means wholly forgotten. Real crusading was often contemplated, if only very remotely, by many of the sovereigns of Western Christendom.

Of all the monarchs of Europe, Charles had the liveliest interest in a vigorous revival of the ancient traditions. As Holy Roman Emperor he was designated as the leader of Christendom against Islam. Moreover, in sharp contrast to his rival, the king of France, his political and dynastic interests coincided, instead of colliding, with his duties as the leader of the armies of the Cross. The infidel threatened his family domains in the Danube valley; the task of actually defending them might be delegated, for the most part, to his brother Ferdinand, but the Emperor was always closely in touch with the struggle in that region, and he once intervened there, most effectively, in person. And, finally, as Spanish monarch, he ruled over a country whose whole mediaeval history had been one long crusade — a land which had not rested with the expulsion of the infidel from its own borders, but had carried the Cross to the shores of North Africa. In each one of his different capacities, and in each of his far scattered dominions, Charles was bound to be looked to as the leader against Islam.

It will readily be believed that of all the countries over which he held sway, Spain was by far the most enthusiastic for the waging of the Holy War. There is not a trace of complaint in any of the records, either of the Cortes or of the Council, about the burdens imposed by the conflict against Islam; in fact, Spain was constantly urging Charles to increase his efforts in that direction, and to abandon the contemporary struggle against the king of France. Spanish troops formed the backbone of the two chief expeditions which he led against the North African coast; Spanish galleys did most of the work of their transportation. Nor did Spain restrict her efforts to the maintenance of the conflict in those portions of Europe where it would redound to her own advantage. More than 6000 of her best troops ac-

accompanied the Emperor in the Danube campaign of 1532;¹ and Spanish soldiers continued to serve in the armies which Ferdinand maintained in that region during the next thirty years. One cannot for one moment leave the Danube campaigns out of one's calculations, even when writing only of the Emperor in his capacity as king of Spain. The Spaniards took the liveliest interest in the ebbs and flows of the struggle in that quarter, and there was often close correlation between the naval war in the Mediterranean and the military campaigns on the Hungarian plains.²

A few words as to the condition and extent of the Ottoman Empire at this period may not be amiss; for one must never forget in studying Charles V that his reign coincided with the most brilliant epoch in the annals of the Turks. Under Selim the Terrible (1512-20) they had conquered Egypt, and were thus brought much nearer than before to the Spanish Mauretanian lands. Under Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-66) they were to advance much farther still. The new sultan signalized his advent to power by two important victories. In 1521 he took Belgrade, and was thus brought within striking distance of the Hapsburgs in Austria. In the following year he captured Rhodes, which had been occupied for over two centuries by the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and had prevented the Turks from controlling the Aegean; the Eastern Mediterranean was now open to his fleets.³ And Suleiman followed up both these triumphs with energy and persistence. Despite the fact that his attention was often distracted by his Persian campaigns, he continued to lead his armies up the Danube until the day of his death. In the Mediterranean, he was of necessity obliged

¹ E. Pacheco y de Leyva, *Carlos V y los Turcos en 1532: La Jornada de Viena* (Madrid, 1909), pp. 26-27.

² E. Petit, *André Doria*, pp. 186-187.

³ The impressiveness of these two captures was enhanced by the fact that Mohammed II had tried to take both places and failed.

to rely on others, and the man whom he ultimately found to represent him in that quarter was Kheireddin Barbarossa, the younger brother of that Arudj who had established himself in North Africa in the time of Ferdinand the Catholic. From the moment that Barbarossa was taken over into the Sultan's service, the Spanish campaigns in North Africa and in the Mediterranean were necessarily given a new significance. They were no longer mere isolated ventures in a region comparatively unknown and remote, or desultory defensive operations to protect the Spanish coasts. They became part and parcel of a larger struggle, and had their bearing on the Emperor's policy all over Europe.

But it was not merely through his adoption of Barbarossa that Suleiman made himself felt in the West. He also found a most unexpected ally in one whom every tradition should have made his bitterest foe. So threatening, in 1525, was the preponderance of the house of Hapsburg that the Most Christian King of France made overtures for help to the Ottoman Turk.¹ The story of the development of the ensuing alliance lies obviously beyond the scope of this volume, and can only be touched on when it most directly affects the fortunes of Spain. Yet it is clear that its existence not only served to embarrass Charles V, but also forced him to take the Turkish problem even more seriously than before. In the first part of his reign he had been obliged to set aside that problem to make way for the more immediate necessity of fighting the king of France. Later it became obvious that the two things were so closely connected that it was no longer possible to treat them independently, and that war against the infidel, which Spain had been ceaselessly demanding,

¹ The standard authority on these negotiations is E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant* (1848-

60, 4 vols.), in *Collection de Documents Inédits sur l'Histoire de France*.

was also practically dictated by the state of affairs in Western Christendom.

It was scarcely to be expected that Charles should take the Spanish point of view about the conflict of the Cross and the Crescent, in any of its different phases, at the time of his first visit to the peninsula. He was absorbed in getting recognized as king of his different Iberian realms, and in his prospects in the imperial election. He was under the influence of Burgundian counsellors, who cared nothing for North Africa or for the naval control of the Mediterranean. Yet the precepts and example of Cardinal Ximenes could not be utterly ignored; the defeat of Vera before Algiers called loudly for revenge;¹ and when the Marquis of Comares, who commanded at Oran, came over to Spain in 1517 to pay homage to his new lord, and report on the North African situation, it was impossible for Charles to refuse him a hearing. The opportunity was favorable for a Spanish attack, for the arch-enemy, Arudj Barbarossa, after making himself master of Tenes and Dellys,² had by this time penetrated to Tlemcen, where he had murdered some seventy members of the local dynasty, and was now almost totally isolated in a region that panted for revenge. So Charles finally granted Comares liberal reënforcements, which he utilized, to good effect, in the spring of 1518. The outposts of Tlemcen were carried one by one. The city itself stood a six months' siege, and was only taken at the last through the treachery of the inhabitants. Arudj temporarily escaped, with a handful of his followers, scattering gold and jewels behind them as they went, in the hope of diminishing the ardor of the pursuit; finally, however, he was overtaken and slain, after a desperate encounter, in which he fought like a lion at bay. A

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 22.

² Mercier, iii, p. 18.

representative of the local dynasty was set up at Tlemcen, and paid to the Spanish governor at Oran, in recognition of his suzerainty, an annual tribute of "12,000 gold ducats, 12 horses, and 6 female falcons."¹

It was an excellent beginning, but the sequel was a grievous disappointment. In the first place, the infidels were ultimately strengthened by their defeat; for the mantle of Arudj fell on the shoulders of his brother, Kheireddin, his equal in resolution and his superior in political sagacity. Furthermore, the new leader at once took the step which was dictated by the perils of his situation in North Africa, and hastened to Constantinople to declare himself the vassal of the Sultan; he now had behind him, in theory, at least, all the might and prestige of the Ottoman Empire.² On the Christian side, in the meantime, the outlook became more and more discouraging. Charles's differences with his Spanish subjects, his return to the Netherlands, and the simultaneous outbreak of the revolt of the Comuneros prevented the sending of reënforcements to North Africa for a long time to come. The only attack of any importance that was launched against the infidel from any of the Spanish dominions during the next ten years was a disastrous expedition, in 1519, led by Hugo de Moncada from Sicily against Algiers. He had 40 ships and 5000 good troops, and, despite lack of expected support from the local chieftains, won a commanding position, close to the city, after four or five days of desperate fighting. But the hesitation of his officers prevented his utilizing this success by an immediate attack upon the town; and Kheireddin, by a clever stratagem, induced him to leave his intrenchments, and put his whole force at the mercy of his foes. Like a flock of frightened sheep they

¹ Mercier, iii, pp. 18-23, and references there; Gómara, *Crónica de los*

Barbarrojas, in *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 371-379.

² Mercier, iii, pp. 24-25.

were driven back to their boats, large numbers of them being slain before they could embark; a violent gale completed their discomfiture, twenty-six of their ships being blown ashore, their cargoes seized, and their crews massacred. In the following year Moncada sought to wipe out the memory of his defeat by an attack on the island of Gerba (or, as the Spaniards called it, Los Gelves), in which he was successful, but he failed effectually to rehabilitate his prestige.¹

It was certainly unfortunate that Spain desisted from her aggressions in North Africa in the immediately succeeding period; for Kheireddin was so much weakened by the hostility of his Berber neighbors that in 1520 he had temporarily to abandon Algiers.² Such was the confusion that reigned at that moment that a force of 7000 to 8000, marching eastward from Oran, could easily have gained the submission of the entire region.³ But Charles was unable to take advantage of the situation. His attention of necessity was centred on other things, and a golden opportunity was irretrievably lost. From 1520 to 1529 the offensive was entirely in the hands of the infidels.⁴ On the Danube they won at Mohács in 1526, and three years later seriously threatened Vienna. In North Africa Barbarossa took Velez de la Gomera from the Spaniards in 1522, and an attempt to recover it, three years later, was disastrously defeated.⁵ In 1524 the neighboring cherifs captured Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña, opposite the Canaries, thus depriving Spain of the only post that she held on the

¹ Cf. *Vida de Don Hugo de Moncada recogida por Gaspar de Baëga*, in *D. I. E.*, xxiv, pp. 40-52; Mercier, iii, pp. 25-26; Fernández Duro, *Armada Española*, i, pp. 127-131.

² He got back there shortly afterwards; cf. de Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger*, pp. 33-34; de Rotalier, *Histoire d'Alger*, i, pp. 146 ff. and references there.

³ Mercier, iii, p. 27.

⁴ There are a series of interesting

petitions to Charles from various sources in the early months of 1520, urging him to take vigorous measures for the repulse of the Turks on the Danube and in the Mediterranean, in *R. A. H.*, Salazar Mss., A-19, fols. 9-39, *passim*.

⁵ Fernández Duro, i, pp. 153-154. The place, in the sixteenth century, was usually called Peñon de Velez, or Peñon de la Gomera, from the rocky fortified islet off the coast.

African Atlantic coast.¹ A little later, by a series of negotiations which finally terminated in the spring of 1530, Charles established at Malta, Gozzo, and Tripoli the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, who had been driven from Rhodes in 1522. The action was doubtless largely due to the Emperor's desire to find a home for the Knights, but it is obvious that it was also dictated, at least in part, by his anxiety to shift to other shoulders the burden of maintaining possessions difficult to defend.² Most significant of all, and most humiliating to Spanish pride, was the loss of the Peñon d'Algel in May, 1529. The maintenance of that fortress in Christian hands had been a serious annoyance to Barbarossa. It really neutralized the effect of his possession of Algiers, for his ships could pass neither in nor out of the port without exposing themselves to bombardment; even the city itself was occasionally cannonaded. But in the spring of 1529 the defenders of the Peñon ran short of ammunition; the Emperor, to whom they applied for help, was too busy with European complications to pay any heed to them; and Barbarossa saw that his chance had come. Foreseeing that a siege would cost him many lives, he offered the garrison free transportation to Spain, provided it would surrender without resistance; the proposal, however, was scornfully refused, and the pirate replied by an overwhelming assault. The islet was surrounded by a fleet of forty-five ships, every one of them crammed full of soldiers and arms. The defenders, only 150 strong, were most of them killed. On May 21, Barbarossa entered the fortress in triumph, and caused the twenty-five survivors of the garrison whom he found there to be either tortured or put to death.³

¹ Fernández Duro, i, p. 154.

² Cf. G. Longo, *La Sicilia e Tripoli*, pp. 27-31. It will be remembered (*ante*, II, p. 258) that when Tripoli was

captured by Navarro in 1510, it was placed under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Sicily.

³ The standard authority on the

At the same time that these defeats were being suffered in North Africa, events were occurring off the Spanish coast which served to force the infidel problem even more directly on the Emperor's attention. We have seen that the edict of expulsion of 1525 had put the Moriscos of Valencia up in arms, that the rebels, very naturally, looked for aid from North Africa, and that the result was an orgy of piratical raids.¹ Barbarossa had sixty vessels and a swarm of hardy sea rovers at his command; and he launched them at the most unexpected moments, upon unprotected points. The Cortes were loud in their complaints of the inadequacy of the coast defences, and in the year 1529, just as Charles was crossing from Barcelona to Italy, their remonstrances received a crowning justification. Taking advantage of the fact that the best of Spain's navy were escorting the Emperor to Genoa, the most daring of Barbarossa's sea captains, the famous Caccia Diabolo, suddenly appeared, with fifteen ships, off Cape St. Martin in Valencia. He landed, raided the surrounding country, and rounded up and carried off a large number of Moors and Christians, the former to freedom, and the latter to captivity.² The news of this incursion reached Charles at Genoa, and caused him to despatch his admiral, Rodrigo de Portuondo, with eight galleys, to intercept the raiders on their return to Algiers; the two fleets encountered one another, on October 25, off the island of Formentera, in an action which is described by a contemporary chronicler as "the greatest defeat ever suffered by Spain in a combat with galleys." Portuondo was killed, six of his eight ships were brought back to Algiers or burnt by

Pefion is the notable monograph of Adrien Berbrugger, *Le Pégnon d'Alger* (Algiers, 1860). It contains valuable estimates and criticisms of the different contemporary authorities, both Moorish and Christian.

¹ Cf. *ante*, pp. 130-131.

² Gómara, *Crónica de los Barbarrojas*, in *M. H. E.*, vi, p. 397; Danvila y Collado, *Expulsión de los Moriscos Españoles*, p. 109.

Caccia Diabolo as useless; the other two escaped with great difficulty to carry the sad news of the disaster to Iviza.¹

The report of this defeat, which made a profound impression in Spain, served to give the Emperor a final and conclusive proof of the urgent necessity for vigorous measures against North Africa. It was no longer merely a question of preserving the Spanish foothold in Mauretania; Barbarossa must be attacked as a means of defending Spain. Moreover, for the first time in his career, Charles was in a position to deal an effective blow against the pirate. The peaces of Barcelona and Cambray had set his hands free in Western Europe. The winning of Andrea Doria had furnished him with an adequate naval force.² Accordingly, in the spring of 1530, just as he was about to leave Italy for the Empire, Charles ordered the admiral to attack Cherchell, a pirates' nest on the North African coast, about fifty miles to the west of Algiers. The expedition, which was launched in the following July,³ took the enemy by surprise, and at first succeeded well. Doria took the town and liberated many Christian captives; he was also able either to take or destroy, almost without firing a shot, the infidel ships that lay in the bay. But subsequently his followers dispersed to plunder, and finally their foes drove them back with great slaughter to the shore.⁴ Certainly the expedition could not be regarded as an unqualified success from the Christian point of view. The following year, however, saw a renewal of Span-

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, p. 67; Gómar, *op. cit.*, pp. 398-399; Sandoval, ii, pp. 64-65; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 159-160. Häbler's account (p. 245) of this affair is grossly inaccurate.

² Cf. here *Cartas . . . para los gastos de las guerras contra Soliman y moros* . . ., in *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 140-154, and "La Croisade de 1530 ordonnée par

Charles-Quint," by L. Gilliodts van Severen, in *Compte Rendu des séances de la Commission Royale d'Histoire* (Brussels), quatrième série, xvi, pp. 261-282.

³ That is, July, 1530, and not July, 1531, as Mercier, iii, p. 33, has it.

⁴ Fernández Duro, i, pp. 161-162.

ish aggressiveness, the attack on this occasion being led by Álvaro de Bazán, and directed against the port of Honeine (or One), just west of Oran, from which Tlemcen drew its provisions. The town was taken, and a Spanish garrison established there; 6000 Moors are said to have been slain, and 1000 more made prisoners.¹ Barbarossa, in 1532, attempted to reply to these attacks by launching Caccia Diabolo against the coast of Sardinia; his particular desire was to obtain Christian captives for his galleys, and his special objective a famous shrine where the faithful were assembled for the feast of Saint Antiochus. But the expedition was a total failure. A tempest arose and drove the raiders on the rocks. Instead of replenishing his supply of Christian rowers, Barbarossa lost 1200 from the benches of his own shipwrecked galleys.²

These clashes, however, were but petty affairs. They proved that the Emperor had at last recognized the necessity for vigorous action in North Africa and on the Spanish coasts, but in the immediately succeeding years the scene of interest was to be shifted farther eastward. It was known that Suleiman was preparing a fresh expedition up the Danube in 1532. Charles had now been in the Empire since April, 1530, and was proposing to lead an army of Spaniards and Italians against the Sultan. A diversion in the Mediterranean, in the shape of a naval raid on the coasts of Greece, seemed an obvious way of embarrassing the Turk. In the spring of 1532 Andrea Doria passed through the Strait of

¹ This affair took place in the summer of 1531. Cf. *Revue Africaine*, xix, pp. 187 ff.; Ruff, *Domination Espagnole à Oran*, p. 35; Diego Suárez, *Historia del Maestre Último de Montesa* (Madrid, 1889), p. 97; and Mercier, iii, p. 33. Fernández Duro (*Armada Española*, i, p. 164), who apparently thinks it occurred in 1534, has got the capture of

Honeine confused with the process of dismantling and destroying it, three years later, which was also intrusted to Álvaro de Bazán, when it was found that its upkeep cost more trouble than it was worth. The place does not exist today.

² Gómara, *op. cit.*, in *M. H. E.*, vi, p. 401.

Messina with a fleet of forty-four galleys (of which seventeen were Spanish) and a number of lesser ships, carrying from 10,000 to 12,000 German, Spanish, and Italian soldiers. A Venetian fleet of sixty sail, off Zante, refused to accompany him; it even sent word of his advance to the Turk. On September 12 he seized Coron, on the southwestern promontory of the Peloponnesus, and left 2500 Spanish soldiers to guard it under Jerónimo de Mendoza. Immediately afterward he took Patras, and also the two castles that guarded the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth; the Turks were forced to seek refuge under the guns of Lepanto. In the end of November he got back to Genoa, with 60,000 ducats' worth of cannon. It was a great coup and spread terror in the East. The news of it was doubtless one of the things that led the Sultan to retreat from Güns.¹ In the following May Suleiman sent an army and a fleet to retake Coron, but Doria had solemnly promised Mendoza to send succor in case of need. With a fleet of thirty sail, of which twelve were new Spanish galleys under Álvaro de Bazán, and 2500 Spanish troops, he issued out into the Ionian Sea. One of his best galleys was sent ahead to apprise Mendoza of the arrival of help, and to take 10,000 escudos for the pay of his troops. It crept inshore under the lee of Mendoza's guns, and accomplished its errand; and on August 2, Doria, with his fleet, broke through the Turkish ships and scattered them. Had Doria not been overcautious, he might have reaped greater rewards from the victory he had won; for the Turkish vessels were quite unable to defend themselves and he should never have allowed them to escape unscathed; however, he had at least fulfilled his promise to Mendoza.² But Coron did not remain much longer in

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 142 ff.; Laiglesia, "Un Establecimiento Español en Morea en 1532," in *Estudios Históricos*,

i, pp. 159-201; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 163-164.

² Cf. *D. I. E.*, xiii, pp. 509-515;

Christian hands. Like the territories of the Catalan Grand Company two centuries before, it was too remote to be of real value. On April 1, 1534, it was abandoned, the garrison being permitted to march out with all their equipment, and any Christian Turks who wanted to come with them.¹

It was not only on the military and naval sides that the Emperor revealed his increasing interest in the struggle against Islam; he began to bestir himself diplomatically as well. To this he was doubtless in large measure incited by the rumors which reached him of the relations between Suleiman and Francis I; and it is unfortunate that we have not more definite information as to the origin of these relations, and the period and manner in which Charles first came to know of them. It seems certain that the first regular envoy of Francis to Suleiman was not despatched until the spring of 1525, just after the battle of Pavia;² but there is some reason to think that the French monarch had at least considered the possibility of making use of the infidel as early as three years before. There is a letter of the Emperor to one of his counsellors, written on August 25, 1522, in which he discusses the siege of Rhodes, and uses language which is susceptible of being interpreted to mean that he believed that there was already some sort of an understanding between the Sultan and the king of France.³ This notion, if Charles actually entertained it, was probably in advance of the fact; for though Francis failed to send the Knights the aid that he had promised them, there is no evidence that he was as yet in relations with the Porte; he may well

Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 177 ff.; M. García Cerezedá, *Tratado de las Campañas del Emperador Carlos V*, ed. Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles, i, pp. 346 ff.; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 164 ff.

¹ Laiglesia, i, pp. 179-185.

² J. Ursu, *La Politique Orientale de François I^{er}*, pp. 27 ff.

³ Charles V to Poupet de la Chaux, printed in Lanz, *Correspondenz*, i, pp. 66-68; the interpretation indicated above is that of C. Piot in "Relations diplomatiques de Charles-Quint avec la Perse et la Turquie," in *Messenger des Sciences Historiques de Belgique* for 1843, pp. 46-47.

have looked forward to such relations in the near future, but it does not seem likely that they had actually begun. On the other hand, we may well believe that Charles's fears had been sufficiently aroused to make him desirous of finding himself some ally in the East with whom, if occasion served, he could coöperate against Suleiman; and the obvious place to look for such an ally was in Persia.

It would appear that the notion of an alliance between the Shah of Persia and the powers of Western Christendom against the Turk originated with the counsellors of the boy King Louis of Hungary, who had been betrothed, May 20, 1515, to Mary, the sister of the Emperor, and was thus brought into close relations with the house of Hapsburg. A Maronite of Lebanon, called Brother Peter,¹ arrived from Hungary at the court of the Shah Ismail with letters pointing out the advantages of such an alliance, probably as early as 1518; and it was probably in October of that year that Ismail sent him back to Charles to indicate his willingness to follow the matter up.² Nearly six years, however, elapsed before 'Brother Peter' found the Emperor; the envoy from 'the Sophia,' whose arrival at the imperial court at Burgos on July 1, 1524, was reported by the English ambassador, Sampson, can scarcely have been any other than he.³ At first

¹ "Petrus Maronita de monte Libano," as Charles's letter of August 25, 1525, has it; cf. Lanz, *Correspondenz*, i, p. 168.

² This letter is printed in Lanz, *Correspondenz*, i, pp. 52-53, and discussed in Piot, "Relations diplomatiques de Charles-Quint avec la Perse et la Turquie," in *Messager des Sciences Historiques de Belgique* for 1843, pp. 44-70. There seems, however, to be some doubt about the date of it. Lanz's transcription gives it as of the month of Schaval, 924 A. H., which he rightly changes over into October, 1518 A.D.; Piot, on the other hand, who merely discusses the letter and

does not give the text, places it in the year 1522; and the fact that Charles is referred to in the address as 'Imperator' lends some support to his chronology, as does also the fact that the messenger did not apparently reach Spain until 1524. On the other hand Lanz is generally accurate and Piot is emphatically the reverse (he apparently thinks Charles's brother Ferdinand was king of Hungary in 1522, and refers to him as such), and since the only transcription available gives the date as 1518 it seems better on the whole to accept it.

³ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, nos. 357, 578.

Charles seemed in no hurry to enter into so distant an undertaking. There were apparently grave doubts as to whether the Maronite was a 'counterfeit messenger,' or a genuine one, and the Emperor's hands were full of other things. After suffering more than a year to elapse without doing anything at all, he wrote to the Shah, on August 25, 1525 (Ismail had been succeeded by his son Thamasp in 1523), expressing general willingness to coöperate with the Persian ruler, but carefully avoiding any promise of definite action.¹ He had not yet felt the weight of the Turkish peril to the same extent as had his kinsmen in the Danube valley, and it is not surprising that he was so cautious at first. But four years later there came a change. The peace of Cambray, though not signed till August, was virtually inevitable from the beginning of 1529. The Turk had proved his mettle both in the Danube valley and on the Mediterranean, and his relations with the king of France, whether the Emperor knew it or not, were considerably closer than they had been in 1522. On February 18, 1529, therefore, Charles despatched a certain Jean de Balby to the court of the Shah, to inform him how matters stood in Western Europe and to ask for an anti-Turkish diversion in Asia Minor.²

Nothing came, however, of this interesting experiment. Balby arrived in 'Babylon' in May, 1530, to find a situation most unfavorable to his master's plans. The Shah was off on a campaign against the Usbegs of Khorasan; in order to be able to concentrate all his forces against this new foe, he had temporarily come to an amicable understanding with the Sultan, and there was no chance of inducing him to alter his plans.³ The scheme of a Persian alliance was apparently

¹ *L. & P. Hen. VIII*, iv, nos. 357, 578, and Lanz, *Correspondenz*, i, pp. 168-169.

² Lanz, i, pp. 293-296.

³ Letters of Balby to Charles in

Lanz, i, pp. 329-330, 379-380, 385. There is, however, in the R. A. H., Salazar Mss., A-44, fol. 259, an undated letter of about this period from the

put forward again in the year 1537 by one of Charles's German councillors, Frederick of the Palatinate, but the Emperor did not choose to adopt it.¹ The whole affair doubtless seemed to him too remote; moreover, at precisely that very moment, as we shall later see, he was actually negotiating for a treaty with Barbarossa. Yet the fact that he sought the alliance of the Shah in 1529 proves how seriously he was then alarmed at the extent of the Turkish peril; had his ambassador had the good fortune to arrive at a more opportune moment, it is altogether probable that a treaty might have been signed. The horizon of the Spanish Empire was certainly being enlarged.

In the meantime, Charles had become much more fully apprised of the extent of the relations between Francis and Suleiman. At the time of his interview with the Pope at Marseilles, in 1533, the French king had made a clean breast of his understanding with the Porte, and Clement betrayed the secret to the Emperor. "Not only," reported the pontiff, "will the king of France not prevent the coming of the Sultan against Christendom; he will advance it."² Fuller and more specific information came to hand before the year was out. Charles sent a special envoy, the Count of Nogarolles, to accompany the ambassadors charged by his brother Ferdinand with the duty of arranging a peace in the Danube valley. Nogarolles found Rinçon, the representative of Francis, in close intimacy with the grand vizier, Ibrahim. He learned all the details of what had passed between them, and was further privately informed by a

Shah to the Emperor "manifestando su deseo de continuar en su amistad."

¹ At least so Piot, *op. cit.*, p. 59, affirms; and cites in support of his statement an unpublished document entitled: "Consultatio illustrissimi principis Frederici comitis palatini

Rheni Bavariaeque ducis, contra Turcam, etc., 14 nov. 1537." This Frederick was generalissimo against the Turks in 1532; he did not become Elector Palatine till 1544.

² Ursu, *op. cit.*, p. 78, and references there.

renegade Christian of certain preposterous lies which the ambassador had told the Sultan in regard to the captivity and the release of the king of France, with the object of inciting Suleiman's anger against the Emperor.¹ It would appear that Charles had an ulterior object in sending Nogarolles; namely, to see if it might not be possible to arrange a peace with the Sultan for himself; for, despite all his strictures on the conduct of the king of France, he was not above making a treaty with the infidel on his own account, provided he could hope to do so with advantage; indeed, the sequel will show that he continued to seek for such a treaty in the future. But the Turk was unwilling to meet him half way. Peace was made, for the time being, on the Danube, in the three-cornered strife between Suleiman, Ferdinand, and Zápolya; but on the Mediterranean the Sultan was anxious to continue the fight. The principal reason why he made a treaty in Hungary was doubtless in order that he might be free to attack Persia; but he was also strongly influenced in the same direction by his desire for more resources to use against Andrea Doria.

Ever since the great Genoese sailor had gone over to the Emperor, the Sultan had realized that he was in danger on the sea. The capture of Coron had confirmed all his fears, and determined him to draw closer to the one man who was capable of coping with Doria. Ever since 1518, when Kheir-eddin Barbarossa had gone to the Porte to declare himself the Sultan's vassal, Suleiman had been keeping close watch on the doings of the pirate; and in the summer of 1533 he ordered him once more to repair to Constantinople. Traditional policies and present jealousies at first prevented the Sultan from giving Barbarossa the supreme naval command. The pirate, who was then in his sixty-seventh or sixty-eighth

¹ Piot, in *Messenger des sciences historiques de Belgique* for 1843, pp. 52-58.

year, had to journey overland, in December, into distant Syria, in order to interview the grand vizier Ibrahim, without whose approval the Sultan refused to act. But Ibrahim was quick to recognize the man that was needed. Barbarossa returned to Constantinople to find all his difficulties vanished. In June, 1534, he put to sea as pasha and grand admiral of the Turkish fleet, with over 100 ships, and 10,000 Turkish soldiers. During the next few weeks he treated the coasts of Italy to such a ravaging as they had seldom experienced before. From Reggio north to Fundi he burnt, he sacked, he made prisoners; but the prize that he most ardently desired escaped him. The story goes that he had hoped to carry off as a present to his master, and a proof of his own valor, the famous Julia Gonzaga, accounted the most beautiful woman in the Italy of that day; the lady, however, was warned of his intentions, and escaped with the utmost difficulty, almost naked, in the dead of night.¹

Clearly the time had arrived for a decisive trial of strength, and Barbarossa's next move, after his ravagings of the Italian coast, settled the spot where it should take place. For years his attention had been directed to Tunis, where the tottering Hafsides maintained themselves with difficulty, and only because they were willing to call for Christian help. Full possession of the place would be invaluable to the Sultan, for it would establish him in dangerous proximity to Sicily, and limit the operations of his foe to the western basin of the Mediterranean. The inevitable pretext — defence of the rights of a fugitive claimant — was eagerly seized upon. In August, 1534, Barbarossa landed his janizaries at Bizerta. The terror which his name inspired was certainly not less among his coreligionists than among the Christians; the

¹ *D. I. E.*, ii, pp. 381-392; Gómara, ii, pp. 140 ff.; García Cerezeda, *Tratado*, in *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 404 ff.; Sandoval, i, pp. 459-462.

Hafside ruler did not even wait to receive him, but gathered up his family and his treasures, and retired to the interior. Kheireddin entered the city without striking a blow.¹ The union of the whole naval force of the Ottoman Empire with the dominant power in Moorish North Africa was now officially proclaimed to the world. The establishment of its daring leader in his new headquarters, so close to Sicily, and so advantageous for sudden attacks, roused all the lands of the Emperor and his allies to a keen realization of the imminence of the new peril.

Measures of defence were promptly taken in Spain, Sardinia, Naples, and Sicily. The coast towns were fortified; fresh galleys were prepared; Andrea Doria and Álvaro de Bazán were kept constantly informed of everything Barbarossa did, and were ordered to be ready to sail at a moment's notice.² But Charles was not content with mere measures of defence. He wished to carry the war into the enemy's country, and drive his foe out of the coign of vantage he had seized. A swift, decisive blow, delivered on the instant, might possibly serve to shatter the new combination of his opponents before it had fairly got into working order. Nor was the moment in all respects unfavorable for the organization of a great offensive against the Turks. The situation in Western Europe was temporarily quiet. The Cortes were anxious to contribute funds. The new Pope, Paul III, wanted to revive the Crusades; and Portugal, the Netherlands, and the Empire promised to send contingents.³ The king of France, of course, held off; but in view of all that was known of the state of his relations with Suleiman, the Emperor can scarcely have been surprised. He and the Pope continued to work for the loan of thirty galleys which the

¹ *D. I. E.*, ii, p. 391; Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 201 ff.

² Cerezeda, *Tratado*, i, p. 468; Sandoval, ii, pp. 154-155.

³ Sandoval, ii, pp. 144, 154 ff.

French king had assembled in Marseilles, though probably not as much with the idea of actually obtaining them, as of making capital out of the refusal which they expected and received. But even in this they were doomed to disappointment.¹ The facts of the situation were no longer a secret, but Europe was in no mood to be easily shocked.

The Emperor himself, it must frankly be confessed, was not absolutely guiltless of similar designs. While as temporal head of Christendom he was calling for a crusade, he was plotting to deal with the situation in North Africa in such fashion as would relieve him from the necessity of waging war. In the autumn of 1534, he despatched to Tunis, disguised as a merchant, a certain Genoese called Luis de Presenda, who had lived in Fez and knew the language and customs of the Moors. Presenda's first task was to spy out the land, ingratiate himself with Barbarossa, learn his intentions, and report every two weeks. He was also to get into touch with the dethroned ruler, Muley Hassan, and try, with his aid, to stir up such a revolt as would effect the expulsion of Barbarossa from his new dominions. But if this should not prove feasible, Presenda was empowered, at his own discretion, to embark upon a new and different line of conduct. He was given leave to approach the pirate himself, as the Emperor's accredited ambassador, and to endeavor to win him away from the Sultan by offering him, as a bribe, the lordship of North Africa. And there was lastly a third alternative, which he was authorized to adopt, if the circumstances were favorable and the means could be found; and this was nothing less than Barbarossa's assas-

¹ Sandoval, ii, p. 155; J. Ginés de Sepúlveda, *De Rebus gestis Caroli V*, i, p. 351; Charrière, *Négociations*, i, pp. 249, 257-258. Francis's agent at the Porte, a certain Jean de la Forêt, had had instructions in February, 1534,

to offer these galleys to the Sultan. On the Emperor's information about the progress of the Franco-Turkish entente at this period, cf. Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Granvelle*, ii, pp. 170, 180-204, 293.

sination. Poison or throat cutting were the methods approved; there would be a good chance to apply them when the pirate was drunk — a contingency, it would appear, of no infrequent occurrence.¹ None of these interesting projects was destined to succeed; for Presenda's mission was soon discovered by Barbarossa, and Presenda himself was arrested and put to death;² but the fact that the Emperor gave his consent to the employment of such methods is significant of his attitude toward the entire Turkish problem. That he did not shrink from assassination should cause us no surprise. Few rulers of his time were too proud to adopt it, if the need was sufficient and occasion served, nor is it entirely unfamiliar today; it but emphasizes the importance that Charles attached to Barbarossa.³ That he strove to outbid the Sultan for the pirate's allegiance shows that the political side of the struggle against the infidel was emphatically, for the moment, uppermost in his mind. He possessed his share of crusading enthusiasm, and was only too glad to make use of that of others; but in crises like that with which he was for the moment confronted, he was perfectly ready, if he could do so with advantage, to sacrifice religious consistency to the advantage of the house of Hapsburg, and the safety of the territories over which it held sway. Whether he would have dabbled in such schemes if the king of France had not set him the example, is a question over

¹ Presenda's instructions may be found in Sandoval, ii, pp. 145-150; cf. also "Documents Inédits," ed. E. de la Primaudaie in *Revue Africaine*, xix, pp. 337 ff.; and Cerezeda, ii, pp. 2 ff., 22 ff. The plan to assassinate Barbarossa was apparently Presenda's suggestion; but Charles accepted it, and settled the reward which the murderer, if successful, should receive.

² Sandoval, ii, pp. 145, 183; Cerezeda, *Tratado*, ii, pp. 3-5.

³ It is worth noting that when a certain Moor came to Charles in the following year in his camp before La Goletta, and offered to get Barbarossa stabbed or poisoned, the Emperor indignantly refused, on the ground that no Christian prince could sanction such an undertaking. Doubtless the occasion was too public for any other kind of a reply. Cf. Sandoval, ii, p. 180.

which one can argue indefinitely; but the fact remains that his instructions to Presenda prove that for the moment, at least, he was no more scrupulous than his Most Christian rival.

Charles had not sufficient faith in the success of Presenda's mission to abate his military preparations. The Spanish and Portuguese concentrated at Barcelona, where Andrea Doria subsequently joined them with an imposing fleet which he had gathered at Genoa. The Germans, the papal levies, and the Spaniards in Naples and Sicily had their original rendezvous at different points on the western coast of Italy.¹ Late in the spring of 1535, under the Marquis del Vasto, they united their forces at Cagliari, in Sardinia, where they were joined by the Maltese contingent of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. On June 10 the Emperor and Andrea Doria arrived from Barcelona, and the Christian forces for the first time were united in one place. In all there were probably about 400 sail, of which only about a quarter, at the most, could be regarded as ships of war, and upwards of 30,000 troops. The Spaniards formed the largest contingent, and probably constituted over half of the entire expedition; 10,000 is a fair estimate of those that came from Spain, and 6000 for those from the Spanish dependencies in Italy; the Germans numbered about 7000, and the Italian levies between 4000 and 5000.² Doria was given supreme command of the fleet, and the Marquis del Vasto of the land forces. On Monday, June 14, the

¹ Cf. here V. Vitale, "Trapani nelle guerre di Carlo V in Africa e contro i Turchi," in *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, xxix, pp. 255-323.


² These figures have been taken from a doctoral dissertation (1905) on the Tunis campaign, in the Library of Harvard University, by Professor A. I. Andrews of Tufts: it is expected that

it will soon appear in book form. Professor Andrews has utilized the manuscript accounts of Arcos and Sanabria (cf. below, p. 311, note 2) and all the standard published authorities save the *Crónica* of Santa Cruz, which was not available at the time he wrote, and makes the numbers somewhat larger (iii, pp. 255-264).

expedition set sail, and, with favorable winds, covered the distance to North Africa in about twenty-four hours, arriving off Porto Farina early in the morning of the 15th. Passing slowly on to the south and east, the fleet came to anchor off the ruins of the ancient town of Carthage, and on the 17th and 18th the troops were landed, in excellent order, at a point previously agreed upon, between Carthage and the fortress of La Goletta. The enemy made a few feeble efforts to hamper the disembarkation, but the excellent order and close formation of the Spanish veterans prevented them from doing any serious damage.¹

The city of Tunis stands at the western, or most inland, end of a shallow salt water lake or marsh, about six miles across, and connected with the sea by a strait some 300 yards long and 100 feet wide. A channel was kept open through this strait, and down the centre of the lake to the walls of Tunis itself, to admit of the passage of Barbarossa's largest galleys; in fact, the greater part of the pirate's fleet was anchored in the lake at the time of the Emperor's arrival. On the very end of the narrow neck of land which formed the north shore of the strait was erected the strong fortress of La Goletta, a rectangular tower with thick walls and strong bastions, protected on the land side by several well fortified walls, which ran clear across the isthmus on which it stood. La Goletta was, in fact, the key to Tunis: it got its name from the fact that it "held Tunis by the throat." It controlled absolutely the approach by sea; it commanded the lake and the ships that lay therein. Barbarossa had been quick to realize its importance, and the moment that he learned of the Emperor's expedition, he concentrated all his energies on strengthening its defences. He had no time to spare for those of Tunis itself; but he

¹ "Relacion de lo que sucedió en la conquista de Tunez," in *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 159 ff.



rightly judged that Charles would never venture to advance unprotected overland against the city as long as its chief bulwark remained, untaken, in his rear. The foresight of the pirate was justified by the event. The Emperor immediately decided to attack La Goletta; it was there that the fate of the expedition was to be decided.¹

The siege of the fortress lasted three weeks and a half, from June 20 to July 14.² La Goletta was defended by a garrison of about 5000 Turks and an indefinite number of Moors, commanded by the famous corsair, Sinan 'the Jew'; upwards of 300 cannon were mounted on its walls. The besiegers were obliged to dig trenches and parallels to protect their advance toward their final objective. But what made their task particularly difficult was the sudden attacks to which they were subjected by light-armed Moorish troops concealed in the olive groves nearby. Barbarossa, whose headquarters were in Tunis itself, organized these diversions with consummate skill. Small bodies of Christians were being constantly cut off; not until the last days of the siege did they learn how to defend themselves. Sorties from La Goletta itself were of frequent occurrence, and

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 265 ff.; "Relacion," in *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 163 ff.

² There is an enormous amount of material on the siege: all the standard authorities on the period describe it in detail, and there are a number of special accounts. In 1872 G. Voigt published a careful analysis of the different authorities then available in vol. vi of the *Abhandlungen der königl. sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Classe, pp. 163-243, under the title of "Die Geschichtschreibung über den Zug Karl's V. gegen Tunis (1535)," and Professor Andrews's forthcoming monograph, cited above, will describe those which have come to our knowledge since Voigt wrote. Of these the most important are (1) the so called *Historia y Conquista de Tunez*, by the

Licenciado Arcos, who accompanied the expedition; it still remains for the most part in manuscript in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, Seccion de Manuscritos, E-85, and is fully discussed in E. Cat., *Mission Bibliographique en Espagne*, pp. 53-60; (2) the *Comentarios y Guerra de Tunez* of Alonzo de Sanabria, which forms the basis of Sandoval's account: it also remains in manuscript in the Biblioteca Nacional de Madrid, Seccion de Manuscritos, G-65, and is described by Cat., *op. cit.*, pp. 61-71; (3) the account of Martin Garcia Cerezeda, *Tratado*, etc., ii, pp. 1-51, which had not been published when Voigt wrote; and (4) that of Alonso de Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 237-293, which did not see the light till 1922.

usually timed so as to coincide with the attacks from the olive groves ; Barbarossa kept in touch with his commanders inside the fortress by means of light boats on the shallow waters of the lake. The Christians suffered throughout the siege from lack of proper drinking water, and from consequent overindulgence in fruits and in wine ; dysentery and intoxication made difficulty from beginning to end. Jealousies between the different nationalities of which Charles's army was composed were another fertile source of trouble. The Spaniards and the Italians held one another in contempt, and often failed to coöperate in attack and defence. The Germans were insolent and insubordinate, and shocked the decorous Spaniards by their lack of respect for the person of Charles. One of them actually pointed his gun at the Emperor, and, though apparently drunk, was executed forthwith. Charles himself showed great personal bravery throughout the siege, and proved, on the day of the final assault, that he was by no means devoid of skill as a tactician. It was, in fact, his baptism of fire, and he came out of the ordeal with high credit. The eulogies of the standard Spanish authorities are doubtless overdrawn, but it is evident that the vague doubts, expressed ever since Charles's first appearance in Spain, as to whether he would prove a worthy inheritor of the warlike traditions of his Iberian forebears, were henceforth definitely and permanently set at rest.

During the course of the siege the Emperor established connection with the dethroned ruler, Muley Hassan, who had promised to come to his aid, at the moment of his arrival, with several thousand Arab and Berber troops. The ex-king, when the critical moment came, proved totally unable to make good his word. He did not reach the Emperor's camp till June 29, and when he did finally arrive, brought with him a bare 300 men ; what was even more

serious, he failed to furnish any supplies, which the Emperor needed far more than he did soldiers. But despite all these disappointments, Muley Hassan was cordially received. Though his military value for the moment might be small, he was likely, in case the Emperor should be successful, to prove subsequently indispensable as his local representative; moreover, the information that he could furnish in regard to the country around about was of great help to the invaders. So Charles, after warning him not to attempt any treachery, turned him over to the care of his generals, who saw to it that he was properly impressed with the irresistible power of the Christian arms.

The day for the grand assault on La Goletta was fixed for July 14. Sunrise was the signal for a tremendous bombardment, which was directed against the fortress from all four sides at once. Spanish batteries fired from the north and east — that is, from farther up the isthmus, and on the sea side; there were twenty-one guns in the latter detachment, which was stationed at a point 400 paces distant from the fortress. It devoted its attention to the main tower of La Goletta, and the gunners were encouraged by the presence of the Emperor in their midst. On the west side, near the lagoon, the Italians took charge of the bombardment; their batteries also were established only 400 paces away from their objective. But perhaps the most effective cannonading of the day was delivered from the fleet itself against the sea walls and southern towers; over 70 ships participated in it. They were divided into three squadrons, to facilitate manoeuvring; they advanced, ship by ship, in regular alternation, and having delivered their fire, returned to reload. Particularly valuable were the great guns of the larger carracks. They shook the towers of La Goletta until one of them tumbled and fell, spreading consternation

throughout the fortress. About mid-day orders were given to cease firing, in order that the besiegers might note the effect of their bombardment, which was decidedly the most marked on the eastern and southern sides; it therefore devolved upon the Spaniards, on land, and the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, who were gathered, for the most part, in the ships of the fleet, to lead in the grand assault, for which every preparation had been made. The Spaniards were commanded by Álvaro de Bazán; and the Knights, who were rowed toward the shore in small boats and finally completed the distance by wading, pressed forward most gallantly behind their standard-bearer. Ladders were on hand, and the walls were scaled; after some furious fighting, the Turks gave way; many of them were killed and wounded, while the rest escaped to Tunis. The booty captured in La Goletta was large and rich; significant among the trophies were the fleurs-de-lis of France, stamped on several of the cannon and cannon balls.¹ But by far the most valuable prize that fell into the Emperor's hands was neither the fortress itself nor the spoils it contained, but the pirate fleet on the waters of the lake, comprising all the ships under Barbarossa's command, save for fifteen galleys which he had held in reserve at Bona. According to the Emperor himself, it numbered eighty-two sail. Why it had failed to coöperate in the defence of La Goletta will always remain one of the mysteries of the siege; but as soon as the Christians had got possession of the fortress, there was no possible alternative for it save immediate surrender.

Apparently some of the Emperor's counsellors felt that he ought to rest satisfied with the capture of La Goletta, and urged him to retire to Europe without attacking Tunis. But Charles plainly saw that his prestige would infallibly

¹ Sandoval, ii, pp. 183, 198.

suffer if he came back with the goal he had announced unattained, and he wisely insisted that Tunis must be taken. Whether it would not have been even wiser still to make sure, in the first place, of the capture of the galleys at Bona is another matter. Barbarossa, rather than Tunis, was the Emperor's real objective; it was more than doubtful if the pirate could be captured, but if he could have been deprived of the sole remaining portion of his fleet, he would at least have been immobilized for some time to come. But Charles's heart was set on the taking of Tunis. He listened, as usual, to the objections of his councillors, but none of them served to divert him from his purpose.¹

On July 20 the Christian army began to advance along the northern shore of the lake; as horses were lacking, the cannon had to be dragged along the sandy roads by the soldiers themselves. The heat and drought were terrific; every soldier had been ordered to carry enough water to last him three or four days, but many of them had failed to do so, and in consequence soon began to suffer agonies of thirst. The Emperor accordingly directed his march toward some wells of sweet water of which Hassan had informed him, and which lay about three miles to the northeast of the city walls. Barbarossa had foreseen the necessity of this movement on the part of his foe, and determined to take advantage of it. When Charles arrived within sight of his objective, he found the infidel army drawn up in the form of a crescent, with its flanks resting on the lagoon and on the olive groves, so placed as to make it impossible for the Christians to reach the wells without a battle. But the pangs of thirst made Charles's army desperate, and the issue of the ensuing conflict was soon decided in its favor. The Spaniards bore the brunt of the

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 276-277; Sandoval, ii, p. 200.

fighting, and the Emperor himself was in the thick of it. His horse was shot under him, a page was killed by his side, and he saved the life of one of his followers. The poet, Garcilaso de la Vega, was also wounded in the course of the day. By evening Barbarossa had withdrawn his army to the shelter of the walls of Tunis; the Christians were established in possession of the wells.¹

Charles had doubtless expected more battles on the morrow, but events occurred during the intervening night which spared him the necessity of further fighting. Within the walls of Tunis were several thousand Christian captives, who might easily break out of confinement and bear aid to the invaders; it was Barbarossa's plan to forestall this possibility by ordering a wholesale massacre. His subordinates, however, objected strongly, not so much, in all probability, out of humanitarian motives, as because they did not wish to have their own property destroyed; and finally the pirate consented to a postponement. This decision proved fatal to his hopes of retaining Tunis. The prisoners were informed of the advance of the Christian army, and finally certain renegades, who desired to make their peace with the prospective victors, furnished them with the means of regaining their liberty. Under the lead of a Knight of Malta, they burst into the arsenal, armed themselves with pikes, muskets, and cutlasses, and poured forth to attack the Turks and Moors. By the morning of July 21, the city was no longer in a condition to defend itself, and when the Emperor, advancing from his camp, was apprised of the state of affairs within the walls, he entered Tunis without serious opposition. The Moors in the city implored him to spare them the horrors of a sack, and sought to curry favor with him by the warmth of their welcome to

¹ Cerezeda, ii, pp. 55 ff.

Muley Hassan. The Emperor, however, had promised his soldiers that they should enjoy the ordinary three days of plunder; and, after considering the question in council with his generals, he felt obliged to keep his word. The outrages that occurred in the allotted time were rarely exceeded in the sixteenth century, and stand out in distressing contrast to the clemency shown by Suleiman the Magnificent at the time of his capture of Bagdad in the previous December. On the other hand, it is fair to recall that the Christians, and especially the Spaniards, were but recouping themselves for losses which they had sustained, for many years past, as a result of corsair raids, and that they could scarcely be expected to regard Barbarossa in the light of an ordinary foe.¹

If the postponement of the massacre of his Christian captives was the immediate cause of Barbarossa's loss of Tunis, the permission to plunder which Charles granted to his soldiers was the principal reason why he failed to capture Barbarossa. Taking advantage of the confusion which reigned in the city, the pirate gathered a few thousand Turks and Moors about him, and retired in safety to Bona, where, it will be remembered, he had kept fifteen of his best galleys in reserve.² Andrea Doria, who had remained in La Goletta, had failed to obey Charles's order to occupy Bona; nay more, when subsequently commanded to send a sufficient number of galleys thither to cut off Barbarossa's escape by sea, he only despatched a squadron of fifteen, a force quite inadequate to accomplish its purpose.³ The pirate, after giving his men two days of much needed rest, was able to sail away without molestation; and though Bona itself was soon after occupied by a Spanish garrison, the continuance of the struggle was nevertheless inevitable.

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 276-279; Sandoval, ii, pp. 206 ff.; Cerezeda, ii, pp. 59 ff.

² Sandoval, ii, p. 210.

³ Sepulveda, i, p. 406; Cerezeda, ii, pp. 63-64.

Had the Emperor, with all his forces, laid siege to Algiers, whither it was soon learned that Barbarossa had retired, it is possible that he might have effected his purpose then and there, and broken the connection between the Turkish Empire and North Africa. But the lateness of the season, the state of his army, and, above all, the imperative need of his presence in Europe, combined to convince Charles that that enterprise must be postponed. It was a disastrous mistake, as the sequel was abundantly to prove.

Before departing for Sicily, Charles signed a treaty with Muley Hassan, by which that ruler was set up in Tunis as a vassal of the Emperor, on condition that he should give no aid to any of Charles's enemies, whether Christian Frenchmen, Turkish corsairs, or disaffected Moors.¹ A strong Spanish garrison was left in La Goletta, whence it could dominate the entire situation, and give prompt notice of the approach of any danger. During the second and third weeks of August, the last squadrons of the Christian fleet set sail for their respective destinations, the Emperor accompanying the Italian division to Trapani, and subsequently to Messina and Naples.² Ostensibly, at least, he had scored an important success; the capture of Tunis unquestionably marks the apogee of the Spanish power in North Africa.³ But his failure to capture Barbarossa himself served almost to render nugatory the victory which he had won. While still in Sicily, Charles received a most surprising and discouraging piece of news — a striking proof of the irrepressibility of the pirate, and an evidence that the recent campaign had, after all, been comparatively futile.

Barbarossa had resumed the offensive in dramatic fashion. He had passed on from Bona to Algiers, where he increased

¹ Cerezeda, ii, p. 65; Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 283 ff.

³ Lafuente, xii, p. 89; Mercier, iii, p. 46.

² Sandoval, ii, pp. 215–218.

his fleet to more than thirty sail; then, foreseeing that the Spanish dominions would be absorbed in getting ready to welcome the returning expedition of the victorious Emperor, and consequently more than usually unprepared for a hostile attack, he flew the flag of Spain from his masthead, disguised his crews and soldiers as Christians, and sailed boldly forth to the Balearics. His daring was rewarded with astounding success. He was received with every kind of rejoicing and with ringing of bells. According to one account, the inhabitants were engaged, at the very moment of his arrival, in desecrating the corpse of an executed prisoner, which the authorities had disguised in such fashion as to make men believe that it was Barbarossa himself. Certainly no surprise was ever more complete. The pirate concentrated his forces against Port Mahon, in Minorca; he captured a Portuguese caravel in the harbor, and carried off most of the inhabitants of the city, to serve as slaves and rowers in his galleys. On his way back he visited Oropesa, on the Valencian coast, fought off the inhabitants of the adjacent towns who had hurried to the rescue, and finally sailed away with 6000 ducats, which he consented to accept as ransom for captives.¹

At this point the story of the relations of the Emperor and his infidel foes enters on a completely new phase. Several causes combined to produce the change. In the first place, the reopening of the war with Francis I distracted Charles's attention once more from the Turkish and North African problems; his admiral, Andrea Doria, also, was

¹ Mercier, iii, pp. 42-43, and references there; Haedo (tr. de Grammont), in *Revue Africaine*, xxiv, pp. 217. The date of this affair, which is placed by Jurien de la Gravière (*Doria et Barberousse*, p. 246) in the spring of 1536,

must have been either in late September or early October, 1535, for Charles learned of it at Messina on or before October 23 (cf. Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Granvelle*, ii, p. 392); cf. also Sánchez Alonso, no. 2413.

necessarily much preoccupied with the naval side of the conflict with France, and had consequently less time to devote to Barbarossa. Secondly, the situation in North Africa developed, in the years succeeding the conquest of Tunis, in such fashion that the Emperor felt justified in temporarily leaving it alone. Barbarossa, after his raid on the Balearics, had been summoned to Constantinople, so that the arch-enemy was gone. He left an able representative in Algiers; but everywhere else on the Barbary coast the Spaniards and their Moorish vassals had distinctly the upper hand; even the king of Tlemcen was so impressed by their power that he thought, for one moment, of recognizing Charles's overlordship.¹ And finally, the departure of Barbarossa for Constantinople, and the new naval programme of Suleiman the Magnificent, served to transfer the chief scene of interest to the eastern waters of the Mediterranean, and ultimately brought the republic of Venice into the struggle against the Turks.² The net result of these different factors was to diminish the immediate interest of Spain and the Emperor in the struggle, and to shift, for the time being, the chief burden of what fighting was to be done to the shoulders of another power. The activities of Charles during this phase of the conflict are, on the whole, less military and naval than diplomatic.

By the month of August, 1536, it became generally known that the Sultan was preparing a great naval expedition against Italy for the following year. His agreement with Francis I was in full running order now, and the allies were timing their movements to coincide.³ In July, 1537, a

¹ Cf. below, p. 344, and Mercier, iii, pp. 43-47. The king of Tlemcen changed his mind shortly afterwards. On this complicated affair cf. P. Ruff, *La Domination Espagnole à Oran* (Paris, 1900), pp. 52-67. On the contemporaneous events

in Tunis cf. Fernández Duro, i, pp. 230, 232, and G. Capasso, in *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, xxxi, pp. 37-44, 51-55.

² Pastor, xi, pp. 271-272.

³ Pastor, xi, pp. 261 ff.; Petit, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

Turkish fleet of a hundred ships appeared in Italian waters, with Barbarossa in supreme command, and the famous Lufti Pasha, seraskier of Rumelia, as his principal subordinate. The infidels ravaged the coasts of Apulia. They effected a landing at Otranto, laid waste the surrounding country, and carried off numerous captives. Andrea Doria was far too weak to resist them, and retired with the few ships at his command into the harbor of Messina. Never had the Turkish naval power seemed so menacing before.¹

Yet, curiously enough, it was at this very moment of imminent peril that the Emperor was offered an opportunity to detach Barbarossa from the service of the Sultan and to win him as a vassal and an ally of Spain. In April of the same year, 1537, there had appeared at the court of Ferrante Gonzaga, the viceroy of Sicily, a Spanish gentleman called Alonso de Alarcón, who had been for five years a prisoner of the pirate, and bore a strange message from him to the Emperor. Apparently Barbarossa was anxious to change sides. It was clear that he was profoundly jealous of Lufti Pasha; and the recent fate of the grand vizier Ibrahim² was a warning to all servants of Suleiman the Magnificent. By dint of liberal concessions, Charles might be able to win over the pirate and the fleet that he commanded; possibly an offer of Tunis would turn the trick. Gonzaga, of course, was alive to the possibility that these proposals were being made with treacherous intent, with the idea of lulling Charles into a false sense of security, in order to render more certain the triumph of the Turk. Nevertheless, he determined to communicate them to the viceroy of Naples, the Spanish ambassadors at Rome, and Andrea Doria; and he despatched Alarcón himself in a swift brigantine to Barcelona,

¹ Pastor, xi, p. 269; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 231-232.

² Sentenced to death by the Sultan

in March, 1536, without the slightest warning, after thirteen years of almost unprecedented favor and power.

to deliver his story in person to the Emperor. Nothing more, however, came of the matter for the time being. The episode was chiefly important as paving the way for subsequent developments.¹

The next six months saw a general gathering of the Christian forces, at the exhortation of Paul III, for a campaign against the infidel on a really large scale. The truces of Bomy and Monzon had halted the fighting between Charles and Francis, and seemed to make possible an effective crusade. The failure of the French king to appear in Italy caused the Turks to withdraw from Apulia and concentrate against Corfu; after suffering a repulse at the hands of its heroic garrison, they again transferred the scene of their activities to the eastward, and raided the islands in the Aegean Sea. These operations naturally aroused the ire of Venice, whose Aegean and Ionian possessions bore the brunt of the Turkish attack, and determined the republic, after long wavering, to join with the Emperor and the Pope against the infidel. In early February, 1538, a new 'Holy League' was formed between the three allies for offensive and defensive war against the Turk. The quota which each one should furnish was determined in advance, as was the division of the spoils in the event of victory. But it was plain from the outset that the interests of Charles and of Venice were so divergent that they were highly unlikely to coöperate effectively; and the situation was further complicated by the attitude of the king of France. The Pope journeyed to Nice in the month of May, in the hope of arranging a permanent peace between the Emperor and his principal rival, and thus insuring the success of the crusade. But his efforts were only partially successful. A ten years' truce

¹ *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 207 ff; cf. also G. Capasso, in *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, xxxi, pp. 20-23, 432-434.

was the most he could accomplish; moreover, the whole atmosphere was so charged with suspicion that it was obvious that Charles could not possibly give his undivided attention to the Turkish war. He insisted on conducting the struggle on defensive lines during the rest of the year 1538, while the Venetians wished to carry the war into the enemy's country. His eyes were fixed on the situation in the western basin of the Mediterranean, and on the maintenance of the Spanish power in North Africa; theirs were directed to the Adriatic and the Aegean. The results of these divergences were to be only too plainly evident when the time for decisive action came.¹

The rendezvous for the different contingents of the Christian fleet was fixed at Corfu. The first to arrive were the Venetians, with fifty-five galleys, under Vincenzo Capello. Next, on June 17, came the twenty-seven that were furnished by the Pope; they were commanded by Marco Grimani. Both these leaders wanted to get started at once, and seek out the enemy in the Aegean Sea; but the viceroy of Sicily, who was commander-in-chief, insisted on waiting for the arrival of Doria, who was occupied till the latter part of July with the various goings and comings of the Emperor in connection with the interviews at Nice and Aigues-Mortes, and did not finally reach Corfu until September 7. He brought with him forty-nine galleys, thus carrying the Christian total to over 130; on September 22 a large contingent of 'naos gruesas de combate,' sent on by the Emperor, also arrived, and there was the usual swarm of minor transports. The fleet carried 16,000 land troops and 2500 cannon.² In the meantime, Barbarossa, with a somewhat smaller number of ships,³ had been able to take

¹ Pastor, xi, pp. 270-294, *passim*.

² Such are the figures of Fernández Duro, i, pp. 233-234. Other authorities,

as, e.g., Jurien de la Gravière, make the numbers somewhat larger.

³ Cf. Escorial Mss., ii, v. 4, folio 134 *bis*, printed on p. 325, below.

up a position just inside the entrance to the Gulf of Prevesa, under the shelter of the guns of the fortress, close to the site of the battle of Actium. His inferiority in numbers was very largely compensated by the excellence of his crews and the skill of his captains. All the most famous of his corsairs accompanied him; especially the terrible Torghoud, or Dragut, who was to be a thorn in the side of the Christians for many years to come.

But before the rival fleets got into contact, a strange scene was enacted at the town of Parga, on the shore opposite Corfu. Alonso de Alarcón unexpectedly appeared there, on the night of September 20, as the messenger of Barbarossa, and held a secret interview with Andrea Doria and the viceroy of Sicily, who were empowered to treat with him in the name of the Emperor. Negotiations had made much progress since the previous year; it now looked as if there were a real prospect of inducing the pirate to change sides. On two vital points, however, no agreement could be reached. Barbarossa would be satisfied with nothing short of Tunis, where the Emperor was determined to maintain Muley Hassan. Charles wanted the pirate to burn such portions of the Turkish fleet as he could not bring over with him into the service of Spain, a proposal which failed to appeal to Barbarossa. As Alarcón was only acting in the capacity of a messenger, he could not settle these questions without referring to the pirate, and the ensuing delay spoiled all chances of an immediate understanding. Doria and Gonzaga went back to their fleet to prepare for battle, but in view of the negotiation in which they had just taken part, it was inevitable that they should enter the conflict with somewhat mingled feelings.¹

¹ The documents which underlie this story are printed in Lafuente, xii, pp. 181 ff., but have been overlooked by the

majority of later historians. Cf. E. Watbled and Dr. Monnereau, "Négociations entre Charles-Quint et Kheir-ed-

As soon as he had returned from his secret interview with Alarcón, Doria led the Christian fleet out of Corfu in the direction of Prevesa. It at once became evident that Barbarossa could not be easily tempted to abandon his strong position inside the gulf, and risk a battle in the open sea; and at a council on board the Christian fleet a plan was advanced of landing the troops, capturing the castle, and blocking up the infidel fleet within the gulf by sinking a ship at the narrowest point of the entrance. It seems that Gonzaga originated this scheme, and Doria at first appeared to approve of it; but when the moment for action came, he entirely refused to carry it out.¹ Unfavorable weather conditions, lack of deep water close in shore, and unwillingness to denude his fleet of fighting men, have all been put forward as reasons to explain his conduct. There is also a strong possibility that his action may have been determined by secret intrigues with the foe. At any rate, the land-

Din (1538-1540)," in *Revue Africaine*, xv, pp. 138-148; G. Capasso, in vol. xxxviii of *Rendiconti* of the Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere (Milan, 1905), pp. 893-910; and C. Manfroni in *Rivista Marittima* for 1896, terzo trimestre, p. 278.

¹ Cf. Santa Cruz, iii, p. 523; Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana dalla Caduta di Constantinopoli alla Battaglia di Lepanto*, p. 337; and the following contemporary manuscript account, of which the original is to be found in the Escorial Library, ii, v. 4, folio 134 bis, for slightly differing accounts of this:

"En esto golfo de l'Arta estaua la armada de Barbarroxa al tiempo que vino Andrea Doria, y Andrea quisiera tomar el castillo que esta en la punta [or puerta] del golfo y encerrar allí a barbarroxa, y no halló alto para las naos, por se avia de echar la gente en tierra, y por tierra y mar combatir el lugar, y encerrar dentro al enemigo y su armada. Por esto pasó adelante al otro golfo a querer tomar aquel lugar

questa en la entrada, porque barbarroxa de necesidad saliese deste primer golfo a socorrer la tierra y pudiese darle la batalla con sus naos y galeras juntas, porque de galeras estan yguales que barbarroxa trae ciento y quarenta buenas y andrea doria trae ciento y treinta y quatro, y trae mas andrea sus galeones y naos ragoesas y vizcaynas. Pasando andrea con su armada cerca de Santa Manca [sic for "Marta"] que es una isla salió barbarroxa del golfo con su armada y da sobre la nuestra. Andrea se detuvo a esperallo porque el viento calmó, y las naos no pudieron caminar y tomó las barbarroxa el viento y comenzó a lomardear nuestras naos y ella a el. Echó a fondo una nao nuestra con tresientos hombres españoles. Tomo una galera de las del papa sin defensa. Tomo otra de venecianos. Desbarato otra nao viscaina en que yuan quatrocientos soldados españoles."

Endd. "Nuevas de la mar con Barbarroja; año 1538; Noviembre."

ing operation was not attempted; the Christian ships kept out in the open sea; and finally Barbarossa was persuaded by his pugnacious subordinates to issue out of his retreat and go forth to seek the foe. The Turkish formation was that of a huge crescent; it was divided into several groups, with Dragut and a squadron of his fastest ships in the centre and vanguard.¹

The engagement, which ensued on September 27, is usually known as the battle of Prevesa, and has been a fertile source of discussion ever since.² What is perfectly clear is that Doria and his Venetian and papal allies failed to co-operate effectively; they were cut off from one another and followed different plans of action. United, it is probable that they might have secured a decisive victory; as it was, the day passed off without any serious fighting. There was a certain amount of long range cannonading; a few of the Christian ships were captured, burnt, or sent to the bottom; some of the smaller ones were sunk in a gale which blew up, apparently, in the course of the afternoon; at night

¹ The different accounts vary considerably from one another on this point; cf. Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana*, p. 338; Fernández Duro, i, p. 236; A. V. Vecchi, "Andrea Doria", in *Rivista Marittima* for 1877, anno x, primo trimestre, p. 428.

² The authorities on the battle of Prevesa are numerous and most contradictory, and the difficulty of drawing any definite conclusions from them is enhanced by the fact that naval writers like Fernández Duro (*Armada Española*, i, pp. 233-248) and Jurien de la Gravière (*Doria et Barberousse*, pp. 275-322) pay little or no attention to the accompanying political intrigues with Barbarossa, and the consequent possibility that Doria was deliberately playing false to his Venetian and papal allies. C. Manfroni, on the other hand (*Storia della Marina Italiana* (Rome, 1897), pp. 325-345, and "L'Empia Alleanza," in

Rivista Marittima for 1896, terzo trimestre, p. 278) obviously regards these intrigues as the key to the whole situation. The latest writer on the entire subject is Professor Gaetano Capasso ("Andrea Doria alla Prevesa," in vol. xxxviii of *Rendiconti* of the Reale Istituto Lombardo di Scienze e Lettere (Milan, 1905), pp. 893-910), who is certainly the foremost authority on the negotiations with Barbarossa, and his conclusion is highly favorable to Doria. The admiral, he maintains, had no idea of avoiding battle, provided he could hope to engage with assured prospects of success; nor had the Emperor ordered him to avoid a fight; but he did not wish to risk the entire Christian fleet unless he had more than even chances of victory. The difficulties of the situation were certainly very great, totally apart from the question of the secret negotiations with the foe. The

the allies retired to Corfu, while Barbarossa, who was victorious if any one can claim to have been, sought safety from the weather in the shelter of the Gulf of Arta. The Spaniards drew some consolation for the inglorious issue from the conduct of one Martin de Munguia and a company of 200 Biscayan arquebusiers whom he commanded. The ship in which they were placed had borne the brunt of such fighting as had occurred; it had been almost shot to pieces; its crew had fled; and at the end of the day it had been given up for lost. But the Biscayans were able seamen, and kept the ship afloat. They beat off several savage attacks, and entirely refused to haul down their flag. Finally, five days after the fight, they managed to reach Corfu, battered, crippled, the only heroes of the entire conflict, long after their companions had given them up for lost.¹

Doria was anxious to deliver before the end of the year some blow which would serve to neutralize the effect of Prevesa; and the allies finally agreed to attack the strong fortress of Castelnovo at the entrance to the Gulf of Cattaro.² On October 27 the place was taken; but its capture only served to bring the old divergences between Doria and

jealousies of Venice towards Spain and Genoa (cf. A. Guglielmotti, *Storia della Marina Pontificia* (Rome, 1887), iv, pp. 31-62) did not make for effective coöperation; according to Fernández Duro (i, pp. 241-243), Doria gave explicit orders to Grimani and Capello to keep the Turks from contact with the shore, but they disobeyed him, and Doria was consequently isolated. In the account given by Santa Cruz (iii, pp. 522-528) and in the brief Escorial manuscript which I have published on page 325 — neither of which has been utilized by any previous writer on this topic — it would appear that the weather had much to do with the outcome; not so much the gale that sprang up in the evening, as the calm which came on in the middle of the day

and held up all the ships that depended exclusively on their sails. ("Les faltó el viento en tal manera que los navíos que no eran de remo no pudieron ir más adelante," Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 525.) There are, of course, a host of older authorities on the battle — standard sixteenth-century works like Jovius, Sandoval, and Paruta, two sixteenth-century biographies of Doria by Capelloni and Sigonius, and the modern one by E. Petit (Paris, 1887); but as they are referred to in detail in the more recent books which I have mentioned, it does not seem worth while to enumerate them here.

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 526-528; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 244-245.

² Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 528 ff.

the Venetians more sharply than ever to the fore. The Venetians claimed the right to occupy and hold it, under the terms of the League; but Gonzaga and Doria insisted that it be garrisoned by Spaniards, 4000 of whom were finally left there under command of Francesco Sarmiento. They were not to remain long. In the summer of 1539 Barbarossa reappeared with a large army and a fleet of 200 ships to retake the fortress.¹ The garrison performed prodigies of valor in its defence, which was prolonged from July 12 to August 7, and cost the besiegers many lives; but Doria failed to come to its rescue, and it was finally obliged to capitulate. Only 800 of the garrison, counting women and children, survived. One of the prisoners was Martin de Munguia, of Prevesa fame. Barbarossa complimented him on his past performance and promised him his favor if he would change sides; but on receiving a point blank refusal, he made haste to have him executed.²

The dispute between Doria and the Venetians over the possession of Castelnuovo foreshadowed the dissolution of the Holy League; it was the beginning of the end of that chapter of Charles's Turkish wars. From the Spanish point of view, that phase had been most unfortunate. It had served to distract attention from North Africa; and the Venetian alliance, which had formed the keynote of it, had been productive of nothing save misunderstanding and defeat. Soon after the dispute about the occupation of Castelnuovo, the Doge made overtures for peace with the Turks; though these were not finally successful until October, 1540,³ it is clear that the Venetians pinned their faith on them from the very outset, for when the Emperor offered to put them in possession of the fortress that they had

¹ Petit, *André Doria*, pp. 184-185.

² Fernández Duro, i, p. 248.

³ Cf. T. F. Jones, "The Turco-

Venetian Treaty of 1540," in *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1914*, i, pp. 161-167.

coveted, they unhesitatingly refused him.¹ They doubtless had their own suspicions of double dealing on the part of Charles and Doria, and justifiably; for secret negotiations with Barbarossa continued, as we shall later see, for many months to come.² In any case, it was obvious that Spain and Venice could no longer effectively combine; geographically, politically, and commercially, their aims and ideas diverged; and the sole result of the league that had been arranged between them had been to raise the Turkish navy to a position of recognized supremacy in the Mediterranean from which it was not to be displaced till the battle of Lepanto.³ We may well believe that the lesson was not lost on Charles; and the result of it was to bring the purely Spanish side of the war against the infidel, which he had rather neglected ever since the capture of Tunis, again prominently to the fore. Henceforth the North African situation, and the repression of pirate raids, became once more his chief preoccupations; and the scene of interest shifts back from the Adriatic and Ionian seas to the western basin of the Mediterranean.

The summer and early autumn of the year 1540 witnessed three events, all of which reflected the new tendency of affairs. The first was the capture, in the middle of June, of the corsair Dragut, by Giannettino Doria, a nephew of the admiral, and Berenguer de Requesens, commanding the galleys of Sicily.⁴ There had been a good deal of indiscrimi-

¹ Fernández Duro, i, p. 246; Pastor, xi, pp. 295-296.

² Jovius tells us that while the allied fleets lay before Castelnovo, they learned that Barbarossa's ships had been dispersed by a storm and that there was, consequently, an admirable opportunity to attack him. Doria, however, refused to move. Cf. Petit, *André Doria*, p. 184.

³ Cf. Jurien de la Gravière, *Doria et Barberousse*, p. 316; also Cervantes in *Don Quixote*, pt. i, cap. xxxix: "Aquel día [of Lepanto] se desengañó el mundo y todas las naciones del error en que estaban, creyendo que los Turcos eran invencibles por la mar."

⁴ Fernández Duro, i, pp. 249-250; Petit, pp. 185-186, and references there.

nate chasing of this pirate, whose ability and boldness were by this time generally recognized, in the months succeeding the surrender of Castelnuovo; the chief scene of operations was the waters near Sicily, where Dragut had effected a number of daring raids. Neither there, nor off Sardinia, had it been possible to find him, but at last his pursuers had the good fortune to run him down in the inlet of La Giralata, between Calvi and Bastia, on the northern shore of the island of Corsica. So utterly desolate and unfrequented was the place that the infidels had neglected to keep any lookout for the foe. Most of them fled inland when the Christian fleet appeared. Dragut, with a few followers, attempted to put to sea, but was captured, with eleven galleys, two of which had been lost by the Venetians at Prevesa. The corsair was carried off to Genoa, and chained with the other galley slaves to a rowers' bench, until, four years later, he was ransomed by Barbarossa.¹

The inevitable reply to this Christian victory took the form of a raid on the fortress of Gibraltar in the early part of the following September. It was organized in Algiers, at the instigation of Barbarossa. It was led by a Sardinian renegade, who called himself Ali Hamet; and a certain Caramani, who had been a galley slave under Álvaro de Bazán, was placed in command of the accompanying troops.² The expedition consisted of 16 vessels, rowed by about 1000 Spanish captives, and carrying over 2000 soldiers, mostly Turks, with a sprinkling of Valencian Moriscos. It left

¹ Petit, p. 208.

² The chief authorities on this affair, besides López de Ayala and the other standard histories of Gibraltar, are a *Dialogo entre Pedro Barrantes Maldonado y un Caballero extranjero*, first printed in 1566 at Alcalá de Henares and again in 1889 at Madrid in vol. xix of the *Coleccion de Libros Españoles Raros ó*

Curiosos, pp. 17-127; and M. de Saralegui y Medina, *Una sorpresa en tierra y su desquite en la mar* (Madrid, 1912); based on a contemporary Latin poem called *Bernardina* by the humanist Juan de Vilches, and on the researches of José Ferrer de Couto printed on pp. 123-149 of his *Crisol Histórico Español* (2d ed., Havana, 1862).

Algiers on August 24, and turned its course westward in order to avoid the Spanish galleys, which were concentrated at that moment off the Balearics.¹ On September 9 the infidels arrived off Gibraltar, and, concealing their identity by hoisting Spanish flags, landed upwards of 1000 troops before they were discovered. The fortress just managed to hold out against them, but they gutted the town at the base of the Rock, slew twenty of its defenders, took seventy-three prisoners and a lot of booty, played havoc with the smaller vessels that lay at anchor in the harbor, and got away, unscathed, to their own galleys.² For three days more they hung about the Rock, haggling over the amount of ransom that should be paid them for their prisoners. At last, fearing that the Spaniards were inventing delays in order to bring up overwhelming reinforcements, they departed, on September 12, for the Barbary Coast, and cast anchor in the harbor of Velez de la Gomera. Seven thousand ducats were sent after them from Spain, and after prolonged negotiations, the prisoners were given up.³

At the time of the attack on Gibraltar, the Spanish galleys were moving westward from the Balearics, in the hope of getting news of the movements of the infidel fleet. They were commanded, at the time, by Don Bernardino de Mendoza,⁴ who had recently taken the place of Álvaro de Bazán. At Cartagena, on September 18, he learned of the raid on Gibraltar, and though his ships were somewhat less numerous than those of the enemy,⁵ he at once started out to find the foe. Finally, on October 1, off the little island of Alborán,

¹ Saralegui y Medina, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-33.

² *Ibid.*, p. 89, and Fernández Duro, i, pp. 250-251.

³ Saralegui, *op. cit.*, p. 40; Ferrer de Couto, pp. 133-135.

⁴ A brother of the great Diego Hur-

tado de Mendoza and of the viceroy of Mexico.

⁵ Saralegui, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51, maintains that he had thirteen ships in all; three more than most writers assign to him.

125 miles due east from the strait, the rival fleets came into contact. The combat that ensued was fierce in the extreme; both sides were confident of victory and anxious to fight to a finish. Many deeds of heroism were performed on both sides, but after an hour, victory declared itself for the Spaniards. Ten of the enemy's ships were captured and one was sunk; the five others managed to escape. Most of the infidel captains were slain, among them Caramani; upwards of 700 others were killed or wounded; Ali Hamet and more than 400 of his men were taken prisoners, and over 700 Christian captives were set free. On the side of the Spaniards, the loss in killed and wounded was scarcely less heavy than that of their foes; but the moral effects of the victory were so great, and the lesson which it had taught to the pirates had been so severe, that the return of the fleet to Malaga was celebrated with salvos of artillery and triumphal processions.¹

If the results of the Prevesa campaign had cured the Emperor of all desire to make war in alliance with the Venetians against the Turk in the Eastern Mediterranean, they had not caused him to abandon his plans of attempting to win Barbarossa away from the service of the Sultan. The encounters which we have just been describing had all occurred while Charles was absent in the Low Countries. They were due to the activity of the Spanish commanders on the spot, and do not prove that the Emperor had yet made up his mind to trust the solution of the whole naval problem in the Mediterranean to the arbitrament of war. On the contrary, there were many considerations which

¹ Saralegui, pp. 82-83; Ferrer del Couto, pp. 140 ff.; Pedro Barrantes Maldonado, in *Libros Raros ó Curiosos*, xix, pp. 129-161; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 253-254. Saralegui (p. 10) was

apparently unable to find the manuscript of Alonso Arias Riquelme's *Verdadera Relacion*, mentioned in Fernández Duro, i, p. 254, note 2.

urged him to continue the crooked diplomacy of 1537 and 1538. A new war with France was highly probable, and with Barbarossa in supreme command of the entire Turkish navy, the Franco-Turkish alliance would be more menacing than ever. The Emperor's resources were exceedingly low; and the need of chastising the Lutherans in Germany promised in the near future to drain them to the dregs. The ransom of the survivors of the garrison of Castelnuovo gave a pretext for renewing the negotiations that had been broken off on the eve of the battle of Prevesa, and in the autumn of 1539 we find Andrea Doria and the viceroy of Sicily, with the approval of Charles, once more making overtures to Kheireddin Barbarossa.¹ The name of Alarcón no longer appears; the principal agents on this occasion were the contador Juan Gallego, Captain Juan de Vergara, and a certain Doctor Romero, all of whom were in Constantinople in the spring of 1540. So important did Charles consider the pirate's adherence, that he authorized his representatives to offer more for it than before. He would abandon Muley Hassan and give up Tunis; he might even consent to the dismantling of Tripoli and La Goletta.² Barbarossa apparently had professed himself satisfied with the terms which the proposed agreement called on him to perform. He even went so far as to promise Charles to help him in an offensive war against Venice, and to come to his aid if he were attacked by the king of France. Everything seemed, in the early part of 1540, to point to a successful termination of this singular intrigue, when suddenly, at a moment's notice, the whole affair was dropped. According to a letter of Cobos to the Emperor, it would seem that the French representative at Constantinople, the argus-eyed Rinçon, got wind of

¹ *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 530-539.

pp. 82 ff., 337 ff., 436 ff.; Lafuente, xii,

² *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 207-227; G. Cappa, in *Archivio Storico Siciliano*, xxxi,

pp. 186 ff.

the negotiations and told them to Suleiman;¹ but one of Charles's agents at the Porte was convinced that Barbarossa, "more Mussulman than Mahomet," had really been duping the Emperor from first to last; that he had never had any intention of deserting the Sultan, but had entered into negotiations with Charles solely in order to learn his designs, and report them to headquarters. "His treachery is worse," so the agent concludes, "than that of Count Julian or the Bishop Oppas."² Whatever the methods by which it was brought about, it is certain that Charles's projects were terminated for the time being, and they were not to be renewed until 1545.

The failure of his plots made the Emperor ready to fight; in fact, he was most anxious to get in a hard blow before his attention was distracted by the now inevitable war with France. There was little or no question as to where it could be most effectively delivered. The desires of Spain, her traditions in North Africa, and the safety of navigation in the western basin of the Mediterranean, all dictated an assault on the town of Algiers. It had been the chief headquarters of pirate fleets ever since its capture by Arudj Barbarossa in 1516, and the main starting point of the terrible raids of which the Spaniards were constantly complaining. It stood out unsubdued in a region which, for the most part, had been forced to acknowledge the overlordship of Spain; it was a bar to the development of her Mauretanian Empire. A vigorous attack on it might also divert the attention of Suleiman from the Hungarian campaign on which he had started in January, 1541. Indeed, it is highly probable that the Sultan's withdrawal to Constantinople, in the autumn of that year, at the instance of Barbarossa, was

¹ Lafuente, xii, p. 191, and note 2 thereto.

² Cf. E. Watbled and Dr. Monnereau,

"Négociations entre Charles-Quint et Kheir-ed-din (1538-1540),"¹ in *Revue Africaine*, xv, pp. 138-148.

caused by his fears of what Charles might accomplish in the West.

Algiers was at that moment commanded by a henchman of Barbarossa named Hassan Aga. Born in Sardinia, he had been captured in a pirate raid and converted to Islam; and though apparently a eunuch, he had already signalized himself by desperate courage on the field of battle. The garrison he commanded, however, was not large — probably not over 1500 Turks and 5000 or 6000 Andalusian Moors — and it occurred to the Spanish governor of Oran, the Count of Alcaudete, that he might be detached from the service of his Turkish masters, and induced, by the offer of a suitable reward, to deliver up Algiers without attempting a defence.¹ We are not very fully informed in regard to this affair, but it is interesting to observe that it began in the autumn of 1540, or, in other words, at the very moment when it had become obvious that Charles's plan for winning over Barbarossa could not possibly succeed; apparently the habit of secret negotiation with the foe had by this time become so strong in these Turkish wars that it was no sooner checked in one direction than it broke out in another. On this occasion it seems probable that Hassan Aga was really persuaded seriously to consider the surrender of Algiers, but demanded, for appearance's sake, that the Emperor should attack him with forces sufficiently overwhelming to give him an adequate excuse for so doing. Such, at least, seems to be the most obvious explanation of the way in which Charles insisted on undertaking the enterprise so late in the year, at the very stormiest season, and against the advice of all his councillors, of his brother Ferdinand, and even of the Pope. It is not inconsistent with the in-

¹ Sandoval, ii, p. 301; Mercier, iii, p. 51; Ruff, *La Domination Espagnole à Oran*, pp. 69 ff.

solent refusal with which Hassan Aga replied to Charles's demand that he give up Algiers before he was attacked — a refusal which has been explained in so many different ways by Spanish and Moorish historians. In any case, the project ultimately failed. Whether Hassan was merely playing with the Spaniards, or whether, at the critical moment, the protests of his subordinates held him loyal to Barbarossa, it is certain that he defended his post with courage and success, and that a subsequent renewal of negotiations, after the failure of Charles's attack, was unable to win him away from his allegiance.¹

The Emperor spent the summer and early autumn of 1541 in Bavaria and Lombardy. He had begun his preparations for attacking Algiers long beforehand, but apparently had succeeded in keeping them secret, for we learn that Hassan Aga was not apprised of them until just before the expedition sailed.² The rendezvous for the different detachments had been fixed at the Balearics, where the Emperor arrived, with the galleys of Andrea Doria, on October 13, to find Ferrante Gonzaga with 8000 Spanish troops from Naples and Sicily, 6000 Germans, and 6000 Italians awaiting him; but the force from Spain, under Bernardino de Mendoza and the Duke of Alva, was so slow in getting started that the Emperor subsequently sent word for it to proceed directly to the North African coast, where he finally united with it on October 21. All told, the expedition numbered 65 galleys and 450 other ships, with 12,000 sailors and 24,000 troops. Almost all the greatest soldiers of Spain accompanied it, among them Hernando Cortés, the conqueror of Mexico, who had returned from the Indies in the preceding

¹ The documents on this point are to be found in the *Revue Africaine*, ix, pp. 379-385. Cf. also Ruff, pp. 69-71; Mercier, iii, pp. 50-51, and H. D. de

Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger sous la domination Turque* (Paris, 1887), pp. 57-58.

² Ruff, p. 70.

year. On Sunday, the twenty-third, the troops were landed at the head of the bay, near the mouth of the Harrach, southeast of Algiers; while the fleet was left scattered along the shores, completely at the mercy of any storm that might blow up.¹

On the morning of the twenty-fourth, the march on the city began: the Spaniards, under Gonzaga, in the lead, the Emperor, with the Germans, in the centre, and the Italians in the rear.² The army was much hampered in its advance by a series of sudden attacks from light armed Berber troops. To avoid this embarrassment, it was decided to carry the heights of Koudiat-es-Saboun, whose deep ravines promised to afford much needed shelter. This feat was promptly performed by two Spanish regiments; the Emperor at once transferred his headquarters to the new position, and by nightfall the whole army was safely intrenched from the shores of the bay to the crest of the heights, whence it could sweep the city with a devastating fire. Inside Algiers there was terror and confusion. It is said that in the evening a Moor stole out and was brought before the Emperor, and begged him, when he assaulted on the morrow, to leave one of the gates of the city unguarded in order that the inhabitants might have a means of escape.³ Everything combined, on the evening of the 24th, to convince the Emperor that he was certain of his game.

¹ A critical account of the different authorities on the siege of Algiers is to be found in G. Turba, *Über den Zug Kaiser Karls V. gegen Algier* (Vienna, 1890), and it does not seem worth while to enumerate them here. Besides the standard works like Cerezeda, Vandenesse, Sandoval, Jovius, Fernández Duro, Mercier, and the rest, special mention may be made of the *Relation* of N. D. de Villegaignon, edited by H. D. de Grammont in 1874, and de Grammont's own *Histoire d'Alger sous la Domination Turque* (1887); I have followed the latter for the main points of the narrative.

There is a manuscript account of the siege by a seventeenth-century writer called Diego Suarez, in the Biblioteca Nacional at Madrid, which is summarized on pp. 73-78 of E. Cat's *Mission Bibliographique en Espagne* (Paris, 1891). Cf. also the note to Armstrong, *Charles V.*, ii, p. 7, and Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2416-17, 2424-25.

² De Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger*, pp. 59 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 60. It was apparently however at this juncture also that Hassan Aga scornfully refused the Emperor's demand that he surrender.

But shortly before midnight rain began to fall, and rapidly increased in violence; a wind also blew up from the north-west, and before many hours had become a howling gale. The Christians were unable to find adequate shelter from the elements, and the defenders, perceiving their situation, determined to profit by it. In the small hours of the morning of the 25th, they directed a sortie in force against the Italians, who broke and fled before them. The heroism and devotion of a small detachment of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem served to check the retreat before it became a rout, and ultimately drove the assailants back within the walls; the Emperor also showed courage and presence of mind, and rallied his Germans¹ for an attack on the foe. But the rain had rendered the muskets and cannon of the besiegers well-nigh useless, while the Moors shot their crossbows from the walls with deadly effect; and the discouragement of the Christians reached the point of demoralization when they looked out on the bay and saw what the storm had done to their fleet. No less than 140 vessels had been driven, utterly helpless, upon the shore. It was necessary to send off company after company to protect the shipwrecked crews from Moorish attacks. Worst of all, it soon became evident that Andrea Doria did not dare to risk the rest of his fleet by remaining where he was; and he finally despatched a swimmer to the shore to beg the Emperor to abandon the enterprise, and to inform him that he would await him in the more sheltered waters off Cape Matifou. When the soldiers saw the admiral weigh anchor, they gave up in despair. They were tired, wet, and desperately hungry,² and obviously in no condition to fight. On the morning of the 26th, to the amazement of the Algerians, Charles began to

¹ There is some question about this. Some historians give the credit to the Italians. Cf. de Grammont, p. 61, note.

² Apparently few supplies, if any, had been landed on the 23d; cf. Mercier, iii, pp. 52-53.

withdraw his forces to the eastward. Three days later, they reached Cape Matifou. At a council of war the preponderant opinion was in favor of retirement. It was in vain that Hernando Cortés, who had been confronted with far more difficult situations in the war against the Aztecs, assured the Emperor that if he were allowed to remain with a small portion of the army, he felt perfectly certain he could conquer Algiers;¹ the more cautious advice of Doria prevailed, and on November 1 the army began to embark. The ships were in bad condition and terribly overcrowded. The bad weather persisted throughout the month. There were several wrecks, and Charles, who was the last to set sail, was forced to put into the port of Bugia to refit; he did not reach Majorca till November 26, nor Cartagena till December 2. The total losses are almost impossible to ascertain; but it does not seem likely that they were less than 150 ships and 12,000 men, not to speak of large quantities of cannon and supplies; in Spain it was believed that Charles himself had been killed, and his return was consequently celebrated with rejoicings.² The moral effects of the defeat were of course immense. It was the first serious reverse that the Emperor had ever sustained. It weakened his confidence in his own good fortune, while it encouraged the infidels to greater activity than ever. Hassan Aga was loaded with presents by Suleiman and given the title of Pasha. Algiers was henceforth regarded as impregnable; while the raids of the Barbary corsairs and pirates became an even worse menace to Western Christendom than before.

¹ Gómara, *Crónica de los Barbarrojas*, in *M. H. E.*, vi, p. 433.

² De Grammont, pp. 65-68; Fernández Duro, i, p. 259; Mercier, iii, p. 54. It appears that Barbarossa, who had been closely in touch with the situation at Algiers, had desired, ever

since the early summer, to take part in the approaching conflict. Palace intrigues, however, prevented his departure from Constantinople till October, so that he was just too late to catch the Emperor on his way back to Spain.

From the failure before Algiers to the end of the reign, the war against the infidel rather falls into the background. Charles himself took no further active part in it. He was busy with Continental politics and the suppression of the Lutherans; he was only too glad to leave his Turkish and Moorish enemies alone, provided they would consent to do the same by him; indeed his chief contribution to the struggle after 1541 was another attempt to gain peace with his foes. The story of that attempt we must now briefly relate, and then pass to the remaining conflicts on the Mediterranean and in North Africa.

The Franco-Turkish alliance caused Charles more annoyance than ever during the Hapsburg-Valois war of 1542-44. Andrea Doria was unable to deal effectively with the joint fleets of his foes, and at the end Barbarossa was permitted to ransom Dragut.¹ In 1545 the Emperor wished to concentrate against the Lutherans; and accordingly despatched a secret envoy, one Gerard Veltwyck, to Constantinople, in the hope of getting peace with Suleiman on the Danube, and with Barbarossa as well in the Mediterranean and North Africa. Veltwyck's instructions and correspondence are complicated and very interesting.² He was apparently commanded to carry on his negotiations ostensibly in accord with the French ambassador, and for the purpose of obtaining a joint peace; but he was also given private orders of his own. He was urged to try to bring Venice into the discussion in such a way as would render the Emperor safe in that quarter, and to checkmate any possible efforts of the Lutherans to get help at the Porte. On the Danube Charles's emissary soon accomplished his purpose. An eighteen months' truce there was arranged on November 10,

¹ Petit, *André Doria*, pp. 202 ff.

in *Messenger des Sciences Historiques de Belgique* for 1843, pp. 59-70.

² Printed in Lanz, *Correspondenz*, ii, pp. 435-450, 453-478; cf. also Piot,

1545, to be converted in June, 1547, into a permanent peace; the rumblings of a war with Persia which broke out in 1548 were doubtless a strong factor in causing Suleiman to agree to a suspension of hostilities in the West.¹ As for Barbarossa, it was plain that Charles was in mortal terror lest he should attack Tunis; and Veltwyck was therefore charged to inform him that if he would refrain, the Emperor would make no effort to oust him from Algiers and the other North African ports of which he illegally held possession. This singularly one-sided proposal was naturally not accepted; but the Emperor was relieved of the worst of his anxieties in that direction by the death of the old pirate on July 4, 1546, at the age of at least eighty;² he was certainly one of the most picturesque figures in the whole history of naval warfare. But if Barbarossa was gone, Dragut still remained, as Charles and Spain were to learn to their cost. In the year 1550 the Mediterranean was ablaze once more.

Dragut's four years as a galley slave in the service of Doria made him burn for revenge on his Christian captors. After his ransom by Barbarossa in 1544, he devoted all his energies to the collection of a fleet, which should enable him to dominate the Western Mediterranean. He carried neither the banner of the Sultan, nor of any of the North African states, but flew a red and white flag with a blue crescent on it, emblematic of his freedom from all overlordship, and of his resolve to maintain complete independence.³ Partly by treachery, and partly by force, he managed, in the early months of 1550, to establish himself at Monastir and El Mehedia, to the southeast of Tunis; thence he organized ravaging expeditions against the Sicilian, Neapolitan, and

¹ Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, iii, pp. 28 ff., and references there.

² Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, iii, p. 269.

³ Fernández Duro, i, p. 278; Petit, *André Doria*, p. 312.

Spanish coasts. By midsummer of that year, the situation had become intolerable, and Charles, who was busy in the Netherlands and the Empire, sent orders to Andrea Doria and Juan de Vega, the viceroy of Sicily, to oust the pirate from his new headquarters.¹ The expedition had the good fortune to arrive at its destination while Dragut was absent on a piratical raid. Monastir surrendered without attempting a defence; the troops and artillery were promptly landed; and, most important of all, Doria was able to place his ships in such fashion as to cut off Dragut, on his return, from bearing aid to El Mehedia. The siege of that fortress was long and very difficult. Incredible amounts of ammunition were shot away before it was possible to breach the walls, and many gallant lives were lost in the ensuing assault, but finally, on September 10, the place was entered, the defenders were overpowered, and those who were not killed, reduced to slavery. A strong Spanish garrison was installed, and on September 25 the victors sailed away to receive the plaudits of all the Hapsburg lands; but the sequel soon showed that these rejoicings were premature.²

Dragut, infuriated at the loss of El Mehedia, retired temporarily to the island of Gerba, where Doria went to seek him out in the spring of 1551. The admiral caught the pirate fleet in an inlet from which escape without a conflict seemed absolutely impossible, and contented himself with guarding the entrance to it. But Dragut was more than equal to

¹ The date is 1550, despite Mercier, iii, p. 72, who would make it 1551, and Fernández Duro, i, pp. 281-284, who would put it in 1547. Cf. Sandoval, ii, pp. 494-515; Petit, pp. 312 ff.; and P. Rachel, *Die Geschichtsschreibung über den Krieg Karls V. gegen die Stadt Mahedia* (Dresden, 1879).

² The standard contemporary accounts of this capture are those of J. C. Calvete de Estrella, *De Aphrodisio*

expugnato Commentarius on fols. 153-183 of *Rerum a Carolo V. in Africa bello gestarum Commentarii*, collected by C. D. Schepper or Scepperus, and published at Antwerp in 1555; and of Pedro de Salazar, *Historia de la guerra de Africa*, etc. (Naples, 1552). For further information about these and other works, cf. P. Rachel, *Geschichtsschreibung über den Krieg Karls V. gegen Mahedia*.

the occasion. While he distracted Doria's attention by a heavy artillery fire from the shore, he caused all his ships to be dragged overland, on greased ways, to the other side of the island of Gerba, where he launched them and got away without his opponents being any the wiser.¹ Such energy did not long remain unnoticed by the Sultan; the next time that Dragut was heard from, he bore an official title and commanded Suleiman's galleys.² Aided by a still larger fleet under the terrible Sinan 'the Jew,' he attacked the strongholds of the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem. At Malta, their principal fortress, he was repulsed: but he had no difficulty in capturing the neighboring island of Gozzo; and finally on August 16, 1551, he took Tripoli, where the Order had been established since 1528.³ El Mehedia itself was in grave danger of sharing the same fate, more especially as its garrison was discontented and mutinous; and so, after the Tripolitan Knights had been offered and refused an opportunity to establish themselves there, it was abandoned and dismantled in 1554.⁴ All the fruits of its capture in 1550 had been thrown away; and the reign ended with the Turk in the ascendant on the sea.

The land operations of the Spaniards against the infidel in North Africa during the closing years of the Emperor's reign were even more unfortunate than their ventures on the Mediterranean. Their failure, several times noted here-

¹ Petit, *André Doria*, pp. 317 ff. and references there. P. de Salazar, *Historia*, fols. lxxxii ff., tells a slightly different story.

² Sandoval, ii, p. 515; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 285-286.

³ The command of the place was in the hands of a French Knight of the Order, named Gaspard de Villiers, and the fact that the Baron d'Aramon, French ambassador at Constantinople was present on one of the Turkish ships,

and in constant communication with the garrison, lends color to the idea that the place was not defended so vigorously as it might have been. Cf. P. de Salazar, *Historia*, fols. lxxxiii ff.; Fernández Duro, i, pp. 286-287.

⁴ Full details and documents in regard to this interesting episode may be found in N. Alonso Cortés, *Don Hernando de Acuña* (Valladolid and Havana, 1913), pp. 75-85, 117-130.

tofore, to make any serious effort to penetrate inland, or to establish their authority elsewhere than on the coast, had caused deep dissatisfaction to the more enthusiastic of the expansionists. When, in the spring of 1535, Martin de Córdova y Velasco, the brave but imperious Count of Alcaudete, arrived at Oran with the title of captain-general,¹ he determined to do his utmost to atone for this defect; but the remedy he applied proved worse than the disease.

The goal of his efforts was the kingdom of Tlemcen, whose capital was the chief centre of the commerce of the western part of North Africa. The puppet sovereign set up there by the Marquis of Comares in 1518 had recently found difficulty in maintaining himself against rivals supported by Barbarossa, whose predominance in the seaports of Tenes and Mostaganem enabled him to influence the course of Tlemcen's trade; and Alcaudete's first act, on arriving at Oran, was to despatch a strong force to reëstablish the Spanish protégé.² But the expedition, after having been on the point of scoring a notable success, was forced to retire with its mission unaccomplished. Indeed, had it not been for the effect of the contemporaneous success of the Emperor at Tunis, the last vestige of Spanish authority at Tlemcen would have been shattered then and there.³ As it was, the different claimants continued to quarrel for the control until after the defeat of Charles at Algiers, when Alcaudete, convinced of the necessity of striking some vigorous blow in order to rehabilitate Spain's badly shaken prestige, offered to fit out a fresh expedition for the conquest of the kingdom.

¹ P. Ruff, *La Domination Espagnole à Oran sous le Gouvernement du Comte d'Alcaudete, 1534-1558*, pp. 1-11, 23-36. Previously the power had been divided between a corregidor and the commander of the local garrison.

² In June-July 1535, despite Mercier (iii, p. 58) to the contrary, who wrongly

places the expedition in 1543. Cf. Ruff, p. 38, note 1; and G. Jacqueton, "L'Expédition d'A. Martinez de Angulo contre Tlemcen," in *Revue Africaine*, xxvi (1892), pp. 149-165.

³ Ruff, pp. 43 ff., and references there. Marmol and Mercier exaggerate the importance of the Spanish repulse.

This time he had better success than before. He won two bloody battles over superior forces on February 3 and 5, 1543; on February 6 he entered the city of Tlemcen at the head of his troops.¹ But instead of installing a strong Spanish garrison — the sole possible way to secure what he had won — he intrusted his conquest to the same local vassal who had previously given his allegiance to the Emperor, with the result that shortly afterwards the Turkish protégé regained control.² In 1547 Alcaudete returned to the charge once more, entered Tlemcen and again set up a puppet ruler; but by this time his Turkish rivals had learned what the Spaniards were apparently never able to comprehend, namely, the futility of all efforts to maintain control through vassal kings. In the spring of 1552 the redoubtable Hassan Corso, sent in from Algiers, conquered Tlemcen and established a Turkish governor and garrison, and therewith all Alcaudete's hopes of recapturing it were gone.³ Henceforth the scene of the conflict transfers itself to the presidios on the coast, where the Spaniards during the remaining years of the reign continued to fight a losing contest.

In September, 1555, they were forced to surrender Bugia, which capitulated to Salah Reis, the new and energetic viceroy of Algiers, after twelve days of hopeless resistance. The generous terms which the Spanish commander, Alonso de Peralta, demanded and obtained at the time of the surrender were afterwards shamefully violated by the victors. The majority of the garrison was enslaved; Peralta and the rest were cast adrift on the Mediterranean and only reached Alicante by a miracle. Bugia had been uninterruptedly in Spanish hands for a period of forty-five years,

¹ [F. de la Cueva], *Relacion de la Guerra del Reino de Tremecen* in vol. xv of *Coleccion de Libros Españoles Raros ó Curiosos* (*Guerras de los Españoles en*

Africa) (Madrid, 1881); Ruff, pp. 74-102.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 109 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 118-131.

and so deeply was the nation cast down by the news of its loss that Peralta was executed in the public square at Valladolid, a really innocent victim of the popular wrath.¹ In the following year the death of Salah Reis necessitated the abandonment of a Turkish project to besiege Oran, and Alcaudete, taking advantage of the ensuing demoralization of his foes, began collecting a large force to besiege Mostaganem. But there were as usual interminable delays. Not until August, 1558, was the expedition able to start, and the Turks had been given their opportunity to prepare.² An assault, delivered under hopeless conditions, suffered a disastrous repulse. A retreat ensued and soon became a rout. Alcaudete was slain in an attempt to rally the fugitives, and only a handful got back to Oran. The Emperor was on his death bed when the sad news reached Castile; and it was decided not to darken his last hours by telling him what had occurred.³

Taken as a whole, Charles's reign had witnessed a radical alteration of the aspect of the conflict between Spain and the infidel. He had inherited from his predecessors merely a desultory struggle for supremacy in North Africa, which had been constantly relegated to the background by the pressure of other affairs. In the period of his rule, new elements had come into play, which had served to create fresh ramifications of the contest, and invest it with a new and far wider significance. Practically all of these new elements had been the result, directly or indirectly, of the advance of the Turks in the Danube valley and in the Medi-

¹ The best contemporary account of the loss of Bugia, by a Biscayan priest who was present on the occasion, was published by C. Fernández Duro in the *Boletín de la R. A. H.*, xxix (1896), pp. 465-537; cf. also de Grammont,

Histoire d'Alger, p. 81; Mercier, iii, pp. 80-81, and references there.

² Ruff, pp. 144-151, *passim*.

³ Ruff, pp. 144-164, and references there.

terranean. The task of defending the Austrian lands was never absent from the Emperor's mind, and Spanish gold and Spanish soldiers were being constantly requisitioned to enable him to accomplish it. The rise of the Barbarossas not only brought the Ottoman power into rivalry with Spain for the control of North Africa. It subjected the coasts of the peninsula and its dependencies to merciless raids, of which the inhabitants were constantly complaining. It imperilled the whole structure of Spain's Mediterranean empire by menacing communication between the different parts of it, and thus forced Charles into naval warfare upon a large scale. What had been but a side issue of the latter part of the reign of the Catholic Kings was now thrust prominently into the foreground. In one or another of its various phases, the war with the infidel was one of the Emperor's most unceasing cares.

It must be confessed that the story as a whole is rather a record of failure than of success. On the Danube the Turk, in 1558, was perhaps less of a menace than in 1529 or in 1532, but he was certainly far more dangerous than in 1516. In the Mediterranean the situation was very much worse. Navigation in the western basin of it had hitherto been generally safe; but at the time of Charles's death, there was no area between Gibraltar and Constantinople which was not likely to be visited by infidel corsairs; while the verdict of Prevesa, in 1538, had established, at least for the time being, the primacy of the Ottoman fleet. In North Africa the Spaniards were distinctly weaker at the end of the reign than at the beginning; and it is with good reason that the most recent Mohammedan history of the region calls the period beginning with Charles's accession, that of "the revival of Islam."¹ Since the death of Ferdinand the

¹ I. Hamet, *Histoire du Maghreb* (Paris, 1923), pp. 257 ff.

Catholic, Spain had lost Algiers and Tripoli, Bugia, Tenes, Dellys, and Velez de la Gomera. She had taken El Mehedia in 1550 only to abandon it in 1554; she had gained the overlordship of Tlemcen only to lose it again, and had been forced to give up all hopes of penetrating into the interior. Moreover her one great conquest, the capture of Tunis and La Goletta, had proved, before the end of the reign, to be largely illusory. Her vassal, Muley Hassan, was unable to maintain authority there. In 1542, he was dethroned, imprisoned, and blinded by his son Ahmed, who ruled till 1569 in no friendly spirit to the Spaniards; even the commander of the Spanish garrison at La Goletta adopted the customs and costume of Islam.¹ The prestige of Spain, as a conqueror of the infidel, was lower at the end of Charles's reign than at the beginning.

As far as the situation in North Africa was concerned, the cause of Spain's ill success was fundamentally the same as that which had explained her halting progress there under the Catholic Kings.² The whole matter had been treated as a side issue. There was no systematic or continuous policy for the permanent establishment of Spanish power. No consistent efforts were made to penetrate the interior, or even effectively to colonize the regions already won. The garrisons in the coast towns were inadequate and ill-furnished. The fortifications were allowed to fall into disrepair. Above all, there was a constant tendency to rely on puppet vassal kings — Moorish chieftains whose loyalty to Spain was measured solely by their dread of Turkish domination or their fear of dethronement by some local rival. We have remarked that Charles had been obliged to take the infidel problem as a whole more seriously than his grandparents

¹ Mercier, iii, pp. 56-57; Bona, too, was really back in Turkish hands at

the end of the reign. *Ibid.*, pp. 56, 83.

² Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 258-260.

had done before him, at least after the fall of Granada in 1492; but the portions of it that claimed his most urgent attention were the struggle for naval supremacy and the wars on the Danube. The essentially Spanish side of the problem — the consolidation of the North African conquests — was relegated to the background quite as emphatically as before. It was all an interesting example of the way in which Spain's mounting power and prestige under Charles were counterbalanced by her enforced assumption of new duties and responsibilities. She was mighty, indeed, as she had never been before, but, on the other hand, she had never before had anywhere nearly so much to do. A French historian has said of the Emperor, "[Sa] force a toujours été exactement égale à sa faiblesse,"¹ and the generalization is especially true of his rule in his Iberian dominions. Spain's increased resources had to be almost exclusively applied to what her monarch regarded as his most serious responsibility — the wars against different enemies for the maintenance of Hapsburg supremacy in Western Europe. North Africa from the outset had been subsidiary to these, and though the experience of Charles's reign had served to show him that it was far more important than he had originally thought, he was never able to afford sufficient time, money, or men to establish the Spanish power there with any measure of permanence.

¹ Lavisso, *Histoire de France*, v, 2, p. 15.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

See note at the end of Chapter XVIII, and add :

Sources. — The best account of the unpublished material on the subject dealt with in this chapter may be found in Édouard Cat, *Mission Bibliographique en Espagne* (Paris, 1891); cf. also footnotes to pp. 311 and 337, above. In addition to the printed sources in the standard collections, elsewhere referred to, the most important contemporaneous published Spanish accounts of the naval and North African campaigns are perhaps Francisco López de Gómara's "Crónica de los Barbarrojas" in *M. H. E.*, vi, pp. 331-439; the different 'relations' collected by C. D. Scepperus or Schepper and published at Antwerp in 1555 under the title of *Rerum a Carolo V. Cesare Augusto in Africa Bello gestarum Commentarii*; the *Historia de la guerra de Africa* by P. de Salazar (Naples, 1552); and the "Dialogo entre Pedro Barrantes Maldonado y un Caballero extranjero" and the "Relacion de la Guerra del Reino de Tremecen" in vols. xix and xv of the *Coleccion de Libros Españoles Raros ó Curiosos*. Further details in regard to most of these and other works may be found in Georg Voigt, *Die Geschichtschreibung über den Zug Karl's V. gegen Tunis (1535)* (Leipzig, 1872); P. Rachel, *Die Geschichtsschreibung über den Krieg Karls V. gegen Mahedia* (Dresden, 1879); and G. Turba, *Über den Zug Karls V. gegen Algier* (Vienna, 1890). The first two volumes of *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, published by E. Charrière in the *Collection de Documents Inédits* (Paris, 1848-60, 4 vols.), are, of course, fundamental for any study of the relations of the Turks with the Christian states of Western Europe in this period. Of the various contemporary Turkish and Moorish accounts, the most interesting and important is the so-called *R'Azouat* or *Ghazewati Aroudj we Kheir-ed-Din* (the victories of Arudj and Kheir-ed-din), published in French by Sander (or Alexandre) Rang and F. Denis (Paris, 1837, 2 vols.) under the title of *Fondation de la Régence d'Alger, Histoire des Barberousse*. The theory of A. Berbrugger (*Le Pégnon d Alger*, p. 10) that this work was dictated by Kheir-ed-din Barbarossa was called in question by H. de Grammont in a small monograph (*Le R'azouat, est-il l'oeuvre de Kheir-ed-Din (Barberousse)*, Villeneuve-sur-Lot, 1873), but there can be no doubt that it was written by some one who lived through and participated in the events he describes.

Modern Works. — The best general work on the naval side of the war is vol. i of C. Fernández Duro's *Armada Española* (Madrid, 1895). The writer had access to many sources previously unknown, and

despite a few minor inaccuracies, he used them to the best advantage. Close beside it stand the monographs of E. Petit, *André Doria* (Paris, 1887); J. P. Jurien de la Gravière, *Doria et Barberousse* (Paris, 1886); Édouard Cat, *De Caroli V in Africa Rebus gestis* (Paris, 1891); C. Manfroni, *Storia della Marina Italiana dalla Caduta di Constantinopoli alla Battaglia di Lepanto* (Rome, 1897); P. Ruff, *La Domination Espagnole à Oran sous le comte d'Alcaudete* (Paris, 1900); and J. Ursu, *La politique orientale de François I^{er}* (Paris, 1908). For the Mohammedan side of the story the best general account is that contained in N. Jorga's *Geschichte des osmanischen Reiches*, vols. ii and iii (Gotha, 1909-10); it virtually supersedes Hammer's work of the same title and other earlier authorities. Besides the great book of Mercier, cited in Chapter XVIII, which still remains the standard authority on the history of North Africa in this period, the works of Charles de Rotalier, *Histoire d'Alger et de la piraterie des Turcs* (Paris, 1841, 2 vols.); of A. Berbrugger, *Le Pégnon d'Alger* (Algiers, 1860); and of H. de Grammont, *Histoire d'Alger sous la Domination Turque* (Paris, 1887), will be found very useful. I. Hamet, *Histoire du Maghreb* (Paris, 1923), gives the most recent presentation of the subject from the Moorish point of view.

For numerous minor monographs and other articles of such special nature that they could not be inserted here, the reader is referred to the footnotes in the text.

CHAPTER XXVI

GERMANY, ENGLAND, AND CHARLES'S LAST YEARS

IF Spain was anxious to have Charles make peace with Christian kings in order to save time and strength to fight the infidel, she was even more desirous to have him utilize the resources which could be husbanded by the cessation of the wars with France for the purpose of putting down the Lutherans in the Empire. In her eyes the suppression of heresy was the most important task of all; even her chronic complaints about the Emperor's prolonged absences could be silenced by the plea that he was departing to attack the Protestants. Doubtless the Spanish monarch had been obliged by the political situation to postpone that work much longer than he desired. The development of Lutheranism since 1521 showed that it was far more than the mere monkish quarrel which Leo X had thought. Every year it became plainer that Charles could not hope to overthrow it until all his other responsibilities had been cleared away. This was not accomplished till the winter of 1544-45, when the Emperor's last war with Francis I had been closed by the peace of Crespy, and a truce with the Turk on the Danube, though not actually signed until the following November, was clearly in prospect.¹ Then, and not till then, were Charles's hands free.

Yet never, in all his career, were the Emperor's caution and foresight more plainly manifest than at the moment when he resolved to open his long delayed campaign against his

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 340; Jorga, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches*, iii, p. 28.

Lutheran foes. His recent successes, more especially his triumph over the rebel duke of Cleves, had convinced him, so he tells us in his memoirs, that it would not be impossible "to restrain such presumption by force; indeed it appeared quite an easy task if undertaken with adequate means, and under favorable circumstances"¹; but he was determined to render those means so adequate and those circumstances so favorable as to make assurance doubly sure. His army needed strengthening after the strain of the recent war with France; particularly was he in want of Spanish soldiers, whose orthodoxy would make them willing fighters in a war for the suppression of heresy, and whose efficiency was already the terror of Western Europe. Even more essential was it for him to justify his cause before the world, to prove that he had no idea of unrighteous conquest, and that his sole object was to preserve the unity of the church, as a Holy Roman Emperor was in honor bound to do. Finally, it was of the utmost importance that he make sure of the attitude of the papacy, for whose benefit, in one sense, he was proposing to wage war, and whose hearty coöperation was indispensable to success. And as the easiest means of effecting these ends, Charles called on the Pope in the autumn of 1544 to summon the general council of Christendom, which had been so often demanded ever since the beginning of Paul's pontificate, but which, for one reason or another, had never been able to meet for effective business.² If such a council were summoned, the Lutherans would have no excuse for refusing to attend it. If they did so refuse, Charles would be absolved from all his promises to leave them in peace; if they did not, they would be certain to be outvoted

¹ Morel-Fatio, pp. 258-259, "Mémoires de Charles-Quint."

² Pastor, xii, p. 207. A council had been summoned and actually opened at

Trent in the spring of 1542; but the attendance was so small that Paul adjourned it. Cf. Wilhelm Moeller. *History of the Christian Church*, iii, p. 135,

by the Catholics, and the Emperor would gain their submission without a war. As for the Pope, the council would be a means of holding him in leash, as similar councils had been for his fifteenth-century predecessors; Charles could test the genuineness¹ of his enthusiasm for ecclesiastical reform. The choice of the meeting place, which must have been foreseen — at Trent in Tyrol — was deeply significant. Nominally German, it was really Italian in sentiment and affiliation, and close to many important Italian sees. A council meeting there would not be “free, Christian, and general,” as the Lutherans desired; it would infallibly be dominated by Spanish and Italian bishops; and yet it would formally comply with the expressed wish of the Protestants that it should meet on German soil. As Charles had doubtless foreseen would be the case, the Lutherans declined to fall into the trap. They refused to recognize the validity of the council or be bound by its decisions; when it finally opened on December 13, 1545, not a single one of them was found to be in attendance.²

From that moment war was inevitable, and the Emperor began to prepare for it in earnest. The complicated tale of his diplomatic negotiations with the different German princes does not concern us here, but the military side of the story is of great interest, for Spanish soldiers played an important part in the ensuing campaigns, and the reputation and dread of the Spanish arms were thereby much enhanced. Charles passed the year 1545 and the early part of 1546 in the Netherlands and on the Rhine. In April, 1546, he moved across to Ratisbon, partly to hold a Diet, at which his secret agreements with the different princes he had won over to support him were concluded, and still more to take up an advantage-

¹ Of which, in contrast to most Protestant historians, the Catholic Pastor is firmly convinced. *History*

of the Popes, vols. xi and xii, *passim*.

² Pastor, xii, pp. 240 ff.

ous position for the union of the various bodies of troops which began to pour in on him from south, east, and west. Among the first to arrive was Don Álvaro de Sande with his *tercio* of 2800 Spaniards from Hungary; another Spanish contingent, 3000 strong, came on from Lombardy; and scattering German levies streamed in from the different states of the Empire.¹ On August 12, at Landshut, Charles effected a junction with the 12,000 Italian troops under Ottavio Farnese, which the Pope, by a treaty of alliance of the previous June,² had promised to furnish him. He now had an army of nearly 40,000 men. It seems probable, however, that he was still numerically inferior to his Lutheran foes,³ who had concentrated their forces near Ingolstadt to the west of him, in the hope of preventing his union with the only large contingent which he still expected — some 15,000 to 20,000 troops from the Netherlands, under Maximilian of Egmont, Count of Buren. Charles's forces, as usual, were heterogeneous to the last degree, and the Duke of Alva, who was his constant adviser throughout the campaign, urged him to avoid a pitched battle until he was more certain to win.⁴

There are few instances in history of a military inefficiency more glaring than that displayed by the Schmalkaldic forces in the summer of 1546. Whatever the relative size of the two armies after the arrival of the papal levies in August, it is certain that until that time the Lutherans

¹ Luis de Ávila y Zúñiga, "Comentario de la Guerra de Alemania," in *B. A. E.*, xxi, p. 412; Janssen, *History of the German People*, tr. Christie, vi, p. 337.

² The text of this treaty is given in *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland 1533-1559*, ix (Gotha, 1899), pp. 575-578; also in Pastor, xii, pp. 288-289.

³ Pastor, xii, p. 296, thinks the arrival of the papal levies gave Charles the numerical superiority; but in view of the statements of contemporary historians on the Protestant side, this

seems somewhat doubtful. The Protestants had between fifty and sixty thousand men.

⁴ This Schmalkaldic campaign has been gone over with the utmost thoroughness by recent German historians, of whom perhaps the most prominent are S. Riezler, *Geschichte Baierns*, and in *Abhandl. der bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaften*, hist. Classe, xxi (1895), and M. Lenz, in *Historische Zeitschrift*, lxxvi, pp. 462-468.

were enormously superior; had they struck at once, after Charles arrived at Ratisbon, they would have had the game in their own hands. Divided leadership, and excessive respect for the counsels of Martin Luther¹ to avoid aggressive warfare, and "let the word of God take care of itself," were doubtless chiefly responsible for their mistakes; in any case it is certain that the Emperor took advantage of them in masterly fashion. It was on August 28 that the opposing forces first came into contact, on the plain before Ingolstadt; but the ensuing engagement was limited to a half-hearted cannonade; the Lutherans did not venture a vigorous attack. During the following week they had recourse to abusive letters. On the thirtieth they declared that "the Antichrist at Rome . . . had issued a decree that all the wells, fountains, and other bodies of stagnant water in Germany should be poisoned, in order that by the joint malice of Emperor, Pope, and Devil, the slaughter of man and beast may be accomplished." On September 2, they wrote Charles that 'under pretence of obedience to God's word, and the Christian religion, he had forgotten his vows made to God, his Lord and Creator, at his baptism, and violated his oath to the whole German nation'; this letter, says the Lutheran, Sastrow, "was not written by man, but by Lucifer himself, with the characters of hell; it cost the German nation tons of gold, the lives of many thousands of its citizens, and the shame and dishonor of multitudes of women and girls, all of which might have been avoided had the letter remained unwritten; they challenged the Emperor's authority with it and then ran away."² It was on September 4 that the Lutheran retreat began. Its object, in so far as it had any at all, was to cut off Buren's detach-

¹ Luther had died in the previous February.

² Cf. Janssen, *op. cit.*, vi, pp. 338-339.

ment, which was advancing from the west, but even in this it was unsuccessful. On September 15 the Netherlanders arrived safely at the Emperor's camp before Ingolstadt and brought the total of the Imperial forces to more than 60,000 men. But not even yet did Charles venture to take the offensive. Alva's policy of inactivity had more than justified itself in the past. The season was getting late. If the enemy did not force him to a pitched battle, he was only too glad to let things remain in statu quo. And so the next two weeks were spent in doing nothing, on the upper Danube, between Ulm and Giengen; there was not even a skirmish between the hostile forces. The cold German autumn played havoc with Charles's Italian levies; there was much disease, and many desertions. The Spaniards were better off, but made trouble about their pay. The case of the Lutherans was even worse. Their treasury was empty; subsidies that had been promised from France and the South German towns did not arrive; and when, in early November, news came that Charles's brother Ferdinand and Duke Maurice of Albertine Saxony had entered upon the conquest of the Ernestine lands (which had been formally transferred to the latter by the Emperor on October 27), it was the signal for the scattering of the Schmalkaldic forces to the four winds of heaven. The municipal levies departed one by one; Philip, the landgrave of Hesse, retired "to his two wives"; and the Elector, John Frederick of Saxony, too late to recover his territories before winter set in, consoled himself by plundering the defenceless dependencies of the Empire.¹

In the following spring all eyes were turned on Saxony, for John Frederick had managed to collect a considerable force during the winter months, and obviously proposed to use it

¹ Pastor, xii, pp. 297-299; and Janssen, vi, pp. 344 ff., and references there.

for the recovery of the electoral lands. The Emperor had not originally intended to take the field himself, but had sent to Maurice a reinforcement of 7000 men, under Albert Alciades of Brandenburg-Culmbach. These troops, however, were surprised and defeated by the elector on March 2 at Rochlitz, and it soon became clear that Charles would have to come in person to save the situation. His forces were now much smaller than they had been in the previous year. The papal levies had been recalled. Many of the Germans and Netherlanders had gone home. When, on April 13, Charles crossed the Saxon frontier with Ferdinand and Maurice, his army numbered only about 25,000 men. Alva was chief in command under the Emperor, and the proportion of Spanish troops was much larger than before. In the early morning of April 24 the imperialist forces reached the Elbe opposite Mühlberg, where John Frederick, after listening to a sermon, was eating a lazy breakfast. He had carefully destroyed the bridge across the river, and felt sure that it would be impossible for the Emperor to attack him. But Charles and Alva knew how to force the fighting at the proper time, as well as how to rest, when expedient, upon the defensive. Descrying a bridge of boats which was attached to the opposite bank, they ordered a dozen Spanish soldiers to swim across the river with their swords in their mouths, cut down the guard, capture the bridge, and set it in place; and this was done. The discovery of a ford made the operation of crossing even simpler, and the corpulent elector's unaccountable failure to defend his strong position on the higher bank showed Charles and Alva that victory was within their grasp. The ensuing battle degenerated into a sort of running skirmish, in which the imperialists lost only about 50 men, and the enemy over 2500, with the whole of his artillery and baggage train. John Frederick himself fought bravely,

but was finally captured, and brought before the Emperor with his face streaming blood from a sword-cut in his cheek. Charles characterized his victory in the apposite words, "I came, I saw, God conquered."¹

The story of the use Charles made of his triumphs in the Empire lies for the most part outside the scope of the present volume; its main lines, moreover, are well known, and need not be repeated here. Titian's two greatest portraits of him² give a pretty clear inkling of what was passing through his mind at the time; the pale, set face, furrowed with care, and plainly revealing the beginnings of decaying health, expresses a stern resolve to keep the mastery of Western Europe in the hands of the house of Hapsburg. His treatment of the captive elector and landgrave was ungenerous, if not positively dishonorable. The constitutional reforms which he sought to put through in the Diet which met at Augsburg on September 1, 1547, ran counter to all the main tendencies of German history for the previous three centuries, and afford convincing proof of his incorrigible lack of sympathy with his Teutonic subjects. As for his provisional settlement of the religious question — the Interim, which, on June 30, 1548, became a law of the Empire by a recess of the Diet — it was a Catholic settlement with certain notable concessions to Protestantism, made inevitable, on the one hand, by Charles's zeal for the faith, and, on the other, by the fact that despite the treaty of June, 1546, he was now once more at odds with Paul III. To a brief account of the origin and progress of that quarrel we must now devote ourselves. Its ramifications are very wide, and they ultimately led Charles to put forward an entirely

¹ Full references for these facts may be found in the footnotes to Armstrong, ii, p. 148; Pastor, xii, p. 359; and Janssen, vi, pp. 359-363.

² The equestrian portrait in the Prado at Madrid, and the seated figure in the Pinakothek at Munich.

new dynastic plan, which threatened powerfully to affect the development of the Spanish Empire.

Profound distrust is plainly evident in every communication between Emperor and pontiff, from the middle of the summer of 1546.¹ Charles had many grounds for suspicion of the Pope. Paul had been far too neutral to suit his taste during his recent war with the king of France; moreover, the Emperor had grave doubts about the papal attitude on the question of ecclesiastical reform. Paul, on his part, feared to see Charles too strong. Might he not use his victory over the Lutherans, not so much for the benefit of Rome, as for the further extension of the power of the house of Hapsburg? Might he not win for himself such a position as would reduce the papal authority to a cipher? The first open evidences of the approaching breach were the order (January, 1547) withdrawing the papal contingents which had reached Germany in the previous August, and the stormy scene in which Verallo, the papal nuncio, announced their recall to Charles.² The next was the decision of the Council of Trent, in the following March, against the Emperor's wish, to transfer its sittings to Bologna. This transference was made possible by the votes of the Italian prelates, who were of course in the majority; and Charles was not slow to attribute their attitude to the influence of the Pope, who desired to have the council more closely under his own supervision, and further removed from possible interference by the Emperor. But fourteen Spanish and Sicilian bishops, at Charles's command, continued their sittings at Trent, and refused to recognize the validity of the sessions at Bologna; apparently the Spanish church was national and loyal to its king, rather than Roman and obedient to the

¹ Pastor, xii, pp. 300 ff., and references there; also Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2253,

² *Nuntiaturberichte*, ix, pp. 444 ff.; Maurenbrecher, *Karl V. und die deutschen Protestanten*, pp. 86* ff.

Pope.¹ The episode may well have had its effect on Charles, and reminded him, in the midst of all his German and imperial preoccupations, how largely, for his real power, he was dependent upon Spain.

Meantime grave news was coming in from Italy, also plainly foreshadowing a papal-imperial quarrel. The death of the Duke of Orleans (September 8, 1545) destroyed the last hope that Charles's enemies may have cherished of keeping Milan out of Spanish hands;² and the appointment, in the following April, of Ferrante Gonzaga as viceroy there showed that Spanish interests in Lombardy were not only to be vigorously pressed, but pressed, if need be, in opposition to those of the Pope; for Gonzaga was a bitter enemy of the Farnese, and was known to have cast longing eyes on Parma and Piacenza.³ Clearly the Spanish supremacy weighed more heavily on Italy than ever before, and Paul, as head of the church, and also as an Italian potentate, felt himself hemmed in on every side. A series of revolts against Charles's allies and representatives in Italy broke out during the years 1545-47, and though positive proof is not in every case forthcoming, it is impossible to resist the conclusion that they were all, directly or indirectly, inspired by the Pope. First came a rising in Siena against the imperial commissioner Juan de Luna. The rebels put themselves under the protection of the Pope; the Spanish garrison was expelled, and the intervention of Cosimo de' Medici and of Diego Hurtado de Mendoza was necessary before it was readmitted and order restored.⁴ In January, 1547, oc-

¹ Moeller, *History of the Christian Church*, iii, p. 239. The list of the bishops that remained at Trent may be found in Massarelli's *Diarium IV*, ed. Merkle, in *Concilium Tridentinum*, i, p. 638.

² Cf. *ante*, p. 271.

³ Gosellini, *Vita dell' illustrissimo Sig. D. Gonzaga*, pp. 14, 18; Maurenbrecher, *op. cit.*, pp. 115 ff.; *Nuntiatuberichte*, ix, pp. 316 ff.

⁴ De Leva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo V in Correlazione all' Italia*, iv, pp. 223 ff.

curred the famous attempt of the Fieschi against the Dorias in Genoa. A slipping plank was the conspirators' undoing, but the fact that they had been permitted to purchase four papal galleys to aid them in their attempt showed plainly enough what the pontiff's attitude was. Had the plot succeeded, it would have been a terrible blow to Charles.¹ Hot on the heels of this (May, 1547) came news of a rebellion in Naples, which it took all the skill and courage of the viceroy to put down. The ostensible cause of the revolt was the appearance of a papal commissary with a brief, which opened an old sore by hinting at the establishment of the Inquisition in the kingdom; but it was generally believed that Paul had taken this measure merely as a means of stirring up trouble for the Emperor, and that his real object was to tie the hands of the Hapsburg.² Charles, urged on by Gonzaga, was in no mood to tolerate such machinations as these; and in September, 1547, he showed his real feelings by tacitly consenting to the murder, through the instrumentality of Gonzaga, of the papal bastard, Pier Luigi Farnese, and by the subsequent annexation of Parma to the duchy of Milan.³

Both in Germany and in Italy, then, both in religion and politics, the opening months of the year 1548 found the temporal and spiritual heads of Western Christendom in deepest jealousy and suspicion of one another. Charles knew that Paul was eagerly seeking for allies in his schemes for retaining his rival within bounds. Fear of Hapsburg power might keep them from immediately declaring themselves, but it was evident that the Emperor was surrounded by potential foes. Some means of concentrating his resources and solidifying his authority must clearly be found. Had he been a

¹ De Leva, *Storia Documentata di Carlo V in Correlazione all' Italia*, iv, pp. 236 ff.

² H. C. Lea, *The Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, pp. 70-77.

³ Cf. *ante*, p. 280; de Leva, iv, pp. 366 ff.

less devoted Catholic, had it not even been, perhaps, for his maternal inheritance, he might have sought to find the way out of his difficulties along the lines which Napoleon Bonaparte, two and a half centuries later, declared he should have followed; he might have turned Protestant, defied the Pope, and sought to conquer Europe at the head of a unified Germany. But under the circumstances as they actually existed, such a policy would have been impracticable. Even if we assume, what is by no means certain, that there was sufficient popular enthusiasm for Lutheranism in the Empire to have made it possible for Charles, as its champion, to overcome the established forces of particularism and disunion; even if we leave out of account his own religious inheritance; it was impossible for a Spanish king to be a heretic. Spain, as he was learning more and more surely every day, was, far more than Germany, the real source of his power. Spain, ever since the revolt of the Comuneros, had stood loyally by him, in fair weather and foul. Spanish soldiers and Spanish gold had been in large measure responsible for his victory over the Lutherans. Spanish bishops had stayed on at Trent, and in spite of their orthodoxy had supported him against the Pope. If a conflict with Rome was to be fought, it would be far better, from every point of view, to lean on the support of that part of his dominions which was "*plus catholique que le pape*," than to imperil his reputation and tempt Providence by making common cause with a lot of German heretics. Everything that had happened since the peace of Crespy had served to make Charles yearn for Spain and for Spanish help; it was to Spain that he was to turn in the present crisis.

His son Philip was by this time twenty-one years old. In May, 1543, he had married his first cousin, the Infanta Maria of Portugal, partly as a means of continuing the

traditional Castilian policy of strengthening all ties with the Lusitanian kingdom, partly because the Emperor was in desperate need of funds, and Portuguese dowries were gratifyingly large; but in July, 1545, the princess died in giving birth to a son, the unfortunate Don Carlos, so that Philip was left a widower at the age of eighteen.¹ The prince had already had some experience in ruling; for Charles had intrusted him with the regency of his Spanish realms, when he departed for the Empire and the Netherlands in 1543.² Philip had unbounded respect for his father; their correspondence is full of expressions of confidence and affection; the Emperor knew that he had a son after his own heart. During all the difficulties and vicissitudes of the next few years he longed increasingly for Philip's companionship; and it may well have been the situation which developed in Milan after the death of the Duke of Orleans in September, 1545, that first suggested to Charles the idea of trying to win for Philip the succession in the Empire.³ Though Philip had been nominally duke of Milan since October, 1540, the duchy was still reckoned as a fief of the Empire, and all its traditions were imperial, not Spanish.⁴ Philip's hold on it would be immensely strengthened if he could win the imperial crown, and the scattered territories of the house of Hapsburg would be bound together more closely than ever before. But what would be the attitude towards this scheme of Charles's brother and German representative, Ferdinand? In 1531 Ferdinand had been permitted to assume the title of King of the Romans, together with the claims to the imperial succession which that dignity implied; since that time it had been generally understood that Ferdinand would follow Charles, and that Ferdinand's

¹ Forneron, *Histoire de Philippe II*, i, pp. 7-8.

² Laiglesia, i, pp. 69-92.

³ G. Egelhaaf, *Deutsche Geschichte im sechzehnten Jahrhundert*, ii, p. 527.

⁴ Cf. *ante*, p. 268.

son Maximilian would be elected to succeed him.¹ Could Ferdinand be expected to acquiesce in any change in these arrangements?

It seems clear that the two brothers discussed the question at Ratisbon in the summer of 1546, in connection with a proposal of Charles to render the Empire hereditary in the House of Hapsburg. Ferdinand was of opinion that the most that would be possible would be to bind the electors for two or three elections to come, and then let things go back to the old established footing.² For the time being the matter was dropped, but the events of the next twelve months made the Emperor more anxious than ever to put the project through, and at the Diet of Augsburg in the summer of 1548 it was taken up again. This time it was agreed that Philip should leave Spain and come to meet his father in the Empire; while his cousin Maximilian, Ferdinand's son, who was soon to go to Spain to marry the Emperor's daughter Mary, should remain there with his bride as regent in the Iberian kingdoms. It is worth noting that in the famous paper of instructions which the Emperor despatched to Philip from Augsburg on January 18, 1548, there is not the slightest hint of the project under discussion. It is by no means certain that Charles had yet definitely decided to carry it out; in any case he was keeping his plan to himself.³

In October, 1548, the Infante sailed from Rosas,⁴ for Genoa, and proceeded, in leisurely fashion, via Milan, Tyrol, Munich, and Heidelberg, to Brussels, where he joined his father in April, 1549. He made every attempt to please his

¹ Egelhaaf, ii, p. 526.

² A. von Druffel, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts*, iii, p. 166.

³ Philip, however, knew all about his father's plans when he left Spain; cf. Egelhaaf, ii, p. 528.

⁴ This journey is the subject of a special work, *El felicissimo Viaje*, by Juan Cristóval Calvete de Estrella (cf. p. 342, note 2, *ante*, and p. 599, note 3, below), which was published at Antwerp in 1552.

future subjects in each of the different countries through which he passed, and during the tour of inspection on which he was sent in the Low Countries. Contemporaries differ widely in their estimates of the measure of success that attended these efforts; but in general it seems probable that the well known formula, that he pleased the Italians little, displeased the Flemings, and made the Germans hate him,¹ is not far from the truth. Linguistic limitations were the beginning of his difficulties. He would speak nothing but Spanish; it was a curious reversal of the situation that had obtained when his father had made his first journey into Spain. His haughtiness and reserve were another fertile source of trouble, at least with the Flemings and the Germans. If he consented to drink beer with them, he always made a wry face over it, and nothing whatever would induce him to get drunk. There was also a very general impression that he lacked manliness and courage; there are different stories of the way in which he handled himself in tournaments, but most men were convinced that he had no stomach for a fight. Certainly his hosts were by no means pleasing to him; nothing but his sense of duty and respect for his father kept him from taking the first ship back to Spain. Probably the only really happy hours of that period of his life were those which he daily spent in the companionship of the Emperor, listening, questioning, and taking notes, drawing on Charles's vast and varied experience of the difficult art of reigning. His Spanish subjects whom he had left behind were quite as dissatisfied as he. They ardently desired to have their prince to themselves, and had no wish to see indefinitely perpetuated the situation that had existed under the Emperor.²

¹ "... poco grato agl'Italiani, ingratisimo alli Fiaminghi ed odioso ai Tedeschi." *Relazione di Spagna di M. Soriano*, in 1559; in Albèri, *Relazioni*, serie i, vol. iii, p. 378.

² Forneron, i, pp. 12 ff.; Prescott, *History of the Reign of Philip the Second*, i, pp. 55 ff., and references there.

In June, 1550, Charles and Philip left the Netherlands for Germany. On July 8, accompanied by the King of the Romans, they entered Augsburg, where the Diet had been summoned to meet them. The complexion of affairs had been considerably altered since Charles's last sojourn in Germany, chiefly owing to the death (November 10, 1549) of Pope Paul III, and the election in the following February of the much more complaisant Julius III; the arch-disturber of the Emperor's plans was gone. Charles, however, had now proceeded too far with his scheme of altering the succession in the Empire to be willing to draw back from it; the papal policy might, and indeed in all probability would, soon veer around again; and so, in the autumn, a Hapsburg family council was called to consider the question. Mary of Hungary was summoned from the Netherlands; she had been won over to support the views of Charles, who counted on her well known ability to influence her brother Ferdinand. Ferdinand, in turn, insisted that Maximilian should also be sent for from Spain; and though Charles had no wish for him to be present, the demand was so clearly just that it was impossible for him to refuse.¹ The family deliberations were often interrupted by the Emperor's gout, by the business of the Diet, by the disturbances in the Empire, by the news of the Turkish war, and by the tension in the Netherlands over the introduction of the Spanish Inquisition — Mary of Hungary had to return thither on this account less than three weeks after her arrival in Augsburg, and did not get back until the following January — but finally, in November, the question of the succession was vigorously taken up. The relations of Charles and Ferdinand had grown less and less cordial during the preceding months. To the natural distrust engendered by Charles's plans for putting Philip

¹ Egelhaaf, ii, pp. 527–535.

on the imperial throne were now added other grievances. There were violent quarrels over the use of the funds which had been granted by the Diet. Ferdinand wanted to employ them for the defence of his Danubian lands against the Turk, while Charles insisted that they be spent on the reduction of Magdeburg. Ferdinand even went so far as to declare that he was bound rather to his honor than to Charles, and that he demanded his money for the defence of Hungary with the clearer conscience because Charles had stirred up the Sultan to wrath by the capture of Monastir and El Mehedia; never had men seen the two brothers so angry with each other before. Only the influence of their sister Mary prevented an open breach, and it did not seem as if even that could bring them to any sort of an agreement when, on February 14, 1551, the Diet was formally closed. In the next few weeks, however, the situation cleared up. Almost no details of the discussions have been preserved to us, but finally, on March 9, a formal agreement was signed between Ferdinand and Philip to the effect that as soon as Ferdinand, after Charles's death, should be crowned Holy Roman Emperor, he would see to it that Philip was elected King of the Romans, and that Philip, in his turn, would do likewise for Maximilian.¹ A number of other minor stipulations provided for the most intimate coöperation between the two branches of the house of Hapsburg, and especially for the hearty support of Ferdinand to the Spanish hegemony in Italy; ostensibly, at least, the Emperor had gained his point, and yet preserved peace with his brother. In May Maximilian accompanied Philip back to Spain, where the latter once more assumed the regency; while the former, who was quite as unsympathetic with things Iberian as his cousin was with things Teutonic, made haste to gather

¹ Egelhaaf, ii, p. 535.

up his wife and children and bring them back into the Empire.¹

Surprise has often been expressed that the Emperor should have been so blind to the dangers with which he was surrounded in the summer and autumn of 1551, that he made no adequate preparations to meet the catastrophe that was to overwhelm him in the following year. For the first and only time in his life he was guilty of overconfidence. The most probable explanation of his mistake is the fact that he had been so absorbed, ever since the peace of Crespy, in German and in papal affairs that his grasp of international conditions had temporarily deserted him. In the Empire and at Rome, the outlook was far brighter than it had been after his victory at Mühlberg four years before. He had rammed the Interim down the throats of the Lutherans; there was, of course, still grumbling and resistance, but Charles had successfully encountered that sort of thing before, and was confident of his ability to do so again.² He had succeeded in winning his brother's consent to an arrangement which he believed would secure a larger measure of coöperation between the German and Spanish branches of his dynasty than he had previously dared to hope for; the power and prestige, both military and financial, of his Iberian dominions would thenceforth be available to support the house of Hapsburg in the Empire. The papacy was far less ominous. Julius III was neither so able nor so cantankerous as his predecessor; and in May the fathers had reassembled at Trent. The real source of danger was France. Henry II had made peace with England. He was in league with

¹ The documents on all this are to be found in von Druffel, iii, pp. 161-204, and Maurenbrecher, pp. 136* ff. There is a monograph on the whole affair by Soldan, which is cited in Egelhaaf,

ii, p. 527, note, but I have been unable to see it.

² Magdeburg surrendered on November 3, 1551.

Dragut. He was supporting Charles's enemies in Parma, and on September 26, 1551, he actually declared war.¹ But the season was so far advanced that he was not able to accomplish much. Charles was assured by his sister Mary that in the Netherlands she would be able to take care of herself. It was in Germany, as she repeatedly warned him, with the possibilities of an alliance between Henry and the Protestant princes, that the real peril lay.² But Charles refused to listen to her. He knew that the French king was a far more ardent Catholic than his father had been before him. He could not believe that he would combine with heretics. A little more forcing the pace, he was now convinced, would settle the fate of the remnant of the rebels. When he was finished with them, it would be time to turn on the French. The sequel was to show that his calculations were wrong; but it is not altogether surprising that he made the mistake.

His treatment of the captive elector and landgrave evoked much hostile comment. Men felt that such honorable foes should have been restored to liberty; and that their continued detention was an insult to the German nation.³ His enforcement of the Interim made him many enemies;⁴ he stopped at no measures, however brutal, that would enable him to accomplish his end. But if he had used German methods and German soldiers to effect these objects, it is not impossible that he might have weathered the storm. The fundamental cause of the revolt that overthrew him was the growing conviction that he was sacrificing German liberties in the interests of Spain. His Spanish veterans were an

¹ Pirenne, *Histoire de Belgique*, iii, p. 143; Romier, *Les origines politiques des Guerres de Religion*, i, pp. 220 ff.

² Henne, *Charles-Quint en Belgique*, ix, p. 145, and references there.

³ Egelhaaf, ii, pp. 537-538, for details.

⁴ Cf. report of the English ambassadors cited in *Cambridge Modern History*, ii, p. 266.

eyesore to all men ; they were not very numerous, but they were scattered through the country in such fashion that they seemed to be everywhere, and created the impression that Germany was a conquered land. Certain contemporary remarks deserve quotation in this connection. "Germans have become so tame," remarked an imperial councillor, "that they will all yet learn Spanish." "Spanish troops," declared another, "shall teach the German cities the Catholic truth."¹ "Spaniards," wrote Roger Ascham from the imperial court, "had now in their hands the seal of the Empire, and in their swing the doing of all things, and at their commandment all such men's voices as were to be called the imperial diets ; compelling the Germans in their own country to use strange tongues for their private suits, wherein they could say nothing at all, or nothing to the purpose ; using *camera imperialis* at Spires for a common key to open all men's coffers when they listed."² The younger Granvelle, who had succeeded his father in the autumn of 1550, showed a true appreciation of the real state of affairs when he told Charles, on September 1, 1551, that he "could not remain safely in Germany after the Spaniards had gone," and the Emperor enclosed this opinion in a letter to his sister Mary, written two and a half weeks later, in which he pointed out the difficulty of deciding whither he should go next.³ And if the presence and conduct of the Spanish soldiers was a sign which every one could read, there were other even more ominous portents for those who were in a position to know all the facts. The electors were furious when they heard of the family compact. When Ferdinand asked for their support of it, they indignantly refused to let the Span-

¹ Egelhaaf, ii, p. 526.

² "A Report and Discourse . . . of Germany" in *The Whole Works of*

Roger Ascham, ed. Giles (London, 1864), iii, pp. 28-29.

³ Lanz, *Correspondenz*, iii, p. 75, and Egelhaaf, ii, pp. 538-539.

iards "lead them like cattle by the nose."¹ The Diet accepted, but certainly disliked, the new arrangement which Charles, in 1548, for purposes purely dynastic, had made for the Low Countries. They were erected into a circle of the Empire simply and solely that they might enjoy imperial protection in case of war. Of German control they were made completely independent; they became a hereditary dominion of the house of Hapsburg, transmissible even to female heirs.² It was only too evident that they were destined for Spain and for Philip; the Hispanicizing of their government, which had begun in 1522, was now rapidly approaching completion.³ On every hand it was the same story. Charles's growing dislike of Germans and things German, and his increasing affection for Spain and for Philip, were leading him on to a rearrangement of his family possessions which promised ultimately to merge the Holy Roman in the Spanish Empire.

The blow that was to hurl the Emperor from his high place fell like a thunderbolt in the spring of 1552. Maurice of Saxony was the king-pin of the combination that delivered it; Charles had been warned of his machinations as early as November, 1550, but refused until too late to pay any heed. The Princes' League, on whose support Maurice depended, was gradually and securely formed in late 1550 and in 1551; but the success of the rebels was by no means assured until their acquisition, by the treaties of Chambord and Friedewald, in September, 1551, and January, 1552, of the support of the king of France. It was the first real test⁴ of the policy of alliances with foreign Prot-

¹ Egelhaaf, ii, p. 538.

² Pirenne, iii, pp. 140 ff.

³ Cf. *ante*, p. 225, and Pirenne, iii, p. 91. It is worth noting that in 1530, despite the complaints of the Diet, Charles had declared the Low Countries

to be exempt from all imperial jurisdiction. Henne, v, p. 126.

⁴ Unless one counts the mission of Guillaume du Bellay to the German princes in 1534; cf. Lavissee, *Histoire de France*, v, 2, pp. 78-80.

estants for the preservation of the balance of power, which in all the important international crises of the next hundred years was to prove the salvation of France, and the undoing of the house of Hapsburg; it was the policy of Richelieu and of Mazarin in the Thirty Years' War. Charles was at Innsbruck when his foes, who had massed their forces in Lorraine and in Franconia, were finally in a position to strike. For a moment the Emperor thought of escaping to the Netherlands, but the way was barred; in the latter half of May, as the sole means of eluding the troops of Maurice, he fled over the Brenner, in a storm of sleet and snow, and found safety at last in the little Carinthian town of Villach.¹ All the work that he had accomplished since the battle of Mühlberg was now undone. His plans for winning the imperial crown for Philip were shattered forever; and though, with characteristic obstinacy, he refused to recognize it, there was no longer the remotest chance of reëstablishing Roman Catholicism as the sole religion in the Empire. Lutheranism, from thenceforth, was bound to receive some form of legal recognition.

Bitter indeed must have been Charles's thoughts during those weeks of retreat in the Tyrolese mountains. He had been just on the verge of an overwhelming triumph; then fortune had deserted him, and he had been reduced to impotence. Doubtless he was sorely tempted to get rid of Germany at once; never had it seemed so inhospitable and unattractive; never had Charles so longed for Philip and for Spain. Yet it was contrary to his nature to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune without a return blow. To Ferdinand, under suitable guidance, he left the temporary settlement of internal affairs at the conference of Passau; but as soon

¹ References for the different views of the attitude of Ferdinand in this crisis are to be found in Armstrong, ii,

p. 251, note; to the works there cited add that of G. Turba in *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, xc, pp. 1-76.

as the treaty signed there had set him free, the Emperor hurried back across Southern Germany to seek satisfaction at the hands of the French, in whom he now recognized the chief source of his misfortunes. The news of the doings of Henry II in Italy¹ may well have stimulated his desire for revenge; the blow that had fallen on the Hapsburgs in the Empire must not be suffered to be followed by another against their dominions across the Alps. "Necessity," so he wrote to his sister Mary on November 13, "knows no law,"² by way of justification of his unholy alliance with the wild marauder, Albert Alcibiades, who joined him with 18,000 good troops in return for the imperial ratification of his plunderings of the bishoprics of Würzburg and Bamberg. The Emperor's objective was the city of Metz, which the French had occupied and fortified six months before. In the end of October he sat down before it with what a contemporary calls "the biggest army he ever collected at his own expense,"³ possibly as many as 75,000 men. For two long months the siege continued. Never in his whole career had the Emperor shown more dogged persistence. Despite his deep discouragement, and bodily ills; despite horrible weather, and the more than usually bitter quarrels between the different elements of which his motley forces were composed, he kept his soldiers steadily at their task.⁴ But Alba was fatally hesitant at the critical moments. The German commanders were openly scornful of his generalship. The duke of Guise met every move of the attacking forces with consummate skill, and finally, on the first day

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 280, and Romier, *Les Origines Politiques des Guerres de Religion*, i, pp. 220 ff., *passim*.

² Lanz, iii, p. 513.

³ Gómara, p. 148; Armstrong, ii, p. 269.

⁴ For the best references on the siege

of Metz, consult Armstrong, ii, pp. 267-268, note, and Sánchez Alonso, nos. 2271-76. In his discouragement, Charles once declared his intention of taking leave of the world and entering a monastery: "By God, before three years are out, I make myself a monk."

of the year 1553, the Emperor raised the siege and departed for the Netherlands. Had he been successful at Metz, he might well have returned to the Empire and made one last desperate effort to regain all that he had lost in 1552. The fires of ambition — at least of dynastic ambition — were not yet quenched within him, though his physical condition made all activity a torture. But his failure in the great siege, on which the eyes of all Europe were directed, convinced him that in Germany, at least, the game was played out. He shook the dust of it from his feet and retired to his native land. That, and his Spanish dominions, were all that were left to him now. Henceforth he would devote all his energies to strengthening and consolidating them, and to seeking for some means of compensating his beloved Philip for the failure of his plan of getting him the succession in the Empire.

Under the circumstances it was natural that the Emperor's attention, during the spring and summer of 1553, should be chiefly directed to the state of affairs in England. The 'good duke' of Somerset had perished on Tower Hill on January 22, 1552; the next twelve months had seen the triumph of the policy of the odious Northumberland; ultra-Protestant reforms, spoliation of the church, truckling to France, were the order of the day. But the health of the boy king Edward was beginning to fail. In the spring he had been attacked by measles and small pox; in January, 1553, he developed a chill, and shortly afterwards showed signs of consumption. Northumberland did not realize the true state of affairs until the end of March;¹ but as soon as it had become evident to him that the king could not survive, he bent all his energies to altering the order of succession es-

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi (for 1553), p. xii.

tablished by the will of Henry VIII, depriving the princesses Mary and Elizabeth of their just rights, and ultimately transferring the crown of England from the Tudors to the Dudleys, by the marriage of his son Guildford to the ill fated Lady Jane Grey. The ceremony was performed on Whitsunday, May 21; precisely one month later, the instrument altering the succession received its final signatures.¹

John Scheyfve, the very mediocre imperial ambassador in London, was slow to realize the true state of affairs. Not till June 11 did he report to the Emperor that "the Duke has formed some mighty plot against the Princess [Mary] and feels confident that he will prevail."² During the early months of the year Charles's mental and physical state had been so bad that his ordinary activities were suspended. 'He spent long hours sunk in thought and then wept like a child; . . . no one . . . dared offer him any consolation or had enough authority to dispel his dark imaginings so injurious to his health.' To ambassadors he gave audiences "that lasted about as long as it takes one to recite the creed"; his single care and occupation, day and night, was "to set his clocks and keep them going together; he has many, and they are his chief thought, with another new sort of clock he has invented and ordered to be set up in the frame of a window. As he cannot sleep by night, he often summons his servants, assistants, and others, and orders them to light torches and help him to take some of his clocks to pieces and set them together again."³ But the news of the prospective disinheritance of his cousin Mary aroused him to a realization of the dangers and possibilities of the English situation. On June 23 he wrote out instructions for three special ambassa-

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, p. xiii, and Pollard, *History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth*, p. 86.

² *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, p. 50; cf. also, *ibid.*, pp. 17 ff., 35 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 222, 225.

dors to the English court, who finally reached London on July 6, the very day of Edward's death.¹ Of these three, the Franche-comtois Simon Renard was much the ablest. In the course of a few weeks the conduct of affairs was entirely in his hands; in September his two associates, and also Scheyfve, were recalled.²

The brief, pathetic reign of Lady Jane Grey was ended on July 19, when Suffolk proclaimed the Princess Mary to be lawful Queen; six days later Northumberland was in the Tower. Charles's ambassadors had reported to him on the seventh, and his characteristically cautious reply of the eleventh advised them to do little more than sit still and watch events;³ but his cousin's triumph was so rapid and complete⁴ that a few weeks later he adopted a bolder course. On July 29, the day after he had definitely learned that the rebellion was at an end, he wrote to his son Philip at Valladolid to ask if he would care to wed the new queen of England. Negotiations for a second Portuguese match for the prince were then pending, and though Charles had little faith that they would terminate successfully, he was unwilling to commit himself until definite word was received; he offered the possibility of the English marriage merely as a suggestion, with the strictest injunctions to keep the matter secret. But certain passages in the letter make it clear what thoughts were uppermost in the Emperor's mind. "Nothing happier," he wrote, in reference to the recent revolution in England, "could have taken place from the point of view of these dominions and their relations with France. Although I believe that the English will do all in their power to prevent our cousin from wedding a foreigner, her discretion and tact may render it possible, directly or indirectly, to

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, pp. xv, 60-65.

² *Ibid.*, p. xxix.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 72 ff., 80 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 106-109, for an interesting contemporary account of events by an Italian resident of London.

propose once more a match which was talked of many years ago,¹ and which several considerations might recommend to her as a wise choice. I am sure that if the English made up their minds to accept a foreigner, they would more readily support me than any other, for they have always shown a liking for me. But I assure you that the hope of winning many other and more important states would not avail to move me from my intentions, which are in the opposite direction.”² Philip’s answer, dated August 22, reached Brussels on September 11. “The Portuguese business,” so he stated with pleasing frankness, he had “decided to break off . . . in view of the reply . . . that the king could not possibly give his sister more than 400,000 ducats of dowry. . . . All I have left to say,” he continues, “about the English affair is that I am rejoiced to hear that my aunt [*sic* for ‘cousin’] has come to the throne in that kingdom, as well out of natural feeling as because of the advantages mentioned by your Majesty where France and the Low Countries are concerned. It is certain that if she suggested a match between herself and your Majesty, and your Majesty was disposed, it would be the very best thing possible. But as your Majesty feels as you say about the question, and if you wish to arrange the match for me, you know that I am so obedient a son that I have no will other than yours, especially in a matter of such high import. Therefore I think best to leave it all to your Majesty, to dispose as shall seem most fitting.”³

The phraseology of these letters is particularly significant as an indication of the fact that it was more even of the Low Countries than of Spain itself that the Emperor was thinking at the time that he first broached the question of the mar-

¹ Referring of course to the arrangement for a marriage of Mary and the Emperor by the treaty of 1522.

² *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, p. 126.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 177-178, 230.

riage of Philip and Mary. He was one of the first statesmen to appreciate how closely the political as well as the commercial interests of England and the Netherlands were interwoven, and how indispensable was each to the safety of the other.¹ His reasoning was the counterpart of that of Lord Burleigh when he averred, under Queen Elizabeth, that "the Netherlands were England's strongest bulwark"; it had its echo in the action of the British government when Germany invaded Belgium in 1914. Charles had already resolved to leave the Netherlands to his son, and definitely to incorporate them into the Spanish Empire;² but the recent evidences of the hostility of Henry II had shown him how infinitely difficult it was going to be for Philip to retain them in the face of the opposition of France. Even two years before, when his prospects had been far brighter, it had been the prevailing opinion that the Low Countries could not be regarded as really safe unless an important English seaport could somehow be acquired, so as to protect the sea route between Flanders and Spain. There had even been talk at the time of sending an expeditionary force against England for that purpose.³ But now Charles had been defeated in the Empire; moreover, the French king, after the raising of the siege of Metz, had shifted the scene of operations to the Netherlands frontier. So immediate, in fact, was the danger, that in April Charles had written Philip that unless he could soon arrive in Flanders with plenty of funds to save the situation, there was a serious chance of the Low Countries being lost.⁴ The Spanish dom-

¹ The same idea had come out at the time of Catharine of Aragon's arrival in England in 1501. Zurita (v, fol. 221) informs us that "fue recibida con tanta alegria comunmente de todos, que afirman auer de ser ella causa, no solo de muy grande paz, y prosperi-

dad de todo aquel Reyno, pero de la vnion d'el, y de los Estados de Flandes."

² Cf. *ante*, p. 372.

³ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, p. xxii, and references there.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-30.

ination there was obviously unpopular. Men spoke longingly of the cheerful and jovial disposition, affable demeanor, and linguistic talents of Ferdinand's son Maximilian, and compared them with the sinister and taciturn ways of the Spanish ruler, who knew "neither Latin, French, nor Flemish, the native languages of the States."¹ Clearly the maintenance of Spain and the Netherlands in a single hand was going to prove even harder than Charles had originally thought, and the Emperor knew, if any one did, the difficulties inherent in the possession of scattered states. Then suddenly came the possibility of solving these thorny problems by a single stroke — not the difficult acquisition of a mere channel port by the hazards of war, but the absorption of nothing less than the whole of England, by the easy and traditional Hapsburg method of marriage. The intimate commercial ties that bound England and the Low Countries were but an added argument in favor of the new plan; in the reign of Henry VIII an imperial ambassador is said to have calculated that no less than half the population of England depended, directly or indirectly, for subsistence, upon the wool market of the Netherlands.² It was an entrancing prospect that had suddenly opened; enough to atone for the miseries of 1552, enough to awaken the old Emperor from his lethargy, and make him announce to Philip that "God be praised, I am well."³ He even allowed himself, in the latter part of November, some fleeting thoughts as to ultimate results. If children should be born to Philip and Mary, "it would be possible to give them England and the Low Countries, leaving the Spanish dominions, the Italian states, and the adjacent islands, to the son of the first marriage [i.e., Don Carlos]. This would protect both

¹ *G. S. P.*, *Spanish*, xi, pp. 223-224.

² So Pollard, *op. cit.*, pp. 103-104;

though the reference there cited cannot be said to support the assertion.

³ *C. S. P.*, *Spanish*, xi, p. 127.

countries and drive the French from the Ocean, which would be the best possible means of encouraging commerce, the foundation of the Low Countries' prosperity, and hold the French perpetually in check. . . . Even if there were no children, the marriage would serve, as long as it lasted, to enable the Low Countries to send through England to Spain for help as often as need might arise. It would bridle the French, and it might be possible not only to hold out against them, but also to use the alliance to make them see reason."¹ It is interesting to see how the Emperor's dynastic ambitions leaped into flame at a crisis like this. Not even his love for Spain was proof against them. If his dearest hopes were realized and the English marriage was put through and proved fruitful, he would abandon his original plan of giving the Low Countries to Spain, in favor of the creation of a ring of Hapsburg states that would ultimately encircle and paralyze the hereditary enemy, France. His dream, at the moment, was rather of Hapsburg supremacy than of Spanish Empire.

There remained the all important question as to how Mary and England would regard Charles's schemes for a Spanish marriage. In view of the violent oscillations of English history since the death of Henry VIII, the Emperor was quite alive to the importance of going slowly. On July 29, when Renard and his colleagues had their first audience with the new queen, the conversation turned chiefly on the question of religion and the advisability of extreme caution in restoring the ancient faith. The question of Mary's marriage was in everybody's mind;² but when it was broached, in general terms, the queen declared that she never thought of wedding before she came to the throne, that "as a private individual she would never have desired

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, pp. 386-387; the quotation is taken from a paper headed "A Proposal to be made by

the Emperor to the principal lords and members of the Council of State."

² *Ibid.*, pp. xxiii-xxiv, 132, 154.

it, but preferred to end her days in chastity," and that the Emperor "would remember that she was thirty-seven years of age." She realized, however, that now that she occupied a public position, the situation had changed, and she 'would submit herself to the Emperor's decision as to her marriage and all other matters, since he was willing to take the trouble to advise her.'¹ During the next three months there was much talk and correspondence, but no definite decision. Renard had to get rid of his colleagues, whose jealousy had made them a hindrance to his plans; the question of rival candidates — both English and foreign — for the queen's hand, had to be disposed of; the opposition of certain prominent councillors, and the intrigues of the French ambassador, Antoine de Noailles, had to be met and overcome.² But the candidacy of Philip loomed larger every day, and in mid-September Renard received from Granvelle the definite news that the prince had given his consent.³ Finally, on Sunday evening, October 29, the queen sent for the imperial ambassador. After having invoked the holy sacrament, as her protector, guide, and counsellor, she knelt and with her visitor and her lady in waiting she repeated the *Veni creator Spiritus*. She then gave Renard "her promise to marry his Highness . . . and her mind, once made up, would never change, but she would love him perfectly and never give him cause to be jealous. . . . Sire," continues the ambassador's report, "the joy this declaration gave me was such as your Majesty may imagine, and if she had invoked the Holy Ghost, I had invoked the Trinity to inspire her with the desired answer."⁴

That simple scene portended much. It showed, what the events of the succeeding years were conclusively to prove,

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, pp. 132-133.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 230.

² *Ibid.*, pp. xxv-xxxvii, and references there.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 328.

that though Charles and Mary had agreed upon the course to be pursued, they had been impelled to their decision by very different motives. Political and dynastic reasons, as we have already seen, had led the Emperor to propose the match. He wanted to protect his native land, and ardently longed to be revenged upon the French. That the marriage would also redound to the advantage of Catholicism was all to the good, but that was distinctly a secondary consideration; his advice to Mary about her religious policy is conclusive proof of this. For the queen, on the other hand, religious considerations were of primary importance. Her whole soul longed to bring England back to the Roman fold; and the real reason why she accepted Philip was because she doubted her ability to do it without the aid and support of Spain. She has rightly been characterized as the "most honest of Tudor rulers"; when she told Renard that as a private individual she had not desired matrimony, she spoke the literal truth. It was "conscience, not inclination, that impelled her to wed." With the Emperor's dynastic plans she was certainly sympathetic, but chiefly as a means to her own most desired ends. This divergence of objects was ominous for the future; as matters ultimately developed, it was to prove fatal. And the situation was still further complicated by the attitude of the English nation. Despite the enthusiasm with which Mary's accession had been hailed, it is not certain that the majority of Englishmen approved of the restoration of Catholicism, even as it had been at the end of the reign of Henry VIII; as for the possible bringing back of the Roman jurisdiction, the Venetian ambassador, Barbaro, had reported in 1551, that 'the detestation of the Pope was now so confirmed that no one, either of the old or new religion, could bear to hear him mentioned,'¹ and there is

¹ *C. S. P., Venetian*, v, p. 346.

no reason to believe that the situation was very different in 1553. To the Spanish marriage, and the Spanish domination which it would necessarily imply, there could be no question that the nation was bitterly opposed; and when men discovered the purposes for which Philip intended to use them, their opposition was to become more bitter still. The Tudors had inspired England with their enthusiasm for independence — for the elimination of foreign interference in national affairs; the idea of being dragged at the tail of the Hapsburg kite was intolerable. Not only, then, were the objects of the two parties in the Spanish marriage divergent; but England, without whose support neither one could be attained, was fundamentally hostile to both. As in Germany, Charles's projects were confronted with the bitterest national opposition.

But the Emperor once more had the bit in his teeth, and did not care. Military successes against his French foes — the captures in June and in July of Théroutanne and Hesdin, and the successful defence in September of Cambray — had further encouraged him; if he could only put through this English marriage, he felt that he could retire and end his days in peace. "At all costs," so he wrote to Renard on November 28, "it is our desire . . . that England and the Netherlands be paired off together, in order to afford one another mutual aid against their enemies";¹ if concessions to English policy were necessary to accomplish this end, they were to be made without the slightest hesitation. And so it came about that the marriage treaty, which was practically settled in the month of December, was arranged in such fashion as to relieve the worst of English fears. The sturdy patriotism of Stephen Gardiner, who conducted the negotiations in London, doubtless counted for much, but it

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, p. 389.

was the Emperor's complaisance that made possible the final issue. Philip was to be rather a prince consort than a king. He was strictly to observe the rights and privileges of all classes, and foreigners were to be excluded from office. He was to have no claims on English ships, guns, or treasure for his foreign wars, and to do his best to maintain peace between England and France. If Mary should die childless, his connection with England should be at an end. If there were issue of the marriage, that issue should inherit, as the Emperor had planned, the Low Countries and Franche Comté, as well as England, while the rest of the Spanish dominions should go to Don Carlos. In case Don Carlos should die without heirs, the child of Philip and Mary should inherit the Spanish Empire. Small wonder that the Spaniards murmured loudly against the alliance, and protested that it amounted to disinherit the Infante.¹ Whether all these stipulations would have been rigidly carried out if Mary had borne Philip the much desired heir may well be doubted; but the fact that the Emperor consented to their insertion shows how important he deemed it to make certain of the English alliance in view of the situation in 1553.

It was over six months more, however, before the wedding could take place. In the latter part of January, 1554, several weeks after the Count of Egmont and other gentlemen had arrived in London to do the formal wooing, a striking demonstration of the unpopularity of the queen's policy was afforded by the famous rebellion of Sir Thomas Wyatt.² It was aided and abetted by the French ambassador Noailles, and narrowly missed complete success. Even after it had

¹ *C. S. P., Spanish*, xi, p. 409. Text of the treaty in Rymer, *Foedera*, xv, pp. 377 ff.; Dumont, iv, 3, pp. 106-108. The treaty is dated March, 1553, i.e., 1554 (day not stated).

² Jean Mary Stone, *Mary the First, Queen of England*, pp. 280 ff.; and references there.

been put down, and the ensuing executions had duly taken place, the people manifested their detestation of Spain and of Catholicism in no uncertain terms. "A dead cat, having a cloth like a vestment of the priest at Mass, with a cross on it afore and another behind put on it; the crown of the cat shorn, a piece of paper like a singing cake put between the forefeet of the said cat, bound together, . . . was hanged on the post of the gallows in Cheap, beyond the Cross, in the parish of St. Matthews, and a bottle hanged by it. . . . The Lord Mayor and his brethren, the aldermen of the city of London, caused a proclamation to be made that afternoon, that whosoever could utter or show the author of the said fact should have £6, 13 sh. 4 d. for his pains, and a better reward with hearty thanks. But at that time after much enquiry and search made, it could not be known, but divers persons were had to prison for suspicions of it."¹ Small wonder if Philip hesitated to come to England as long as men's minds were in such an excited state. He found, moreover, much in Spain to delay him. There was the difficult question of providing for a regency, which it was finally decided to intrust to his sister Joanna; but the death of her husband, the prince of Portugal, and the birth of her son, the ill-starred Sebastian, made it impossible for her to reach Valladolid till after Philip left it.² Not till the fourth of May did the prince at last start northward. At Compostela, where he stopped to pay homage to Santiago, he signed the marriage contract, brought on from England by the Earl of Bedford. On Thursday, July 12, he embarked at Corunna. On the twentieth he landed at Southampton. On Monday, the twenty-third, he met his bride at Winchester,

¹ Wriothesley, *Chronicle* (ed. Camden Society), ii, pp. 114-115.

² The Prince however had an interview with his sister on his way north;

cf. *C. S. P., Venetian*, v, no. 904; cf. also, for an interesting story of Joanna's reception at Valladolid, Florez, *Reynas Catholicas*, ii, p. 873.

and there, two days later, they were married.¹ The Emperor had a very interesting wedding present in readiness. In order that Philip might have the title of king, and possibly as an earnest of his own future intentions, he had conferred on Philip the investiture of the kingdom of Naples and Jerusalem.²

Philip had been amply warned, before he left Spain, of the necessity of accommodating himself to foreign customs which he loathed; and he had prepared himself to undergo a martyrdom similar to that which six years before he had endured in the Netherlands and in the Empire. He kept only four Flemings and six Spaniards with him when he landed; he recommended them "to live in all respects after the English fashion," and showed them the way by calling for beer; he proudly exhibited to the English aristocracy the 50,000 ducats that he had brought with him to distribute.³ But these efforts to please were painfully unsuccessful. Amid the salvos of artillery that accompanied his

¹ Cf. Juan de Varaona, "Viaje de Felipe II á Inglaterra en 1554," in *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 564 ff.

² There was apparently also a very general impression that Sicily had been handed over to Philip at the same time with Naples, and it was also rumored that the Prince had been given the investiture of Naples as far back as 1550 (cf. *C. S. P.*, *Venetian*, v, nos. 923-925). But the dating of the investiture of Siena by Philip to Cosimo de' Medici — "Datum Caleti, die 17. mensis martii, anno Domini 1557, Regnorum autem nostrorum, videlicet Hispaniarum et ulterioris Siciliae, anno secundo; Angliae vero, Francia, citerioris Siciliae, Hierusalem et Hiberniae Anno 4." (Dumont, v, 1, p. 11) — seems to furnish conclusive evidence that neither report was true. It is also generally stated that Milan was given to Philip at this time (cf. *C. S. P.*, *Venetian*, v, no. 961; Gómara, p. 151; P. Verri, *Storia di Milano*, ii, p. 381;

cf. pp. 347, 363); what this probably means is that Charles finally ceased on this occasion to exercise the sovereign authority in the duchy, which we have seen that he still possessed in 1552 (cf. note 5 to p. 268, *ante*).

³ Forneron, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 43-44, and references there; *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 567 ff. The following quotation is taken from a "Relacion de las cosas de Inglaterra" which occupies folios 483-488 of Tomo ii, v, 3, of the Biblioteca del Escorial: "Trata su magestad a la gente noble muy bien; a los mas principales quita un poco el bonete, quando vienen a la corte o se van della. No ay costumbre de mandar cubrir a nadie. Ellos hablan siempre al rey de rodillas, aunque el este en pie. No entre ninguno en la camara sino es llamado, ny pasa de la sala de presencia que ellos llaman, que es adonde el rey come, y alli estan sin bonetes. Pero ya nosotros les vamos quitando; esta buena costumbre que ellos tienen."

landing, it was observed that a cannon ball struck the water in disagreeable proximity to the royal barge.¹ When Philip entered London with his bride, the crowd in the streets jeered at the cross of Santiago on his breast as if it were a symbol of idolatry. The Council was unnecessarily explicit in pointing out to him that he could exercise no independent authority. They made it clear that they had no use for him whatsoever save as a means to cause the queen to bear a child; and they spoke of the Pope as if he were "merely a man like the rest of them."²

More serious still were the first evidences of the trouble that was bound to arise out of the divergency between the aims of the two parties to the marriage. Mary, who had accepted it chiefly as a means to enable her to bring back the Roman jurisdiction in England, had hitherto followed the Emperor's advice and rested content with the restoration of religion to the state that it was in at the death of Henry VIII: now that she was married, she was eager to proceed with the work of reconciliation with Rome, and to admit to the realm the papal legate, her beloved Reginald Pole. With England safely entangled in the Hapsburg net, the Emperor did not feel that he had the right to interpose further delays, though he dreaded the effect of the possible restoration of the abbey lands. Assured, however, that the Pope would not insist upon this, he withdrew his last objections, and on November 20 Pole once more trod the soil of his native land. Philip, an even better Catholic than his father, bade

¹ Cf. preface, p. xxiv, to Andrés Muñoz, *Viaje de Felipe Segundo á Inglaterra*, ed. Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles (1877). This volume also contains four contemporary letters on the same subject. The *Viaje* was first printed at Saragossa in 1554.

² At any rate such is the impression that is gained from consulting the contemporary Spanish authorities. Cf.

Forneron, i, p. 45, and references there. On the other hand, it is fair to note that, in recognition of the fact that the control of affairs had officially passed into the hands of a king who knew no English, it was ordered in the Privy Council "that a note of all such matters of state as should pass from hence, should be made in Latin or Spanish from henceforth." Pollard, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

the legate welcome; a resolution favorable to reunion was extracted from Parliament, and on November 30, the feast of St. Andrew, England was solemnly restored to the communion of the see of Rome.¹ But the great act with which Parliament legalized the restoration in the following December bore an ominous title: "An Act repealing all statutes, articles, and provisions against the See Apostolic of Rome since the twentieth year of King Henry the Eighth, *and also* for the establishment of all spiritual and ecclesiastical possessions and hereditaments conveyed to the laity."² Only on condition that they were allowed to keep the ecclesiastical spoils, would Englishmen consent to return to the Roman fold. Let the pliant Julius III be succeeded by a Pope who would not consent to that concession, and the whole fabric which Mary had reared with such pains would fall to the ground.

Meantime the development of the political and dynastic side of the marriage was such as to arouse the gravest misgivings. In September, 1554, only two months after his arrival and wedding, it was evident that Philip desired to leave England and go to help his father in the war against France. He even hoped, under the pretext of an escort, and in defiance of the marriage treaty, to be able to take with him a few thousand English troops.³ Renard, with a true appreciation of the ticklish state of affairs, prevailed on him, for the time being, to remain; day by day it became increasingly evident that everything depended on whether or not the queen was to have a child. Mary herself was certain that she would be confined in the latter part of April, 1555. So confident was she of the approaching event that circular letters were drawn up to announce it — the day and the

¹ J. M. Stone, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-342.

³ Cf. Weiss, *Papiers d'État de Gran-*

² R. W. Dixon, *History of the Church of England*, iv, pp. 287 ff. *velle*, iv, p. 294.

month only being left blank ; it was even decided that the child was to be a boy.¹ But the appointed time passed by without result ; and soon it began to be whispered that the queen had never been pregnant at all. Mary alone refused for some months longer to give up hope, and assured her attendants that she felt the child ; but it gradually became more and more obvious to her physicians that she was the victim of a tragic delusion.² And if no child was to be born, the major part of what Charles had hoped to gain from the English marriage would be lost. His scheme of permanently uniting the Netherlands and England, and thus gaining lasting control of both sides of the Channel, would fall to the ground. The advantages of the match, both to Spain and to the Low Countries, would last only as long as Mary's own life ; as soon as she died, the connection would be broken. A significant proof of the international effect of the news that Mary's hopes had been disappointed was afforded in May, 1555. The war on the Netherlands frontier, which had gone well for France in the early months of the preceding year, had once more turned in favor of the imperialists ; Charles himself had taken the field for the last time. Namur was successfully defended. There was an indecisive engagement at Renty, and then the French retired. If the expected child arrived, it was evident that England would be bound more closely than ever to the house of Hapsburg. The French saw the handwriting on the wall, and thought it might be well to end the war while they could do so with honor ; in the latter part of 1554 the Constable Montmorency asked for the mediation of England. A peace conference was accordingly opened at Marcq, in the Calais Pale, on May 23, under the presidency of Cardinal Pole ; but as

¹ Froude, *History of England*, vi, p. 326, note.

² *C. S. P., Venetian*, vi, 2, p. 1060 ; Forneron, i, pp. 64-65.

soon as it was known that Mary's hopes were to be disappointed, the backs of the French plenipotentiaries stiffened. They demanded impossible terms, and before the end of July the conference broke up, having accomplished nothing.¹

Another heavy blow, from a most unexpected quarter, fell on the Hapsburg projects on the very day of the opening of the conference at Marcq. On March 24, Julius III, whose easy-going complaisance had proved infinitely helpful to the Emperor at all critical moments during the previous six years, had died; his successor, Marcellus II, had a pontificate of but twenty-two days; on May 23, Giovanni Pietro Caraffa was elected, at the age of seventy-nine, to the chair of St. Peter, and took the title of Paul IV. The new Pope was not only a fanatic zealot; he was also, most unfortunately for Charles, the bitterest enemy of the house of Hapsburg; and his accession was the signal, all over Europe, for the downfall of nearly everything that the Emperor, in the past two years, had striven so hard to erect. Paul was plainly going to lend his heartiest support to the French, particularly in Italy, where he was hemmed in by Hapsburg foes; the Spanish domination there was in greater danger than ever. In England, too, his influence was immediately felt. He detested Cardinal Pole, and would not tolerate for one moment the retention by the laity of the spoils of the church, the one condition on which Parliament had been willing to consent to the restoration of the Roman jurisdiction.² Ecclesiastically as well as politically the major part of what Charles and Mary had hoped to set up when the queen's marriage was arranged in 1553 seemed now destined to fall; and Philip, whose impatience to leave England and go to the aid of his father had only been restrained by the im-

¹ Henne, *Charles-Quint en Belgique*, x, pp. 122-145, 183 ff.; Decrue, *Anne de Montmorency sous Henri II*, pp. 166-167.

² Moeller, *History of the Christian Church*, iii, pp. 249-250.

portunities of Renard, felt that it was no longer possible to postpone his departure. On August 28 he bade good-by to his sorrowful queen, who had now abandoned her last hopes of an heir; on September 8 he met the Emperor at Brussels. His sole remaining hope of getting any real good out of the English alliance lay in persuading Mary, in violation of the terms of the marriage treaty, to invest him with real authority as king, and he corresponded with her for that purpose in the weeks after his arrival in the Netherlands. Mary herself would have been only too glad to comply, but she dared not fly in the face of Parliament, Council, and the nation. And so argument and persuasion soon gave way to recrimination; Philip ordered the removal of his personal attendants, in order "to agitate the Queen," and threatened never to return. The mass of the people openly rejoiced; they had come to detest the very sight of a Spaniard.¹

In justice to Philip it is only fair to add that dissatisfaction with England, and desire to help fight the French, were not the sole, or even the most important reasons, that led him to desert the queen. His father had summoned him to the Netherlands for a very special purpose. The Emperor's resolve to abdicate and go into retirement, of which there had been many a hint during the previous three years, was now practically ready to be put into effect, and the presence of his son was necessary for the ceremony. The death of Charles's mother, the unfortunate Joanna, which had occurred on the thirteenth of the previous April at Tordesillas, probably helped to confirm, if not to hasten, his decision;² it also doubtless served to turn his thoughts once more to Spain, from which they had been temporarily diverted in recent years by his desire to unite the Netherlands and

¹ Strype, *Ecclesiastical Memorials*, vi, 1, pp. 212, 227, 267, 269, 272, 281, iii, 2, pp. 418-419; *C. S. P., Venetian*, 376.

² Henne, x, p. 233.

England. Mary's childlessness had knocked that project on the head; Spain and the Low Countries were henceforth to be permanently joined, not only under Philip, but also under his successors. The best that Charles could hope for as far as England was concerned was that Spanish influence would be sufficiently perpetuated there to enable him to count on her aid in keeping the sea route open — a hope which was destined to be cruelly disappointed in the succeeding years. The accession of Paul IV was an added reason why his attention should be once more attracted to his Spanish dominions. A war for the maintenance of Spanish supremacy in Italy was clearly inevitable; Charles himself was too weary to fight it; his Spanish son must take the reins. The dynastic ambitions, which had flared up so strongly in 1553, now fell into the background once more; it was plain that Europe would not tolerate their realization. Spain, 'the inexpugnable,' and his Spanish son Philip occupied all Charles's thoughts once more; if he could not have all Europe under the heel of the house of Hapsburg, he could at least contribute notably to the aggrandizement of the Spanish Empire. Yet in and by the very act by which he was to give it the largest territorial addition which it acquired in Europe in the course of his reign — his Burgundian inheritance, the Netherlands and Franche Comté — he was really paving the way for its ultimate downfall. Without the support of England, which Spain was soon to lose, it was to prove impossible for her to retain the Low Countries, in the teeth of Protestant opposition and the hostility of France; indeed, it was her attempt to do so which was to prove the most important factor in bringing her into the conflict with England which lost her the sovereignty of the seas. That Charles realized the danger is shown by his anxiety to obtain the English alliance in 1553, and by the

provisions of the marriage treaty ; that Philip also realized it, in a measure, was to be shown by his offer of marriage to Queen Elizabeth after the death of Mary in November, 1558 ; but neither of them could be induced to take the sole and truly heroic measure that could certainly avert it — namely, to separate the destinies of Spain and the Low Countries, and to leave the latter, where they belonged, with the inheritance of Ferdinand. Never had the Spanish Empire been so topheavy before ; never had it acquired such an incongruous addition.

But Charles was not gifted with the vision of a prophet. The English alliance was tottering in 1555, but it was by no means as yet irretrievably lost ; and it was entirely possible that it might be completely reconstituted. And so the preparations for the abdication were pushed rapidly forward. On September 26 the States General, and the chief officers of the Low Countries, were sent orders to convene, on October 14, at Brussels. Ferdinand was also invited to come, in order to lend added solemnity to the occasion, and sent his second son to represent him. The heavy rains, and bad state of the roads, made it necessary to postpone the assemblage until October 25 ; on that day the Emperor, mounted on a mule, and accompanied by Philip and a few personal attendants, left the little house in the park where he had taken up his residence, and rode to the palace in Brussels. At four o'clock in the afternoon he entered the great hall, where the members of the States General, the provincial governors and principal magnates, and Knights of the Golden Fleece, were assembled to meet him ; it is said that as many as one thousand were present. The Emperor was conducted to a raised dais, whereon were seats for himself, his sister, and his son. One of his councillors made a formal address to the estates, to apprise them of the purpose for which they had

been convoked ; then Charles, seated, with his spectacles on, and a little paper in his hand to refresh his memory, began to speak. He recalled the events which had made him the heir of such great and such scattered dominions. He reminded his hearers of the endless journeyings which his many responsibilities had entailed : nine times to Germany, six times to Spain, seven to Italy, ten to the Low Countries, four into France, twice each to England and North Africa, eight crossings of the Mediterranean, three voyages on the ocean. He spoke of his failures and successes, in peace and in war, and frankly confessed his incapacities and his faults ; he begged forgiveness for what he had done amiss, and assured his hearers that it was not vaulting ambition, but sense of duty, that had been his constant motive. He continually harped on his love for his native land, and grieved that it was impossible for him to leave it at peace. The time, however, had now arrived for him to give effect to the decision which he had made long before — to go into retirement and hand over his responsibilities to his beloved son, who was there present to receive them, and to whom he begged his hearers to render the same measure of love and obedience which they had always shown to him.¹ The Emperor himself was deeply moved ; tears rolled down his cheeks as he spoke. The audience also wept ; there was not, in the opinion of Sir Thomas Gresham, who witnessed the scene, “one man in the whole assembly, stranger or other, that during the time of a good piece of his oration poured not out abundantly tears, some more, some less.”²

But a moment later the charm was broken. Philip threw himself at his father's feet, and was about to kiss his hand ; but Charles raised him, and addressing him in Spanish, pro-

¹ Henne, x, pp. 250 ff. ; Armstrong, ii, pp. 349-352.

² Burgon, *Life of Gresham*, i, pp. 175-176.

ceeded formally to invest him with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. The sudden shift to a foreign tongue was a rude shock to the whole assembly, and the bad impression was heightened when Philip, seated, briefly apologized to the councillors for his inability to speak French, and informed them that the bishop of Arras would address them in his stead. Nothing could possibly have been more prophetic; all the miseries of the future were foretold in that brief scene. Granvelle did his utmost to reassure the assembly. He spent half of his speech in asseverations that nothing but the express and reiterated command of Charles could have induced his son to consent to replace him; the rest was filled with promises to respect all the national liberties — promises which were to be broken almost at the very moment that they were made. The sympathies of the company were momentarily revived when Mary of Hungary announced her resignation as regent, and told of her intention to accompany her brother into retirement; she had done well by the Netherlands for twenty-four years, and men willingly believed her protestations of affection. But the impression created by Philip's Spanish ways was indelible; and when the deputies separated to return to their homes, they were less filled with regrets over the termination of a glorious past than with grave forebodings for the future.¹

No such touching ceremonies accompanied the Emperor's renunciation of his other and yet greater dignities and possessions. On January 16, 1556, in his little house in the park, he handed over to his secretary, Francisco de Eraso, the act of abdication of all his Spanish dominions, in the Old World and the New, and of Sicily;² his two sisters, Mary and Eleanor, Emanuel Philibert of Savoy, and a

¹ Henne, x, pp. 270 ff.

² Cf. *ante*, p. 387, note 2.

number of Spanish grandees alone were present.¹ On the twenty-eighth of the following March, Philip was solemnly proclaimed king at Valladolid, his son, the Infante Don Carlos, making the formal announcement in person.² At the same time, and in gross violation of his constitutional authority, Charles secretly created Philip and his successors vicars perpetual of the Empire in Italy, which was thus henceforth to be subjected to Spain.³ On February 5 the signature of the truce of Vaucelles with the French gave the Emperor the opportunity to hand over Franche Comté to his son; it had not been possible for him to do this during the continuation of a state of war, for the county and the duchy had pledged mutual neutrality as long as the fighting lasted, and abdication during hostilities might have exposed it to French attack.⁴ There remained only the Empire to be gotten rid of⁵ — the burden which of all others Charles was most anxious to lay down, and in which his destined successor was to be his brother Ferdinand. Doubts as to the possibility of an imperial abdication without the consent of the Diet, the misgivings of Ferdinand, and fears of the possible effects of the hostility of Paul IV combined to persuade Charles to postpone the final act. Not till the spring of 1558 were the last difficulties cleared away; not till May 3 of that year did he know that his resignation had been definitely accepted.⁶ But for practical purposes the delay made little difference. Ferdinand had virtually been Emperor in everything but name since 1553, when Charles departed from the country of his worst defeat.

¹ L. P. Gachard, *Retraite et Mort de Charles-Quint*, i, 1, pp. 111 ff.

² Lafuente, xii, p. 433.

³ Armstrong, ii, p. 355.

⁴ Gachard, i, 1, pp. 116–117.

⁵ The Hapsburg hereditary lands in Upper Germany and Austria had been Ferdinand's since 1522; Bohemia and

Hungary, of which countries Ferdinand had become king in 1526, had never belonged to Charles at all, save in so far as the former was a part of the Empire.

⁶ Lanz, *Correspondenz*, iii, pp. 707–709; Dumont, *op. cit.*, v, 1, pp. 3–8; Gachard, ii, pp. 386–387.

It was not till the autumn of 1556 that Charles was able to get away to Spain and to the rest for which he so ardently longed. Money to pay his debts was only found with difficulty. There were many last farewells to be said. The political horizon was also very dark. The rage of Paul IV when he heard of the conclusion of the truce of Vaucelles plainly showed that war in Italy was bound soon to break forth. The conduct of Philip, too, must have caused Charles grave misgivings. Less than a month after his father's abdication of the Netherlands, he was proposing to go back to Spain; already it was clear that it was going to be his policy to rule the Low Countries "from afar off."¹ But at length Charles set sail from Flushing, on September 17; his two sisters accompanied him on another ship; he was escorted by Spanish, Flemish, and English squadrons. On September 28 he landed at Laredo, and thence promptly departed for his chosen retreat, the Hieronymite convent of Yuste in Estremadura. At Burgos and at Valladolid the Castilian aristocracy flocked to pay him homage. In the latter city he consented to dine in state; it was his last formal public appearance. Finally, on February 3, 1557, he reached his destination, and the convent gates closed behind "the chief of men that had ever been or would ever be."²

The story of the Emperor's life at Yuste has been so often and so fully told that it is almost impossible to add anything more. It was studied in the utmost detail three centuries after his death, during the decade between 1850 and 1860,

¹ Henne, x, p. 287, and references there.

² So his major-domo, Luis de Quijada (cf. Gachard, *op. cit.*, i, 2, p. 406): The modern reader is not expected to concur in the estimate. Cf. Armstrong, ii, pp. 358 ff.; Prescott in Robertson,

History of the Reign of Charles V. (Lippincott), iii, pp. 303 ff.; Foronda, pp. 655 ff. Charles was obliged to remain at Jarandilla, a village two leagues east of Yuste, from November 12, 1556, to February 3, 1557, while the convent was being made ready for his reception.

by five different authors,¹ who completely dispelled the persistent delusion that he lost touch with outside affairs during the period of his retreat. They showed that he received many visitors, that he was accurately informed of the progress of war and diplomacy all over Europe, that he sent Philip advice on the conduct of a campaign, and that he used his influence to help raise money and troops for his son. At one time there was even a rumor that he expected to leave the convent, and lead an army for the defence of Navarre.² But if Charles ever said anything to encourage this last idea, "it must have been," as Quijada reported, "from mere policy."³ His activities were rigidly confined to what he could accomplish from his place of retreat; the power and authority were now in Philip's hands. The course of events after the spring of 1556 must consequently be reserved for another volume; all that remains to be considered here is the general effect of Charles's character and reign upon the development of the Spanish Empire.

Territorially he had considerably increased it. The enormous extension of the Spanish lands in the New World will be taken up in another place; in Italy, Charles had added Milan and the Presidios by conquest; while the Netherlands⁴ and Franche Comté had been united to Spain by the manner in which he had divided his inheritance.

¹ W. Stirling-Maxwell, *The Cloister Life of the Emperor Charles V.* (four editions from 1852); L. P. Gachard, *Retraite et Mort de Charles-Quint* (1854-55, 2 vols.); F. A. Mignet, *Charles-Quint: son Abdication, son Séjour et sa Mort* (1854); A. Pichot, *Charles-Quint; Chronique de sa Vie* (1854); and W. H. Prescott, in his edition of Robertson's *Charles V.* (1857). Prescott utilized the works of his predecessors, and commented upon them; *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 295-298. The latest treatment of the subject is to be found on pp. 101-208 of the *Historia del Monasterio de*

Yuste by Domingo de Guzmán María de Alboraya (Madrid, 1906).

² Prescott, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 391-392.

³ Gachard, i, 2, p. 167.

⁴ It is to be noted, furthermore, that the Netherlands, as Charles left them to Philip in 1555, were considerably larger than the Netherlands as he had inherited them from his father in 1506. The town of Tournai, and the provinces of Frisia, Utrecht, Overijssel, Gröningen, Drenthe, and Gelderland had been annexed in the Emperor's reign. Cf. Pirenne, *op. cit.*, iii, pp. 93-134, *passim*.

In North Africa, it is true, Spain had lost more than she had gained. The advent of the Turks, the pirate raids, Charles's failure before Algiers, and the various defeats of the Count of Alcaudete, more than neutralized the effects of the conquest of Tunis. In Europe, however, which was far more important, it is clear that the lands which acknowledged the rule of the Spanish crown were both more extensive and more widely scattered in 1556 than in 1516.

But the mere possession of territory is an unsafe criterion of greatness; it is time that we looked for other indications of the effect of Charles's reign on the development of the Spanish Empire. Certainly his rule caused Spain's name and fame to be carried much farther through Western Europe than ever before. The last remnants of her mediaeval isolation were gone. The Italian peninsula had now become almost completely Hispanicized. At the north as well as at the south of it, Spanish authority was securely established; Spain also really controlled the destinies of the intervening petty states; only the Pope and the Venetians maintained a precarious independence. Moreover, for the first time in recorded history, the Northern, Teutonic, as well as the Latin, Mediterranean countries had seen and felt the Spanish power. The Spanish soldier was now a familiar figure in the Netherlands, in the Empire, and in the Danubian lands; a Spanish king-consort sat on the throne of England. It is an open question, as we have often pointed out, whether this enormous extension of power and prestige ought properly to be regarded as Spanish or as Hapsburg; but the men of the sixteenth century thought rather in national than in dynastic terms, and in view of the progressive Hispanicization of Charles's character and policy, it is small wonder that they not only attributed his triumphs to Spain but regarded them as redounding almost exclusively to her benefit. When the

Emperor divided his inheritance in 1555 and 1556, there was no longer any room for doubt. All the adjacent and immediately important acquisitions had been adjudged to Philip — the economic nerve centres in the Netherlands, which were traditionally associated with the Empire, the Italy over which men had fought and bled for the previous sixty years. To Ferdinand was left only the nebulous authority of the Holy Roman Empire; the Hapsburg lands in the Rhine and Danube valleys had already been his since a much earlier date. Already one can discern the dread of Spanish preponderance — a dread which the succeeding years were enormously to intensify, a dread which outlasted its reason for existence, and endured until long after the Spanish Empire had become a ghost of its former self.

The development of Charles's religious policy, also, had a powerful effect upon the destinies of Spain. He was irrevocably committed, by his traditions and inheritance, to the cause of Rome. Both as Holy Roman Emperor and as king of Spain, it was inevitable that he should be a Catholic, and do his utmost to advance Catholicism. He might temporize with Lutherans, and even quarrel with Popes, in order to gain political and dynastic ends; but of his fundamental loyalty to the ancient faith there could not be for one moment any serious doubt. Of heresy, to the very last, he kept his Spanish and Italian dominions clear.¹ In the Netherlands, where his authority was firmly intrenched, he persecuted the Lutherans with the utmost vigor; the very first martyrs to the Protestant cause were burnt in the public square at Brussels on July 1, 1523.² In the Empire alone the Reformation had beaten him, and won a precarious right to coexist-

¹ Cf. E. Schäfer, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Spanischen Protestantismus* (Gütersloh, 1902, 3 vols.).

² Henry Voes and John van Essen,

both of Antwerp. Luther's hymn "Ein neues Lied wir heben an" was written to commemorate their heroism. Moeller, *History of the Christian Church*, iii, p. 197.

ence with the ancient faith ; but as the Empire had now been turned over to Ferdinand, it no longer formed a part of the Spanish picture. In all the lands that he left to Philip, Roman Catholicism had virtually been maintained to the exclusion of everything else. At the time of his abdication, no other country in Western Europe, save Portugal, was so free from the taint of heresy as were the different scattered states that composed the Spanish Empire. And the inevitable result of this was that the cause of Spain and that of Catholicism came to be synonymous in men's minds. Spain was henceforth saddled with the role of championing the Old Faith against the New, just as hitherto she had been saddled with that of upholding the Cross against the Crescent, and of carrying the Christian faith to the New World. That the Emperor had bequeathed to his son a bitter quarrel with the papacy served if anything to make the matter worse. It was apparently Catholicism according to Spanish, not papal definition, that Spain was attempting to foist on Europe. Small wonder that men took alarm at such tremendous pretensions. Was it to be the aim of Iberia to dictate the religious as well as the political future of the rest of Western Christendom? All these developments are usually associated with the reign of Philip II ; but the foundations for them were laid during the reign of his father. Both politically and religiously, Spain had inherited a burden far too heavy for her to bear, a task that her resources could not enable her to perform.

But that was by no means all. Not only was the burden too heavy and the task too hard, but the path that Spain was obliged to travel in order to carry them was mediaeval rather than modern, — the path of reaction rather than of progress, of darkness rather than of light. Against the modern political principle of national independence and individuality she

was already committed ; she was forced to combat it in order to maintain her own inherited preponderance. Against the still more modern principle of balance of power, which was to be gradually evolved as the most obvious method of preserving national independence, she was equally inevitably arrayed ; indeed, the first great victories of that principle were won in defending the liberties of Europe from the perils of Hapsburg and Spanish supremacy. Religiously, too, the tale was much the same. Whether Protestantism or Catholicism is the better faith is a matter on which men have continued to dispute ever since the Reformation ; but there can be no question that religious toleration is one of the greatest blessings which the progress of the last four centuries has conferred upon mankind. That Protestantism does not mean toleration, the history of those four centuries has abundantly proved ; but it was at least through the persistency of Protestantism's efforts to win for itself the right to exist, that men first came to realize the horrors and the futility of religious persecution. And Spain's inherited religious role — her most sacred duty, as she conceived it to be — committed her in advance to that very policy of persecution and intolerance which the more fortunate and enlightened nations to the north of her were gradually to abandon in the succeeding years. She was landed in a sort of strait-jacket of unbending mediaevalism, from which honorable escape seemed utterly impossible ; she was almost obliged to be an anachronism. Against freedom, both national and ecclesiastical, she had been forced to take her stand. Verily, she was the child of fate.

How far Charles realized the nature of the position in which he had left Spain, and the impossibility of the task he had bequeathed to Philip, how accurately he was able to forecast the future, is a problem which must constantly recur

to all students of the sixteenth century. In the matter of religion there can be little doubt that, whatever the dangers and difficulties he foresaw, he ardently believed that his was not only the right but also ultimately the winning side. Heretics had threatened and had been put down before, ever since the days of Constantine. The peace of Augsburg, it had to be confessed, was the greatest rent that had ever been made in "the seamless garment of Christ"; but surely, with the forces of militant Catholicism rallying to the standard on every hand, it was going to be possible to mend it soon. The very ambiguity of the phraseology of the instrument was an indication that neither party expected it to be permanent. And this reasoning was doubtless intensified by the development of the Emperor's own character during the latter years of his life. Ever since his defeat in the Empire, he had become increasingly religious. The evidences of his personal piety multiplied apace. He was more zealous than ever for the persecution of heretics, less willing to sacrifice the interests of the faith to political and dynastic considerations. Religiously, then, he had no misgivings for the future. He was convinced that the cause of Catholicism was bound to triumph in the end.

In matters political, however, it was a somewhat different story. There is reason to think that Charles was not entirely free from doubts and forebodings as to the prospects of Philip's reign in Spain and in the Spanish Empire. The significance of the fact that the Emperor had been willing to abandon his claims to Burgundy in 1529 has been already commented on. It showed that he realized that men regarded the integrity of France as the symbol of European escape from the perils of Hapsburg preponderance, and that the literal fulfilment of the treaty of Madrid would serve to unite all Western Christendom against him. The

nature of his defeat in Germany in 1552 emphasized the same lesson in another way. His victories in the preceding years had made him too great for the general welfare ; all the outside powers, and even some of his own vassals, desired to have him checked. And so at his abdication he had divided his inheritance, — in itself a confession that his life had stood for an ideal no longer realizable ; the union of Spain and Germany in one hand had proved a dream that could not possibly come true. But now there remained the further question : was not the Spanish part — Philip's inheritance alone, disburthened of the Empire and the Austrian lands — too great to be regarded with equanimity by the rest of Europe ? Without the Netherlands and Franche Comté, it would probably not have been so. The Spanish authority in Italy had been so long established that no one save France — the hereditary foe there — was greatly disturbed by its recent extension through the addition of Milan ; and the American possessions were still too remote seriously to affect the course of European politics. But the acquisition and retention of the Burgundian lands altered the whole situation. It planted the Spanish power in a region where it had never been before, where it had no tradition or precedent, and where, most important of all, it continued to threaten France with the old bugbear of encirclement and would therefore inevitably arouse her hatred. Certainly the Emperor had realized the danger here. His anxiety for the English alliance in 1553, and the provisions that he made for the inheritance of the issue of Philip and Mary, are sufficient proof of this. But the grandchild he so ardently longed for was never born, and the sovereignty of the Netherlands remained in Spain ; nay more, the most important result of the English alliance was to estrange instead of unite the parties to it, and ultimately to convert the island

realm into the most effective and unrelenting of Philip's foes. All this it was impossible for Charles to foresee; but the events of the first part of the year 1558 — the loss of Calais,¹ the increasing estrangement of Mary and Philip, the queen's despondency and her tragic sense of failure — must have given him cause for the gravest fears. The Burgundian inheritance, with all that it implied, was full of evil portent for the future of the Spanish Empire.

If much can be deduced from the Emperor's actions in regard to his views on the events of the day, something may also be gleaned from his different writings. Of these the best known is his *Commentaries* or *Memoirs*, which he dictated for the most part as he voyaged up the Rhine, from Cologne to Mainz, in June, 1550, and finished at Augsburg in the latter part of the year. These, however, are little more than a bare narrative of events and campaigns;² moreover, they only carry the story to the month of August, 1548, and consequently shed no light at all on what was passing through the Emperor's mind during the years when he finally settled the disposal of his vast inheritance. More enlightening by far are the various 'Poderes' and 'Instrucciones' which he drew up for the guidance of those to whom he intrusted the regency in Spain during the periods of his various absences from the peninsula, and finally his so-called 'political testa-

¹ The Emperor's forebodings and grief over this are vividly portrayed in his own letters and in those of Luis de Quijada. Gachard, i, 2, pp. 253-260.

² Save possibly for the period just preceding Charles's attempt to alter the succession in the Empire in favor of Philip. O. Waltz (*Die Denkwürdigkeiten Kaiser Karls V*, Bonn, 1901) would have us believe that the *Commentaries* were written for the express purpose of justifying this project in the eyes of posterity. The *Commentaries* were first published at Brussels in 1862, by the Baron Kervyn de Lettenhove,

who retranslated them into the French, in which they were originally written, from a Portuguese text in the Bibliothèque Nationale. The latest and most accurate edition is that of A. Morel-Fatio (Portuguese text and French translation), which occupies pp. 182-335 of his *Historiographie de Charles-Quint*. It is accompanied by a learned introduction and notes, in which the various problems that have arisen in connection with the *Commentaries* are treated at length, and many hitherto doubtful points are cleared up.

ment' of October 25, 1555. Many of the less important of the 'Poderes y Instrucciones' remain, still unpublished, in the archives at Simancas and Madrid;¹ the best known of them, however, especially those to Philip in 1539, 1543, and 1548, have been printed more than once,² and afford rich material for the student who desires insight into the underlying principles of the Emperor's government.³ Over the genuineness of the 'testament' of 1555 there has recently raged a vigorous controversy. It was first published in a French translation of one of the Italian texts in which it was first discovered,⁴ by Antoine Teissier, the councillor and historiographer of the Elector Frederick III of Brandenburg,⁵ in 1699, at Berlin, for the instruction of the elector's son. Neither Teissier, nor any of the various writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who subsequently mentioned it,⁶ cast any doubts whatever upon its authenticity; but in 1919, it was declared to be an absolute forgery, and nothing more nor less than an Italian essay on the theory of statecraft; while the most recent authority inclines to the view that while the basis of it is genuine, many of its statements were modified and changed by the Italian compilers of the best known of the available texts.⁷ Whatever the final con-

¹ Most of them are in Simancas (Patronato Real, Documentos 2589-2721 (*passim*) de Poderes); the late Enrique Pacheco y de Leyva was kind enough to show me, at Madrid in 1922, a number of transcripts he had made from them. The 'Poderes' run from the year 1516 to 1554. Cf. also "Charles V.'s Last Paper of Advice to his Son," by the present author, in *American Historical Review*, xxviii, 3 (April, 1923), pp. 489-491.

² Most recently by Laiglesia, i, pp. 13-120.

³ Among the different analyses of these 'Poderes y Instrucciones' may be mentioned those of Armstrong, ii, pp. 76-83, 202-210; and of B. Stübel

in *Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, xxiii (1902), pp. 611-638.

⁴ There is little doubt that it was originally written in Spanish, but no Spanish text has yet been found. Cf. B. Stübel in *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, xciii, p. 187.

⁵ Afterwards King Frederick I of Prussia.

⁶ A list of these is given by Stübel in the *Mittheilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, xxiii, p. 621, note 2.

⁷ The historiography of the 'Testament' in the twentieth century is briefly as follows. In 1902, B. Stübel, in *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, xciii,

clusion in the matter of the 'Testament' (and it certainly seems clear that it is not entirely apochryphal), there is enough material in the various 'Poderes' and 'Instrucciones' to enable us to form a basis for important deductions in regard to the Emperor's political theories and expectations for the future.

We have no space to go into details; in view of the careful analyses that have already been made, it would be but a task of supererogation to do so. There is, however, one fundamental idea which may be discerned in almost every line that the Emperor wrote, which it were wellnigh impossible to exaggerate or overemphasize. It is perhaps best expressed in a single phrase in the Instruction to Philip of 1543: "por no dexaros menos de la herencia que heredé."¹ A sturdy defensiveness, not aggression, in other words, was the keynote of Charles's policy, and the line of action that he commended to his son. Maintenance of the status quo was the utmost that he could hope for; the Spanish Empire was already so great that any attempt to enlarge it further would be certain to meet disaster. Charles realized that his own vast inheritance had been the result of a dynastic accident, and that Europe, more sensitive than ever before to the principles of nationalism, would never permit its like to occur again; he had divided his dominions, as we have already seen, as a concession to the sentiment of his day and genera-

pp. 183-248, published a sixteenth-century German text of it, whose discrepancies from the Italian version he carefully pointed out; he obviously regarded the Testament, however, as essentially genuine, and W. Richter (*Die Politischen Testamente Kaiser Karls V und ihre Stellung in der politischen Anschauung seiner Zeit* (Leipzig diss., Halle a. S., 1911) takes practically the same view. E. W. Mayer (in *Historische Zeitschrift*, cxx, pp. 452-494) is the author of the theory which

holds the Testament to be a forgery; while J. K. Mayr (in *Historische Blätter*, ed. Stowasser for the Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv in Vienna, 1. Jahr, 1921, pp. 218-251) develops the view first put forward by Häbler (pp. 361-362, note) in 1907, that there was a perfectly genuine original Testament which was subsequently much modified by the authors of the texts that have come down to us.

¹ "So as not to leave you less than the inheritance which fell to me."

tion. Yet nothing would induce him to surrender one foot of what he had inherited and won, or suffer it to pass out of the orbit of Hapsburg control; and he was most anxious that Philip should be guided by the same idea. Acceptance of the enormous possessions and responsibilities with which it had pleased God in His infinite wisdom to invest him was the principle which he sought to inculcate at every turn. To attempt to increase them further would be manifestly unwise; to shun or shirk them would be cowardly. The details of the various 'Instrucciones' which Charles left to his son were chiefly designed to help him in carrying out this fundamental principle.¹

Illustrations of this spirit of 'sturdy defensiveness' may be found on almost every page that the Emperor wrote. The duchy of Burgundy, so he told his son, was unquestionably the lawful patrimony of the house of Hapsburg, and its claim to that territory must never be abandoned; so essential, however, was the maintenance of peace, especially in view of the exhaustion of his treasury, that it would be better to leave the matter in suspense than to engage, for the sake of it, in an unnecessary war. The French had wickedly despoiled the Emperor's kinsman and faithful ally, the duke of Savoy, of a large part of his estates, in the hope of opening a road for themselves into Italy; yet Philip was advised to let the injury pass without revenge, and to concentrate his efforts on the defence of the remaining possessions of the Savoyard. The papacy, also, had given the Emperor much cause for complaint; Paul III had deserted him after his victory over the Schmalkaldic League, and had constantly sought to thwart him in Italy, while Paul IV had made trouble for the house of Hapsburg in every corner of Christen-

¹ Cf. here the very suggestive lecture of Stubbs on "The Character of Charles V.'s Rule in Spain and the Netherlands"

in his *Lectures on European History* (ed. Hassall, 1904).

dom. Yet Philip was urged to treat the successor of St. Peter with reverence and respect; to wait until the refractory pontiff was removed by the hand of death, and then to use every lawful means to compass the election of a more amenable successor. Even against the infidel the Emperor emphasized the danger of offensive warfare. The passage in which he discusses this subject is curiously involved, but certainly his counsels did not breathe the spirit of the Crusades. The Turk, he insisted, could be more advantageously met with craft than with force. No war against him should be undertaken at all unless it could be justified in the eyes of the world as being of a strictly defensive character. If Philip should be so fortunate as to capture any place from him, he was to direct all his energies to fortifying and retaining it, rather than endanger his army by attempting further conquests.¹

The same essentially negative spirit which animates the Emperor's advice on the conduct of foreign affairs is made evident in a somewhat different fashion in his remarks on internal government. The famous passage in the instruction of 1543, in which Charles gives his views of the characters of his principal counsellors, affords an admirable illustration of this.² No one of them, he repeatedly insists, was so good or so wise as to be given unquestioned precedence over the rest or even permitted to seem to monopolize Philip; it was in order to prevent this that the Emperor had filled the most important posts with the heads of opposing factions. The Duke of Alva was the best soldier in Spain, well versed in foreign affairs, and should always be consulted in matters military and diplomatic; but he was also of the ancient

¹ Text of the 'Instruccion' of 1548, in Laiglesia, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 93-120, *passim*; cf. also Armstrong, ii, pp. 202-207, and

Stübel, in *Archiv für österreichische Geschichte*, xciii, pp. 233-243.

² Text in Laiglesia, i, pp. 84 ff.; cf. also Armstrong, ii, pp. 78 ff.

Castilian aristocracy — a grandee of grandees — who had not ceased to aspire to rule the realm. It would therefore be dangerous to admit him to the inner circle of the government. Cobos and Zúñiga were financiers and administrators, whose value was perhaps all the greater because they belonged to opposite parties and would consequently emphasize both sides of every question. On the other hand, they were both avaricious, and Philip was cautioned not to reward either of them so liberally as to give the other just cause for complaint. And so on through the entire list; never a word of praise without the corresponding apportionment of blame; perpetual balancing of good and evil. It was a notable proof of Charles's shrewdness and insight, a monument to the keenness of his judgment of men; and yet, when one comes to consider it as a whole, its net effect was to paralyze initiative. So evenly weighted were the pros and cons that Philip must often have been at a loss which way to turn. One sees the reason for the fatal hesitation which was to be the source of so many of his subsequent defeats. A modern nation, with a cabinet in which all parties were given equal representation, would certainly find it difficult to follow any definite or consistent policy; the probable result would be to make it stand stock still. The system of government which Charles commended to Philip was bound to arrest the progress of the Spanish Empire.

It was doubtless the vast size and unwieldiness of his Spanish inheritance — more obvious than ever when coupled with his Austrian and imperial one — that first convinced Charles that he must be content to rest on the defensive; and the lesson that Spain had taught him sank deep into its teacher's heart. The Spanish ideal was henceforward the preservation of the status quo; Spain is conservative, not progressive; she looks backward, not forward. She seems

overwhelmed by the tremendous load that God has given her to bear, oppressed by a fatalistic feeling that the future depends solely on His will, and is out of her power to mould or control. There is the sharpest possible contrast between the eagerness and enthusiasm with which Pedro of Aragon went forth to win the crown of Sicily, and the almost reluctant acquiescence with which Charles V finally accepted the inheritance of Milan; and the attitude of both rulers is accurately reflected in that of the peoples over whom they held sway. The Spain of the middle of the sixteenth century gives the impression of being strangely tired. The fire and energy which characterized every action of the heroes of the Reconquest and of the early builders of the mediaeval Aragonese Empire are no longer there. She was conscious, in other words, that she had reached her zenith. There was no longer any possibility of her rising any higher; the only question was whether she could prevent a decline. A spirit of grandiose sombreness seems henceforth to pervade her. She was proud of the mighty deeds that she had wrought in the past; for the future she must trust in the omnipotence of God.

Never before had Spain and Charles of Burgundy been so close to one another's hearts as during the last few months of the Emperor's life at Yuste. The long and difficult process of reconciling their originally divergent viewpoints had now attained its final stage. The news that poured in from abroad was mostly sad, yet nothing of necessarily fatal significance was reported; nation and retired ruler were calm and undismayed. In February, 1558, Charles got word of the death at Talaverauela of his sister Eleanor, the widow of Francis I, who had bidden him good-by only two short months before; but the Emperor himself, in the following summer, seemed in excellent condition; in July he was de-

scribed as "well and fat, with a better color than for many a day."¹ On August 31, however, there was a sudden turn for the worse; while sitting on a covered terrace by the western side of his apartment, he was attacked by chills and a fever, and retired to his room, which he was never more to leave. In the early hours of the morning of September 21, it was evident that the end had come. Rousing himself from his lethargy he grasped, for one brief instant, the crucifix which had been held in death by the Empress Isabella; then, calling loudly on the name of Jesus, he sank back upon the pillows and expired. Twenty-six years later his remains were removed from Yuste to the Escorial, where they lie today, under the altar of the great monastic church, amid surroundings symbolic of the union of the vast empire which he bequeathed to his successor, with the spirit of the ancient faith in which, at the last, he found enduring peace.

¹ Gachard, ii, pp. 445, 453.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

See note at the end of Chapters XXIV and XXV, and add:

Sources and Contemporary Authorities. — Charles the Fifth, "Historia do invictissimo Emperador," Portuguese text and French translation, ed. A. Morel-Fatio on pp. 182-358 of his *Historiographie de Charles-Quint* (Paris, 1913); Luis de Ávila y Zúñiga, "Comentario de la Guerra de Alemania," in *B. A. E.*, xxi, pp. 409-449; vols. viii-xii of the series of *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland 1533-1559*, ed. the K. Preussische Historische Institut in Rom (Gotha and Berlin, 1898-1901); and A. von Druffel, *Briefe und Akten zur Geschichte des sechzehnten Jahrhunderts*, vols. i-iv (Munich, 1873-96), are invaluable for the Schmalkaldic campaign and the ensuing diplomatic developments. The eleventh volume (ed. Royall Tyler, London, 1916) of the *Calendar of Letters, Despatches, and State Papers, Relating to the Negotiations between England and Spain* (referred to in the notes as *C. S. P., Spanish*), covers the year 1553, and sheds a flood of new light on the negotiations for the marriage of Philip and Mary. Vol. vi of the *Calendar of State Papers, Venetian* (ed. R. Brown, London, 1877) is valuable, as are also the Abbé Vertot's *Ambassades de Messieurs de Noailles* (Leyden, 1763, 5 vols.), and the other standard sources and contemporary authorities on English history in the reign of Mary. The letters and other documents printed in L. P. Gachard's *Retraite et Mort de Charles-Quint* (Brussels, 1854-55, 2 vols.) are useful for the Emperor's last years.

Later Works. — The sixth volume of the *History of the German People* by J. Janssen, translated into English by A. M. Christie (London, 1903), and the second volume of Gottlob Egelhaaf's *Deutsche Geschichte im sechzehnten Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart, 1892) give admirable pictures of the general situation in the Empire. Vol. i of H. Fernelon's *Histoire de Philippe II* (Paris, 1881) furnishes a vivid though not invariably accurate portrait of the prince during these critical years. Vols. ix and x of A. Henne's *Histoire du Règne de Charles-Quint en Belgique* (Brussels and Leipzig, 1859-60) and volume iii of H. Pirrenne's *Histoire de Belgique* (Brussels, 1912) are indispensable for the Netherlands, while F. Decrue, *Anne de Montmorency sous Henri II* (Paris, 1889), and L. Romier, *Les origines politiques des Guerres de Religion* (Paris, 1913-14, 2 vols.), give an excellent idea of the attitude of France. For England, the most recent general work is A. F. Pollard's *History of England from the Accession of Edward VI to the Death of Elizabeth* (London, 1910), but the preface to vol. xi of the *C. S. P.*,

Spanish, cited above, will prove far more useful to the specialist for the critical period of the Anglo-Spanish negotiations. A list of the principal books on Charles's life at Yuste is given in note 1 to p. 399, above : and the names of the most recent authorities on his ' political testament ' in note 7 to p. 407. Numerous monographs of a more special nature are cited in the footnotes to other of the preceding pages, and the list may be indefinitely extended by referring to the appropriate pages of Sánchez Alonso and Dahlmann-Waitz.

BOOK VI
SPAIN IN THE NEW WORLD

CHAPTER XXVII

THE CIRCUMNAVIGATION OF THE GLOBE AND THE ISLANDS OF THE PACIFIC

THE progress of Spanish discovery and colonization was much influenced under Charles V, as it had been under the Catholic Kings, by the long standing rivalries between Portugal and Castile. It was early in March, 1518, at Valladolid, when he had been in his Iberian dominions for less than five months, that the new monarch received an application, of far reaching consequences, from a Portuguese adventurer who had but recently taken up his residence in Spain.

Ferdinand of Magellan, to call him at the outset by the Anglicized version of his name, was born of noble parentage, probably in the city of Oporto, about the year 1472 or 1473.¹ Transplanted at an early age to the capital for his education, as was the custom with the scions of the aristocracy, he grew up a page in the household of Queen Eleanor,² and thence passed, in 1495, into the service of Emmanuel the Fortunate. Fired by his sovereign's enthusiasm for exploration, an eye witness of the triumphant return of those memorable expeditions to the Far East and to the New

¹ Neither date nor place can be stated with certainty. The date can only be deduced from the year in which the explorer probably entered the service of the queen. Most of the recent historians (e.g., Denucé in *Mémoires de l'Académie Royale de Belgique*, Classe des Lettres, iv, p. 96) have inclined to the view that his birthplace was the

little town of Sabrosa, in Traz-os-Montes; but Medina, who has carefully sifted all the evidence (*Descubrimiento del Océano Pacífico*, iii, pp. i-xv), obviously prefers Oporto, and Pastells (*Descubrimiento del Estrecho*, i, p. 33) agrees with him.

² The wife of John 'the Perfect.'

World which succeeded the circumnavigation of the Cape of Good Hope, he enlisted as a volunteer in the great armada which Francisco de Almeida, the first viceroy of India, led out to the Orient in the spring of 1505. After distinguishing himself by many acts of skill and gallantry on the East African coast and the western shores of India, he passed from the service of Almeida to that of Albuquerque, and in the autumn of 1510 joined the famous expedition which captured Malacca in the following summer. Whether or not he sailed in the fleet which Albuquerque despatched to the Moluccas, we cannot surely tell;¹ but we know that he was on most friendly terms with Francisco Serrão, one of its principal commanders, and that he later exchanged letters with him about the wealth of the new lands. In 1512 we find him back again in Portugal, and in the following year taking part in an expedition against the Moors of Azamor; but it was his experience in the Far East that had sunk most deeply into his heart, and was destined to give birth to the project which won for him immortal fame.²

An interview with King Emmanuel, on his return from the Moroccan campaign, proved to be the critical moment in Magellan's career. We know that the explorer asked for an increase³ of his *noradia*, or annual court stipend, and was refused. It is also natural to infer — though there is no documentary evidence to prove it — that Magellan broached to the king a plan of reaching the Spice Islands by the western route, but failed to elicit any encouragement from his master.⁴ At any rate, it is certain that the rebuff

¹ Medina, iii, pp. xvii ff.; Koelliker, *Die Erste Umseglung der Erde*, pp. 24-40; Denucé, pp. 100-128, *passim*.

² Cf. Medina, iii, pp. xxxi-xxxix; Koelliker, pp. 40 ff.; Denucé, pp. 100-138.

³ This increase amounted to one half-

cruzado a month, which has been reckoned by Guillemard, *Ferdinand Magellan*, pp. 77-78, as "about equivalent to thirteen pence." Cf. also Denucé, pp. 129-132.

⁴ Medina, iii, pp. xxxv ff.; Koelliker, pp. 42 ff.; Guillemard, pp. 81-82.

that he received determined him, like Columbus in 1484, to try for a more favorable reception for his projects in Spain. Discussion with his friend, the learned cosmographer, Ruy Faleiro, convinced him that the idea of reaching the Spice Islands by the west was perfectly feasible; and if he were determined to try to realize it, there would be obvious advantages in entering the service of the king of Spain, within whose demarcation, under the treaty of Tordesillas, lay most of the water he would be obliged to traverse. In October, 1517, he crossed over to Seville, and took out his naturalization papers as a subject of King Charles.¹

Shortly afterwards he applied to the officials of the Casa de Contratación for aid in carrying out his great project. He told them that the Spice Islands belonged to Spain by virtue of the demarcation line; he promised to prove it before all the doctors who might contradict him, and would pledge his head for it. Furthermore, when the officials replied that it was impossible to go thither without trespassing within the demarcation of Emmanuel the Fortunate, he replied that if they would give him ships and men, he would show them "navigation to those parts without touching any sea or land of the King of Portugal."² Most of the officials were unconvinced, but one of them — Juan de Aranda — made up his mind that Magellan knew whereof he spoke; he questioned him more closely, and also catechized Faleiro, who had arrived in Seville in the month of December. Faleiro found it difficult to get on with Aranda. He was furious when he discovered that the official wanted a share in the profits of the expedition, if it should be possible to arrange it. However, on realizing that Aranda was the only possible open sesame to an audience with Charles, he swallowed

¹ Medina, iii, pp. lxxix ff.; Koelliker, p. 43.

² G. Correa, on p. 245 of *The First*

Voyage around the World by Magellan, tr. Lord Stanley of Alderley for the Hakluyt Society (London, 1894).

his bile, and the three men journeyed northward to Valladolid. Aranda got his companions into touch with Chièvres, Adrian of Utrecht, the Chancellor Sauvage, and the rest of the Flemings; he enlisted the support of Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, head of the Casa de Contratación, and now bishop of Burgos also; in fact, he did everything for his associates that could contribute to their success. Even the unfor- giving Faleiro was forced to recognize the importance of his services. In February, 1518, at Valladolid, he and Magellan signed a formal agreement,¹ in which they promised to give Aranda an eighth portion of such profits as they should derive from their expedition.²

One month later, on March 22, Charles gave his consent to the *capitulacion y asiento*, defining the terms under which Magellan and Faleiro were to sail for the Spice Islands.³ He promised to furnish them with five ships, provisioned and equipped for two years, and carrying crews to the total of 234 men. He agreed that for ten years to come no other explorer should be sent out on the same quest. Magellan and Faleiro were to receive one-twentieth of all profits arising from the expedition; and a subsidiary document gave them the rank and pay of captains, with all the dignities and powers thereto pertaining. The rights of the king of Portugal were carefully safeguarded. Nothing was to be done, no discovery to be undertaken inside the limits of his line of demarcation. This last stipulation, however, was by no means sufficient to mollify the wrath of Emmanuel the Fortunate, who was apprised of all that had happened since Magellan and Faleiro had left his dominions, and was

¹ Printed in J. T. Medina, *Coleccion de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de Chile*, i, pp. 1-5, but misdated 'October' in the heading.

² Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. xcv ff.; Koelliker, pp. 43 ff.

³ Printed in Martin Fernandez de Navarrete's *Coleccion de Viajes*, iv, pp. 116-121.

furious at the prospect that Castile would reap the profits of an opportunity which he had suffered to escape him. An excellent occasion for making trouble was afforded by the fact that negotiations for his marriage with Charles's sister Eleanor were at that moment pending,¹ and that his ambassador, Alvaro da Costa, was resident at Charles's court, charged with the duty of bringing them to a conclusion. Da Costa tried to persuade Magellan to abandon his intended enterprise. He sought to bribe him. There was even talk of his assassination.² The Portuguese ambassador also approached the Flemings, and he finally remonstrated with Charles himself;³ the matter continued after the removal of the court to Saragossa, whither the explorers accompanied the young monarch in May; it was reopened after Charles reached Barcelona.⁴ But da Costa's efforts were in vain. In such matters Charles relied, at this stage, on the advice of Fonseca, who gave enthusiastic support to Magellan's cause. The crying need for funds, and the strong probability that an expedition to the Spice Islands would help to supply them, were other considerations which doubtless carried weight. Charles stood loyally behind the leader of the expedition; and he further indicated his enthusiasm for the explorers by decorating them with the Cross of the Order of Santiago.⁵ Nay more, when, after Magellan and Faleiro had gone to Seville to fit out, a Portuguese agent started a riot among their crews, Charles expressed himself so vigorously that no more difficulty was experienced for some time.⁶ The hostility of King Emmanuel, however, was

¹ The marriage was celebrated in November.

² Cf. Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cxxxii ff.; Koelliker, pp. 55-62.

³ Cf. letter of da Costa to Emmanuel, in Medina, *Coleccion*, i, pp. 16-18.

⁴ Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp.

cxxv-cl, *passim*; Guillemard, pp. 112-117, and references there.

⁵ Antonio de Herrera, *Historia General*, dec ii, lib. iv, cap. ix.

⁶ Navarrete, iv, pp. 125-127; Herrera, dec. ii, lib. iv, cap. ix; Pastells, i, pp. 46-47; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. clxv ff.; Koelliker, pp. 65 ff.

only held in leash; and he continued to show it by sending out expeditions to intercept Magellan after he had set sail.¹

The opposition of Portugal was not the only hindrance that Magellan was compelled to overcome before he was able to depart. The officials of the Casa de Contratación interposed delays, and a sharp letter from the Emperor was necessary to bring them into line.² Faleiro, too, made trouble. Whether it was through jealousy or madness, it is not possible to say;³ but the fact remains that from a colleague and friend he was rapidly becoming converted into a trouble maker and foe, until finally a royal *cedula* of July 26, 1519, effected his removal, by ordering him to remain in Seville after Magellan's departure, to superintend the fitting out of a second expedition. From that moment he drops out of the picture,⁴ and Magellan was left in supreme command. Faleiro's elimination at this stage of the proceedings was probably not an unmixed evil; indeed, it is quite possible to regard it as a blessing in disguise. His scientific accomplishments and knowledge of navigation had certainly been a priceless asset to Magellan in launching his project and in obtaining the indispensable support of the crown.⁵ Without them the whole plan might well have been nipped in the bud. But Faleiro's temper was far too uncertain to enable him to stand the strain of a long and arduous voyage. He was utterly deficient in practical common sense and ability to get on with his fellow men. He had made his contribution, and it was time for him to give place to others.⁶

¹ Guillemard, p. 139, and references there. None of these intercepting expeditions was successful in accomplishing its object.

² Navarrete, iv, pp. 122-123.

³ Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. clx ff.; Guillemard, pp. 118, 134-135, and references there.

⁴ On Faleiro's subsequent career, cf. Barros Arana, *Vida de Magallanes*, pp. 139-142; Pastells, i, pp. 51-54; Koelliker, p. 241.

⁵ Cf. Denucé, pp. 139 ff.

⁶ Santa Cruz, i, p. 210 (parte ii, cap. xi).

In the meantime, the preparations for the voyage were pressed forward as rapidly as these various difficulties would permit. The funds which the Casa de Contratación was able to furnish proved inadequate, but the merchants of Seville advanced the rest, so that the entire cost — over 8,000,000 maravedis — was finally defrayed. The five ships that composed the expedition — the *San Antonio* (120 tons), the *Trinidad*, in which Magellan sailed (110 tons), the *Concepcion* (90 tons), the *Victoria* (85 tons), and the *Santiago* (75 tons) — were provided for defence with high castellated structures fore and aft.¹ The total number of persons who finally embarked was probably upwards of 265.² They were a cosmopolitan lot. Most of them were Spaniards, but there were also many Portuguese — far more, in fact, than Charles desired — besides Italians, Frenchmen, Flemings, Germans, Greeks, and Moors, one Englishman, and Magellan's Malaccan slave. The ships were plentifully supplied with cannon, powder and ball, and provisions of all sorts. On August 10, 1519, the fleet left the quays at Seville, and dropped down the Guadalquivir to San Lucar. On the twenty-fourth Magellan made his last will and testament.³ On September 10 the expedition weighed anchor, and sailed boldly forth on its memorable voyage.

Among the supernumeraries (*sobresalientes*) who sought

¹ Pastells, i, pp. 61–63; Koelliker, pp. 73 ff.

² One of the official lists in the Archivo de Indias, which gives the number of those who sailed as 239, is published in Pastells, i, pp. 207–212, and in Medina, *Coleccion*, i, pp. 113–117. A "Relación del sueldo que se pagó a los marineros etc., de la armada de Magallanes" — also in the Archivo de Indias, and likewise published by Pastells, i, pp. 213–227, — places the total at 234, the exact figure mentioned in the royal *Capitulacion y Asiento* of March 22, 1518. Neither of these documents

bears any precise date. Pigafetta declares in his journal (i, p. 31) that "counting those of every nationality, we were 237 men." But there is reason to believe that the whole number was somewhat larger. Cf. Pastells, i, p. 62; Koelliker, *Tafel* 8 (between pp. 80 and 81), and above all Medina (*Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cccxxxix–ccclv), who has gone into the whole matter with the utmost care, and places the total at 268.

³ Printed, in translation, in Guille-mard, pp. 317–326.

and obtained passage with the explorers was a native of the town of Vicenza in Lombardy named Antonio Pigafetta, who had come to Spain with the papal nuncio Chiericato in 1519. He tells us that he was possessed with a desire to see and experience "the great things of the Ocean," and that through the favor of Charles V he was able to attach himself to the expedition. He sailed in the *Trinidad* as a servant or *criado* of Magellan. It was most fortunate for posterity that he was able to do so; for his account of the expedition is by far the best that has come down to us, and, in fact, one of the most precious narratives of travel in the history of the world.¹

Favorable winds accompanied the explorers during the first few weeks of the voyage. They put in, *more antiguo*, at the Canaries, and then ran down along the West African coast inside the Cape Verde Islands. As they approached the Line, the weather became much worse. There were harassing alternations of flat calms and heavy gales; and before they got across to the eastern point of Brazil, a large number of the crew were sullen and discontented, while Juan de Cartagena, the captain of the *San Antonio*, showed such open insubordination that it was necessary to put him in irons.² But the hardships of the voyage were by no means the only cause of trouble. Many of Magellan's companions

¹ The best edition of Pigafetta's work is that published by J. A. Robertson (original Italian text and English translation) in two volumes, at Cleveland, in 1906. Pigafetta can have been none other than the *sobresaliente* described in the "Relacion del Sueldo" above referred to (Pastells, i, p. 223) as "Antonio Lombardo" (not "lombardero" as Medina, *Coleccion*, i, p. 114, and Pastells, i, p. 208, have it) "criado del dicho capitan, natural de Biganço en Lombardia, hijo de Juan e Anzola su mujer" — a statement which disposes of the assertion that he was a natural child.

In the first line of his work, he describes himself as a "patrician of Venice"; and it was at Venice that the Pigafetta family, which was of Tuscan origin, had its principal residence. His connection with the Knights of Rhodes began after his return from the voyage around the world. Cf. Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cccxxi-cccxxiv, and A. Zeri, "Antonio Pigafetta," in *Rivista Marittima*, xiii, 4 (Rome, 1880), pp. 741-758.

² Pigafetta, i, pp. 33 ff.; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cxciv ff.

had been pledged to rise against him long before the expedition set sail from San Lucar. The Portuguese, as will be readily surmised, were at the back of these conspiracies. There are hints of a prearranged mutiny in letters of King Emmanuel's agents in Castile to their master. Not long after his departure, Magellan received definite warning "that his captains had told their friends and relations that if they had any trouble with him they would kill him."¹ The great explorer, then, was not unprepared for emergencies; and when, in the end of March, 1520, suffering from cold and short of provisions, the little fleet anchored, to spend the antarctic winter in the harbor of Port St. Julian, in southern Patagonia,² the blow fell.

On Easter Sunday (April 8) Magellan commanded that all hands should go ashore and attend mass, and that afterwards the captains of the different ships should come to dine with him. Both orders were but partially and half-heartedly obeyed, and on the following morning Magellan awoke to discover that a band of armed men from the *Concepcion* had boarded the *San Antonio*, overpowered the officers, and assumed control. The mutineers were led by Gaspar de Quesada, the captain of the *Concepcion*, which had already been gained for the rebel cause; and the *Victoria*, whose captain, Mendoza, was notoriously hostile to Magellan, was also quick to give its adherence. Juan de Cartagena likewise took sweet revenge for his previous punishment by lending his support; and Juan Sebastian del Cano, who was later to win immortal fame by completing Magellan's great work, was numbered, at this juncture, in the ranks of the *sublevados*. The situation was such as would have daunted any but the stoutest heart; but Magellan was

¹ Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. clxxx ff., notes, cxci ff.

was given to the region by Magellan, cf. Pigafetta, i, pp. 49-51, 226-227.

² On the origin of this name, which

fully equal to the occasion. It was clearly a case of win all or lose all; unless the mutiny was completely and immediately suppressed, his hopes were blasted and his career ruined. Numbers were apparently against him; he must therefore try the effect of a surprise. So he sent a handful of men to the *Victoria*, many of whose crew, despite the treachery of Mendoza, he knew to be loyal to himself. The captain was held for a moment in parley, and then suddenly cut down; while at the same instant the *Victoria* was boarded by fifteen men from another boat which had been kept in readiness for the crucial moment. There was practically no resistance. Magellan's ensign was hoisted, and the *Victoria*, together with the *Santiago*, which had been loyal from the first, was moved alongside the *Trinidad*, so as to block the mouth of the harbor and prevent the possible escape of the *Concepcion* and the *San Antonio*. The odds were now three to two in favor of authority, and the morale of the mutineers had been broken by the swiftness and success of Magellan's onset.¹

A delay of twenty-four hours and a bloodless contest between the *Trinidad* and the *San Antonio* were sufficient to induce the rest of the rebels to surrender; and an inquiry was promptly held to determine their fate. 'Politic mercy' was clearly the line for Magellan to take with the rank and file — the more so as he could not dispense with their services for the remainder of the voyage; but of the ringleaders it was equally obvious there was every reason to make an example. The body of Mendoza, slain on the *Victoria*, was accordingly drawn and quartered, as was the immemorial custom with traitors; Quesada was taken ashore and beheaded on the Saturday after the mutiny, and his body, after execution, subjected to the same treatment as that of

¹ Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. ccxiii ff.

Mendoza; while Juan de Cartagena, and the priest, Pedro Sánchez de Reina,¹ who had been caught in the act of attempting to stir up a second revolt after the failure of the first, were marooned. More than thirty-five others were found guilty by the court of inquiry, and sentenced to death, but Magellan pardoned them. Having shown enough decision and severity to make it certain that his authority would thenceforth be unquestioned, he could afford to be generous to the rest of his vanquished foes. The mutiny, though passed over in silence or else accorded only bare mention by the four historians of the expedition who actually accompanied it,² was really the turning point of the whole adventure.³

The expedition remained in the bay of St. Julian until August 24, 1520. Much time was spent in careening and caulking the ships. In the end of April a reconnaissance to the southward was undertaken by Magellan's loyal follower, João Serrão,⁴ with thirty-seven men in the *Santiago*. But a gale blew up after they had gone some sixty miles. The *Santiago* was driven ashore and went to pieces. The captain and crew, with the exception of Serrão's negro slave, were fortunate to escape alive, but they were destined to endure terrible hardships before they got back to their comrades. A river three miles wide barred their passage northward along the shore; finally a raft was constructed on which two of them fought their way across and managed, after terrible privations, to bring the news of the disaster to Port

¹ Or Calmette, as some of the authorities call him. Cf. Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, p. cxxi, note 17, and pp. ccclxii-ccclxiii.

² These are, Pigafetta; an unknown Portuguese writer whose work is printed in Medina, *Coleccion*, ii, pp. 395 ff.; the Genoese pilot, whose *Derrotero* is also printed in Medina, *ibid.*, ii, pp. 398-

417; and Francisco Albo, whose *Diario* appears in Navarrete, iv, pp. 209-247. Cf. also Guillemard, pp. 144-147.

³ Guillemard, p. 174, note; Denucé, pp. 272 ff.

⁴ The brother of Magellan's great friend of earlier Malaccan days; cf. *ante*, p. 420.

St. Julian; a relief party was organized, and the rest of the survivors were finally rescued.¹ Efforts were also made to learn something of the interior of the country and its inhabitants, six of whom were brought to Magellan's ship and given food enough to satisfy twenty men, "but the six ate it all, since they were so big that the smallest was bigger and taller than the tallest man in Castile."² Two of the *gigantes* were later somewhat treacherously enticed on board, and manacled, to be taken home as a present to the Emperor, but they both died before the expedition had begun to cross the Pacific. This last episode naturally aroused hostility between the natives and the explorers during the closing weeks of their stay at Port St. Julian, and made the prospects of the two marooned culprits — Juan de Cartagena and Pedro Sánchez de Reina — even darker than they had been before.

It was on the twenty-first of October, 1520, that the adventurers, in the four ships that remained to them, reached the Cabo de las Virgenes and the opening of the strait³ that bears Magellan's name. The next thirty-eight days were spent in threading its devious windings. The farther the explorers went the more difficult their enterprise seemed to be. The low lying pampas at the eastern extremity of the strait gave way as they passed westward to the bleak precipices of the Southern Andes. The waters beneath them were apparently fathomless. New and strange forms of life appeared on sea and shore. Even the dauntless spirit of Magellan was appalled.⁴ At least one council was held to discuss the expediency of turning back, but when it came

¹ Pigafetta, i, p. 63; Herrera, dec. ii, lib. ix, cap. xiii; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. ccxxvi ff.

² Herrera, dec. ii, lib. ix, cap. xiii.

³ The interesting question of the degree of Magellan's possible foreknowl-

edge of the existence of this strait is treated at length in Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, cap. v, and in Guillemard, pp. 188-198. Cf. also *C. S. P., Venetian*, iii, no. 556.

⁴ Herrera, dec. ii, lib. ix, cap. xv.

to the question of abandoning the search to which he had dedicated his life, the courage of the great captain revived, and the doubts and objections of the more timid were set aside. Desertion, however, Magellan could not prevent, the more so as the necessity of sending out constant reconnoitring expeditions gave every opportunity for it; and before the expedition had reached the Pacific, the *San Antonio* was seized by a party of mutineers, under the pilot Estevan Gómez, and taken back to Spain.¹ It was a dastardly act, and it was rendered even more heinous by the lies that the deserters told about their leader when they got home. But nothing could induce Magellan to swerve from his purpose. Finally, in the end of November, a well equipped boat, which had been sent ahead to explore, returned, after three days' absence, with the news that it had found "the cape of the other sea The captain-general wept for joy," continues Pigafetta, "and called that cape, Cape Deseado, for we had been desiring it for a long time."² "The other sea" proving blessedly free from the terrible gales that had recently beset their course, they called it the Pacific, a name which finally prevailed over that of the Mar del Sur first given to the same ocean by Vasco Nuñez de Balboa, when he saw it, seven years before, from a "peak in Darien."³

For nearly three weeks the explorers worked their way northward along the Chilean coast; then, on December 16, when they were near the fiftieth parallel of latitude, they struck out boldly, in a northwesterly direction, across an apparently unlimited waste of water. After thirty-nine days they sighted a small island covered with trees (prob-

¹ A contemporary account of this affair, contained in a letter from the contador Juan Lopez de Recalde to the bishop of Burgos, written May 12, 1521,

is printed in Navarrete, iv, pp. 201-208.

² Pigafetta, i, p. 71.

³ *Ibid.*, i, p. 85; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, pp. ccxxxiii-cclxiv.


ably Puka-Puka, in the Tuamotu Archipelago); it proved to be uninhabited, and they passed on. Eleven days more brought them again within sight of land (probably Flint Island, in the Manihiki group), but it was likewise uninhabited and desolate, "and they called these islets the Unfortunate, since they found there neither people, nor consolation, nor any kind of food."¹ For thirty more days they struggled on, again without sight of land, their only encouragement being a favorable wind. Never had the pangs of hunger been so sharp. Rations were reduced to the lowest possible limits, and consisted, says Pigafetta, "of biscuit which was no longer biscuit, but powder of biscuits swarming with worms, for they had eaten the good. It stank strongly of the urine of rats. We drank yellow water that had been putrid for many days . . . and ate some ox hides that covered the top of the mainyard," after they had been softened in sea water for four or five days. "Rats were sold for one-half ducado apiece, and even then we could not get them."² Scurvy broke out, and several died; more sickened, and all were utterly discouraged, when at last, on March 6, 1521, they sighted an island (almost certainly Guam) which proved to be inhabited, and the worst of their troubles were over for the time being.³

The thievish propensities of the natives impressed the explorers so vividly that they gave the archipelago that they had reached the name of the Ladrões or Robber Islands. "The inhabitants entered the ships," declares Pigafetta, "and stole whatever they could lay their hands on," including "the small boat that was fastened to the poop of the flagship. Thereupon, the captain-general in wrath went ashore with forty armed men, who burned some forty or fifty

¹ Herrera, dec. ii, lib. ix, cap. xv.

² Pigafetta, i, pp. 83-84.

³ Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, p. cclxxi.



houses together with many boats, and killed seven men.”¹ Fresh fruit and vegetables, however, were obtained, and on March 9 the explorers departed on a southwesterly course which brought them, on the 16th, to Samar in the Philippines. Two days later they landed at the neighboring island of Humunu (Malhou or Homonbon), and were visited there by a prau with nine men in it. These people soon proved to be friendly, hospitable, and anxious to trade, and in a short time “they became very familiar with us.”² The sick recovered rapidly with the good food that was now easily available. Troubles and complaints began to vanish as the wonders of unknown lands continued to unfold themselves. Finally, on March 28, after they had passed over to the little island which is now called Limasaua, the adventurers encountered some natives who were able to comprehend the language of Magellan’s Malaccan slave, and thus knew definitely for the first time that their great quest had been successful, and that they had reached, by sailing westward, the outer confines of the Asiatic world.³

For the next few weeks fortune continued to smile. On Good Friday, March 29, Pigafetta and another man were sent ashore to visit the local king and see the country; and such was the hospitality with which they were treated that Pigafetta was forced “to eat meat on holy Friday, for I could not help myself,” while his companion “became intoxicated as a consequence of so much drinking and eating.”⁴ Easter Sunday, the 31st, was the first anniversary of the mutiny at Port St. Julian, and therefore doubly appropriate for remembering God’s mercies. Mass was accordingly celebrated on shore with the utmost solemnity, and Magel-

¹ Pigafetta, i, p. 91.

² Pigafetta, i, p. 103.

³ Pigafetta, i, p. 109; Albo, in *Nava-*
rete, iv, p. 220; Herrera, dec. iii, lib.

i, cap. iii; Medina, *Descubrimiento*,
iii, pp. cclxxiii–cclxxv.

⁴ Pigafetta, i, pp. 115–117.

lan was deeply gratified by the participation of two of the local chieftains in the service. "They went forward to kiss the Cross as we did," writes Pigafetta, "and when the body of our Lord was elevated, they remained on their knees and worshipped Him with clasped hands."¹ But the greatest triumph of all occurred two weeks later, when the expedition had passed on to Cebu. After some hesitation, the king of that island agreed to a treaty giving Spaniards the exclusive privilege of trading in his dominions, and a little later he accepted the Christian faith. On Sunday, April 14, the ceremony of baptism was performed with appropriate rites. The king of Cebu was called Don Carlos, in honor of the Emperor, and the queen was given the name Joanna, in honor of the Emperor's mother.² As the news spread, the people came in from the countryside and the neighboring islands to follow the royal example; within a few weeks over two thousand had been baptized. Apparently, however, the natives did not show sufficient alacrity to suit Magellan in fulfilling their promises to destroy their ancient idols, and on one occasion they were reprovved by the captain for their slackness in this respect. Thereupon they replied that they were preserving the idols "not for themselves but for a sick man who had not spoken now for four days, so that the idols might give him health. He was the prince's brother, and the bravest and wisest man in the island. The captain told them to burn their idols and to believe in Christ, and that if the sick man were baptized, he would quickly recover; and if that did not so happen they could behead him [i.e., the captain] then and there. Thereupon, the king replied that he would do it, for he truly believed in Christ. We made a procession from the square to the house of the sick man with as much pomp as possible.

¹ Pigafetta, i, p. 121.

² *Ibid.*, i, pp. 153-157.

There we found him in such condition that he could neither speak nor move. We baptized him and his two wives, and ten girls. Then the captain had him asked how he felt. He spoke immediately, and said that by the grace of our Lord he felt very well. That was a most manifest miracle in our times. When the captain heard him speak, he thanked God fervently." After this episode, iconoclasm apparently proceeded at a more satisfactory rate, "and the people themselves cried out, 'Castiglia! Castiglia!'" as they destroyed their idols.¹

But alas, that the triumph so gallantly won should have been destined by fate to be so cruelly short-lived! Some of the petty rulers of the territories near Cebu had become restive under the suzerainty of the king of that island, and Magellan, naturally wishing to strengthen the authority of his friend and convert, gladly offered aid in effecting their subjugation. One of the most troublesome of these petty rulers was the rajah of Matan, an island just across the harbor of Cebu, and when one of the rajah's minor chieftains promised the Spaniards his support in subduing his overlord, Magellan thought the opportunity too good to be let slip. Against the advice of his old friend and comrade, João Serrão, he embarked at midnight on Friday, April 26, with fifty-nine of his followers, in three boats. The king of Cebu and upwards of a thousand natives accompanied them in war canoes. But when the armament reached Matan, these auxiliaries were requested by Magellan to remain where they were, and "watch the Spaniards fight";² while the captain, with forty-eight of his men, waded ashore and advanced, unsupported, against the foe. It soon became apparent that he had undertaken an impossible task. The natives

¹ Pigafetta, i, pp. 161-163; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cclxxix ff.

² Herrera, dec. iii, lib. i, cap. iv.

had prepared the ground in front of their village with stakes and pitfalls. As the assailants advanced they were attacked by vastly superior numbers. Showers of arrows, stones, and small javelins fell among them, and though their armor protected their bodies, their arms and legs suffered cruelly ; Magellan himself was among the first to be wounded. The crisis came when the captain ordered a few of his men to advance and fire a group of huts ; for when the natives saw their dwellings in flames, they turned on the invaders with redoubled fury. Magellan gave the word to retire slowly and in order ; but all but a handful of his men broke and fled, leaving their captain and six or eight others to get away as best they could. Magellan's sole thought seemed to be to cover the retreat of his friends ; "he turned back many times," writes Pigafetta, "to see whether we were all in the boats." Step by step the little band retreated to the shore, and a good crossbow flight beyond, fighting until up to their knees in water. Magellan, his helmet lost, was recognized by the natives, and was wounded again and again. "An Indian hurled a bamboo spear into his face," writes Pigafetta, "but the latter immediately killed him with his lance, which he left in the Indian's body. Then, trying to lay hand on sword, he could draw it out but halfway, because he had been wounded in the arm with a bamboo spear. When the natives saw that, they all hurled themselves upon him. One of them wounded him on the left leg with a large cutlass, which resembles a scimitar, only being larger. That caused the captain to fall face downward, when immediately they rushed upon him with iron and bamboo spears and with their cutlasses, until they killed our mirror, our light, our comfort, and our true guide. . . . I hope through [the efforts of] your most illustrious Lordship that the fame of so noble a captain will not become effaced in our times.

Among the other virtues which he possessed, he was more constant than ever any one else in the greatest of adversity. He endured hunger better than all the others, and more accurately than any man in the world did he understand sea charts and navigation. And that this was the truth was seen openly, for no other had had so much natural talent nor the boldness to learn how to circumnavigate the world, as he had almost done. . . . In the afternoon the Christian king sent a message with our consent to the people of Matan, to the effect that if they would give us the captain and the other men who had been killed, we would give them as much merchandise as they wished. They answered that they would not give up such a man, as we imagined [they would do], and that they would not give him for all the riches in the world, but that they intended to keep him as a memorial."¹

The death of Magellan changed the whole face of affairs. His successors² in the supreme command were by no means his equals; still worse, the fact that it had been possible to kill him and to defeat the expedition which he had led against Matan undermined the prestige of his followers with the natives. Their ally, the king of Cebu, turned against them; a group of twenty-nine were enticed ashore, and, save for two who scented danger and made their escape in the nick of time, were surrounded and slaughtered.³ It is scarcely necessary to add that the Christianity which the natives had so recently adopted was not proof against the shock to which this additional demonstration of the mortal

¹ Pigafetta, i, pp. 171-179; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cclxxx ff.

² These were, at first, Duarte Barbosa, and João Serrão jointly; then, after their murder by the natives of Cebu, João Carvalho; and later Gonzalo Gomez de Espinosa and Juan

Sebastian del Cano. Cf. Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. ccc ff.; Guillelmard, pp. 262-275, *passim*.

³ Pigafetta, i, pp. 181-183; Herrera, dec. iii, lib. i, cap. ix; letter of A. de Brito in Navarrete, iv, p. 309.

character of its propagators subjected it; and as the survivors sailed away, they saw the inhabitants tearing down all the emblems of the faith, save the great cross, which, as Herrera assures us, they were unable to bring to the ground while the ships of the Spaniards remained in sight.¹ Desertion and death had by this time reduced the numbers of the participants in the expedition by more than half. Since there were not enough left to man the three ships that still remained, it was decided to abandon the *Concepcion*, which was no longer in a seaworthy condition, and to transfer her cargo and crew to the *Trinidad* and the *Victoria*. This was done, off the island of Bohol, just opposite Cebu, and thereupon the expedition bore away to the southwest. This course took the explorers away from land, and provisions were again beginning to run short, when they finally arrived at the island of Palawan, where they were fortunate in finding the inhabitants friendly and plenty of food of every kind.² They were also able to seize native pilots,³ whom they forced to conduct them to the town of Brunei, on the northwest coast of Borneo, of whose wonders many rumors had reached them; and there they arrived in the middle of June.

A royal welcome and opportunities to trade encouraged the travellers to plan for a long stay. They were, moreover, fascinated by the sights that met their eyes; the city of twenty-five thousand houses built all on piles in the salt water, "except the houses of the king and certain chiefs"; the graceful praus with gold and silver ornaments; the elephants; the fat king, with whom "no one was allowed to communicate save through a speaking tube"; and "the

¹ Herrera, dec. iii, lib. i, cap. ix.

² Pigafetta, ii, pp. 13-25.

³ Herrera, dec. iii, lib. i, cap. ix; de Brito, in Navarrete, iv, p. 311; Guille-mard, p. 269. There is some doubt as

to how many of these pilots there were, and there is certainly no justification for calling them 'Moors,' as Herrera and Guille-mard do.

three hundred foot soldiers with naked rapiers at their thighs to guard him.”¹ But rumors of treachery soon began to fill the air. Several members of the expedition were seized and detained by the king. Two large junks and a fleet of over two hundred praus attempted a naval demonstration against the *Trinidad* and the *Victoria*, and had to be fought off with cannon. The capture, on July 30, of another junk with a number of notables on board did not serve to make the Spaniards sure of their position. In early August, accordingly, they sailed away to the northeast, taking with them sixteen men and three women whom they had captured on the junk, and not stopping till they reached an islet off Banguey, where they landed to caulk and refit their badly damaged ships. Setting sail once more on September 27, they altered their course to the southeast. Learning from the crews of captured junks that the Spice Islands which they had set out to find were not far off, they continued their voyage until November 8, 1521, when they cast anchor off the shore of Tidore in the Moluccas.²

It was but natural, now that the explorers had reached their goal, that the hostility of Portugal, which had pursued them so relentlessly at the time of their departure from Spain, should give unwelcome evidence that it was still alive. Ternate, a neighboring island, had already been occupied by the subjects of King Emmanuel; in fact, the explorers soon found out that Magellan's old friend, Francisco Serrão, had been made captain-general of the forces of the king of Ternate, and had been poisoned eight or nine months before their arrival, through the instrumentality of the king of Tidore, against whom he had been leading

¹ Pigafetta, ii, pp. 27-35.

² Pigafetta, ii, pp. 45-65; Albo, in Navarrete, iv, pp. 222-223; Guille-

mard, pp. 274-277; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. ccciii-cccvii.

the troops of his master.¹ On November 14 they were visited by a renegade Portuguese from Ternate, one Pedro Affonso de Lorosa,² who not only brought them much valuable information in regard to conditions in the Moluccas, but also was able to give them news of events that had occurred in Spain after their departure, and of the various efforts of the Portuguese king to intercept them.³ Clearly, in view of the enmity of their ancient rivals, it behooved them to take all possible precautions; and as the Portuguese had already established themselves in Ternate, it was evidently the part of wisdom for them to do likewise in Tidore. A treaty was accordingly signed with the local ruler, who had received them with the utmost kindness, and assured them that astrologers had been prophesying their arrival for a long time. He listened with deep attention to the explorers' accounts of the greatness of the Emperor, and assured them that he wished to live at peace with him. He gladly accepted all their proposals for trade, and promised them that if his island would not afford them enough spices to fill their ships, he would personally undertake to see that they were obtained elsewhere.⁴

For the next six weeks trading went merrily forward. Cloves and spices were brought in from every side, and the explorers "bartered for them with might and main,"⁵ knives, caps, hatchets, scissors, clothes, glassware, and Bornean gongs being given in exchange. Relations with the king of Tidore became more cordial every day, and the rulers of many of the neighboring islands came in and signed treaties of peace with the representatives of the king of Spain; some

¹ At least so Pigafetta, ii, p. 71, assures us; Leonardo de Argensola, *Conquista de las Islas Malucas* (Madrid, 1609?), p. 17, asserts that Magellan and Serrão died on the same day.

² On the subsequent career of this

man, cf. Guillemard, pp. 286, 303; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, p. cccxxviii.

³ Pigafetta, ii, pp. 81-83.

⁴ Pigafetta, ii, p. 69; cf. also Navarrete, iv, pp. 296-297.

⁵ Pigafetta, ii, p. 95.

of the nobles of Ternate, also, dissatisfied with their experiences at the hands of the Portuguese, crossed over to Tidore and offered their allegiance.¹ Altogether it would seem that the Spaniards made a considerably more favorable impression in the Moluccas than their predecessors had done before them; and when their ships were filled and the time came for them to leave, they were unfeignedly sorry to depart.²

The adventures of the explorers were not yet at an end. On Wednesday, December 11, all was ready, and the *Victoria* stood out to sea; but when it came the turn of the *Trinidad* to weigh anchor, it was discovered that she had sprung so bad a leak that there was not the remotest possibility of her being able to set sail.³ The *Victoria* accordingly returned; a council of war was held, and it was finally determined that the *Trinidad* should discharge her cargo, receive a thorough overhauling, and sail for Panama after the change of the monsoon; while the *Victoria*, after being lightened of some of her burden, which was believed to be dangerously heavy, as well as of a part of her crew who preferred to remain in the Moluccas, should take advantage of the east winds then prevailing and sail direct for Spain via the Cape of Good Hope. Juan Sebastian del Cano was placed in command of her; although involved in the mutiny at Port St. Julian, he had since that time given high proofs of loyalty, skill, and efficiency as a navigator. Fifty-nine others accompanied him, of whom thirteen were natives and forty-six Europeans (among them, Pigafetta); while fifty-three others remained behind with Gonzalo Gomez de

¹ Whether the treaties signed by the different kings connoted any real recognition of the suzerainty of the king of Spain is a little doubtful. Maximilianus Transilvanus (Navarrete, iv, pp. 277-284) indicates that they did, but

Pigafetta (ii, pp. 91 ff.) speaks as if they were merely agreements to preserve peace and amity.

² M. Transilvanus in Navarrete, iv, pp. 277-282; Guillemard, pp. 286-287.

³ Pigafetta, ii, pp. 107-109.

Espinosa, who was left in command of the *Trinidad*. Thus only 101 were still remaining of the 265 or more who had set forth with Magellan; and most of the members of the two parties into which the expedition was now divided were destined never to see each other again.¹

The story of the subsequent adventures of the *Victoria* and of the *Trinidad* and their crews is full of thrilling details; ² here it can only be indicated in outline. The *Victoria*, steering a southwest course, reached the island of Timor on January 25, 1522, remained there for barter and provisions for nearly two weeks, and on February 13 started southwest across the Indian Ocean for the Cape of Good Hope. The ship's condition gave constant cause for alarm. The food and water it carried became more and more unfit for use. Disease broke out, and many died; "when we cast them into the sea," writes Pigafetta, who almost alone of that whole ship's company had succeeded in keeping always well, "the Christians went to the bottom face upward, while the Indians always went face downward." So great were their sufferings that "some of our men wished to go to the Portuguese settlements at Mozambique," but the rest, "more desirous of their honor than of their own life, determined to get to Spain, living or dead. Finally, by God's help, we doubled the Cape [of Good Hope] on May 6,³ at a distance of five leagues." On July 9 they reached the Cape Verde Islands, where they were obliged to put in for provisions and refitting. Fearing a hostile reception from the Portuguese if their identity should become known, they attempted at first to

¹ "Relación de todas las personas que fallecieron en la expedición de Magallanes," printed in Pastells, i, pp. 231-241, and in Medina, *Coleccion*, i, pp. 171-177, also Guillemard, p. 289; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cccix ff., and cccxix ff.

² For the *Victoria*, cf. Pigafetta, ii,

pp. 147-189; for the *Trinidad*, cf. Navarrete, iv, pp. 98-109; also Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cccxiii ff., *passim*.

³ Pigafetta, ii, pp. 183-185; the actual date was nearly two weeks later, cf. Pigafetta, ii, p. 236, and Albo, in Navarrete, iv, pp. 235-236; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, p. cccclxi.

conceal it; but the truth soon leaked out, and thirteen of their number were detained.¹ With eighteen Europeans and four natives left on board, they completed the last stage of their journey.² Finally, on Monday, September 8, as Pigafetta relates it, "we cast anchor near the quay of Seville and discharged all our artillery. Tuesday, we all went in shirts and barefoot, each holding a candle, to visit the shrine of Santa Maria de la Victoria, and that of Santa Maria de l'Antigua."³

Heavy as had been the sufferings of the crew of the *Victoria*, they were exceeded by those of the men who accompanied Gonzalo Gomez de Espinosa on the *Trinidad*. After a thorough overhauling, she set sail for America on April 6, but she was not destined to get far. Disease, shortage of provisions, and head winds forced the adventurers, after a few weeks, to turn back; and the cup of their bitterness was filled to overflowing when they found, on reaching the Moluccas, that the Portuguese had regained control. A fleet of seven ships, with more than three hundred men, under Antonio de Brito, had arrived there a short time after the departure of the *Trinidad*, possessed themselves of the warehouse which the Spaniards had built, and captured the scanty garrison which they had left to guard it; and when Espinosa and his men returned, they also were obliged to surrender. The *Trinidad* shortly afterwards went to pieces in a heavy squall, and the survivors of the expedition, of whom there

¹ Another interesting incident of their stay at the Cape Verde Islands is recounted by Pigafetta, ii, p. 185, in the following words. "We charged our men when they went ashore in the boat to ask what day it was, and they told us that it was Thursday with the Portuguese. We were greatly surprised, for it was Wednesday with us, and we could not see how we had made a mistake; for as I had always kept well, I had set down every day without any interrup-

tion. However, as was told us later, it was no error, but as the voyage had been made continually toward the west and we had returned to the same place, as does the sun, we had made that gain of twenty-four hours, as is clearly seen." Cf. also Guillemard, p. 295; Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 130.

² Denucé, *op. cit.*, pp. 380-381.

³ Pigafetta, ii, p. 189. There were some thirty in all, besides del Cano. Herrera, dec. iii, lib. iv, cap. iv.

were now but twenty-three, were left at the mercy of their captors. De Brito maltreated them in every possible way. He insulted and abused them in the presence of the natives, in order to undermine the prestige of Spain; and then sent them via Banda and Java to Malacca and Cochin. Vasco da Gama, who was viceroy there at the time that they arrived, refused to give orders for their release; but his successor, Enrique de Meneses, who replaced him in the year 1524, proved more compassionate, and commanded that they be sent back to Portugal. But their numbers had by this time been again sadly diminished. Death had claimed the majority of them; two had been detained in the Moluccas; one had escaped and got back as a stowaway to Lisbon. Five only — Espinosa and four others — of the fifty-four who had stayed with the *Trinidad* when she parted company with the *Victoria* in December, 1521, ever saw Europe again, and Espinosa was the only one of these to get recognition and reward.¹

Del Cano, the captain of the *Victoria*, had better luck; indeed, from all we know of his character and actions, the recompense he received was far greater than he deserved. He returned to Spain at a fortunate moment for himself, for Charles had only just got back from the Empire, and everything combined to invest del Cano in the popular mind with the credit that in reality was due to his leader.² Charles sent for him to Valladolid the moment he arrived. He and his companions were presented at court; he was given an annual pension of five hundred ducats and a coat of arms.³ There

¹ Pastells, i, pp. 119-137; Guille-mard, pp. 306-307; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. ccxxix ff; cccxxxix-ccxcxi; Denucé, pp. 380-381.

² Cf., e.g., Gómara, p. 62; "The long voyage of Sebastian del Cano, which encircled the whole world."

³ Cf. *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 247 ff.; Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 17-22; Medina, *Descubrimiento*, iii, pp. cccxv-cccxx; N. de Soraluce y Zubizarreta, *Gloria y Gratitude al inmortal autor del Primus Me Circumdedisti* (Vitoria, 1884); Koelliker, p. 233 ff.

was good reason for the Emperor's satisfaction, over and above the reflected glory which the successful accomplishment of the circumnavigation cast upon him; for the cargo of spices which the *Victoria* brought home was worth considerably more than it had cost him to send the expedition forth.¹ Charles's perennial need was money; if a hazardous preliminary exploration of uncharted seas could succeed, in spite of almost every conceivable misfortune, in sending home survivors with a cargo that could be disposed of at a profit, it was clear that the experiment was well worth repetition.

But after all, for the student of the history of the Spanish Empire, at least, the most important result of the voyage of Magellan was neither economic, nor even scientific,² but rather what may perhaps be best called psychological. It occurred, not only at the beginning of Charles's reign, but also at the most critical moment of his fortunes. His election as Holy Roman Emperor took place two months before Magellan's departure. His authority was challenged, almost overthrown, and finally reëstablished in Spain, during the months covered by the voyage. The Diet of Worms, the beginning of the wars against the king of France, and the first foreshadowings of the struggle against the Turks, all fall in the same period, and the Emperor got back to Spain just fifty-three days before del Cano arrived. The news that the

¹ The estimates of the profits vary widely. Peschel, *Zeitalter der Entdeckungen* (1877), p. 507, note 4, puts them at over 78,000 ducats; Guillemaud, p. 310, at about a quarter of that amount. Cf. also *C. S. P., Venetian*, iii, no. 556, and Koelliker, pp. 235-237.

² Of the scientific importance of the circumnavigation — its irrefutable demonstration of the sphericity of the earth — this is not the place to speak. Cf. Koelliker, pp. 255 ff., and references there; Denucé, pp. 383-391; and E.

Oberhummer, *Ferdinand Magellan und die Bedeutung der ersten Erdumsegelung* (Vienna, 1921). But it is worthy of note that though the vast majority of thinking men were prompt to admit the proven fact, the three leading Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century — Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin — held fast to the views of the shape of the earth which are set forth in the Book of Genesis. Cf. A. D. White, *The Warfare of Science and Christian Theology*, i, pp. 97 ff.

first circumnavigation of the globe had been accomplished — accomplished from Spain, by men whom he had sent forth, and in the teeth of the most violent opposition from the king of Portugal — strengthened Charles in the belief that it was his destiny to rule the world. *Austriæ est imperare orbi universo* had already been the motto of the house of Hapsburg for many years past, but hitherto the interpretation of it had been limited to Europe. Now Charles had not only inherited the American lands which had been won under the rule of the Catholic Kings, but he had himself sent forth the first expedition to put a girdle around the globe. And moreover, with the idea that his empire was to be indeed and in truth a world empire, came the added conviction that, for all practical purposes, his Iberian dominions were destined to be the centre of it. Traditionally his imperial title was of preëminently German origin,¹ but the power that was to enable him to make that title a reality, to an extent that few of his predecessors had done, was brought to him, it was equally obvious, through his Spanish inheritance. He had just got back from the Germany where Martin Luther had raised the standard of revolt, to the Spain where revolt had been crushed. He could take advantage of the victory that had been won for him in his absence. Small wonder if all things combined as markedly to draw him closer to his Iberian dominions as, on the occasion of his first visit to the peninsula, they had combined to do the reverse; small wonder if the immediately succeeding years were preëminently the Spanish period of his rule. Through Spain could the destinies of the house of Hapsburg be actually realized; through her could the programme of *Plus Oultre* be accomplished, until his family dominions encircled the earth.

¹ Cf., however, *ante*, Vol. I, pp. 89–91.

If profit was to be derived from the circumnavigation of the globe, it was essential to reassert and fortify Spain's claims to the Moluccas, by far the most valuable source of revenue that had been found. That claim was bound to be resisted by the Portuguese, and thus to perpetuate the hard feeling between the two nations over the limits of their colonial empires, — a feeling which dated back to the days of Columbus.¹

It was evident, in the first place, that Magellan's expedition must be promptly followed up, and before the end of the year 1522, Charles had issued a series of thirty-three 'privileges' to any of his subjects who would undertake to fit out ships to go to the Moluccas.² But it was not until 1525 that a voyage was actually begun; and in the meantime Charles turned his attention to negotiations with the king of Portugal. On February 4, 1523, he despatched two ambassadors to his cousin to propose that the limits of their respective jurisdictions on the other side of the globe be determined in accordance with a continuation of the Tordesillas line, but at the same time asserted that the Moluccas clearly belonged to Spain; King John, however, was totally disinclined to concur in this.³ Clearly the next step was to arrange for a conference of expert scientists and lawyers to discuss the matter; and on April 11, 1524, this conference met at the bridge over the Caya, which forms the boundary between Spain and Portugal. It has gone down into history as the Junta of Badajoz, since its meetings were alternately held in that city and in Yelves. It continued its sessions until May 31. Among the Spanish representatives were

¹ Koelliker, pp. 261 ff.; Denucé, pp. 391 ff. The New York Public Library ms. volume entitled "Documentos del Torre do Tombo, Simancas, etc., 1359-1535," contains summaries and transcripts of a number of original

manuscripts which shed light on the attitude of the Portuguese king to the whole affair.

² Cf. Navarrete, v, pp. 196-207.

³ Navarrete, iv, pp. 301-305, 312-320.

Ferdinand Columbus, Juan Sebastian del Cano, Sebastian Cabot, and Juan, the nephew of Amerigo Vespucci.¹ But the conference broke up without reaching any decision. The Spaniards pushed their case aggressively, and even asserted that Sumatra, as well as the Moluccas, clearly fell within their line of demarcation. The Portuguese, on the other hand, played for obstruction and delay. They were, without doubt, in a serious quandary, for if the line should have to be pushed eastward in order to give them the Moluccas, they would inevitably, by the same process, be deprived of Brazil.² Under the circumstances, it was impossible to arrive at an agreement, and so Charles turned his attention once more to the sending out of a fresh expedition to assert his claims.³

The commander of this new expedition was García Jofré de Loaysa, a native of Ciudad Real, a knight commander of the order of St. John, and a kinsman of the archbishop of Seville (1539-46) of the same name.⁴ The armada was to consist of seven vessels, and was fitted out and despatched from Corunna, whose advantages for the purpose were pointed out to the Emperor in an interesting 'memorial' which has fortunately been preserved to us.⁵ Sebastian del Cano was Loaysa's first lieutenant, and there was the usual galaxy of

¹ Cf. Navarrete, iv, pp. 326-371.

² Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 88 ff. Cf. E. G. Bourne, *Essays in Historical Criticism*, pp. 208-211, and references there; Koelliker, pp. 263-265; also Blair and Robertson, *The Philippine Islands*, i, pp. 159-221.

³ Herrera, dec. iii, lib. vii, cap. v.

⁴ The standard contemporary account of Loaysa's voyage is that of Andrés de Urdaneta, of which an excellent English translation is available in Markham, *Early Spanish Voyages to the Strait of Magellan*, Hakluyt Society Series, 1911, pp. 41-89. See also Herrera, dec. iii, lib. vii, caps. v, vi, vii; Oviedo, *Historia*

General y Natural de las Indias, lib. xx, cap. v; Blair and Robertson, ii, pp. 26-35, and references there.

⁵ Cf. Navarrete, v, pp. 193-195; Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 88-91. The date of the "memorial" is doubtful. Navarrete places it in 1524, but a summary of the original document made by Muñoz, and now in the New York Public Library ms. volume mentioned above, bears the marginal comment "Sin duda luego que vino la Nao Vitoria," in other words in the autumn of 1522. In view of the developments narrated on p. 627, *infra*, I incline to prefer the earlier date.

detailed and prolix instructions as to the course to be steered, the precautions to be observed, the discoveries to be made, the barter to be effected, and the policy to be pursued in regard to the Portuguese. The fleet left Corunna July 24, 1525, and reached the southern part of Patagonia in December, where it encountered storms so violent that the ships were separated and several of them lost; when Loaysa entered the Pacific on May 26, 1526, he had only three vessels left.¹ Two months later, on July 30, 1526, Loaysa himself died and was buried at sea; and he was followed, five days after, by Sebastian del Cano, who had succeeded him in command of the armada.² When the survivors, on the first day of the year 1527, finally arrived in the Moluccas, it is clear that discipline had utterly broken down; and they soon began to engage in fighting the Portuguese, who were in no mood to be ousted from the position they had won, and returned their hostility with interest.³

Meantime, at home, Charles continued to contemplate the sending out of fresh expeditions. A group of Sevillans, fired by the prospects of gain through the spice trade, engaged Sebastian Cabot to pilot a fleet to the Moluccas. The Emperor, hearing of the project, put himself in touch with its originators, gave them the ships that they needed, and, in an agreement of March 4, 1525, fixed the conditions of his

¹ For details cf. Markham, *Early Spanish Voyages to the Strait of Magellan*, pp. 41-89; Navarrete, v, pp. 223 ff., 313-323; Herrera, dec. iii, lib. vii, caps. v, vi, vii; lib. ix, caps. iv, v, vi; Oviedo, *Historia General*, lib. xx, caps. v-xiv. Apparently, one of Loaysa's ships, the *San Lesmes*, captained by a Cordovan, Francisco de Hoces or Hozes, was blown southward, beyond the entrance to the strait, as far as the 55th degree of latitude, to what seemed to him to be the end of the land (*acabamiento de la tierra*). What

they reached was doubtless the eastern end of Staten Island, but not Cape Horn, as the *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada* (cf. under "Elcano," xix, p. 498) makes out. Cf. the Narrative of Andrés de Urdaneta, in Markham, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

² Navarrete, v, p. 367.

³ Cf. Pastells, i, pp. 141-157; Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 468 ff.; Markham, *op. cit.*, pp. 1-107; and Koelliker, pp. 265-266, on Loaysa's expedition as a whole.

concurrence.¹ Cabot was not only to visit the Moluccas, but to pass on to "Tarshish, Ophir, East Cathay, and Cipango"; he was to bring home all the precious stones that he could find; according to Herrera, he was to go by the route that Magellan had followed, but there was also, apparently, high hope in Spain that he would be successful in finding a much shorter way, for the belief in the existence of a strait near the middle of the Western Hemisphere continued to persist, in spite of all discouragements.² The expedition was to have set sail in August, 1525, but a serious disagreement between Cabot and the merchants who employed him postponed its departure until the following April. The subsequent development of this lamentable affair, which was to divert the expedition from its original objective and convert it into an exploration of the southeast coast of South America and the estuary of the La Plata, will be taken up in another place;³ for the present it suffices to observe that it put an end to Charles's first project for following up the expedition of Loaysa.

Other things had meantime occurred to modify the Emperor's outlook on the whole problem of the Spice Islands. On March 10, 1526, a month before Cabot's departure, Charles had married his cousin, Isabella of Portugal; peace and amity were proclaimed afresh between Spain and her western neighbor. Under these circumstances it did not seem wise to despatch another expedition to the Moluccas direct from Spain, for such action could only be construed in hostile fashion by the Portuguese; on the other hand, the Emperor could not persuade himself to abandon the claim

¹ For details, cf. Herrera, dec. iii, lib. ix, cap. iii; Peter Martyr, *De Orbe Novo*, dec. vii, lib. vi; Tarducci, tr. Brownson, *John and Sebastian Cabot*, pp. 151 ff., and references there; J. T. Medina, *El Veneciano Sebastián Caboto*

al Servicio de España (Santiago de Chile, 1908, 2 vols. quarto).

² Cf. Herrera, dec. iii, lib. ix, cap. iii; and Navagero, in *C. S. P., Venetian*, iii, no. 1115.

³ Cf. below, p. 606.

which Magellan had established, and which Loaysa and Cabot had been sent out to reënforce. The best solution of the dilemma seemed to lie in the Western Hemisphere, where Hernando Cortés and others had by this time established the Spanish power; for America was still regarded as a Spanish outpost on the way to the Spice Islands, quite as much as a new dominion great and valuable in itself. An armada could be sent out from its Pacific coast without fear of arousing the hostility of Portugal, which would not, in all probability, be apprised of its despatch; and there would be the additional advantage of a much shorter journey. On January 20, 1526, accordingly, Charles sent from Granada, where he was spending his honeymoon, a royal decree to Hernando Cortés, ordering him to despatch ships from the west coast of Mexico to the Moluccas, to discover what had become of the ship *Trinidad*, and of the subsequent expeditions of Loaysa and Cabot.¹

The story of the ensuing enterprise can be very briefly told.² Command of it was given to Alvaro de Saavedra Ceron;³ it consisted of two ships and a brig; it carried a letter, explaining its objects, from Hernando Cortés to the king of Cebu; it set sail on the last day of October, 1527, from the port of Zacatula, at the mouth of the Rio de las Balsas. On December 29, it reached the Ladrones; shortly afterwards it came into contact with natives who had known Castilians, and a little later with survivors of the expeditions of Magellan and Loaysa. There the adventurers became involved, like their predecessors, in negotiations

¹ Navarrete, v, pp. 440-441.

² Cf. Navarrete, v, pp. 440-486, especially Saavedra's own account on pp. 465-486; Oviedo, *Historia de las Indias*, lib. xx, especially caps. xxviii, xxix, and xxx; Bernal Díaz del Castillo, Hakluyt Society edition, cap. cc;

Markham, *Early Spanish Voyages to the Strait of Magellan*, pp. 111-132.

³ Usually spoken of in the books as Alvaro de Saavedra, but that, apparently, was the name of the *veedor*; cf. Navarrete, v, p. 442.

with the natives, and in fighting with the Portuguese. In the course of the next few years they became scattered, many of them finding their way home to Europe by way of India and the Cape of Good Hope. Saavedra Ceron apparently died at sea, in the month of December, 1529, in the course of a futile effort to get back to New Spain; and the ship in which he sailed returned to the "port of Zamafo" in the island of Gilolo, which seems to have temporarily become the principal centre of Spanish influence in the East Indies.¹ Altogether, the different expeditions by which Charles had attempted to enforce his claim to the Moluccas had signally failed to accomplish their purpose. The Portuguese, constantly reënforced from India and from Malacca, had maintained the upper hand.

The news of all these events made the Emperor less and less anxious to prolong a struggle in which ultimate success seemed increasingly remote. His affection for his wife was doubtless another element to influence him in the same direction, while the pressure of the war against Francis I, and the need of his presence in Italy, constituted conclusive arguments in favor of a settlement, provided it should prove possible to reach one on reasonable terms. Finance was, as usual, his most urgent problem; and so, finally, on April 23, 1529, at Lerida, on his way to Barcelona and Italy, he put his signature to an agreement which had been reached by his representatives and those of the king of Portugal during the preceding weeks at Saragossa; the treaty of Saragossa is the name it bears today.² It provided that in

¹ Navarrete, v, pp. 56-57, 409, 422, 486; Santa Cruz, ii, pp. 316 ff.; Koelliker, pp. 266-267. I have been unable to find the source for Pastells' statement (i, p. 161) that Saavedra Ceron's death occurred near the Sandwich Islands. On the position of

Zamafo, Camafo, or Zamofa, cf. Denucé, p. 367.

² Sandoval, ii, p. 20. The text of the treaty is to be found in Navarrete, iv, pp. 389-406, and an abridged English translation of it in Blair and Robertson, i, pp. 222-239.

view of the prevailing uncertainty in regard to distance, position, and latitude, and the impossibility of accurately measuring them, the line of demarcation between the possessions of Spain and Portugal on the other side of the globe should be drawn from pole to pole nineteen degrees or $297\frac{1}{2}$ leagues east of the Moluccas; that the Emperor should neither claim, trade, nor sail beyond it; and that, in return for this renunciation, the king of Portugal should pay him in instalments the sum of 350,000 ducats. Neither of the contracting parties, as Herrera sagely remarks,¹ had any real idea of what he was buying or selling, and the treaty consequently stipulated that if a subsequent scientific investigation should accurately determine the exact position of the original line of demarcation according to the treaty of Tordesillas, the present agreement should be void and of no effect. This investigation, however, was never made. The line laid down by the treaty of Saragossa continued to be valid, in theory at least, and so far as the Moluccas themselves were concerned, in practice also. They remained in Portuguese hands until, in 1581, Portugal and her colonies were annexed to Spain; twenty-four years later, in 1605, they were seized by the Dutch.²

But with the archipelago of St. Lazarus — such was the name that Magellan had given to the group of islands where he had met his death³ — there was a different tale to tell. As these islands lie in a northwesterly direction from the Moluccas, they were unquestionably in Portuguese waters; but the Portuguese had done practically nothing to assert their claims to them, and Charles was not the man to let unclaimed territory remain indefinitely without a master. In the years 1538–41 we find him making formal *asientos* or

¹ Herrera, dec. iv, lib. v, cap. x.

Portugal in the year 1548. Cf. Gómará, p. 138.

² There was apparently a project of buying back the Moluccas from

³ Pigafetta, i, p. 105.

agreements for the discovery, conquest, and settlement of the "islands in the Southern Sea toward the westward" with Pedro de Alvarado, the adelantado of Guatemala, and with Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy of New Spain.¹ Whether the phrase "islands in the Southern Sea toward the westward" was a definite reference to the archipelago of St. Lazarus, it is impossible to say; but it seems clear that the question of trespassing within the Portuguese demarcation must have been squarely faced, and a decision reached to break the treaty of 1529. Spain and Portugal were now far less friendly than they had then been. The death of the Empress had severed the strongest bond of union between them, and Prince Philip was not yet betrothed to the Portuguese Infanta. On the other hand, the old notion that Spain's possessions in the New World were in some measure an outpost on the way to the Far East had not yet entirely died out. In the end of the year 1542, accordingly, an expedition was prepared, and set sail (November 1) from Navidad, on the west coast of Mexico.² Command of it was given to one Ruy Lopez de Villalobos, a native of Malaga and brother-in-law of the Viceroy Mendoza; it was composed of six vessels, carrying upwards of three hundred and seventy men. After a three months' voyage, during which numerous minor islands were discovered, the explorers reached Mindanao on February 2, 1543, and christened it *Caesárea Karoli* — "because it was so great, and gave evidence that the majesty of the name was suited to it."³ This appellation, however, did not last; but the name which Villalobos,

¹ *Colección de Documentos Inéditos de Ultramar*, 2d series, ii, 1, pp. 7-26.

² *D. I. I.*, v, pp. 117-209; xiv, pp. 151-165; *D. I. I.*, 2d series, ii, pp. 1-94; Herrera, dec. vii, lib. v, caps. v-vii, xi-xiv; Blair and Robertson, ii, pp. 47-73, and references there.

³ *D. I. I.*, v, p. 119. Some authorities have thought that the island to which this name was given was Luzon, but the story of the course steered after leaving it proves clearly that it was Mindanao.

a few months later, gave the group to which Mindanao belongs — “the Philippines, after our most fortunate Prince” — has endured unchanged until this day.¹

The christening of the Philippines was the most permanently important thing accomplished by Villalobos. The rest of his stay in the “islands toward the westward” was one long chronicle of struggles with the Portuguese, to whom he was finally obliged to surrender himself; and he died of a fever at Amboina on Good Friday, 1546, receiving the last rites of the church at the hands of St. Francis Xavier.² Had he not labelled the islands with a Spanish name, it seems probable that the work he had started would not have been continued, and that the Portuguese would have been left undisturbed within their line of demarcation, as provided in the treaty of 1529. As it was, his renaming of the archipelago of St. Lazarus paved the way for its permanent occupation by Legazpi in the succeeding reign. It was the last expedition to the “islands toward the westward” during the Emperor’s life, and taken by itself, it was assuredly neither creditable nor successful. It was sent out on a quest which no interpretation of the treaty of Saragossa could possibly justify. It failed to effect any permanent Spanish settlement in the islands which it visited. Yet it managed to prevent the extinction of the name and fame of Spain in that part of the world. It preserved the memory of Magellan’s great exploit. It was a challenge to the *conquistadores* of the reign of the Prudent King to carry further the great work that had been begun under his father. Whether that challenge and its subsequent acceptance by Legazpi was an advantage or the reverse to the Spanish Empire as a whole is a difficult question.

¹ *D. I. I.*, v, p. 127.

² *D. I. I.*, xiv, p. 162; Herrera, dec.

vii, lib. v, cap. xiv; *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, xxxi, p. 159.

The subsequent development of the American possessions proceeded at such a pace in the ensuing years that the Moluccas and the adjacent islands were soon relegated to the background; moreover, Spain's battle line, at the Emperor's death, was so far flung that she emphatically needed rather to contract than to expand it. On the other hand, her final acquisition of the Philippines in 1571 was to make her empire a world empire to a degree that it could not otherwise have been. Together with her contemporaneous victory over the Turks at Lepanto, and her subsequent annexation of Portugal and its dependencies, it placed the capstone upon the edifice of her preponderance throughout the globe.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

The recent celebration of the quatercentenary of Magellan's voyage was marked by the appearance of several monographs and collections of sources on the explorer's great achievement. Of these the most important by far is volume iii of J. T. Medina's *El Descubrimiento del Océano Pacífico* (Santiago de Chile, 1920), which utilizes and virtually supersedes all previous works on the voyage. It contains (pp. 115-176) an elaborate critical bibliography, a number of documents (supplementing those in vol. iv of Martín Fernández de Navarrete's *Colección de Viajes*, in vols. v and xiv of the *D. I. I.*, and in Medina's own *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de Chile*, vols. i and ii), a detailed account of the voyage, and biographical data in regard to those who participated in it. The only other one of the quatercentenary publications that it seems worth while to mention here is *El Descubrimiento del Estrecho de Magallanes* (Madrid, 1920, 2 vols.), by Pablo Pastells; it adds something to our knowledge, but it is not invariably accurate, and several of the documents printed in the appendix had previously been published in the *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de Chile*.

Of earlier works, those of Peter Martyr, Oviedo, López de Gómara, Herrera, and the other standard authorities will all be found valuable in their proper places. I have used the edition of Pigafetta prepared by J. A. Robertson (Italian text and English translation, Cleveland, 1906, 2 vols.). Lord Stanley's *First Voyage Around the World* (Hakluyt Society, London, 1874) contains much that is not easily available elsewhere. The four most valuable modern works on Magellan, previous to Medina's great book, are Diego Barros Arana's *Vida i Viajes de Hernando de Magallanes* (Santiago de Chile, 1864); F. H. H. Guillemard's *Life of Magellan* (London, 1890); Oscar Koelliker's *Die Erste Umseglung der Erde durch Fernando de Magallanes und Juan Sebastian del Cano* (Munich and Leipzig, 1908); and J. Denucé's "La Question des Moluques et la première circumnavigation du globe," in Académie Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres, *Mémoires*, collection in -4°, deuxième série, iv (1910).

Valuable material on the subsequent expeditions of Loaysa, Sebastian Cabot, Saavedra Ceron, and Villalobos, may be found in Navarrete, *Colección de Viajes*, vol. v; in Medina, *Colección de Documentos Inéditos para la Historia de Chile*, vol. iii; in *D. I. I.*, vols. v and xiv; and in *D. I. I.*, 2d series, vol. ii. Markham's *Early Spanish Voyages to the Strait of Magellan* (Hakluyt Society, 2d series, no.

xxviii, 1911); Koelliker's *Erste Umseglung* (pp. 261-269); Blair and Robertson's *The Philippine Islands* (Cleveland, 1903), vols. i and ii; Tarducci's *John and Sebastian Cabot* (English translation by H. F. Brownson, Detroit, 1893); J. T. Medina's *El Veneciano Sebastián Caboto al Servicio de España* (Santiago de Chile, 1908, 2 vols.); and E. G. Bourne's "The Demarcation Line of Pope Alexander VI," on pp. 193-217 of his *Essays in Historical Criticism* (New York, 1901), will also be found useful.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THE CONQUEST OF NEW SPAIN

"I AM the man who has given your Majesty more provinces than your ancestors left you cities." Such was the haughty reply which the Emperor is said to have received, when he angrily demanded the name of a gray-haired Spaniard, who had ventured to push himself through the jostling crowd and mount the steps of the imperial carriage in a desperate effort to attract Charles's attention.¹ The picture that the story conjures up — of a daring, devoted, and incredibly effective servant of the crown, whose successes had aroused the jealousy of his master, and who was consequently suffered to die in obscurity — was already a familiar one in the history of Spain, and destined to become still more so as the years rolled on. The boast, on this occasion, may not have been literally substantiated by the facts, but the man who made it was unquestionably the chief founder of the Spanish power in the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.

His name was Hernando Cortés, and he was born in the year 1485, at the little town of Medellin, on the Guadiana — the scion of parents of gentle though not distinguished ancestry, without much property or political influence. Destined by his father for the law, he was sent at fourteen to the University of Salamanca to study that profession; but his career there was less notable for his academic attain-

¹ It seems that this tale, which has passed into history, rests simply and solely on the authority of Voltaire,

Essai sur les Moeurs, cap. cxlvii, last sentence.

ments than for his fondness for brawling and amorous adventures. After two years it became evident that he was best fitted for a military calling; and after wavering for some time between Italy and the Indies as the most favorable scene upon which to begin, he finally decided in favor of the latter, and sailed in a trading vessel for Española in 1504. His character at that time, though not yet fully developed, gave clear promise of what it was to be. Calculated audacity formed the basis of it, and, coupled with a truly Napoleonic ability to seize opportunities and to estimate men, furnishes the key to his brilliant successes. Zealous, like all true Spaniards, for the advancement of the faith, determined to effect the subjugation of the Indians, and get possession of their treasures, he shrank from no means to accomplish these ends; yet there are few instances in his whole career in which he was cruel or bloodthirsty without a purpose. In his care for his person and dress, in his passion for gambling, and in the looseness of his relations with women, he was typical of the Spaniard of his day and generation; but he kept business and pleasure rigidly separate, and when he recognized the moment for decisive action, drove forward with a power that refused to be denied. His followers could not resist the magic of his appeal. Under his leadership they attempted and achieved the impossible.¹

For the first six years after reaching the New World, he found little opportunity to exercise his particular talents. He announced, on arrival, that he had come to seek for gold, and not to till the soil; but save for distinguishing himself in sundry encounters with rebel Indians, he lived for the most part on his *repartimiento* at Daiguao. In 1511, however, a new field was opened to him. One of the first acts of Diego Columbus, who had succeeded Ovando as Governor of

¹ Cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, i, pp. 230 ff.; iii, pp. 352 ff.

Española in 1509, was to fit out an expedition for the conquest of Cuba. Command of it was given to Diego Velasquez, who had already risen to wealth and fame in the Indies, and Cortés was among the earliest to volunteer. The invaders easily accomplished their object. The unwarlike natives could make no effective resistance, and were slaughtered wholesale; by the summer of 1514 the Spaniards were virtually in control of the entire island; a year later they had founded seven towns, of which the most important was that of Santiago.¹

Cortés showed valor and skill in the conquest of Cuba; he won a high place in the esteem of his comrades, and also, at first, of the Governor Velasquez. But the relations of the two men soon changed for the worse. According to Cortés's chaplain and apologist — the chronicler, Francisco López de Gómara — the trouble originated in Cortés's refusal to fulfil his promise to marry a lady whom he had persuaded to become his mistress; the Governor took the matter up, there were a trial, two imprisonments, and subsequently miraculous escapes. In the history of Las Casas, who was at that time in Cuba, and an eye witness of the scenes he describes, the source of the difficulty is reported as a plot, in which Cortés was deeply involved, to lodge complaints against Velasquez before the royal judges at Española, in order to get him removed from his post. There is better reason to accept this story than the first. Injuries to women were too frequent in Spanish America to enlist the intervention of the constituted authorities, and the story of Las Casas fits in well with what we know of Cortés's character and ambitions. Whatever the facts about the origin of their quarrel, it would appear that outwardly some sort of a

¹ I. Wright, *The Early History of Cuba*, pp. 23-37, 59; MacNutt, *Fernando Cortes*, pp. 6-7, and references there.

reconciliation was patched up between the two men; Cortés married the lady he had wronged; Velasquez conferred on him the office of *alcalde*, and actually stood godfather to one of his children. But smouldering jealousy and distrust still remained. Each man had formed his estimate of the other, and longed to sweep him from his path. Both might be forced to dissemble for a time, but an opportunity to give vent to their real feelings was ultimately bound to come.¹

Cuba was at that time an improvement on Española from the point of view of the Spaniard who had come out to seek his fortune; yet its supply of gold and potential slaves was by no means inexhaustible. Schemes for an expedition to Tierra Firme, further westward, began to take shape, and in 1517 a certain Francisco Hernández de Cordoba, with the help of Velasquez, got together a fleet of three vessels, and set sail. After a passage of twenty-one days, they reached Cape Catoche, on the northwest point of Yucatan. The natives gave them a hostile reception. Forty-eight of their number were killed, two captured, and the rest wounded, including Cordoba, who died of his injuries a few days after his return to Cuba; on the other hand, the survivors took two of the Indians prisoners, and brought back glowing reports of the gold that they had seen, at which "we felt well content, for at that time Peru was unknown."² It seemed worth while to follow up the expedition, and accordingly Velasquez sent out a larger armada in May, 1518, under the command of his kinsman, Juan de Grijalba, with instructions to continue the discoveries of Cordoba, and establish, if possible, trading relations with the natives.

¹ Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, pp. 297-298; Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lrv, pp. 10 ff.; and the anonymous *De Rebus gestis F. Cortesii*, in Icazbalceta, *Coleccion de Documentos para la Historia de Mexico*, i, pp. 309 ff.

² The best account of this expedition has been left us by Bernal Díaz del Castillo (*The Conquest of New Spain*, bk. i, cap. ii), who accompanied it. Cf. also R. B. Cunningham Grahame's *Life of Bernal Diaz del Castillo*, pp. 7-14.

Grijalba reached the island of Cozumel after a short and pleasant voyage, coasted around the end of Yucatan, and came down along the shores of the Gulf of Campeachy, past the mouth of the Tabasco, which he named for himself, to an island off the harbor of what was subsequently to be Vera Cruz, where he reported finding recent proofs of cannibalism and human sacrifices.¹ Thence he passed over to a smaller island close at hand, which he christened, through a misunderstanding of a native word, by the name of San Juan de Ulua.² There he became convinced of the necessity for further help and formal authorization to begin to colonize. He accordingly despatched one of his followers — Pedro de Alvarado, with whom he was not on good terms — to the Governor Velasquez, in Cuba, to seek for what he desired.³

The governor, in the meantime, having become very impatient at not receiving any news from Grijalba, sent out another adventurer — Cristóbal de Olid — to look for him. But Olid, soon after reaching Cozumel, encountered heavy weather and was obliged to return with his mission unaccomplished.⁴ Soon after Olid got back, Alvarado also arrived, and the news and the specimens of gold that he brought with him determined Velasquez to send out a still larger fleet. The reasons that led him to give command of it to Hernando Cortés,⁵ in view of the difficulties that had arisen between them in the past, have been variously estimated by different historians, and there is no possibility of obtaining certainty on the point. The whole of the Indian

¹ They called it the *Isla de los Sacrifícios*. Cf. Bernal Díaz, *op. cit.*, caps. viii-xiv, and the "Itinerario de Grijalba," in Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 281 ff. Cf. also the anonymous *Provinciae sive regiones in India occidentali noviter repertae in ultima navigatione* (Valladolid, 1520).

² The native word was *Culúa* (a synonym for Mexico) which the Spaniards

failed to catch. The strongest Spanish fortress in North America was afterwards built on this island.

³ Cf. "Itinerario de Grijalba," in Icazbalceta, i, pp. 281-308.

⁴ Bernal Díaz, cap. xv.

⁵ Velasquez's instructions to Cortés are dated October 23, 1518; cf. *D. I. I.*, xii, pp. 225 ff.; xxxiv, pp. 516 ff.

administration at that time was so honeycombed with official jealousy and suspicion that men like Velasquez were constantly reversing their policies; the enemy of one day was often the friend of the next, and cause and effect are difficult to trace. The appointment of Cortés is usually attributed to the influence of two favorites of the governor. They are said to have formed a partnership with the future conqueror for a share of all spoils that his expedition might obtain.¹ It is also not impossible that something may have been due to the influence of Alvarado, in view of what we know of his subsequent career, and of the fact that he was already at odds with Grijalba. At any rate, when Grijalba finally got back to Cuba, in the midst of the preparations for the new expedition, we know that he was coldly received by Velasquez, who was obviously determined to have a fresh deal all around.² Meantime, the governor took pains to look out for his own interests, and sent back to Spain for a formal authorization to conquer, settle, and trade with the lands that had been so recently discovered.³

Cortés saw in the appointment he had received the chance for which he had been waiting ever since he came out to the Indies. It was the opportunity of a lifetime to make a fortune and win renown. A gambler by nature, he resolved to stake everything on the venture before him. The accounts⁴ vary as to the proportions of the cost borne by him and by Velasquez, but it is clear that Cortés put into it every ducat that he could raise. The feverish energy of his preparations threw the town of Santiago into a whirlwind of excitement. The inevitable jealousy was aroused, and communicated itself to the governor, who finally decided to revoke Cortés's appointment. Cortés, however, was warned in time to fore-

¹ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 69-70.

² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁴ Full references to these are given in MacNutt's edition of the *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 19.

stall Velasquez's intentions by a characteristic stroke. By superhuman exertions, he rushed his men and supplies on board the ships on the very day that he received the news (Las Casas tells us that he bought up the whole meat supply of Santiago, and paid for it with the gold chain that hung around his neck); and after taking leave of the governor, stood down the bay. Whether, as Bernal Díaz del Castillo asserts,¹ that leave taking was public, outwardly friendly, and in presence "of all the most distinguished citizens of the town," so as to shame Velasquez into desisting from his purpose; or whether, as Las Casas would have us believe,² the departure of Cortés resembled a flight, with futile and undignified recrimination at the water's edge, it is clear that the two men parted foes.³ In addition to the memory of their ancient quarrel, their interests in the present venture were diametrically opposed. Unless Cortés were ousted from the command, it would profit Velasquez nothing. If Velasquez's authority were recognized, all Cortés's hopes would be gone. These jealousies and rivalries were soon to bear bitter fruit.

Cortés left Santiago on November 18, 1518, and for the next three months, as he himself long afterwards described it, played the "gentle corsair" along the Cuban shores. Neither his army nor his stores were yet adequate for his purposes; and as he slowly proceeded westward, he steadily increased them, by either seizing or purchasing what he wanted from the settlements where he landed, or from the ships that he chanced to meet. Velasquez sent constant orders to displace or imprison him, but it was observed that

¹ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 75-77.

² Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lxxv, pp. 445 ff.

³ Gómara (*B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 300) takes up a position midway between those of Bernal Díaz and Las Casas. Speaking of Velasquez, he says: "Pesá-

bale que Cortés fuese allá tan pujante, mas no le pudo estorbar la ida, porque todos le siguian . . . ca' si lo tentara con rigor, hubiera revuelta en la ciudad y aun muertes; y como no era parte, disimuló." Cf. also *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 385 ff.

those who bore them never ventured to carry them out, and invariably ended by joining with Cortés himself.¹ Never had the magnetism of the great conqueror been so evident before; it was like a triumphal procession. When, on February 10, 1519, he finally left the shores of Cuba for Yucatan, his armada consisted of eleven vessels, one of one hundred tons, three of from seventy to eighty, and the rest caravels and open brigantines. They carried upwards of 600 soldiers, including a certain number of Cuban Indians, the two natives of Yucatan who had been captured by Cordoba two years before and were indispensable as interpreters, and 100 mariners.² Olid, Alvarado, and other well known cavaliers were among them, and also, fortunately for posterity, that sturdy soldier historian, Bernal Díaz del Castillo.³ Ten brass cannon, and some smaller pieces called falconets, together with a plentiful supply of ammunition, formed an essential part of their equipment; the adventurers also brought with them sixteen horses, and the supreme importance that was attached to their presence is attested by the great difficulties involved in their transportation, and by the care with which the old chronicler describes them one by one.⁴ Altogether it was an imposing armament; but after all, the expedition's best prospect of success rested on the fact that its indomitable leader had burned all his bridges behind him; that retreat, in the face of the enmity of Velasquez, was impossible; that he had to go forward because he could not go back. Had he known of the terrific difficulties which he was soon to encounter, and had honorable retirement been an open alternative, it is possible that even his

¹ Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lxv, pp. 450 ff.

² There are some differences in the estimates; cf. Cortés, *Letters*, i, p. 138; Bernal Díaz, lib. i, cap. xxvi; Prescott, *C. M.*, i, p. 262.

³ Cf. F. A. de Icaza, *Diccionario Autobiográfico de Conquistadores y Pobladores de Nueva España* (Madrid, 1923, 2 vols.).

⁴ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 86-87.

stout heart would have quailed. It was the absence of all chance of retracing his steps that explains the astounding success of his memorable adventure.

Another result of the fact that Cortés had set sail in defiance of the constituted authority of the governor of Cuba was that he was scrupulously careful to act, in every particular, after his departure, in the strictest possible accordance with the principles of law and justice. Sooner or later, if he proved to be successful, he would have to gain the sanction of the Emperor in Spain, over the head of his enemy, Velasquez; and the surest way to do this would be to show himself worthy of the imperial confidence. Discipline was enforced with the utmost rigidity. Maltreatment or robbery of the natives was severely punished, for Cortés's announced policy at the outset was to respect the persons and property of the Indians, provided they accepted the Christian religion and the sovereignty of Spain. A certain formality was even observed in the process of demanding this acceptance. A *requerimiento* or summons, containing a most unhistorical account of the origin of the primacy of Roman Christianity, was invariably pronounced whenever a new district was reached, regardless of whether or not any Indians were near enough to hear it, or able to understand it if they were. The bull of Alexander VI was also read to prove the title of the king of Spain.¹ Such a proceeding was obviously a hollow mockery in fact. In theory, however, it salved the conscience of the legalist, and it also had a good effect upon the soldiery.

A few words must be inserted at this point in regard to

¹ The text of this *requerimiento* is given in Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lxxv, pp. 154 ff. See also MacNutt, *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 39-40, for an interesting reference to a discussion between

the shades of Cortés and of William Penn on the merits of their respective methods of colonizing the New World, in the eighth of Lord Lytton's *Dialogues of the Dead*.

the origin and civilization of the native peoples with whom Cortés was to come into contact; for the Indians of Yucatan and Mexico were infinitely further advanced than those whom the Spaniards had already encountered in the islands. The earliest race, of which we have any real knowledge,¹ to inhabit the southeastern part of Mexico, and the northern half of what is now Central America, is known as the Mayas. This people exhibited in their ancient native culture what is probably on the whole the highest aboriginal development that has yet been found to have existed in the Western Hemisphere. There are clear traces of centralized governments and legal systems. Trade and agriculture were highly developed. Architectural ruins and hieroglyphic inscriptions have furnished the material for the most interesting and valuable archaeological discoveries of the last two decades. The accuracy of the scientific observations of the Mayas is illustrated by the excellence of the calendar they invented; and the enduring qualities of their native language are attested by the fact that it has not only held its own against the Spanish, but in certain cases actually supplanted it; for there are families of pure white blood in Yucatan today who know no other speech than the Mayan.

Into the regions immediately northwest of the Mayan territory, there had been a series of migrations, from at least as early as the eighth century of our era, by tribes who came down from farther northward still; and these migrations reached their culmination in the year 1325, with the arrival of the famous Aztecs on the shore of Lake Texcoco. Tradition tells us that the newcomers found there a cactus growing out of a rock, with an eagle perched on the cactus, and a serpent in the talons of the eagle; that their soothsayers assured them that it was an excellent omen, and that they

¹ Save a few faint traces of an archaic civilization.

then founded on an island in the salt waters of the lake a city which they called Tenochtitlan¹ in memory of the events which led them to settle there.

The dominant characteristic of these Aztec invaders was their passion for fighting: indeed it is doubtful if a more warlike race (save possibly a few of the African tribes) has ever existed on the face of the globe. Everything combined to magnify and exalt the profession of arms; religion, education, and public life were alike directed to the promotion of it. The Aztec priesthood held the whole people in a grip of iron, and directed its chief attention to the worship of the god of war; their principal religious festivals were bloody sacrifices of the most distinguished of their war captives, whose bodies were afterwards often served up in a solemn ceremonial banquet for their captors.² Their discipline in action evoked the admiration of the Spaniards;³ the surest road to honor and advancement was to win distinction on the field of battle; cowardice or desertion was punishable by death. In other respects the Aztec civilization presented strange contrasts between enlightenment and barbarism. Their systems of government and taxation were orderly and secure. Justice was administered by regular tribunals, and the rights of private property were respected and recognized. Their public couriers were more rapid and efficient than those of Europe. They had accomplished notable things in architecture and engineering. Their picture writing had reached a high stage of perfection. They were extraordinarily skilful in many trades and arts. They had made great strides in astronomy and in medicine; and homes

¹ 'Tenochtitlan' means 'cactus on a rock'; the device appears on the coat of arms of the Mexican Republic of today. 'Mexico' means 'home of the god of war' — Mexitli, or Huitzilopochtli.

² Indeed it is not too much to say

that the chief object of the Aztecs in going to war was to provide these sacrifices; and they spoke of themselves as "idle" when not engaged in it.

³ Prescott, *C. M.*, i, p. 47.

for the aged were provided at the public expense. Yet they possessed no beasts of burden nor milk-producing animals; they had no coinage; iron, tin, and lead were unknown to them, as was also every kind of cereal except maize. Above all, the dark authority of the sacerdotal order, and the terrible rites of their polytheistic faith — the repulsive images and revolting sacrifices — served to oppress the vast mass of the people with a sense of superstitious awe, and opposed an insurmountable barrier to the attainment of the higher culture which their gentler Mayan neighbors to the south had already won.¹

The boundaries of the region that acknowledged the Aztec overlordship at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards are impossible accurately to determine; but it seems clear that it stretched from the Atlantic to the Pacific, covering the bulk of the southern portion of the present republic of Mexico, and also a small part of that of Guatemala, with isolated colonies stretching down to Panama. The centre of it was the island city of Tenochtitlan, or Mexico, connected with the shores of Lake Texcoco by three giant causeways, each of them several miles in length and wide enough to permit ten horsemen to ride abreast.² It numbered, apparently, at the time of the arrival of the Spaniards, about sixty thousand families, and save for the royal palaces, and the great solid pyramidal teocalli or temple, was probably chiefly composed of adobe huts. It was the chief residence of the Aztec ruler, Montezuma, who had occupied the throne since the year 1502. He had begun his career as a soldier, but

¹ I am greatly indebted to my friend and colleague, Professor A. M. Tozzer of Harvard, for aid in preparing these last three paragraphs. Further references may be found in T. A. Joyce, *Mexican Archaeology* (1914), and H. J. Spinden, *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (1917).

² Cf. map opposite p. 484, also Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 108-109, and references there; Clavigero, *Storia del Messico*, vol. ii, lib. vii (on Clavigero cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, i, pp. 52-53); Bernal Díaz, ii, appendix a; and MacNutt, *Hernando Cortes*, pp. 50-51.

subsequently passed into the priesthood; and it was this curious mixture in the training that he had received that chiefly accounts for his fatal hesitations in dealing with the Spaniards. Personally brave, he was also grossly superstitious; and when once convinced that the invaders were the supernatural beings whose coming had been predicted by the Aztec oracles, the spirit of resistance died within him, and he tamely submitted to their most outrageous demands.¹

The Spaniards reached the island of Cozumel on February 18, where they were received by the natives in such friendly fashion that Cortés promptly tried to instruct them in the mysteries of the Christian faith. To judge from his own account of the affair,² his efforts were most successful; but a more probable explanation of the apparent readiness of the Indians to be converted is the fact that the cross which they were asked to adore happened also to be the symbol of their own god of rain. It was at this time also that Cortés had the incredible good fortune to pick up a Spaniard, Jerónimo de Aguilar, who had once been settled in the colony at Darien, but had subsequently been shipwrecked on the shores of Yucatan, while trying to cross over from Tierra Firme to Española. Since that time he had become thoroughly Indianized; he had learned to speak Mayan and had married a Mayan wife, and was invaluable as an interpreter in Yucatan.³ But that was by no means all. When the Spaniards passed on to the mouth of the Tabasco River, they were fiercely attacked by the natives, whom they defeated with great slaughter at Cintla on March 25.⁴ This battle was of much value to the invaders in more ways than one.

¹ Joyce, pp. 26-27.

² *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 145.

³ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 95 ff., 134.

⁴ Cf. "The Battle and Ruins of

Cintla," by D. G. Brinton, in the *American Antiquarian*, xviii, pp. 259-268 (September, 1896).

It gave them experience in the native methods of warfare, and confidence in their own ability to defeat them. It resulted in the submission of the entire region to their authority, and the formal acceptance by the inhabitants of the Christian faith. And, finally, it caused the local cacique to hand over to Cortés, as a pledge of his obedience, a present of twenty female slaves, of whom one, a Mexican woman who was rechristened Marina, was to be his chief means of communication with the Aztecs in the succeeding months. But it was solely through Aguilar that Marina, who had known Mayan in her youth, was able in turn to communicate with Cortés; each one of these precious discoveries supplemented the other, and the good luck by which the Spanish leader had been able to secure them seems still more striking when we read that the best of the Indian interpreters who had been brought over from Cuba had already succeeded in deserting to the foe.¹ On Palm Sunday the Spaniards sailed away from Tabasco, which they renamed, before their departure, Santa Maria de la Victoria; at midday on Holy Thursday, April 21, they cast anchor at the island of San Juan de Ulua. On the morrow, Good Friday, they set foot on the mainland, on the site of the modern town of Vera Cruz.

The four months (April 22–August 16, 1519) that elapsed between the landing of the Spaniards and the beginning of their march inland are remarkable, on the one hand, for a complete change in the official status of the expedition, and, on the other, for the development of relations with the natives. These two processes went on simultaneously, and exercised an important influence upon each other. For the sake of clearness, however, it will be better to examine them separately.

¹ Bernal Díaz, i, p. 134; *D. I. I.*, xli, pp. 188 ff.

Despite the fascination of Cortés's personality, there still remained a considerable faction of the Spaniards which was convinced that the supreme authority of Velasquez should be maintained, and felt that it was the first duty of the expedition to follow implicitly the instructions he had given it. These instructions¹ — to preach the Gospel, establish trading relations, and obtain treasure — had now, these men argued, been practically fulfilled; it was consequently time to go back and report. These arguments were reënforced by the hardships and sufferings the expedition had undergone. The camp had been pitched in a most unsanitary spot; before the end of May, some thirty men had died. A party was sent north along the coast to discover a more favorable place, which was finally found, some dozen leagues away; and Cortés gave orders that the camp be transplanted thither.² This command was the signal for a vigorous remonstrance by the Velasquez faction, and for a definite demand that the whole expedition return to Cuba; and greatly were the grumblers amazed when Cortés, instead of refusing, showed himself disposed to comply. But they little realized the craft, the ambition, or the prescience of their leader. Cortés had plainly foreseen what was coming, and had already prepared to meet it. He had made sure of the support of some of the ablest of his followers. He had learned much of the internal conditions of the Aztec empire. He was now quite convinced that it would be possible to overthrow it, and to win glory and treasure unlimited thereby; and his adherents had circulated the news among the

¹ *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 385 ff.

² This spot became the site of the Villa Rica de Vera Cruz, which was founded by Cortés shortly afterwards. A few years later it was abandoned for a new settlement to the south of it near the modern town of Antigua — called

Vera Cruz Vieja — which in turn was abandoned again at the close of the century, and a return made to the original landing place, which is the site of the Vera Cruz of today. Cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, i, p. 353, note; iii, pp. 259–260.

soldiers and successfully appealed to their cupidity and ambition. When it was known that he had acceded to the request for a return to Cuba, there was an outburst of disappointment. Not only did the Velasquez faction find itself outnumbered; a counter demand was now made that a colony forthwith be founded, subject only to the authority of the Spanish crown, and entirely independent of that of Velasquez; and before long it became evident that this was to be the way out.¹

There only remained the question of methods, and here it was Cortés's far-sighted resolve to observe the forms of law that ultimately gave the solution. The mediaeval traditions of Castilian municipal independence were pressed into service. Cortés nominated all the officers of the first *ayuntamiento* of the Villa Rica de Vera Cruz — *alcaldes*, *regidores*, *alguaciles*, and the rest; into the hands of the body thus formed he resigned his commission; by it, in turn, he was unanimously appointed, in the name of the Emperor, captain-general and chief justice of the newly founded colony.² The supreme authority under the Spanish crown was now in his hands, and he straightway proceeded to fortify it in such fashion as to preclude the possibility of its overthrow. On July 16 he despatched a ship with two envoys direct to Spain, bearing letters to the Emperor, telling him exactly what had occurred, and begging him to confirm all that had been done; the whole of the treasure which had already been collected was sent back at the same time as a present to his Majesty.³

¹ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 154 ff., *passim*; Prescott, *C. M.*, i, pp. 371-373.

² *D. I. I.*, xxvi, pp. 5 ff.; Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 154 ff., *passim*; Gómara, *Conquista de Mexico*, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, pp. 312 ff., *passim*.

³ *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 155-160; M. Cuevas, *Cartas de Hernán Cortes*, pp. 1-5; Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 194 ff.

Three contemporaneous letters from persons concerned in this affair were translated into German at the time and published at Amsterdam in 1871 for the bookshop of F. Müller, under the very misleading title of "Trois lettres sur la Découverte de Yucatan, écrites par les compagnons de . . . Grijalba, Mai 1518." Only 30 copies were

And the grand culmination of his carefully laid plans was the scuttling of the remaining ships which had brought him to Mexico, as they rode at anchor off the shores of Vera Cruz, thus cutting off all possibility of retreat for the faint hearted, and making death the sole alternative to absolute success in the stupendous venture against the mighty Aztec empire, upon which he had now resolved to stake his entire fortune.¹

Meantime, while establishing his own ascendancy and authority over his followers, Cortés skilfully prepared the way for the work of conquest that lay before him. An embassy from Montezuma appeared at the Spanish camp on Easter Sunday, two days after the landing; from it and its successors Cortés got much valuable information. Montezuma, it was clear, had no wish to receive the Spaniards, and at first flatly refused Cortés's request for an interview; on the other hand, it soon became equally evident that he was very much afraid of them, and inclined to believe that they were really gods. More important still, Cortés soon became apprised of the fact that the rule of Montezuma was by no means universally acceptable to all his subjects. There was an ambitious pretender who aspired to dethrone him. There were various regions, most of them recently conquered, which longed to rise in revolt. One of these regions was the town and district of Cempoala, which Cortés and his followers visited on their way northward to the new site which had been selected farther up the coast. It was ruled by a cacique so fat that Bernal Díaz decided to "call him by this name," and it was so well built and amply

printed, of which the New York Public Library has one. The first of these three letters from a "Diener seinem Herrn" was written "am 28 Juni 1519" from the "Stadt genannt Neu Sevilla" (probably Cempoala, cf. Bernal Díaz,

i, p. 165), and contains a list of the treasures sent home to Charles which is worth comparing with that given in *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 170-171, note.


¹ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 208 ff.

provisioned that the Spaniards compared it to Seville and Villaviciosa.¹ One day was enough to enable Cortés and his men to persuade the cacique to defy Montezuma and transfer his allegiance to the king of Spain; nay more, the cacique followed the Spaniards on to the next town, Quiahuitztlan, to make certain that its ruler imitated his example, and that the Spaniards did not repent of their decision to protect him. While the Spaniards were at Quiahuitztlan, an event occurred which Cortés utilized to his own advantage with even more than his usual adroitness. Five tax-gatherers from Montezuma arrived to collect tribute, and to demand the surrender of twenty sacrificial victims, in punishment for violating Montezuma's orders not to receive the dreaded Spaniards, whom they openly flouted as they passed them. Cortés thereupon ordered the local cacique to refuse to yield the tribute or the victims, and to imprison the tax-gatherers, thus definitely committing the cacique to open rebellion. Then suddenly reversing his policy, he took the five tax-gatherers out of the hands of their jailers, and, after assuring them that he had thereby saved them from death, sent two of them back to Montezuma, to prove his good will and the friendliness of his intentions. Thus with one and the same stroke, he had won valuable allies, and allayed the hostility of the power he had resolved to conquer. Meantime he strengthened his hold on Cempoala and Quiahuitztlan by spreading the notion that he and his followers were demigods, certain to bring victory to any cause they espoused; while the building of the new town of Vera Cruz in the immediate neighborhood gave him a coign of vantage from which to detect the slightest sign of disloyalty. Finally, he demolished the local idols, and demanded and obtained the acceptance of Christianity. Dread of the loss of the

¹ Bernal Díaz, cap. xlv.

THE MARCH TO MEXICO
1519

SCALE OF MILES



precious alliance of the divine strangers proved an effectual deterrent to any serious resistance.¹

The march to Mexico began on August 16, 1519. The expedition numbered between three and four hundred foot soldiers, fifteen or sixteen horsemen, and six pieces of artillery. Forty native chiefs accompanied it as counsellors and guides, and there was a considerable force of Indian soldiers and porters.² The route for several days lay steadily upward; the luxuriant vegetation of the *tierra caliente* gave way to the pine clad slopes of the Sierra Madre; the snowy summit of Orizaba shone out on the left. After six days the Spaniards entered a high and fertile valley, and, crossing it, arrived at the town of Xocotla, whose chief, doubtless instructed beforehand by Montezuma, sought to dissuade them from continuing their march to Mexico. Finding, however, that they were resolved to proceed, he advised them to pass through the city of Cholula, and leave the independent republic of Tlascala³ on one side. But the Cempoalan chiefs assured Cortés that this was a ruse; the Cholulans, they declared, were notoriously treacherous, and on the friendliest possible terms with Montezuma. The Tlascalans, on the other hand, were enemies of the Aztecs and therefore more likely to be favorable to the Spaniards. Toward Tlascala Cortés accordingly directed his force, sending on ahead "a letter to the Tlascalans, although we knew that they could not read it, and also a red fluffy Flemish hat, such as was then worn."⁴

The Tlascalans found it difficult to decide how to receive

¹ Bernal Díaz, caps. xlvi-xlvii.

² Bernal Díaz, cap. lxi; *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 188; Prescott, *C. M.*, i, pp. 391-392, and references there; MacNutt, *Cortes*, p. 119, note. There

is a good deal of discrepancy between the different authorities.

³ On conditions in Tlascala at this time, cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, i, pp. 410 ff.; MacNutt, *Cortes*, p. 124.

⁴ Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 217-223.

their mysterious visitors, but finally elected to lure them on by the appearance of friendship, and then suddenly to fall upon them unawares. The Spaniards were suffered to pass unmolested through the opening in the great wall¹ which served as the frontier of the republic, and to advance some dozen miles beyond it; but Cortés was keenly on the watch to prevent a surprise, and kept his force in constant readiness to do battle.² It was fortunate that he did so, for on September 2, two days after passing the great wall, the Spaniards found themselves suddenly surrounded by a vast host of hostile Indians, which Cortés estimates at no less than one hundred thousand men.³ Any such figure as that is ridiculously inadmissible; yet there can be no reasonable doubt that the Spaniards were outnumbered, in this, and in many succeeding battles, in the proportions of ten to twenty to one, and even more; and some explanation is consequently necessary to account for the regularity with which they emerged victorious. The comparative ineffectiveness of the natives' weapons,⁴ and their massed formations, on which the Spanish artillery and smaller arms did such deadly execution, their natural amazement at the guns and the horses, and their superstitious conviction that the invaders were demigods, have all been held partially responsible for what actually occurred; but the capitally important element in the case was the fact that the Indians were invariably less anxious to kill their enemies than to capture them alive to be sacrificed to their war god. None of the contemporary chroniclers states this in so many words; but the more one reads, the more inevitable seems the conclusion. It explains the way in which they crowded around single Span-

¹ Bernal Díaz, i, p. 228; *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 199 ff.

² *D. I. I.*, xxvi, pp. 19 ff.

³ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 201; Bernal

Díaz, i, p. 231, makes it 40,000; other estimates vary between these two.

⁴ On these cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, i, pp. 441-442, and references there.

iards, and used their darts and spiked clubs to wound rather than to kill. It certainly went a long way towards accounting for the Spanish victory in the battle of September 2, and in an even more decisive engagement which followed, on the fifth.¹

The eighteen days which elapsed between this second battle and the entrance of the Spaniards into the Tlascalan capital on the twenty-third show Cortés at the height of his powers as a diplomat and a master of men. Of military operations they were virtually empty, save for one abortive night attack by the Tlascalans on the Spanish camp, and an expedition of Cortés to destroy some neighboring villages.² Politically, however, they were crucial in the extreme. From Cortés's viewpoint, they opened darkly; for the sufferings and hardships the Spaniards had undergone had sapped the courage of the fainthearted; the old Velasquez faction raised its head, and had to be cajoled and bullied back into obedience.³ But the Tlascalans had clearly had enough of fighting, and before long an embassy from them appeared at the Spanish camp to sue for peace. This embassy, however, had been preceded by one from Montezuma, which came to congratulate the Spaniards on their victories, to offer them rich gifts, and to bribe them not to advance farther. Montezuma even promised to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Spanish king, and pay him any tribute in token of it that he should desire, provided Cortés would renounce his intention of visiting the Aztec capital. It was a fresh revelation of Mexican wealth, and of the weakness and vacillation of the Mexican ruler; and it came in the nick of time for the purposes of Cortés, for the spectacle of the humiliation of their Tlascalan foes enhanced the respect of the

¹ Bernal Díaz, caps. lxiii-lxv.

² *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 204-207.

³ Bernal Díaz, cap. lxix.

Aztecs for the Spaniards. Cortés graciously accepted the gifts of Montezuma, but refused to bind himself not to advance; moreover, he kept all but two of the envoys as his guests, for they served as hostages for the good behavior of the Aztec emperor, who forthwith sent on another embassy, with even richer presents than before, to express his solicitude for the safety of the Spaniards, and to warn them against the perfidy of their Tlascalan hosts; while the latter, needless to add, replied in kind. The Spanish leader had, in fact, attained a position where he was simultaneously courted by both the rival powers; but it was evidently the part of wisdom to hold fast to the Tlascalans. Peace and alliance were duly concluded. The Spaniards made a solemn entrance into the capital, where they were received with every mark of friendliness and respect. There was the usual exposition of the Christian faith and demand that it be accepted and the idols cast down. At this, however, the Tlascalans demurred. The most they would do was to admit the Christian God to a parity with their own; "they would not leave off making sacrifices even if they were killed for it"; and, at the advice of his chaplain, Cortés reluctantly accepted this compromise. Meantime the Spanish commander got much precious information out of his hosts, especially in regard to conditions in Mexico, and its hostile relations with Tlascala in the past.¹

The submission of the Tlascalans had its effect on Montezuma. He now abandoned his attempts to induce the Spaniards to turn back, and sent an embassy to invite them to visit him in Mexico. He furthermore advised them to travel by way of the town of Cholula, some twenty miles to the south-southwest of Tlascala, assuring them that the inhabitants were his vassals and friends, and would give

¹ Bernal Díaz, caps. lxxii-lxxx.

his guests a most cordial welcome.¹ The Tlascalans warned Cortés that Cholula would prove a trap, and that Montezuma planned to use it to effect their destruction. They told him that the Cholulans had dug pitfalls in the streets, and gathered stones upon the housetops with which to kill their guests. They besought him on no account to go there. But Cortés was convinced that to show weakness would be fatal. He sent the Cholulans the regular message, demanding that they submit to his authority, and accept the Christian faith, and on October 12 started to march toward their city, taking a large force of Tlascalans with him to help his Spanish followers.² Outside the city he was welcomed by the inhabitants with every appearance of friendliness. On entering it he was conducted to a spacious dwelling place, while his men were encamped in the sacred square enclosure where the temple stood; but there were also signs that treachery was in the wind. Ambassadors from Montezuma came and went. There were traces of the pitfalls of which the Tlascalans had spoken. Finally, Marina obtained from a Cholulan woman the information that there was a plot for a wholesale massacre of the Spaniards; Montezuma, it seemed, was the originator of it, for he had been told by his oracles that Cholula was to be the grave of strangers. Clearly the only means of safety was to forestall the plotters, and with characteristic promptness, Cortés adopted it. The chief caciques and a host of their followers were enticed inside the enclosure where the Spaniards were, and where every preparation had been made for their destruction. The caciques were taken aside and taxed with their treachery. When they attempted to lay the blame on Montezuma,

¹ Bernal Díaz, i, p. 291; *Letters of Cortés*, i, pp. 212-213.

² Bernal Díaz, i, pp. 297-298, ii, p. 1, says Cortés was offered 10,000, and took

1000; while Cortés (*Letters*, i, p. 216) asserts that he took 100,000 Tlascalans with him, but ultimately sent back all but about five to six thousand.

Cortés pretended to be infuriated by such defamation of his friend and ally. A musket shot was fired, as a preconcerted signal, "and," as Cortés grimly describes it, "we did such execution that in two hours more than three thousand persons had perished."¹

The report of the massacre, when carried to Mexico, threw Montezuma into such a panic of fear and of doubt as to render him incapable of decisive action. The Spaniards stayed on at Cholula until the beginning of November, and in the meantime received a stream of conflicting messages from the Aztec ruler. At first he tried to dissuade them from coming; then he sent them a large present of gold, and assured them that he longed to receive them and do them honor. It was also during this period that Cortés sent ten of his followers to make the ascent of Popocatepetl, which with its twin sister, Ixtaccihuatl, guards the sides of the high pass over which the Spaniards would have to go on their way to Mexico. As the mountain, at that time, was in active eruption, the adventurers were unable to reach the summit; they got nearly to the top, however, "and so high was it, that, when they were up there, the smoke began to come out, and they say it came with such an impetus and noise as if the entire mountain was about to sink; so they descended, and brought with them a considerable quantity of snow and icicles, which seemed a strange thing to see in

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 218; Bernal Díaz, vol. ii, cap. lxxxiii; Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 337. There is considerable discrepancy between the different accounts. Gómara gives the slain as 6000, and he and Andrés de Tápia (in Icazbalceta, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 576) are the only authorities to place the dispute between Cortés and the cacique, as to the relative responsibilities of Montezuma and the Cholulans for the plot, *before* rather than *after* the massacre. Even if one puts the worst possible

construction on the intentions of Montezuma and the Cholulans, it is hard to justify Cortés for permitting the slaughter to go to the lengths that it did; there is also, of course, the possibility that the whole plot was a fiction invented by the Tlascalans, in order to get their Cholulan enemies murdered. If, as Las Casas asserts, it was Cortés's sole object to terrify the natives, he certainly succeeded well. Cf. also Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 29 ff.

these parts, for according to the opinion of the pilots, they belong to the tropics.”¹ On their way up Popocatapetl, the Spaniards got a look into the great valley of Lake Texcoco, with the city of Mexico seeming to rest upon its surface; they also discovered an excellent road to it, “and God knows,” as Cortés wrote to the Emperor, “how happy I was about it.”²

The first seven days of the month of November were occupied by a leisurely advance from Cholula to Iztapalapa, on the end of a promontory jutting out into Lake Texcoco. Cortés's forces now probably consisted of about three hundred and fifty Spaniards and a few thousand Tlascalans, for most of the Cempoalans had turned back at Cholula,³ and some losses had been sustained in the different battles that had taken place. As the invaders advanced, they became more and more encouraged. Gifts and prayers from Montezuma showed how completely he had been cowed, and the territory through which they passed proved to be restive under the Aztec yoke. Their admiration, too, was aroused by the great beauties of the scene spread out before their eyes — the grandeur of the mountains, the charm of the floating gardens, the gorgeous flowers and well built houses; and their cupidity was likewise stimulated by the unmistakable evidences of wealth and treasure that met their gaze.⁴ On Tuesday, November 8, the climax came, when the Aztec emperor, accompanied by two hundred chiefs, appeared at the north end of the great southern causeway to welcome formally the representative of Charles V. Never before had the civilizations of the Old and the New Worlds been confronted with one another in such dramatic

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 224; Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 338. It is characteristic of Bernal Díaz that he omits all reference to this interesting exploit.

² *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 225.

³ Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 26–27.

⁴ *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 229 ff.

fashion. The interview that followed is described in detail in Cortés's second letter:—

“When I approached,” wrote the Conqueror, “to speak to Montezuma, I took off a collar of pearls and glass diamonds, that I wore, and put it on his neck, and, after we had gone through some of the streets, one of his servants came with two collars, wrapped in a cloth, which were made of coloured shells. These they esteem very much; and from each of the collars hung eight golden shrimps executed with great perfection and a span long. When he received them, he turned towards me, and put them on my neck, and again went on through the streets, as I have already indicated, until we came to a large and handsome house, which he had prepared for our reception. There he took me by the hand, and led me into a spacious room, in front of the court where we had entered, where he made me sit on a very rich platform, which had been ordered to be made for him, and told me to wait there; and then he went away. After a little while, when all the people of my company were distributed to their quarters, he returned with many valuables of gold and silver work, and five or six thousand pieces of rich cotton stuffs, woven, and embroidered in divers ways. After he had given them to me, he sat down on another platform, which they immediately prepared near the one where I was seated, and being seated,”¹ he made Cortés a long speech in which he virtually conceded everything, acknowledging his vassalage to the Conqueror's distant sovereign, and placing himself and all that he had at the disposal of the king of Spain. “And then,” continues Bernal Díaz del Castillo, “he went to his palaces, which were not far away, and we divided our lodgings by companies, and placed the artillery pointing in a convenient direction, and the order which we

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 233.

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had to keep was clearly explained to us, and that we were to be much on the alert, both the cavalry and all of our soldiers. A sumptuous dinner was provided for us, according to their use and custom, and we ate it at once. . . . Thanks to our Lord Jesus Christ for it all.”¹

The events of the next six days served to convince the Spaniards that, however reckless they had been in entering the Aztec capital, they would have to be more reckless still if they desired to remain there in safety. The inevitable differences of opinion at once arose with Montezuma as to whether or not the Aztecs should embrace Christianity and abandon their own gods. This Cortés demanded when he formally returned the Aztec emperor's visit the day after his arrival, and again, more insistently, four days later, when he had been taken to look at the great teocalli and saw signs of the horrors that had recently been enacted there. But Montezuma courteously and firmly declined to do more than permit the invaders to worship their own God in their own way. The Aztec gods, he assured them, were also very good, and he begged his guests to say nothing more to their dishonor.² Clearly the Spaniards could not submit to a rebuff like this without serious loss of prestige; moreover, as they surveyed the city from the heights of the teocalli, another ominous thought occurred. Would it be possible for them to get out of Mexico alive, if the friendship of their hosts should be exchanged for hostility? Let the draw-bridges on the various causeways be raised, and they would be absolutely cut off in the midst of their enemies, who, if they could not overwhelm them by force of numbers, would certainly be able to kill them by starvation.³ The only road to safety lay in anticipating their potential foe, and the

¹ Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 44.

² *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 57, 78.

³ *Ibid.*, ii, pp. 85-87.

method by which it was finally resolved to do so was as characteristic of Cortés as was his anticipation of Velasquez at the time of his departure from Cuba. The sole way to cow the Mexicans was to seize the person of Montezuma, thus demonstrating, in dramatic fashion, the superiority of the power and authority of the Spaniards. A pretext was found in the murder, by one of Montezuma's local representatives named Quauhpopoca, who ruled over the region near the present town of Tuxpan, of a couple of Spaniards who had been sent to escort him to Vera Cruz, in order that he might acknowledge the suzerainty of the king of Spain. The facts of the case were by no means clear, but Cortés chose to pretend that Quauhpopoca had acted throughout on Montezuma's orders, and that he even had been commanded to destroy the Spanish garrison that had been left behind at Vera Cruz.¹ On Monday, November 14, Cortés visited Montezuma and confronted him with this tale. He further requested that the Aztec emperor have the conduct of his lieutenant forthwith investigated. Finally he insisted, as a pledge of his sincerity and determination to have justice done, that Montezuma should at once take up his residence at the Spanish headquarters.² At first the Aztec emperor seemed horrified at this demand; but on being assured by Marina that he would be well treated if he came quietly, but killed on the spot if he resisted, he finally gave his consent. As the imperial litter passed through the streets, borne by the attendants, and guarded by the Spaniards, signs of commotion were apparent, but Montezuma ordered it stopped, and "thus all was as completely quiet as though nothing had

¹ The accounts of this affair in the *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 236-237, in Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 88 ff., in Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 351, and in the other authorities differ considerably

in detail. I have followed Cortés's own account, which he says he received from his lieutenant at Vera Cruz.

² *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 239; Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 93-94.

happened. . . . And I, and those of my company," as Cortés naïvely adds, "did everything we could to please him."¹

The next six months were spent by the Spaniards in utilizing the consequences of this daring coup d'état. Quauhpopoca, his son, and fifteen of his followers were caught, sent to Mexico, interrogated, and promptly burned alive in front of Montezuma's quarters, and, "so that there could be no obstruction while they were being burned, Cortés ordered shackles to be put on Montezuma himself . . . and if before this he was scared, he was then much more so."² After the burning, the fetters were removed, and a long and outwardly friendly conversation between the Aztec emperor and his captor took place; its chief result was to show how utterly all Montezuma's power of resistance had been sapped. In the meantime, small parties of Spaniards were sent out to explore the surrounding country, to estimate its treasures and mineral wealth, and above all, to make certain of the attitude of the rulers of the various adjacent states which formed the loose confederation acknowledging Montezuma's overlordship. Every advantage was taken of local jealousies and quarrels to secure recognition of the supremacy of Spain; finally Montezuma summoned "all the lords of the city and the neighboring countries," and in a voice choked with sobs, solemnly commanded them one and all henceforth to regard and obey the Spanish monarch as their rightful sovereign, and to pay to him all the tribute and services that they had hitherto paid to the Aztec emperor.³ It took a long time to collect the wealth — to the value of over six hundred thousand pesos⁴ — which, in consequence of this ceremony, began to pour into Mexico. There was much quarrelling

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 240.

² Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 97-98.

³ *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 251-252.

⁴ So, at least, says Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 139; the other authorities differ.

over its distribution, after the royal *quinto* had been set aside. To pacify the malcontents, Cortés voluntarily gave up much of what fell to him, and caused it to be secretly divided among the poorer soldiers.

There remained, finally, the great question of the overthrow of the Aztec religion, which Cortés, with all his energy, had been unable to accomplish during the early months of his stay at Mexico. The more he learned of the local cult — the grinning idols, with necklaces of human hearts and skulls, and the horrible butcheries on the tops of the *teocallis* — the more his Christian soul revolted; and at last, after a violent scene with Montezuma and the priests, he started to cast down the images with his own hand; “and I swear to God,” writes Andrés de Tápia, “that he looked supernatural as he did so.” Altars were erected, mass was said, “and the Aztecs came to ask the new gods for rain, since the old ones had been done away with; . . . and they went to the service in full sunshine, but when they came away, it was so wet that their feet were covered with water, whereat the Indians marvelled greatly.”¹ All this, however, by no means atoned for the horror which the desecration had aroused among the mass of the people. The priesthood was furious, and strove in every way to stir up the Mexicans to expel the hated strangers. Montezuma himself began to fear for their safety, and plainly told them so; and their danger was enhanced by the fact that the godlike attributes with which they had originally been credited had begun to wear off as the Aztecs came to know them better. Even their horses no longer inspired fear.²

At this moment an ominous cloud appeared on another part of the horizon. One day in early May, 1520, Cortés was

¹ Andrés de Tápia, in *Icazbalceta*, ii, pp. 585–586.

² Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 146–152.

suddenly confronted with news of the arrival of eighteen ships off the shore near Vera Cruz.¹

In order to understand the fresh danger with which Cortés was now threatened, we must briefly revert to his relations with Velasquez. His solemn defiance of the authority of the Cuban governor on the shores of Vera Cruz, and his despatching of two envoys to Spain to state his case before the Emperor, had both been daring plays whose value remained to be proved; and Cortés was to have further experience of the jealousy of his ancient enemy before he succeeded in getting the full support of the Spanish government. His envoys, on reaching Spain, found that Velasquez had forestalled them, and had turned Fonseca and most of the other Indian officials against their master.² Indeed, when the emissaries of Cortés finally got an audience from Charles, in March, 1520, at Tordesillas, on his way to Corunna, they found the young monarch so prejudiced against them, and so pre-occupied with his journey into the Empire, that they entirely failed to enlist his sympathies.³ Meantime, in Cuba, Velasquez had received from Spain the authorization for which he had asked, giving him the right to trade and to found settlements, and also a commission, naming him *adelantado*.⁴ Strengthened by these, he prepared a force to be sent to the Mexican coast, to assert his authority there and to punish the rebellious Cortés. The command was intrusted to a

¹ Cortés (*Letters*, i, p. 269) says that the news was brought to him by natives; Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 158, and Andrés de Tápia (in *Icazbalceta*, ii, p. 586) assert that it was Montezuma that gave him the information. Tápia is responsible for the story adopted by Prescott, that the news was first communicated by a picture writing.

² *D. I. I.*, xii, pp. 246 ff.

³ Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 221, and references there.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 464; Bernal Díaz, i, p. 192. The date of the commission is given by Herrera (dec. ii, lib. iii, cap. xi) as November 13, 1518, at Barcelona, five days before Cortés left Santiago (Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 222). But Charles was at Saragossa, not Barcelona, on November 13, 1518 (cf. *Fórona*, p. 129); moreover, it is not likely that he had received Velasquez's application at that date.

daring but careless and arrogant conquistador, Pánfilo de Narvaez. The fleet numbered eighteen vessels, carrying nine hundred Spaniards and one thousand Indians, eighty horses, and a large assortment of arms.¹ Before it could set sail, a rumor of its departure reached the audiencia of Santo Domingo, the most important civil and judicial body resident in Spanish America at that time; and the audiencia, perceiving that great scandal would result from open strife between two prominent conquistadores, sent one of its members, Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon, to warn Velasquez to desist. But Velasquez was by this time too far committed to draw back. Narvaez set sail in early March, 1520, and took with him Ayllon, who apparently preferred to accompany the expedition which he had been unable to prevent rather than return to Santo Domingo with a report of failure. His importunities, however, so wearied Narvaez that, soon after the expedition had reached the coast of Mexico, he was unceremoniously packed off by ship to Cuba, whence he made his way back, after many hardships, to Santo Domingo, to announce to the audiencia the flouting of its authority.²

Narvaez arrived at San Juan de Ulua on April 23, and soon was informed of what Cortés had accomplished, and the state of affairs at the Mexican capital. To Montezuma he sent word that Cortés was a rebel whom he had been commissioned to chastise; and at the same time he insisted that Gonzalo de Sandoval, who was in command at Vera Cruz, should submit to his authority and that of Velasquez. But Sandoval was staunch. Not only did he ignore the demands of Narvaez; he promptly despatched the messengers

¹ Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 226, and references there.

² *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 476 ff.; *D. I. I.*, xiii, pp. 332 ff.; xxxiv, pp. 557 ff.;

Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 166 ff.; Orozco y Berra, *Historia de la Conquista de Mexico*, iv, pp. 362 ff.; MacNutt, *Fernando Cortes*, p. 226.

who had borne them, bound hand and foot on the backs of Indian porters, to carry to Cortés the news of what had happened. The Conqueror saw that with affairs in such a ticklish state in the city of Mexico, a quarrel with the newcomers should, if possible, be avoided. He therefore released the messengers on their arrival, extorted from them priceless information in regard to Narvaez, won them over to his own service by flattery and blandishments, and finally sent them back to the sea coast bearing the friendliest of letters to the recent arrivals, and expressing his regret that he could not have been there to welcome them in person. But, in the meantime, Narvaez had established his headquarters at Cempoala, and made it evident that he intended to fight. His attitude toward Sandoval was so hostile that the latter had to retire to the mountains to avoid a pitched battle, and the Indians on the sea coast, plainly reading the signs of the times, began to refuse to work on the fortifications of Vera Cruz, or to bring food and provisions to its garrison.¹

Under all the circumstances, it was essential to assume the offensive before the situation grew worse. In the end of May, therefore, with the unanimous approval of his officers, Cortés left Mexico for the coast to deal with Narvaez, taking eighty or ninety of his followers with him; Alvarado, with the rest, remained behind to guard the capital.² Various messages were exchanged between the hostile camps, as the Conqueror and his tiny army proceeded eastward; the chief result being to reveal Narvaez as both arrogant and weak, and to convince Cortés that it would be possible to defeat him.³ Cortés had meantime been joined by sixty Spaniards

¹ Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 159 ff.; Orozco y Berra, iv, pp. 370 ff.; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 226 ff.

² There is the usual discrepancy as to

the figures. Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 171; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 239.

³ *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 274 ff.

under Sandoval, and a number of Indians, so that his total forces numbered two hundred and sixty-six;¹ and he had secured a large supply of copper-tipped lances from a neighboring tribe, with which to withstand the dreaded cavalry of his foe. Still Cortés did not propose to have a pitched battle if he could help it. All through the march to the coast he kept up the fiction that he had gone forth merely to effect the arrest of a rebel, and not to oppose an honorable foe; and such were the slackness and ineptitude of Narvaez that the Conqueror succeeded in effecting his purpose "with no more loss than two men."² On the night of May 28-29 he surprised the teocalli in Cempoala, where his enemy had established his headquarters. The plan of the attack had been carefully rehearsed, and each of his men discharged to perfection his allotted task. Narvaez was captured; his plans were exposed; his followers, undeceived, made haste to abandon him and enroll themselves in the service of the victor;³ and all "rejoiced very greatly that God should have ordained and provided such an ending. For I assure your Majesty," continues Cortés, "that, if God had not mysteriously intervened, and had Narvaez been victorious, it would have been the greatest injury which for a long time past Spaniards had done to one another."⁴

Cortés had triumphed again; but, as before, he was not permitted to rest long on his laurels. Three days after the capture of Narvaez, two Tlascalan Indians arrived at

¹ Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 186; in the *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 281-282, the figure is given as 250.

² *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 281-283.

³ Cf. "Relación [del adelantado Francisco de Montejo de Yucatan, d. 1548] de las personas que pasaron a esta Nueva España . . . así con el marqués del Valle, Hernando Cortés,

como con el capitan Pánfilo de Narváez, como despues . . ." ed. E. Sánchez Arjona in *R. A.*, tercera época, xxxvi, pp. 419-430; xxxvii, pp. 111-127; xxxix, pp. 89-99.

⁴ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 283; Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 200 ff.; Orozco y Berra, iv, pp. 393 ff., and references there.

Cempoala, with the alarming news that the city of Mexico had risen against the Spaniards.¹ A revolt had been brewing for some time. Conditions in the city, as we have already seen, were unstable at the moment of Cortés's departure to fight Narvaez, but the outbreak was accelerated by the stupid brutality of Alvarado.² Trouble arose over an attempt of the Aztecs to replace some of their idols. The Spaniards replied by falling upon an unarmed mob on the occasion of a great religious festival. A ruthless massacre of the Mexicans ensued, and drove those who escaped it to desperation.² Alvarado and his men were hemmed in on every side; several of them were killed, and two, who managed to escape and carry to Cortés (about June 10) a confirmation of the report brought by the Tlascalans, assured him that the Mexicans had resolved to rid themselves forever of their hated guests, and exterminate them in whatever way should prove most feasible, before the Conqueror had an opportunity to march to their relief. However much Cortés may have been irritated by the blundering of Alvarado, he had to rescue his lieutenant; for if the garrison in Mexico were permitted to succumb, the prestige of the Spaniards would be gone. Leaving Narvaez himself, and one of his subordinates, to be kept as prisoners of war at Vera Cruz, Cortés accordingly set out for Mexico, with all the forces he could muster. Counting his own followers and those of Narvaez, he had upwards of 1000 Spaniards and nearly 100 horses, and as he passed through Tlascala he was joined by 2000 native soldiers of the republic.³ On June 24, at midday, he reentered Mexico, at the head of this formidable array. The inhabitants made no attempt to

¹ Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 323.

² The massacre probably occurred on May 16. Cf. Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 323;

MacNutt, *Fernando Cortes*, pp. 246-248, and references there.

³ On these estimates, cf. MacNutt, *Fernando Cortes*, p. 249, note.

prevent him, but they showed by their averted faces how their attitude toward the Spaniards had changed.¹

Alvarado and most of his men were still alive; for the Mexicans had decided to leave them to be taken off by the slow processes of starvation. But the arrival of Cortés resulted, as usual, in greatly increasing the pace of events. His peremptory demand for provisions so kindled the fury of the Mexicans that they forthwith resolved to attack the Spanish quarters. On the day after Cortés's return, the whole city rose in arms. The drawbridges on the causeways were raised so as to cut off retreat. Flaming arrows rained upon the thatched roofs of the houses where the Spaniards lodged. The streets were packed with soldiers, and when the Spanish firearms ploughed furrows in their serried ranks, fresh men instantly took the places of the fallen. Hard fighting continued all that day and the next, without decisive result. On the twenty-seventh the Spaniards remained behind their defences, and busied themselves with the construction of three movable towers, or *burros*, as they called them, to be pulled through the streets on rollers with ropes, and afford protection for a sally. On this same day the Spaniards induced Montezuma to address his subjects from the roof of his prison, in the hope of persuading them to desist from the attack, but the speech was so feebly delivered that it produced no effect; nay more, a shower of stones and other missiles was discharged, and the captive emperor was hit on the head. On the twenty-eighth the *burros* were tried in action, but they did not prove so effective as had been hoped. That evening Cortés held a council of war, in which it was recognized that there was no hope of permanent victory for the Spaniards as long as they remained where they were, and that they must needs devote all their efforts to

¹ Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 222.

getting out of Mexico alive. The first step to this end was to gain possession of one of the causeways, and fill up the breaches caused by the removal of the drawbridges. The shortest, western (or Tacuba) one was selected for the purpose, and the twenty-ninth and thirtieth saw desperate fighting to clear the way. Some time during these two days the captive Montezuma died. Whether it was as a result of the wound that he had received on the twenty-seventh, and of his subsequent refusal to take food and have his hurts dressed; or whether he was murdered by the order of Cortés on the eve of the Spaniards' departure, it will probably never be possible to determine. At any rate he was no longer of any value to his captors. His authority with his own subjects had vanished; he was therefore quite useless as a political pawn.¹

At midnight on June 30 all was in readiness, and the Spaniards and their Tlascalan allies filed silently out into the rainy streets. They brought with them a portable bridge to enable them to cross the gaps in the causeway; a less useful load was the treasure in gold and jewels which most of them insisted on trying to carry off. If they had hoped to get away without alarming their foes, they were doomed to disappointment. The Aztecs were keenly on the watch, and the moment the Spaniards appeared, the whole city was aroused. The horrors of the ensuing hours are impossible to describe; they have gained for the occasion the name of the *Noche Triste*. The crisis came when the Spaniards reached the breaks in the causeway and tried to make use of their portable bridge. Jammed together in the narrow

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 287 ff.; Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 226 ff.; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 302-354; Orozco y Berra, iv, pp. 419-443. Orozco y Berra is the principal advocate of the theory that

Montezuma was murdered; practically all the contemporary Spanish authorities attribute his death to the wound from the stone.

passage, they were attacked from behind, and shot at on all sides from war canoes in the lake. The portable bridge soon became unfit for further use. The gaps in the causeway were quickly choked with guns, ammunition, baggage, and treasure, and the struggling bodies of horses and men; it was by setting his long lance in the wreckage at the second cut that Alvarado is said to have accomplished the famous 'leap' which tradition has inseparably associated with his name.¹ Discipline vanished, and retreat became a rout; when Cortés, the next morning, gathered together the survivors of his little band, at the village of Popotla, on the shores of the lake, he found that they numbered less than half of his original force.²

For the next six days the Spaniards retreated, by slow stages, and with infinite suffering, expecting to take refuge with the friendly Tlascalans. Their route lay around the northern end of Lake Texcoco, and from Monday to Saturday they covered less than thirty miles. Finally, on the seventh of July,³ on the great plain of Tonanpoco, near the city of Otumba, they found the Aztec army, in overwhelming numbers, drawn up to intercept their retreat. Death was thus the only alternative to victory in the ensuing battle, and the thought inspired the Spaniards to the most desperate efforts. Through the morning hours fortune wavered between the combatants. Toward midday the Spaniards showed signs of giving way; then finally, just as everything seemed irretrievably lost, the Aztec general took up a prominent position in front of his troops, with his gold and silver

¹ Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 247; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 369; Orozco y Berra, iv, p. 450, note.

² Probably even less than that; cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 376 ff. and Mac-Nutt, *Fernando Cortes*, pp. 276-277, and references there.

³ I have followed, for chronological purposes, the itinerary given in appendix c of Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 325, and in Orozco y Berra, iv, p. 460. In the text of Bernal Díaz, ii, p. 254, the date of the battle is given as July 14; in Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 402, as July 8.

plumes and his banner displayed. There was only one possible way in which to save the day, and that was to kill him, and then make the most of the ensuing disorganization; and Cortés, with six of his followers, accomplished this object. In a trice, defeat was converted into victory. The Aztecs fled in every direction. A demoralized remnant of retreating Spaniards had turned and routed their savage foes.¹

The republic of Tlascala stood loyally by its Spanish allies in their hour of need. It refused a pressing invitation from the Aztecs to desert them, and for twenty precious days afforded them rest and refuge and an opportunity to bind up their wounds.² But Cortés chafed at every moment's delay. His whole soul was set on the recovery of the empire he had lost, and despite all the murmurings of the Tlascalans and of his own followers, he promptly set about his preparations to that end. His first task was to restore the prestige of the Spanish arms, fallen as a result of the flight from Mexico; and the simplest way to accomplish this seemed to be to attack and subjugate some of the neighboring tribes. That of the Tepeacans, to the southeast of Tlascala, seemed the best to begin with, and an occasion for hostilities was afforded by the fact that they had murdered a dozen of Cortés's followers a short time before. In the early part of August, accordingly, an expedition was prepared, and succeeded, after two engagements, in overwhelming the Tepeacans; a number of them were enslaved and distributed among their conquerors.³ Other attacks, for similar purposes, were launched against other tribes in the next three

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 301-302; Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 251 ff.; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 393-403; Orozco y Berra, iv, pp. 460 ff.

² Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 404-422, and references there.

³ *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 306. It was from Tepeaca, on October 30, 1520, that Cortés's second letter was despatched.

months, and were uniformly successful. When Cortés got back to Tlascala in December, he found that all but a few of his followers¹ had forgotten their grievances, and were once more enthusiastic for the resumption of the campaign against Mexico. Not only was the morale of his forces restored; their numbers were also increased. Two ships sent by Velasquez, with supplies and reënforcements for Narvaez, were seized on arrival at Vera Cruz, and the men they carried were persuaded to enroll themselves under the banners of Cortés. The members of an expedition sent out from Jamaica to colonize the region known as Panuco, farther up the coast, found the task too difficult and soon followed suit;² and finally, the captain of a supply ship from the Old World, hearing rumors of the great events that were taking place on Tierra Firme, decided that Vera Cruz promised better than the islands, as a place in which to dispose of his wares. The cargo furnished Cortés some of the things he needed most; and the crew, catching the thrill of adventure in the air, marched off into the interior to throw in their lot with the great Conquistador.³

On December 28, 1520, Cortés left Tlascala at the head of a force of nearly six hundred Spaniards, and set up his headquarters at the town of Texcoco, half a league to the east of the lake whose name it bears. For the next four months all his energies were directed towards preparations for the siege of Mexico. The bulk of these preparations consisted in a series of military and reconnoitring expeditions around the shores of the lake; their principal object was to isolate the Mexicans and cut off the possibility of their being aided by their neighbors. Iztapalapa and Tacuba, which

¹ On these, cf. Bernal Díaz, cap. cxxxvi.

² Cf. below, p. 504.

³ Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 274-277, 282 ff.;

Letters of Cortes, i, pp. 308, 320-321; ii, pp. 4-5; Orozco y Berra, iv, pp. 467-494, *passim*; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, p. 439, and references there.

commanded respectively the land ends of the southern and western causeways, were captured in turn; as was also Cuernavaca,¹ across the sierras to the southward. But it was not merely by conquering adjacent towns that Cortés had planned to make sure of his game. His previous experience had firmly convinced him that Mexico could not be captured without a fleet of brigantines on the lake; and with characteristic energy he prepared to have these built. Sails, rigging, and iron work were brought on from Vera Cruz; timber and pitch were obtained from the adjacent forests, and the work of construction was pressed forward at Tlascala. In the spring, thirteen vessels were carried, piece by piece, on the shoulders of porters, all the fifty miles from Tlascala to Texcoco, whence a short canal was dug to launch them on the lake.² Reënforcements had meanwhile arrived in Vera Cruz, despatched, in all probability, by the authorities of Española, in response to the requests which Cortés had previously sent; they comprised upwards of two hundred and fifty infantry, a number of horsemen, and a plentiful supply of gunpowder, which was sorely needed.³ At the same time, a conspiracy, hatched in the army at Texcoco, to murder Cortés and a number of his subordinates, was betrayed and defeated in the nick of time; and the ringleader was hanged from the window of his lodgings.⁴

On Sunday, April 28, 1521, the brigantines were launched on the lake with impressive ceremonies, and a review of the troops — eight hundred and eighteen foot and eighty-seven,

¹ So called by the Spaniards; the Aztec name was Quauhuahuac.

² Cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, p. 25, note 24, for parallel achievements.

³ Gunpowder was ultimately manufactured, after incredible difficulties, with the aid of sulphur obtained from

Popocatapetl. *Letter of Cortes*, ii, pp. 204-205; Prescott, *C. M.*, ii, pp. 48-49, 446, and references there.

⁴ Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 87 ff.; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 80-83, and references there.

horse — was held at Texcoco. Ammunition was now plentiful once more. The Indian auxiliaries were numerous, and for the most part keen to fight. Never before had Cortés disposed of such a formidable array. The month of May was chiefly occupied in reviewing his forces and distributing them in the most effective manner for the accomplishment of his purpose. Alvarado, with thirty cavalry, one hundred and sixty-eight foot, and twenty-five thousand Tlascalans, was stationed at Tacuba. Sandoval and Olid, with slightly larger detachments, were placed where they could command respectively the land ends of the eastern and western branches of the great southern causeway. Cortés himself took command of the brigantines, which he justly characterized as “the key to the whole war,” and retained about three hundred Spaniards to man them. Each of the brigantines was furnished with oars and with sails, and each of them carried a single piece of artillery.¹

The first event of the siege itself was the cutting of the aqueduct which brought water to Mexico from the springs of Chapultepec; this was accomplished by Alvarado and Olid on Sunday, May 26.² Five days later, the fortress of Acachinanco or Xoloc, at the junction of the eastern and western branches of the great southern causeway, was seized by the besieging forces, and Cortés enabled to set up his headquarters there;³ this operation was carried out both by land and by water, and furnished the first practical demonstration of the value of the fleet of brigantines, which beat off and wellnigh destroyed some fifteen hundred native war canoes which attempted to dispute its passage. With

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 60 ff.; Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 96 ff.; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 87–90, 103.

² *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 64–65; Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 105, 377.

³ On the causeway, cf. *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 69 ff.; Bernal Díaz, ii, app. a, and iv, pp. 108 ff.

Alvarado in control of the western or Tacuba causeway, the city of Mexico was now completely invested, save for the long dike which connected it with the north shore of the lake; and this, in turn, was soon occupied by Sandoval.¹ The next two months saw desperate and bloody fighting. In the third week of June, the Spaniards made rapid progress, and by the twenty-second they appear to have held possession of most of the city. Then for the next eight days the tide turned, and on the thirtieth (the anniversary of the *Noche Triste*) they suffered a bloody repulse, in which more than fifty of their number were captured alive and subsequently sacrificed, in plain sight of their friends, on the summit of the teocalli of the Mexican war god. The first three weeks of July witnessed a general slackening of the siege, largely because, after having witnessed their recent reverse, many of the Indian allies of the Spaniards began to desert them, and vigorous efforts were necessary to bring them back to their allegiance. By the twentieth there was a resumption of active operations, in which the Spaniards followed the policy of consolidating their advance by a systematic destruction of temples and buildings. Slowly but surely their progress continued, from south to north; finally the carnage became so frightful that Cortés made various attempts to induce the new Aztec emperor, Guatemoc, to yield to the inevitable, so as to avoid further slaughter. None of these efforts, however, was successful; indeed, the last of them, which occurred on August 9, resulted in the killing and sacrificing of the messenger who bore the proposal, and was the prelude to the last attack of the Mexicans on the Spaniards. But flesh and blood could endure no more. On the twelfth the Aztecs yielded, and requested Guatemoc to meet Cortés in the market place to discuss terms; and it was the failure of

¹ Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, p. 108, and references there.

the Mexican emperor to appear at the rendezvous that gave the Spanish commander the pretext for a final assault. This time there was practically no effective resistance. The half-starved Mexicans were butchered in droves, and Guatemoc was captured while trying to escape in a canoe. On August 13 the proud capital of the mighty Aztec empire bowed its head in submission to the authority of Charles V.¹

One grievous disappointment awaited the conquerors. They had kept up their courage during the trying days of the siege by telling each other wonderful stories of the immense treasure they were certain to gain; and deep was their chagrin when the spoil was collected, and found, after all, to be scanty indeed. Convinced that much more was hidden away, they put the ex-emperor Guatemoc to inhuman tortures in the hope of making him reveal the place where it was secreted. All that they were able to extract from him, however, was a confession that much gold had been thrown into the lake; and yet the divers who were sent after it found almost nothing.² On the other hand, such treasure as Cortés was able to send home, coupled with his account of the siege³ and the efforts of his friends in Spain, sufficed, after long delays, to turn the scale in his favor in the settlement of the long outstanding question as to whether his acts and authority should be repudiated or confirmed. His enemy, Velasquez, had done his utmost to ruin him, and in April, 1521, when the revolt of the Comuneros was at its height, had succeeded, with the support of the bishop of

¹ For details, cf. *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 67-129; Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 137-193; López de Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, pp. 389-392; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 102-204; N. de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico*, iii, pp. 935-982; Orozco y Berra, iv, pp. 573-644, and references there. Cortés's own estimate of the dead — 67,000 killed, and

50,000 victims of disease and starvation — is the lowest of the contemporary accounts. Cf. Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 210-211, notes.

² Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 235-236, and references there.

³ Contained in his "Third Letter," despatched, May 15, 1522, from Cuyoacan.

Burgos, in extorting from the regent, Adrian of Utrecht, an order for an official visitation of the conquests of Cortés, an inquiry into his conduct, and the seizure of his person. But the officer intrusted with this task proved alike incompetent and untrustworthy; he was bribed by Cortés to abandon his object, and returned ingloriously to Castile.¹ Shortly afterwards (July, 1522) the Emperor got back to Spain. He at once perceived the importance of the new conquests, and of settling all questions that had arisen in connection with them. A board of inquiry was accordingly appointed, composed impartially of the friends of both sides. After patient deliberation, it rendered its verdict in favor of Cortés, and forbade Fonseca and Velasquez to interfere any further in his affairs.² The judgment of the board was ratified by the Emperor, and a commission appointing him governor, captain-general, and chief justice of New Spain,³ with all the powers⁴ pertaining to these titles, was despatched to Cortés from Valladolid, October 15, 1522.⁵ Thus the conqueror of Mexico, who through all the hardships and perils of the expedition had never known how he stood with the government in Spain, was at last confirmed in the supreme authority under the crown over the lands that had been won by his foresight and daring.

¹ Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 242-244, and references there.

² Both died shortly afterwards. Velasquez in the latter part of 1523, and Fonseca on March 4, 1524. Cf. Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 335-336; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 251 ff., and references there.

³ The name was apparently formally conferred on the region for the first time on this occasion, in accordance with Cortés's own suggestion of two years before; cf. *Letters of Cortes*, i, p. 322.

⁴ Except the management of finance, which was taken over by the crown on the very day of the issue of the com-

mission to Cortés, with the appointment of a contador, a treasurer, and associates. It was a plain evidence that Charles regarded the Indies, first and foremost, as a place to derive revenue from, and ominous of future developments. I am indebted for this note to Professor A. S. Aiton of the University of Michigan, who has found the certificate of the appointment of the contador in the Archivo de Indias.

⁵ For details cf. Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 320-337; the text of the Emperor's letter is in *D. I. E.*, i, pp. 97-100; cf. also *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 59 ff., 65 ff.

In Mexico the work of reconstruction was begun at once. A cathedral, dedicated to St. Francis, arose on the site of the teocalli of the Aztec war god. A palace of hewn stone, which was subsequently appropriated as a residence for the viceroys, was erected for Cortés on the corner of the great square; and a strong fortress was built to protect the Spanish quarters. "Your Sacred Majesty may believe," wrote Cortés to the Emperor in October, 1524, "that within five years this will be the most nobly populated city which exists in all the civilized world, and will have the finest buildings."¹

On the seacoast, moreover, new cities were begun; while fresh attempts by Francisco de Garay to settle in the Panuco region were frustrated, and the territory in question brought under Cortés's control.² At the same time, an expedition was sent through to the Pacific, where it founded the town of Zacatula, near the mouth of the Rio de las Balsas; a dockyard was speedily constructed there, and active preparations made for the building of a small fleet of four vessels with which to explore the adjacent shores. These ships, unfortunately, were destroyed by a fire as they were approaching completion; but the energy and zeal which were shown in their construction reveal how deeply the exploring enthusiasm of the conquerors had been stirred.³ The key to it all, as is evident from the letters of Cortés to Charles V, was the conviction that the continent was pierced by a strait, which would enormously shorten the voyage to the Spice Islands. The Conqueror planned to send the Zacatula fleet southward along the Pacific coast as far as the Strait of Magellan to search for it; while he urged on the Emperor the importance

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, ii, p. 203; Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 402; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 256-259.

² Cf. above, p. 498; *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 71 ff.; Bernal Díaz, ii, pp. 282 ff.;

iv, pp. 207, 247-259, *passim*; Prescott, *C. M.*, i, p. 390; ii, p. 438.

³ *D. I. E.*, xvi, pp. 67 ff.; *Letters of Cortes*, ii, p. 162; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 238, 270, and references there.

of exploring the shores of the Atlantic for the same purpose from Vera Cruz to Florida, and thence northward, if need be, to the Bacallaos, or 'codfish waters' off Newfoundland, which had already been visited by John Cabot and Cortereal. "If the strait exists," he roundly declared, "it cannot escape both those who go by the South Sea and those who go by the North. . . . As I am informed of your Majesty's desire to discover this strait, and of the greater service your Royal Crown would thereby receive, I ignore all other profits and interests to follow this other expedition."¹ This belief in the existence of a strait through the Western Continent continued for many years before it was finally disproved; on the other hand, schemes for the construction of an interoceanic canal were definitely broached before the end of the Emperor's reign.²

In spite of his assurances to his imperial master that the search for a strait occupied his exclusive attention, Cortés did not neglect the extension of the Spanish power on land in the years immediately succeeding the conquest of Mexico. Especially was his attention directed toward the region to the south, alike by reports of its riches and by a natural fear that if he did not occupy it at once he might be forestalled by others of his countrymen advancing northward from Darien. In November, 1523, accordingly, he sent Pedro de Alvarado, with more than 300 men, into the territories beyond the rich valley of Oaxaca. There, after a series of bloody battles with the natives, Alvarado founded (July, 1524) the city of Santiago de los Caballeros, which subsequently was given the name of Guatemala. After a ravaging expedition into

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, ii, p. 209.

² Notably by Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 222; cf. also I. E. Bennett, *History of the Panama Canal* (Washington, 1915), pp. 1-101, *passim*; Haring,

pp. 190 ff.; also Parkman, *La Salle and the Discovery of the Great West* (1907), pp. 6, 15, 29, on the origin of the Canadian name 'Lachine.'

the region of Salvador he returned in 1526 to Mexico, and shortly afterwards to Spain, where he was accused on various grounds before the Council of the Indies. Finally released, he was sent back to the lands he had won; we shall hear of him again in connection with the conquest of Peru.¹

More important in its influence upon the fortunes of Cortés was an expedition led by Cristóbal de Olid in January, 1524, to Honduras.² Olid made the journey by sea; touching at Cuba, he fell under the influence of the enemies of Cortés, and was persuaded by them to renounce his allegiance. When the news was reported in Mexico, Cortés despatched one Francisco de Las Casas to recall the rebel to obedience; and though Las Casas was wrecked on the coast of Honduras, and subsequently taken and imprisoned by Olid, he was afterwards able to raise an insurrection against his captor, with the final result that Olid was beheaded.³ A little later, Las Casas started back for Mexico; but before he could arrive there, Cortés, who had become greatly alarmed at getting no news from Honduras, determined to go thither and investigate in person. He started in October, 1524,⁴ taking with him about 150 Spaniards, over half of them cavalry, a large force of Indians, and the ex-emperor Guatemoc. His route lay overland, through Yucatan, across difficult country, intersected by rivers and swamps,

¹ Cf. *Dos Cartas de Alvarado á Cortés* (April 11 and July 28, 1524), ed. A. W. Kurtz (Guatemala, 1913). Cf. also *An account of the Conquest of Guatemala in 1524 by Pedro de Alvarado*, ed. S. J. Mackie for the Cortes Society (New York, 1924); *Proceso de Residencia contra Pedro de Alvarado*, ed. I. L. Rayon (Mexico, 1847); Bernal Díaz, cap. clxiv; Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, pp. 399 ff.; F. A. de Fuentes y Guzmán, *Historia de Guatemala ó Recordación florida*, ed. D. Justo Zaragoza for the

Biblioteca de Americanistas (Madrid, 1882), i, pp. 43 ff. Cf. also H. H. Bancroft, *History of Central America*, i, caps. xxii-xxvii; ii, caps. iv-vi.

² Bernal Díaz, cap. clxv; Gómara, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, p. 401.

³ Bernal Díaz, iv, pp. 367-374; Bancroft, *op. cit.*, i, cap. xvii.

⁴ This is clearly the right date, despite Hackett, in the *Hispanic-American Historical Review*, i, p. 56, note 77, to the contrary. Cf. *Letters of Cortes*, ii, p. 230.

and covered by dense underbrush.¹ In the course of the journey a rumor reached Cortés of a plot of his Indian followers to massacre his Spaniards, and the report served as a pretext for the execution of Guatemoc, who was hanged from a ceiba tree, with seven minor Aztec potentates who had accompanied him; "this death, which they suffered very unjustly," as Bernal Díaz asserts, "was considered wrong by all those who were with us."² Another episode of the expedition sheds light on the results of the Spanish efforts to spread the Christian faith. Wherever they went they demanded its acceptance; and they apparently found an unusually willing convert in the Indian ruler of the island city that rises from the waters of Lake Peten. On his departure thence, Cortés left one of his precious horses, which had recently gone lame, in charge of his hosts, who fed the beast on flowers and chickens, so that he incontinently died. But so indiscriminately had the necessity of caring for this horse and of accepting the Christian God been mingled in the instructions which the Spaniards left behind them, that the Indians, not unnaturally, got the two things confused. When two Franciscan friars visited the place, nearly a century afterwards, they found the inhabitants worshipping an image of Cortés's charger, and believing that it controlled the thunder and the lightning.³

In the spring of 1525, Cortés and his men came out on the so-called Golfo Dulce at the head of the Bay of Honduras. There he soon learned of the execution of Olid and of the subsequent return of his followers to their allegiance. There also he found another party of some sixty Spaniards who had formed a portion of an expedition led by Gil Gonzalez Davila from Panama for the purpose of exploring the region

¹ On this cf. *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 234 ff.; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, p. 304, note 6, and references there.

² Bernal Díaz, v, p. 27.

³ Bernal Díaz, v, p. 33; J. de Villagutierre, *Conquista de el Itza*, pp. 100-102.

of Nicaragua.¹ The repentant rebels and the followers of Gil Gonzalez were all in wretched condition — sick, half starved, and in fear of the Indians — so that Cortés, instead of having to fight, found himself welcomed on all sides as a saviour and guardian angel. The main settlement was moved eastward to Puerto Caballo, on the seacoast; the chief wants of the colonists were gradually supplied; exploring expeditions were despatched into the interior, and plans were made for the establishment of new towns. Never had Cortés been seen in a better light; his energy and cheerfulness were an inspiration to all. Any jealousy which the followers of Gil Gonzalez may have felt was forgotten in the enthusiasm which his leadership evoked.² But from these arduous and fruitful labors the Conqueror was recalled by ominous tidings from Mexico. Word came that the government there had gone to pieces in his absence, and that the city was rent by dissension and misrule; that a false report of his own death was being circulated and believed, and that the sole remedy for the situation was his immediate return.³ In the spring of 1526, accordingly, he set sail for Vera Cruz, and, after a stormy voyage, reached San Juan de Ulua on May 24, and the city of Mexico on June 19.⁴

The source of the trouble that brought Cortés back to Mexico was, first and foremost, the removal of his own strong hand, and secondly, the envies and jealousies which had been aroused by his successes. We have already had several occasions to observe that the Spanish colonial administration was honeycombed with quarrelling and jealousy; the system itself seemed to foster them, and the bigger the

¹ Cf. below, p. 520; also T. Ayon, *Historia de Nicaragua* (obra escrita por disposición del Presidente Joaquín Zavala, Granada, 1882), i, pp. 137 ff.

² *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 306 ff.;

Bernal Díaz, v, pp. 31 ff.; Herrera, dec. iii, lib. vii, caps. ii and iii.

³ *Letters of Cortes*, ii, p. 321; Bernal Díaz, v, pp. 71 ff.

⁴ *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 334 ff.

man the surer he was to make enemies. So badly had things gone in Mexico since the Conqueror's departure that on his return he was welcomed by the mass of the people with delight.¹ They regarded him as the sole means of restoring law and order. But unfortunately the reins of government were no longer in Cortés's hands, for those whom he had left in authority had utilized the period of his absence to work his overthrow. Charge after charge had been preferred against him before the home government. He was accused of poisoning his wife, who had died three months after her arrival in Mexico; of appropriating a larger share of the treasure than was his due; of plotting, finally, to defy the imperial authority and to set up an independent kingdom of his own.² Whether guilty or not, it was evident to the Emperor that the Conqueror of Mexico was becoming dangerously powerful. On November 4, 1525, accordingly, Charles had written him a letter³ informing him that he had decided to send out an officer — Luis Ponce de Leon — to take his residencia. This letter reached Cortés in Mexico on June 24, 1526, just five days after his return from Honduras; and it was but eight days after that — on July 2 — that Ponce de Leon himself arrived.⁴

He was welcomed by the Conqueror with courtesy and outward friendliness, and the preliminaries of the residencia were instituted at once. During the first seventeen days, so Cortés tells us, no person appeared to enter a complaint against him, and shortly afterwards Ponce de Leon fell ill and died. On his deathbed he delegated his functions to an elderly and infirm licentiate, Marcos de Aguilar, who speedily followed his predecessor to the grave, thus giving the enemies of Cortés the opportunity to circulate a report that they had

¹ *D. I. I.*, xii, p. 367; Bernal Díaz, v, pp. 101 ff.

³ Printed in *D. I. E.*, i, p. 101.

⁴ *D. I. I.*, xxvi, pp. 223 ff.

² *D. I. I.*, xxvi, pp. 298 ff.

been removed by poison, and otherwise to "defame him with their viperous tongues."¹ The air had, in fact, become so charged with suspicion that the Conqueror soon saw that nothing was to be gained by remaining on the spot. The best chance of vindicating himself was to return to Spain and lay his case before the Emperor in person, and this he determined to do. In the spring of 1528 he set sail from Vera Cruz, where he was saddened by the news of the death of his father. In May he arrived at Palos, to be stricken again by the death of Gonzalo de Sandoval, the most loyal and trusted of all his followers. After various delays he was received by the Emperor, who was holding his court at that time in Toledo.²

Outwardly the reception that was accorded him left nothing to be desired. Charles knew how to discount the calumnies of his foes, and realized the immensity of his debt to the Conqueror. The title of Marquis of the Valley of Oaxaca and a huge grant of lands were conferred upon him. He was given full power to continue his explorations. He was confirmed in the office of captain-general of New Spain. He was raised to the knightly Order of Santiago, and visited in person by the Emperor when ill.³ These marks of royal favor were reflected in the attitude of the grandees. The Conqueror was lionized wherever he went, and strengthened his social position by marrying the niece of the Duke of Bejar. There was, however, one possible recognition of services rendered, more important, if less conspicuous, than any of the rest, which the Emperor was resolved that Cortés

¹ *Letters of Cortes*, ii, pp. 338-343; Bernal Díaz, cap. cxcii; *D. I. I.*, xii, pp. 476 ff.; xl, pp. 234 ff.

² Bernal Díaz, cap. cxcv; Herrera, dec. iv, lib. iv, cap. i. There is some discrepancy about the date of the voyage and the arrival, which Bernal Díaz puts in December, 1527. But as

the imperial court did not reach Toledo till October 15, 1528, it seems more reasonable to accept the later date given by Herrera.

³ *D. I. I.*, xii, pp. 376 ff.; Herrera, dec. iv, lib. iv, cap. i; Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, p. 319, and references there.

should not be given, and that was reinstatement in the civil government of his conquests. Whatever the greatness of the work he had done, whatever the baselessness of the accusations of his foes, the combination of civil and military authority would make him too powerful to suit the views of such a master as Charles. The process of withdrawing his political authority had in fact begun before he reached the court, with the appointment, on December 13, 1527, of a royal commission of five¹ persons — the first 'audiencia of New Spain' — to take over the government of the recent conquests; and the new policy was to be carried still further while Cortés was in Castile. The doings of this first audiencia brought a flood of complaints. Its president, the notorious Nuño de Guzman, proved an unscrupulous tyrant; and a joint meeting of the Councils of Castile, of the Indies, and of Finance, which was called to consider the situation, gave its opinion, on November 9, 1529, that the true solution of the existing difficulties lay in the appointment of a royal representative in New Spain with the fullest powers. This recommendation resulted in the selection ten days later of Antonio de Mendoza as the first of the Spanish viceroys on the American continent, and also in the sending out of a second audiencia to tide over the interim — it was nearly six years — before Mendoza could get his instructions and reach his post.² Cortés, by these means, was entirely ousted from the government of Mexico; and the measure of his impotence may be gauged by the fact that on his return thither in 1530 he was formally forbidden to enter the capital, and the clergy were reprovved for praying for him in church.³

¹ Two of these died shortly after they reached Mexico, so that the commission was soon reduced to three.

² This information, as well as that contained in note 4 to page 503 above, was generously given me by Professor

A. S. Aiton of the University of Michigan.

³ *D. I. I.* xii, pp. 403 ff.; Cuevas, *Documentos Inéditos del Siglo XVI para la historia de Mexico*, i, pp. 1 ff.; Bernal Díaz, caps. cxcvi-cxcviii; Herrera,

The career of the great conquistador had in fact long passed its zenith at the time he returned to the lands he had won. Even the military authority he had been allowed to retain was rendered nugatory by the concurrent jurisdiction of the audiencia, which sent back constant complaints of his claims and pretensions. Before long he retired to his estates at Cuernavaca to busy himself with agriculture, sheep raising, and the establishment of new industries.¹ But his restless spirit could not long be satisfied with such sedentary pursuits; and soon afterwards he embarked on a series of explorations of the Pacific coast, "in which," as the old chronicler sadly declares, "he had no luck at all, for everything turned to thorns."² The expedition of Saavedra Ceron in 1527, which has been recounted in the previous chapter, had turned his attention once more to the shores of the Pacific; and his imagination was further roused in the succeeding years by the news that reached him of the riches of Peru. In May, 1532, he accordingly fitted out two ships in the port of Acapulco, "to explore the shore and search for islands and new lands"; but the commander was incompetent, the crews mutinied, one of the vessels was lost at sea, and the other was driven ashore near Jalisco.³ Undismayed by this misfortune, Cortés, in October, 1533, sent out two more ships from the port of Tehuantepec. One of these reached the coasts of Lower California. The other, having lost most of its officers and crew, was obliged to land at the port of Chiametla, within territory claimed by Guzman, the odious president of the first audiencia and the mortal enemy of Cortés; needless to add, he appropriated the ship.⁴ Once

dec. iv, lib. iv, cap. ii, and lib. vii, caps. i, viii; Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, caps. xii-xvi.

¹ Prescott, *C. M.*, iii, pp. 331-333; Bancroft, ii, pp. 413 ff.

² Bernal Díaz, v, pp. 178-188.

³ *D. I. I.*, xii, pp. 298, 541; xiv, p. 128; Bernal Díaz, v, pp. 180-181.

⁴ *D. I. I.*, xii, p. 429; Bancroft, ii, pp. 422 ff.; Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, ii, pp. 441-442, and references there.

more the great Conqueror resolved to try his fortune; in 1535 he took command in person of a large expedition, which carried the previous explorations to the north somewhat farther, and even sought to establish a colony at the tip of the California peninsula.¹ But the prosecution of his magnificent schemes demanded resources far greater than the authorities were willing to grant.² The new viceroy, Mendoza, who had by this time reached his post, threw every obstacle in the way of Cortés's plans; and finally the Conqueror, despairing of fair treatment, left Mexico for the last time in the spring of 1540, and returned, worn out and broken hearted, to Spain. His attempt to retrieve his fortunes by participation in the Algerian campaign was a dismal failure. His star had now set, and others had risen to replace him. He had done his great work, and, like many another loyal servant of the Spanish crown, was ruthlessly cast aside and suffered to die in neglect. The end came at the little village of Castilleja de la Cuesta, on December 2, 1547,³ while the master whose authority he had established in the New World was celebrating his recent triumph over the Lutherans of the Empire.

The arrival in Mexico, in October, 1535, of Antonio de Mendoza, the first viceroy of New Spain, marks an epoch in the history of the Spanish dominions in the New World. It initiated a new system of government and administration, which lasted, with certain important modifications, down to the revolutions of the nineteenth century. But as the present chapter is devoted to conquest and discovery, we can

¹ This last series of explorations is very difficult to trace. The date of May, 1536-37, given by Bernal Díaz (v, p. 184) is obviously wrong. Cf. Winsor, ii, p. 442; Bancroft, *North Mexican States*, i, p. 52; Chapman, *History of California*, pp. 49 ff.; and

Historical Documents Relating to New Mexico, etc., ed. C. W. Hackett, i (1923), pp. 9-10, and references there.

² Cf. *D. I. I.*, iii, p. 535.

³ For details, cf. MacNutt's introduction to the *Letters of Cortes*, i, pp. 60-66.

afford to postpone the consideration of these things. Our task, for the moment, is to complete the story of the exploration and conquest of the various territories which were ultimately to compose the viceroyalty of New Spain; and we can begin to the best advantage with those which were discovered and occupied by expeditions sent out from Mexico.

The majority of these expeditions were directed toward the northwest. Most of them were by land, but a few were by sea, and as the latter naturally connect themselves with the last ventures of Cortés which have just been described, it will be well, even at the sacrifice of chronological sequence, to dispose of them at once. In 1539, before leaving for Spain, the Conqueror despatched Francisco de Ulloa to explore farther north in the Gulf of California; and this expedition, after ascertaining that, contrary to the general belief, the peninsula of Lower California was not an island, followed up its western coast to a point about the latitude of 28° or 29° . From there one of the ships was sent back to report, while Ulloa continued northward: whether or not he ever returned is uncertain, but there is reason to believe that he did.¹ There is also evidence that another expedition led by Captain Francisco de Bolaños made further explorations of the California peninsula in the latter part of 1541 or early the following year, and that an account of his voyage was in the hands of Rodriguez Cabrillo,² a Portuguese mariner in the service of Spain, who was sent out in 1542 by the viceroy Mendoza, largely in the old hope of finding a strait through the Western Hemisphere. On February 3, 1543,

¹ Ulloa's "Relación" is to be found on pp. 181-240 of the volume of *Relaciones Históricas de América; primera Mitad del Siglo XVI*, edited by M. Serrano y Sanz for the Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles (Madrid, 1916). Cf. also H. R. Wagner, "California Voyages, 1539-1541," on pp. 307 ff. of

vol. iii (for 1924) of the *California Historical Society Quarterly*, for the latest English translation of the *Relación* and comment thereon; also Winsor, ii, p. 442, and references there, and Chapman, *History of California*, pp. 53-54.

² Wagner, *loc. cit.*, pp. 387 ff.

when this expedition had reached the southern part of the coast of the present state of California, its leader died; but his pilot, Bartolomé Ferrelo, took his place, and conducted the exploration considerably farther northward: some say to the neighborhood of Cape Mendocino,¹ others to the latitude of the southern boundary of the state of Oregon. Heavy weather was encountered, and the two ships of which the expedition was composed were separated for a period of three weeks, but they got back at last, on April 14, 1543, to the port of Navidad, from which they had set forth. If they had not discovered the strait they had set out to find, they at least had explored many hundreds of miles of unknown coast.²

Meantime even greater progress was being made in the exploration of the interior. Rumors began to reach Mexico in the year 1529 of wealthy Indian tribes some hundreds of miles to the northwest, and especially of seven cities of unusual size and riches, which soon came to be known as the Seven Cities of Cibola.³ It was Nuño de Guzman who first determined to test the truth of these stories; in the winter of 1529-30 he led a large expedition into the region of Culiacan. He failed to find the treasures that he sought; yet he dared not return unsuccessful to Mexico in view of the changes that had taken place there since he left; so he finally retired to the neighborhood of the present town of Guadalajara, where he busied himself in forming the settlements that were to become the kernel of New Galicia.⁴ In 1536 the tales of the wonders of the regions to the northwest were

¹ So called in honor of the viceroy; cf. Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 174.

² Cf. the "Relation" published in Bolton, *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest, 1542-1706*, in *Original Narratives of Early American History*, ed. J. F. Jameson (1916), pp. 13-39; Winsor, ii, pp. 444 ff.; and Chapman, pp. 76 ff.

³ Cf. Bandelier, in *Papers of the Archaeological Institute of America*, American series, v (Cambridge, Mass., 1890). The 'Seven Cities' were unquestionably the Zuñi pueblos of western New Mexico.

⁴ Cf. Winsor, ii, p. 474, and references there; Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, ch. xvii.

revived by the arrival in Mexico of Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, who had passed through them on his long journey from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific,¹ and this time the new viceroy, Mendoza, resolved to follow the matter up. He entered into correspondence with a certain Francisco de Coronado, who had come out with him to Mexico in 1535, and had recently been appointed to the governorship of New Galicia,² with the result that in March, 1539, Fray Marcos de Nizza and another monk, with a negro guide called Stephen, who had accompanied Cabeza de Vaca, were sent on a reconnoitring trip into the regions in question.³ In September Fray Marcos returned, to report that he had seen from afar a city larger than Mexico, and that he had been assured that it abounded in gold and precious stones.⁴ Preparations accordingly were begun for the conquest of the new lands. A force of some three hundred Spaniards and a large body of Indians was collected at Compostella, the capital of New Galicia. Coronado was given command of the expedition, and on February 23, 1540, it started northward.⁵

The tale of the ensuing venture forms one of the most remarkable chapters in the early history of the New World.⁶ Hernando de Alarcón, who had been sent up the Gulf of California with two ships to carry provisions, found the mouth of the Colorado in the month of August, and subsequently ascended it in boats, possibly as far as the lower

¹ Cf. below, pp. 526-528.

² Guzman had been deprived of that office, disgraced, and imprisoned in 1536. In June, 1538, he was apparently set free and sent back to Spain, where he died, neglected and despised, in 1544. Cf. Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii. pp. 457-461, and references there. Cf. also *D. I. I.*, xiii, pp. 406 ff., 436 ff.

³ *D. I. I.*, iii, pp. 325 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, iii, pp. 329-350.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iii, pp. 351 ff.; G. P. Winship, *The Coronado Expedition*, pp. 373-382.

⁶ Winship, *op. cit.*, has reunited practically all the available information, and publishes the original text and an excellent translation of the standard contemporary narrative of Castañeda. Cf. also *Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States*, pp. 281-387, in *Original Narratives of Early American History*, ed. J. F. Jameson (1907).

end of the Grand Cañon.¹ Coronado had meantime marched overland, dividing his forces as he went. With the advance guard he proceeded to Cibola, where he was forced to fight a bloody contest with the Indians before he could effect an entrance, only to discover the falseness of Fray Marcos's reports; "and such," declares the contemporary account, "were the curses that some hurled at the Friar, that I pray God may protect him from them."² A little later another detachment crossed over the Colorado and penetrated to the westward; while de Cardenas with twelve companions tried to explore the Grand Cañon. They spent three days on the bank, "looking for a passage down to the river, which looked from above as if the water was six feet across, although the Indians said it was half a league wide. It was impossible to descend, for after these three days Captain Melgosa and one Juan Galeras and another companion, who were the three lightest and most agile men, made an attempt to go down at the least difficult place, and went down until those who were above were unable to keep sight of them. They returned about four o'clock in the afternoon, not having succeeded in reaching the bottom on account of the great difficulties which they found, because what seemed to be easy from above was not so, but instead very hard and difficult. They said that they had been down about a third of the way, and that the river seemed very large from the place which they reached, and that from what they saw they thought the Indians had given the width correctly. Those who stayed above had estimated that some huge rocks on the sides of the cliffs seemed to be about as tall as a man, but those who went down swore that when they reached these rocks they were bigger than the great tower of Seville."³

¹ H. R. Wagner, "California Voyages," in *California Historical Society Quarterly*, iii, pp. 384-386.

² Castañeda, in Winship, p. 483; cf. also *D. I. I.*, iii, pp. 363 ff.

³ Castañeda, in Winship, p. 489.

The bulk of the expedition passed the winter of 1540-41 on the Rio Grande, at what is now nearly the centre of New Mexico ; and in the spring Coronado started off to the north-east, in search of a town called Quivira, of which marvellous tales had been told him by the Indians. The country he had thus far traversed had been barren and desolate, though no worse than many places in the plains of Old Castile ; but as he proceeded it grew more fertile ; "humpbacked cattle," or buffaloes, were seen, and "there was not one of the horses that did not take flight when he saw them first, for they have a narrow, short face, the brow two palms across from eye to eye, the eyes sticking out at the side, so that, when they are running, they can see who is following them. They have very long beards, like goats, and when they are running they throw their heads back with the beard dragging on the ground. There is a sort of girdle around the middle of the body. The hair is very woolly, like a sheep's, very fine, and in front of the girdle the hair is very long and rough like a lion's. They have a great hump, larger than a camel's. The horns are short and thick, so that they are not seen much above the hair. In May they change the hair in the middle of the body for a down, which makes perfect lions of them. They rub against the small trees in the little ravines to shed their hair, and they continue this until only the down is left, as a snake changes his skin. They have a short tail, with a bunch of hair at the end. When they run, they carry it erect like a scorpion. It is worth noticing that the little calves are red and just like ours, but they change their color and appearance with time and age."¹ After advancing for over a month, Coronado left his main force, and went on with thirty horsemen — still in quest of Quivira. A ride of about six weeks due north by the compass finally brought him to it

¹ Castañeda, in Winship, p. 542.

— a plain Indian village in the northeastern part of the present state of Kansas, and more, if anything, of a disappointment than Cibola; thence he returned in the autumn to his previous winter quarters. The spring of 1542 found him back again in Mexico, "very sad, and very weary, completely worn out and shamefaced," and not very graciously received by the disappointed viceroy, who had entertained such high hopes of the treasure he would bring home.¹ He was reinstated in the governorship of New Galicia, but shortly afterwards was accused of neglect and malfeasance: his residencia was taken, and in September, 1544, he was found guilty and deprived of his office. After a brief confinement in his own house, he was released on bond, and retired to Mexico to live out the rest of his days.² Like many another of the Spanish conquistadores, he could do great deeds when great opportunities came; but when the special incentive to high effort was removed, the effects of the reaction were little short of disastrous.

The story of the expeditions sent out from Mexico to the northwest needs to be supplemented, at this point, by a few paragraphs on the discovery and first settlement of the regions to the southeast, now comprised in the republics of Central America. These territories, as we have already seen, had been coveted by Cortés, who had sent Alvarado into Guatemala and Salvador, and Olid to Honduras; and it was their ultimate fate to become a part of the viceroyalty of New Spain. The larger part of them, however, was first occupied from Panama, and the dominant figure in their early history is that of the savage Pedrarias Davila.

It will be remembered that this official — over seventy

¹ Castañeda, in Winship, p. 539.

Historical Review, January, 1925, pp. 298-304.

² For details cf. A. S. Aiton, "The Later Career of Coronado," in *American*

years old at the time — had been sent out from Spain as governor to Darien in the year 1514. From the first he seemed determined to sweep all rivals from his path, and win for himself all the favors of the crown. He executed Balboa,¹ with four of his companions. He founded the town of Panama, on the Pacific side of the Isthmus, and moved the seat of the government thither in 1519. He sent out expeditions and raids against the natives of the surrounding regions. Such vigorous proceedings roused the inevitable complaints at home; a new official — Lope de Sosa — was sent out from Spain to take his residencia; and simultaneously a fresh expedition was prepared under Gil Gonzalez Davila, to carry further the explorations he had begun. In undertaking this enterprise, Gil Gonzalez had banked on the friendship of de Sosa, whom he had expected to convict and supersede Pedrarias; but Lope de Sosa died almost immediately after his arrival at Panama (May, 1520), with the result that Pedrarias remained in power, and naturally threw every obstacle in the way of Gil Gonzalez. But the latter was not to be swerved from his purpose. With infinite difficulty he constructed four small vessels, and in January, 1522, sent them off on an expedition, which explored the Pacific coasts of the territories to the northwest, as far as the boundaries of the present state of Honduras; he himself, in the meantime, followed on, overland, discovering the Lake of Nicaragua on his way, and making numerous, if temporary, converts among the Indians; in June, 1523, he was back at Panama. Convinced that he had found a most valuable bit of territory, and that Pedrarias would hinder rather than help him in developing it, he promptly got away to Española, where he was received with approval by the authorities, and

¹ In January, 1519; the date given on p. 217 of Vol. II of this work is wrong. Cf. A. de Altolaguirre y Duvalé, *Vasco*

Núñez de Balboa (Madrid, 1914), p. clxxxv.

urged to continue the work of exploration. In the spring of 1524, accordingly, he reëmbarked for Tierra Firme; but this time, in order to avoid Pedrarias, he directed his course to the shores of Honduras, whence he proceeded by land to the regions he had found.¹

In the meantime, Pedrarias, profoundly jealous of the good fortune of Gil Gonzalez, determined to make an effort to get hold of Nicaragua for himself, and despatched his lieutenant, Francisco Hernández de Cordoba,² to occupy it in his behalf. The situation was further complicated by the arrival from Mexico of Olid and Las Casas in Honduras, and finally, in 1525, of Hernando Cortés; and the ensuing confusion became worse confounded still when Cordoba, thinking that he saw in the number of rival claimants an opportunity to strike a blow in his own behalf, threw off his allegiance to Pedrarias, and announced his intention of seizing Nicaragua for himself. This last source of trouble was indeed speedily removed, for the hoary-headed Pedrarias, coming up from the south, surprised and executed his rebellious subordinate. At this juncture the home government intervened, and deprived Pedrarias of his authority at Panama;³ but he richly indemnified himself, in the course of the next few months, by securing the appointment to the governorship of Nicaragua.⁴

¹ On this paragraph cf. letter of Gil Gonzalez Davila to Charles V, of March 6, 1524: original in Simancas, transcript in the New York Public Library, in the ms. volume entitled "Indias, Relaciones Varias, 1533-1775"; also *D. I. I.*, xii, xiv, *passim*; L. Fernández and R. Fernández Guardia, *Colección de Documentos para la Historia de Costa Rica* (1881-1907, 9 vols.), especially volumes iv and vi; P. de Andagoya, *Narrative of Pedrarias Davila*, ed. Hakluyt Society (London, 1865); H. H. Bancroft, *History of Central America*, i, *passim*; Helps, *Spanish Conquest of America* (ed. of 1902), iii,

pp. 48 ff., 164 ff.; M. M. de Peralta, *Costa Rica, Nicaragua, y Panama en el Siglo XVI*, pp. 3 ff.; T. Ayon, *Historia de Nicaragua*, i, pp. 109 ff.; and R. Fernández Guardia, *History of the Discovery and Conquest of Costa Rica*, tr. H. W. van Dyke (New York, 1913), pp. 70 ff.

² Not to be confused with the predecessor of Cortés in Yucatan (cf. above, p. 462), who bore the same name, but died in 1518.

³ Ayon, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 156-157.

⁴ *D. I. I.*, xl, pp. 252 ff. The appointment is dated at Valladolid, June 1, 1527.

The quarrels of the various claimants to that region showed the need of a stern rule, which it was universally known that Pedrarias would provide: there was, moreover, no one else who seemed capable of withstanding the efforts of Lope de Salcedo, the new governor of Honduras,¹ to extend his power over the Nicaraguan lands. The end of the year 1528 saw the veteran firmly established in control of the territory for which he had longed, with the full approval of the constituted authorities.² It had been throughout a contest of rogue against rogue; but in that kind of encounter none could equal Pedrarias. On Monday, March 6, 1531,³ the old man died, at the age of ninety: one of the ablest but most repellent figures in the ranks of the conquistadores; proud, selfish, treacherous, and revengeful.

The whole story of the occupation of the Central American lands — it has only been recounted here in the barest outline — is, in fact, one of the most miserable chapters in the history of the Spanish Empire. It contains no outstanding achievements; it is but a chronicle of jealousy and self-seeking, of sordid scrambling for territory and gold. None of the characters, save possibly Gil Gonzalez, is really attractive; and the inability of the Emperor and of the audiencia in Santo Domingo effectively to adjudicate their various quarrels, is a sad commentary on the inherent evils of government from afar. Yet no picture of the Spaniards in America would be adequate without it; the infamy of Pedrarias, his rivals and associates, makes the greatness of Cortés stand forth in clearer light. The ranks of the conquistadores con-

¹ Appointed November 20, 1525; cf. *D. I. I.*, xiv, pp. 47-52.

² Ayon, i, pp. 153-186; J. Milla, *Historia de la América Central*, i, cap. x.

³ The date is fixed by a letter of Captain Diego Machuca de Zuazo to the Emperor, dated May 30, 1531, and printed on pp. 83-88 of M. M. de

Peralta, *Costa Rica, Nicaragua, y Panama en el Siglo XVI* (1883). Herrera (dec. iv, lib. ix, cap. xv) puts it in the end of July, 1531; Ayon (*Historia de Nicaragua*, p. 186) on July 14, 1531; Winsor (ii, p. 508), in 1532; H. H. Bancroft (*Central America*, i, p. 614) and other writers, in 1530.

tained bad men and good. Courage and persistence were their commonest virtues; brutality and self-seeking their outstanding faults. Sometimes the good qualities so prevailed over the bad ones as to make possible achievements at which the world has not yet ceased to wonder. Sometimes, when the scales were tipped the other way, we marvel that anything was accomplished at all.

We now pass for a few moments to another region, which the Spaniards had explored before Cortés conquered Mexico, but which was ultimately to form part of the viceroyalty of New Spain — the Florida where Ponce de Leon had first landed in 1513.¹ This part of the story is almost exclusively a record of exploration, for none of the efforts at settlement and colonization in the eastern part of the North American continent attained anything more than evanescent success.

Ponce de Leon's voyage of discovery up the west coast of Florida was followed in the next few years by several others in the same waters, the most important being that of Alonzo de Pineda in 1519, which came to the mouth of a river of great size; earlier writers used to identify it as the Mississippi, but it seems on the whole more probable that it was Mobile Bay.² Two years later Ponce de Leon arrived again, with all the material and apparatus of colonization, to exercise his rights under the patent of 1514, and started a settlement in the neighborhood of Tampa Bay. The venture was unlucky from the first. The natives proved hostile, and soon compelled him to return to Cuba with all his followers; and Ponce de Leon himself succumbed shortly afterwards to the effects of a wound from an Indian arrow. "Not yet," comments Oviedo on the failure of this enterprise, "had the time come for the conversion of that land to

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, p. 217.

² Bourne, *Spain in America*, pp. 136-137, and references there.

our holy Catholic faith ; for the Devil was still permitted to deceive and possess those Indians, and the population of Hell to be augmented by their souls.”¹

Meantime, on the Atlantic coasts other projects for exploration were pushed vigorously forward, one of the dominant motives being the old desire to find a transcontinental strait. In 1521 Lucas Vasquez de Ayllon — the man who had vainly attempted to prevent the expedition of Narvaez to Mexico in the previous year² — sent out a caravel, under Francisco de Gordillo, which reached the neighborhood of the present city of Georgetown, South Carolina, captured many Indians, and got back in safety.³ Two years later Ayllon got a patent in Spain, giving him the right to colonize and govern 800 leagues of shore, and in 1526 he set forth to substantiate his claim. With three ships and some 600 followers he coasted along toward the northeast, finally establishing a settlement in a marshy and unhealthy spot which some have identified with Jamestown.⁴ Indian hostility and swamp fevers, however, condemned the colony to a short life. Ayllon died on October 18, and only a quarter of his company got back to Santo Domingo.⁵

But if schemes of colonization languished, the zeal for exploration continued ; the conviction of the existence of a strait remained ; and the man who was to write the next chapter of the great quest was that Portuguese sea captain, Estevan Gómez, who had deserted Magellan with the good ship *San Antonio*.⁶ He had never wavered in his belief in the existence of a passage to the northwest, and

¹ Oviedo, *Historia General y Natural de las Indias* (Madrid, 1851-55, 4 vols.), lib. xxxvi, cap. i ; Woodbury Lowery, *Spanish Settlements, 1513-1561*, pp. 158-159, and references there

² Cf. *ante*, p. 460.

³ Oviedo, lib. xxxvii ; Bourne, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-139.

⁴ Oviedo, *ibid.* ; Bourne, *op. cit.*, p. 140 ; Lowery, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

⁵ *D. I. I.*, xxxv, pp. 547 ff. ; Lowery, *op. cit.*, pp. 164-168.

⁶ Cf. *ante*, p. 431.

in 1524-25 he set out from Corunna to find it, in a ship furnished by the Emperor for the purpose. It is impossible to state with any definiteness where he went, though it seems probable that he made the American shore in the neighborhood of Nova Scotia, and then coasted southwest to the region of Virginia.¹ Needless to add, he found no strait, nor the cargo of spices for which the Emperor had hoped; but he loaded his vessel with Indians for the voyage back, and the similarity of the two words *clavos* (spices) and *esclavos* (slaves), and the natural credulity of mankind, led many to believe, for some time to come, that he had actually discovered the passage he had sought.² In any case, the reports of the lands he had seen were sufficiently interesting to cause the Emperor to make a vigorous protest, when, more than ten years later, reports began to come back of the explorations of Jacques Cartier in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. In Charles's eyes the Frenchman was a common trespasser on lands that were undoubtedly Spanish under the bull of Alexander VI and the treaty of Tordesillas; and when King Francis gave signs of following up his discoveries, the Emperor ordered the preparation of a fleet to prevent him. In the summer of 1541 two caravels were sent out to find Cartier; but they returned unsuccessful in the following winter. For the next two years the matter hung fire, the situation being much influenced by the course of the war in Europe; finally, in 1545, in his instructions to his son, Charles laid stress on the necessity of keeping an eye on the French, so as to prevent them from sending a fleet to the Indies. "In their previous attempts, however," he continues, "it has been noticeable that they have exhibited little

¹ J. T. Medina has studied the evidence with the most painstaking accuracy in his *El Portugués Esteban Gómez*

al Servicio de España (Santiago de Chile, 1908), especially pp. 85-111.

² Peter Martyr, *De Orbe Novo*, tr. MacNutt, ii, p. 419.

pertinacity ; and if a vigorous opposition is maintained, they immediately give way and withdraw."¹

We return to the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and to that Pánfilo de Narvaez who had attempted in 1520 to oust Cortés from Mexico. After his fiasco at Cempoala, Narvaez had been imprisoned for a space at Vera Cruz ; but he was finally liberated on orders from the home government, and shortly afterwards went back to Spain. His experience had apparently not wearied him of adventure ; for he promptly applied to the Emperor for a new grant, and was authorized, in December, 1526, to conquer the country from the peninsula of Florida to the Rio de las Palmas. In the following June he set sail from San Lucar, with five ships and about 600 colonists ; and after being delayed in the West Indies by exceptionally heavy weather, he landed near Tampa Bay in April, 1528. But the Indians proved inhospitable and dangerous. There were the usual tales of fabulous treasures to be obtained further westward, and Narvaez accordingly soon decided to move on. Contrary to the advice of Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, the treasurer and historian of the expedition,² he divided his forces ; and retaining 300 of his men to march along the coast under his own leadership, he despatched the rest with the ships to meet him further west. But the rendezvous that was arranged proved too indefinite to be of any practical value. The two parts of the expedition never saw each other again, and though those who had gone by sea finally managed to effect a safe return, only four of

¹ J. T. Medina, *Una Expedición Española a la Tierra de los Bacallaos en 1541* (Santiago de Chile, 1896) ; for details see H. P. Biggar, "Charles V and the Discovery of Canada," in the *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 3d series, xi (1917), pp. 143-164, and references there.

² Cabeza de Vaca was the grandson of

Pedro de Vera (*ante*, Vol. II, pp. 175-179), the conqueror of the Canaries in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella ; cf. "Relación de los Naufragios y Comentarios de Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca," in *Colección de Libros y Documentos referentes á la Historia de América*, v, p. 144.

those who had accompanied Narvaez ever got back to tell their tale. The story of their awful sufferings in the summer of 1528 — the dismal swamps, the Indian attacks, the efforts to construct ships with inadequate materials, the westward struggle, and the death of Narvaez — need not be repeated here. We will pass on instead to the late autumn of the same year, when the remnants of the expedition, about eighty men in all, finally gathered themselves around Cabeza de Vaca on an island off the coast of Texas.¹

Escape was sought on every hand, but proved at first quite impossible to find. Hunger and exposure further reduced the company; small parties wandered off and were never heard of more. Meantime the survivors won great fame, without wishing it, as traders and medicine men among the surrounding Indians. They were utilized by the natives for all sorts of purposes. They became, in fact, too valuable to be let go. "I was in this country nearly six years," wrote Cabeza de Vaca, "alone among the Indians and naked like them."² Finally, however, in 1534, he got away, and with two other Spaniards and a negro, all of them survivors of the original expedition, started westward across the plains.³ The progress of the party was exceedingly slow. Their reputation as miracle workers preceded them as they went. Often they were obliged to remain for weeks in one spot; and frequently they were accompanied by three or four thousand persons, "and as we had to breathe upon and sanctify the food and drink for each . . . it may be seen how great was

¹ "The Narrative of Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca," ed. F. W. Hodge, in *Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States*, pp. 19-52; in *Original Narratives* series. Lowery, *op. cit.*, pp. 172 ff., and references there. Also Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 479 ff.

² "The Narrative of Cabeza de Vaca," p. 57.

³ An interesting article on Cabeza de Vaca's probable route through Texas, by B. Ponton and B. H. M'Farland, was published in the *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association*, i (1898), pp. 166-186.

the annoyance.”¹ But at last one of the adventurers happened to see “the buckle of a sword belt on the neck of an Indian, and stitched to it the nail of a horsehoe. He took them, and we asked the native what they were; he answered that they came from Heaven. We questioned him further, as to who had brought them thence; they all responded that certain men who wore beards like us had come from Heaven and arrived at the river, bringing horses, lances, and swords. . . . For this we gave many thanks to God our Lord. We had before despaired of ever hearing more of Christians.”² Some days afterwards Cabeza de Vaca came upon “four Christians on horseback,” who, seeing him in such strange attire, and in company with Indians, were greatly startled; “they stood staring at me a length of time, so confounded that they neither hailed me, nor drew near to make an inquiry.”³ A few weeks later the wanderers were at Compostella, telling their story to Nuño de Guzman, who received them cordially, and gave them clothes; but “for some time,” so their leader assures us, “I could not wear any, nor could we sleep anywhere else but on the ground.”⁴ Finally, on July 24, 1536, they reached Mexico. They had crossed the continent, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; and the stories they brought back of the regions they had traversed led directly, as we have already seen, to further explorations. It was the negro whom Cabeza de Vaca had brought with him across the plains that accompanied Fray Marcos in 1539.⁵

One more great adventure — in some respects the most remarkable of them all — completes the list of expeditions which issued, directly or indirectly, from Florida. Hernando de Soto, who with “nothing more than blade and

¹ “The Narrative of Cabeza de Vaca,” p. 98.

² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 120.

⁵ Cf. *ante*, p. 516.

buckler"¹ had already won distinction in the conquest of Peru, returned early to Spain a comparatively rich man, and in 1537 was formally authorized by the Emperor to conquer, pacify, and people the region now comprised in the southeastern quarter of the United States. In April, 1538, he left Seville with a gallant company of 600 men, which included a number of Portuguese. Eight weeks afterwards he reached Cuba, where he remained for nearly a year, collecting material for his adventure. In the spring of 1539 he set sail for Florida, and landed at Tampa Bay on May 30. Shortly after his arrival there, he had a piece of good luck, reminiscent of the encounter of Cortés with Jerónimo de Aguilar more than twenty years before. A survivor of Narvaez's unfortunate expedition, a Sevillian by the name of Juan Ortiz, who had lived in misery among the Indians for over eleven years, was picked up by some scouts who had been sent out to seek for him, and proved invaluable as a guide and interpreter during the ensuing months.²

For some time the expedition busied itself with local explorations in West Florida; it passed the first winter near Appalachee Bay.³ In March, 1540, de Soto broke camp and started off in a northeasterly direction across what is now the state of Georgia. In late April he was on the Savannah, not far from the site of the present city of Augusta; thence he turned northwest and followed up the river almost as far as the southern boundary of North Carolina. No gold or other riches had thus far been found; but the dauntless leader, though he saw that it was imperative to get back to within

¹ "Narrative of the Gentleman of Elvas," ed. T. H. Lewis in *Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States*, p. 135. Very clear statements concerning this and the other sources on the expedition are to be found in Channing, *History of the United States*, i, pp. 87-88, and in *Encyclopædia Britannica*, xxv, p. 436.

² "Narrative of the Gentleman of Elvas," pp. 149 ff.; Lowery, *op. cit.*, pp. 220 ff. Apparently the Spaniards on landing had been apprised by the Indians of the existence of Ortiz.

³ For details, cf. Lowery, *op. cit.*, pp. 220 ff., and references there.

reach of the coast, resolved at least to return by a different route. Striking off, accordingly, towards the southwest, he reached, in mid-October, the head of Mobile Bay. There he fought the bloodiest of his various encounters with the Indians; 2500 is the lowest of the contemporary estimates of the natives that were slain, while of the Christians "there fell eighteen . . . and of the living, one hundred and fifty Christians had received seven hundred wounds from the arrow, and God was pleased that they should be healed in little time of very dangerous injuries."¹ Not yet, however, could de Soto bring himself to turn back, or even to send "news of himself, until he should have discovered a rich country";² so, after a month's rest, he started off once more to the northwest, until, on May 8, 1541, he struck the Mississippi, to the south of the present city of Memphis. Barges were built and a crossing effected, and during the ensuing summer the expedition roamed over the eastern part of Arkansas. A few hundred miles to the northwest, Coronado and his thirty horsemen were simultaneously seeking Quivira. Indeed, an Indian woman who had escaped from one of Coronado's companions fell into the hands of de Soto's men nine days later, "and told them that she had run away from other men like them . . . and gave them the names of some captains."³

The end, however, was near at hand. In the spring of 1542 de Soto started down the Mississippi; not, indeed, with the idea of going home, but rather of reaching a point whence he could communicate with Cuba in the hope of obtaining reinforcements. But the strain and the sufferings which he had endured for the past three years had at last begun to break down his health. Fever overtook him, and on May

¹ "Narrative of the Gentleman of Elvas," p. 193.

² *Ibid.*, p. 194.

³ Castafieda, in Winship, p. 510.

21 he died, and his body was sunk in the waters of the 'Great River.' After vainly seeking to get to Mexico overland, the survivors built boats, floated down to the mouth of the Mississippi, and then coasted along to the southwest, until, on September 10, 1543, 311 members of the original company finally succeeded in reaching Panuco. From the point of view of the seeker for gold and precious stones, the expedition had been absolutely sterile, and de Soto, whose notions on the subject of treasure-hunting had been formed in the school of Pizarro and his companions, was utterly discouraged when he died. From the humanitarian standpoint, moreover, the entire expedition had been nothing short of atrocious. Oviedo describes de Soto himself as "very fond of the sport of killing Indians,"¹ and there are numerous passages in the contemporary accounts recording acts of cold-blooded cruelty unsurpassed in all the annals of Spain in the New World.² Yet one cannot forbear to pay tribute to the indomitable will and magnificent courage which led the Spaniards to persist in their undertaking in the face of all the hardships and perils they were called upon to endure. Their venture has rightly been designated as "the most remarkable exploring expedition in the history of North America";³ for endurance and heroism, it is in some respects unique; and the chief share of the glory belongs to its gallant leader, who chose death in preference to returning unsuccessful.

In order to complete our survey of the process of discovery and acquisition of the various territories that were ultimately to compose the viceroyalty of New Spain, it remains for us

¹ "Muy dado á essa monteria de matar indios." *Historia General*, lib. xvii, cap. xxiii.

² As, e.g., are recorded in the "Nar-

rative of the Gentleman of Elvas," pp. 160 ff.

³ Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 168.

to examine the history of the early attempts to settle and colonize the northern part of South America — the region now comprised in the republic of Venezuela.

The chief attraction of this territory was the opportunities it offered for slave-hunting. The natives were easier to capture than the better organized and more warlike tribes of North America; moreover, being accustomed to a tropical climate, they fared far better and could do more work when transported to the islands. A subsidiary inducement was the pearl fishing, whose centre was the island of Cubagua, just off the Venezuelan coast; down to about 1535, when the oyster beds began to get exhausted, it was one of the most important scenes of Spanish activity in the New World. Many of the slaves that were captured on the mainland were used in the fisheries, and Las Casas assures us that the tyranny which the Spaniards exercised over them in this occupation was "one of the cruellest things that is in the world," and that "there is no hell in this life, nor other desperate state in this world, that may be compared unto it."¹

The eastern part of the region in question, namely, from Cape Maracapana² around to the Gulf of Paria, was, during the first half of the Emperor's reign, alternately the scene of the most brutal kind of slave hunting, and of misguided

¹ Las Casas, *Brevissima Relacion de la Destruycion de las Indias*, cited in *Purchas his Pilgrimes* (1906), xviii, pp. 134-135.

² This cape is mentioned in all the contemporary documents and chronicles, and in the modern books, but it does not appear on any map that I have been able to find. The name "Maracapana" was used to identify an Indian pueblo (*D. I. I.*, i, p. 423); a province (*ibid.*, p. 424); and a stretch of coast, the Costa Maracapana — on the northern shore of the Promontorio de Paria, which forms the northern side of the Gulf of Paria (cf. *Mapa de las Costas de Tierra Firme*, in A. Codazzi's *Atlas*

Físico y Político de Venezuela, Caracas 1840); but none of these has anything to do with the Cabo de Maracapana. In Oviedo y Baños's *Historia de Venezuela* (ii, pp. 50, 225), however, Maracapana is described as "un puerto muy bueno y seguro, y el mejor que hay en toda la costa," and as "una sabana alta al pie de la serranía inmediata á la ciudad" (de Caracas); all of which looks like La Guayra and Cabo Blanco. This seems, at least, by far the most probable identification of the cape for which we are seeking, especially as its position corresponds, reasonably well, to that indicated in the documents.

and unlucky efforts on the part of the Dominican monks to protect the natives from the ravages of their countrymen. It seemed to be the fate of the Dominicans to be punished for the very outrages they had gone forth to prevent; for the Indians did not distinguish between the different types of Spaniards, or the different objects by which they were animated, and not seldom destroyed monasteries under the impression that they were capturing forts. The great names of the story are those of the 'Apostle' Las Casas, whose schemes for the founding of a model colony at Cumana were shattered almost before they had got started;¹ the ferocious Gonzalo de Ocampo, whose slave hunts counteracted all the efforts of the monks; Antonio de Sedeño, who tried, without much success, to occupy Trinidad in 1530;¹ and Diego de Ordaz, who attempted, also fruitlessly, to explore the Orinoco in the immediately succeeding years. Over and above the fundamental differences between the Dominicans and the conquistadores about the treatment of the natives and the development of the territory, there were even more than the usual number of petty complaints and recriminations between the individual adventurers before the audiencia at Santo Domingo, with the net result that by 1540 the greater part of the region was virtually abandoned as unprofitable, and no further attempt was made to develop it during the Emperor's reign.²

Somewhat different was the fate of the regions farther westward — the territory between Cape Maracapaná and

¹ *D. I. I.*, vii, pp. 65 ff., 89 ff.; Fabié, "Vida de las Casas," in *D. I. E.*, lxx, pp. 83-123; P. Aguado, *Historia de Venezuela*, i, pp. 435 ff.; MacNutt, *Bartholomew de las Casas*, pp. 150 ff.; Lea, "The Indian Policy of Spain," in *Yale Review*, viii, pp. 138 ff.; Moses, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 32 ff., and references there.

² On all this cf. Oviedo y Baños, *Historia de la Conquista de Venezuela*,

i, pp. 93 ff., 381 ff.; ii, pp. 225, 273, 302, 369-370; and A. Rojas, *Estudios Históricos: Orígenes Venezolanos* (Caracas, 1891), *passim*. There are a number of transcripts from the manuscripts at Simancas on Sedeño in the New York Public Library ms. volumes entitled "Indias, Relaciones Varias," and "Papeles Varios, Guatemala," etc.

Lake Maracaibo. For more than a quarter of a century after Ojeda's first visit to these shores, they were left virtually alone by the Spaniards, save for occasional raids by slave hunters and pirates.¹ It was to put an end to these depredations, and to answer the various complaints which were constantly pouring in about the scandalous treatment of the natives of these parts, that the audiencia of Santo Domingo, in the year 1527, sent thither Juan de Ampues, who had already won an enviable reputation by the kindness of his dealings with the Indians in the islands. The chief results of the mission of Ampues were the founding of the city of Santa Ana de Coro, in the northwestern part of the region that had been assigned to him, and the initiation of a policy of friendly relations with the natives, which promised to produce the most gratifying results. But Ampues had scarcely got started on his colonization scheme when he was ordered to give way to settlers of a very different sort, sent thither under the auspices of a famous German banking house.²

The older historians are almost unanimous in stating that the grant by the Emperor of the region of Western Venezuela to the Welser Company was made as a security for pecuniary indebtedness.³ More recently it has been urged that this was not the case, but that the whole affair was merely one — the most conspicuous and dramatic — of a large series of money-making enterprises in the New World, on which the great house of Welser, with the imperial approval, had already embarked, before ever it was established on the Venezuelan shores.⁴ Making due allowance for the intensity

¹ J. Humbert, *Les Origines Vénézuéliennes*, p. 31.

² Aguado, *Historia de Venezuela*, i, pp. 11-23; Moses, *op. cit.*, i, p. 58, and references there.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 59, note 1.

⁴ K. Häbler was the first modern historian to take up scientifically the history of the Welsers in the New World. The results of his earlier researches on the subject ("Eine deutsche Kolonie in Venezuela," in Räumers

of German colonial enthusiasm at the time that this theory was first put forth, and the obvious desire of its chief proponent to find historical precedents for his country's expansion, there is much to be said for the view that he advances. Charles realized that the Spaniards were rather conquerors than colonizers; he also knew something of the economic efficiency of the great German banking houses. If the Indies were to be made to yield the highest possible profit, it would be necessary to supplement the efforts of the conquistadores with those of settlers who would utilize and develop the new territories to the best advantage. The Welsers had had a business agent in Santo Domingo since 1525;¹ when Charles learned how badly things were going on the northern coasts of South America — from the point of view both of the humanitarian and of the economist — it was natural enough that he should turn to them for help.

It is unnecessary to enlarge upon a story which has recently been told with such a wealth of detail. The Welser occupation began with a series of *capitulaciones y asientos* issued by the Emperor in the year 1528;² the first party of settlers reached Coro in February, 1529; some months later they succeeded in ousting Ampues.³ For the next sixteen years the Welsers remained in full possession; but their administration gave rise to such universal dissatisfaction

Historisches Taschenbuch, Leipzig, 1890; in the *Beilage zur allgemeinen Zeitung* of Munich, nos. 285, 286 for 1894, and nos. 235, 236 for 1898; and in the *Zeitschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* for 1899) are for the most part incorporated in his *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser*, which was published at Leipzig in the autumn of 1903. Two works by Jules Humbert, which cover much of the same ground, came out in 1905 — *Les origines Vénézuéliennes*, and *L'occupation Allemande du Vénézuéla au XVI^e siècle* — and both contain impressive bibliographies; both

make use of Häbler's earlier researches, but neither makes any mention of his final work — *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen*; and it is somewhat difficult to account for this apparent lapse in an otherwise careful work. Professor Moses has made good use of all these books and other works in his *Spanish Dependencies in South America*, i, pp. 57–79.

¹ Häbler, *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen*, pp. 48 ff.

² *D. I. I.*, xxii, pp. 251 ff.; Häbler, *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen*, pp. 52 ff.

³ Aguado, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 38 ff.

that it was evident that sooner or later they would be obliged to withdraw. They treated the Indians even more abominably than had the Spaniards before them. Never had the good intentions of the home government in respect to the natives been more shamefully disregarded. The region around Coro was virtually depopulated, and Coro itself was converted into a great slave market. The Welsers were also constantly in trouble with the audiencia of Santo Domingo, whose efforts to exert authority over them they regarded in the light of an unwarrantable infringement of their patent. The home government was inundated with charges and counter-charges. The only bright spot in the picture is the achievements of the Welsers in exploring the valley of the Orinoco and the regions farther westward; for they penetrated into territory which has not even today been thoroughly opened up.¹ The chief hero of these explorations — indeed, the most interesting figure in the whole Welser episode — was a hard-hitting Swabian, named Nikolaus Federmann.² In the year 1530 he led an expedition into the back country, whose itinerary it has never been possible definitely to trace. In the autumn of 1536 he started out on an even more remarkable adventure farther westward, which finally brought him to the high plateau of Bogotá, to meet there with Quesada and Sebastian de Belalcázar.³ But these achievements were of slight consequence when weighed against the miseries of the colony as a whole. In 1546 the Welsers' grant was formally rescinded, and after ten years

¹ Häbler, *op. cit.*, p. vi.

² I am unable to concur in the very favorable estimate of this man in R. B. Cunninghame Graham's *Conquest of New Granada*, pp. 175-179, 187. Federmann's German biographer (*Allgemeine Deutsche Biographie*, v, p. 598) says of him that "Eigenmächtigkeit, Eigennutz, und Grausamkeit machten ihn verhasst."

³ *Infra*, p. 583; also Häbler, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-277; Moses, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 63, 69, and references there. A French translation of Federmann's own account of his first expedition and return to Spain may be found in Ternaux-Compans, *Voyages, Relations, et Mémoires . . . de l'Amérique*, i, pp. 15-222.

more of complicated litigation, through which the Germans sought to reassert their title, the judgment against them was confirmed by the Council of the Indies, and their last claim to Venezuela was thus finally and definitely abrogated.¹

Such in brief outline is the story of the discovery, conquest, and settlement of the territories which came to be known as the viceroyalty of New Spain. It certainly seems at this distance to have been a most heterogeneous and ill-assorted agglomeration; all the worst and most characteristic faults of Spanish political administration in the Old World seem to have been reproduced, if not accentuated, in the New. Yet if one looks at the situation from a contemporaneous point of view, one will not be at a loss to find a reason, at least, if not a justification, for the gathering together under a single viceroy of such different and scattered lands. That reason is that all these separate regions had been discovered and colonized by expeditions sent out from the islands of the West Indies. They were linked together, from the earliest days, by the fact that they all recognized, in theory, at least, the supremacy, under the crown, of the authority of the *audiencia* of Santo Domingo; and when, with the establishment of the viceroyalty in 1535, the seat of that authority was transferred to Mexico, the link had become so strongly forged that it seemed undesirable to try to break it. New Spain, in other words, was distinctly Atlantic in its connotation and traditions; while the region of New Castile, to which we turn in the succeeding chapter, was equally essentially bound up with the Pacific.

¹ Häbler, *op. cit.*, cap. xvii.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

See note at the end of Chapter XVII, and add :

Bibliographical. — In addition to the standard critical accounts of the principal contemporary authorities on the discovery and early settlement of Spanish America, such as H. Harrisse, *Bibliotheca Americana Vetustissima*, J. T. Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Americana*, and others cited in Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 320, mention should be made of H. R. Wagner, *The Spanish Southwest, 1542-1794* (Berkeley, 1924). This book is an elaborate account, profusely illustrated, of the different editions of the works of the various writers, within the chronological limits set, on "those parts of the United States which formerly formed part of the province of New Spain." The author's historical knowledge is less impressive than his bibliographical information; but he has left no stone unturned to render his work complete, and deserves the hearty thanks of all laborers in this vineyard.

Sources and Contemporary Authorities. — In addition to the standard collections and chroniclers like the *Documentos Inéditos de Indias* (*Chronological Digest* by B. M. Read, convenient though very inaccurate), Navarrete, Herrera, Oviedo, Las Casas, and the like, there are, for Cortés and the conquest of Mexico, *Letters of Cortes to the Emperor Charles V.*, most recently published, in translation, by F. A. MacNutt (New York, 1908, 2 vols.), with a bibliographical note (i, pp. 101-119) on the earlier editions; *The Conquest of New Spain* by Bernal Díaz del Castillo (best and most recent edition, in English, by A. P. Maudslay, Hakluyt Society, London, 1908-16, 5 vols., with copious notes, maps, plans, and bibliographical information), which is indispensable (on Bernal Díaz, cf. the biography by R. B. Cunningham-Graham, London, 1915); the "Relación" of Andrés de Tápia; the so-called "Conquistador Anónimo" (annotated English translation edited by M. H. Saville for the Cortes Society, New York, 1917); the "Itinerario de Grijalva" and sundry other accounts, all published by J. García Icazbalceta in the *Coleccion de Documentos para la Historia de México* (Mexico, 1858-66, 2 vols.); also an anonymous *Provinciae sive Regiones in India Occidentali noviter reperta in Ultima Navigatione* (Valladolid, 1520), dealing with the conquest of Yucatan (14 small pages, very rare; copies in the New York Public Library, and in the John Carter Brown Library at Providence; cf. Harrisse, *Bibliotheca Americana Vetustissima*, no. 101, where, however, it is incorrectly described as "an account of the conquest of Cuba by Diego Velasquez"); and finally the *Segunda Parte de la Crónica*

General de las Indias or *Conquista de Mexico*, by Francisco López de Gómara, most recently published in *B. A. E.*, xxii (Madrid, 1852); this last work has a special value for Cortés, because of the fact that Gómara afterwards became his chaplain and apologist, and doubtless had many opportunities to hear the story from the Conqueror's own lips; his statements, for the same reason, however, should be accepted with caution, for they are naturally not unbiassed. A collection of *Documentos Inéditos del Siglo XVI para la Historia de Mexico*, edited by Mariano Cuevas (Mexico, 1914); the *Actas de Cabildo de la Ciudad de Mexico*, libros 1-27, 30-35, 38-53, and one unnumbered part (1524-1630, 1635-93, 1698-1724; the books covering the missing years have been burned or lost), ed. I. Bejarano (Mexico, 1889-1916); and H. R. Wagner's "California Voyages," in *California Historical Society Quarterly*, iii (1924), pp. 307-397, add much to the knowledge available when Prescott wrote.

Extracts from the contemporary *Relaciones* of the principal explorations along the coast and within the present limits of the United States have been published in translation in the two volumes of the series of *Original Narratives of Early American History*, ed. J. F. Jameson, entitled respectively *Spanish Explorers in the Southern United States, 1528-1543*, and *Spanish Exploration in the Southwest, 1542-1706*, with introductions describing the previous editions. *The Coronado Expedition* (Washington, 1896) is the title of an exhaustive study by G. P. Winship, in which a number of minor contemporary narratives have been brought together with that of Castañeda. For Central America, *D. I. I.*, xii, xiv, and xl, and Navarrete, *Viajes*, iii, will be found useful; and M. M. Peralta, *Costa Rica, Nicaragua y Panama en el Siglo XVI* (Madrid and Paris, 1883), contains important documents. For Venezuela, *D. I. I.*, vii, xxii; Ternaux-Compans, *Voyages*, i; Las Casas, *Historia de las Indias*; and Fray P. Aguado, *Historia de Venezuela*, ed. J. Bécker (Madrid, 1918, 2 vols.), are the most valuable.

Modern Works. — Of these W. H. Prescott's *History of the Conquest of Mexico* (New York, 1843, 3 vols.) is still the best book on subject with which it deals. It is not usually ranked quite so high as *Ferdinand and Isabella* or the *Conquest of Peru*, but it has all the great qualities which have rendered the author famous; and its estimates of the older authorities are particularly valuable. Much new material has become available since Prescott wrote, and most of it may be found in vol. iv of M. Orozco y Berra, *Historia Antigua de la Conquista de Mexico* (Mexico, 1880); in N. de Zamacois, *Historia de Méjico* (Barcelona and Mexico, 1878-88, 18 vols.), vols. i-v, *passim*;

in Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History of America*, ii, pp. 349-472 (particularly valuable for its bibliographical data); in F. A. MacNutt's convenient but not very scholarly *Fernando Cortes and the Conquest of Mexico* (New York and London, 1909); and in other works cited in the Hakluyt Society's edition of Bernal Díaz del Castillo (cf. above, p. 538), pp. 312-368. T. A. Joyce, *Mexican Archaeology* (London, 1914), and H. J. Spinden, *Ancient Civilizations of Mexico and Central America* (New York, 1917), summarize adequately the recent discoveries of the ethnologists.

On the other explorations and settlements, Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, ii, may still be consulted with profit. The many ponderous tomes (*History of Mexico*, *History of Central America*, *History of Arizona and New Mexico*, *History of California*, etc., etc.) which appeared between 1883 and 1890, under the name of H. H. Bancroft, are admirable summaries of standard originals, and give details that are nowhere else available; it should not, however, be forgotten that the name H. H. Bancroft represents rather a syndicate of employed investigators and writers than an individual, and that the value of the different portions of the work is consequently very uneven. The names of the more special monographs that I have utilized appear in the footnotes. Those that I have found most valuable are E. G. Bourne, *Spain in America* (New York, 1904); W. Lowery, *The Spanish Settlements within the present Limits of the United States, 1513-1561* (New York and London, 1901); C. E. Chapman, *History of California* (New York, 1921); J. Milla, *Historia de la América Central*, vols. i and ii (Guatemala, 1879-82); T. Ayon, *Historia de Nicaragua* (obra escrita por disposición del Presidente Joaquin Zavala, Granada, 1882); José de Oviedo y Baños, *Historia de la Conquista y Población de la Provincia de Venezuela* (Madrid, 1885, 2 vols., in C. Fernández Duro's *Biblioteca de los Americanistas*); and K. Häbler, *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen der Welser* (Leipzig, 1903).

CHAPTER XXIX

THE CONQUEST OF NEW CASTILE

THE founder of Spanish power in South America was a far less attractive personality than the Conqueror of Mexico. His name was Francisco Pizarro, and he was born sometime in the eighth decade of the fifteenth century in the city of Truxillo in Estremadura, the illegitimate son of a colonel of infantry who later served in Italy in the armies of the Great Captain. It is said that he was abandoned by his parents shortly after his birth, and was left at the door of the church at Truxillo, where he was suckled by a sow. He certainly had neither education nor upbringing. He drifted for a time into the occupation of swineherd ; but finding little to attract him in such a sedentary pursuit, he resolved to try his fortune in the New World. There is apparently no record of the time and occasion of his crossing the Atlantic : but we know that he accompanied the expedition of Ojeda for the settlement of New Andalusia in 1509 ; that he crossed the Isthmus of Panama with Balboa in 1513 ; and that he subsequently shifted his allegiance to Pedrarias. These incidents of his early career give an indication of his character. The key to it was insatiable ambition and lust for gold, and willingness to sacrifice everything thereto. He was restrained by no fear or scruple. Religious enthusiasm, which for Cortés was a beacon light, was for Pizarro little more than a means to an end. He was, in fact, a gambler for the highest stakes. Having risen from nothing, he had nothing to lose ; and as each succeeding venture left him better

off than when he entered upon it, he gradually acquired a confidence in his destiny which rendered him invincible at the crisis of his career, but was also a potent cause of his tragic and unhonored end.¹

Balboa's discovery of the Pacific in 1513, together with the general ill-success of the various efforts to develop the Atlantic coasts in the neighborhood of Darien, gave rise to the view that it might be the part of wisdom to transfer the Spanish settlement to the southern side of the isthmus. This idea did not actually bear fruit till the founding of the town of Panama in the year 1519; but before that time a number of expeditions were sent out to explore the Pacific coast, and in these Pizarro played a prominent part. Most of them were directed to the northwest, and yielded no gold: but in 1522 Pascual de Andagoya, sailing southward, returned after a summer voyage with a tale to stir men's blood. On his arrival in the region called Chochama, just south of the Gulf of San Miguel, he was begged by the inhabitants to help them against their enemies of the neighboring district of Birú, who came in canoes to assail them at every full moon. Having obtained reënforcements from Panama, Andagoya set forth with his friends of Chochama, and after a journey of six days reached Birú, attacked its principal stronghold, and received the submission of its chieftains.² There he heard rumors of a still greater power — that of the Incas — farther southward, and he started out in a small vessel to investigate them. But an attack of fever soon compelled him to turn back: and a few weeks later he was once more in Panama, reporting his discoveries to the local authorities. Evidently the affair was well worth following up, though Andagoya himself was too ill to do so; and so Pedrarias

¹ Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 202-207; ii, pp. 189-200, and references there; also P. de Andagoya, *Narrative of the Pro-*

ceedings of Pedrarias Davila, ed. Markham, pp. 4, 42-43.

² On this cf. Andagoya, pp. 40-42.

finally persuaded him to hand over the conduct of the whole matter to Francisco Pizarro, who was eagerly on the watch for just such a chance, and had enlisted the support of two other residents of Panama. The first of these was one Diego de Almagro, a foundling of origin more obscure if possible than Pizarro's, and like him unable to read or write. The second was Hernando de Luque, then a vicar at Panama, who had previously been a schoolmaster in the settlement at Darien.¹

The misfortunes that accompanied the efforts of the three associates would have daunted any but the stoutest hearts. Luque had a hard time in collecting money and supplies. When Pizarro left Panama on November 14, 1524, he had only one ship, carrying about one hundred men; while Almagro, who followed shortly afterwards with another vessel, had the utmost difficulty in finding his partner. Both adventurers encountered bad weather and hostile natives, and suffered heavy losses of men; but they got as far south as the Rio de San Juan, and both succeeded in bringing back gold. When they returned to Panama to refit, it was even harder than before to obtain funds; but the indefatigable Luque finally persuaded a local functionary named Espinosa to advance 20,000 pesos; and a fresh start was made in 1526. This time there were two ships and about 160 men; a few horses also were purchased and brought along. Pizarro was landed with the troops at the southernmost point that had been reached before, one of the wettest and most unhealthy spots on the entire coast; thence one of the vessels was sent still farther south to explore, while Almagro in the other went back to Panama for fresh recruits. When the two ships

¹ Winsor, ii, p. 564, and references there; *D. I. I.*, xxii, pp. 245-247; Zarate, *Historia*, in Barcia, *Historiadores Primitivos*, iii, pp. 1-2; Gómara,

Historia de las Indias, in *B. A. E.*, xxii, pp. 224-225; P. Pizarro, *Relation*,³ ed. P. A. Means, i, pp. 133 ff.; Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 121-125.

returned from their respective missions, they found the followers of Pizarro deeply discouraged. They had made arduous expeditions into the interior to no purpose. They were stricken with swamp fever, and many of them were anxious to return. But the reports of the explorers and the specimens of native gold work which they brought back with them revived the drooping spirits of Pizarro's men. The new recruits whom Almagro had brought from Panama were full of enthusiasm for further adventure. It was accordingly decided to resume the advance southward; and they all coasted along together as far as Atacames¹ in the northern part of the present republic of Ecuador.²

Evidences of a civilization far superior to anything they had yet encountered met the gaze of the explorers as they proceeded on their way. Broad areas were under cultivation; towns of several thousand inhabitants were seen; the natives wore ornaments of gold and precious stones. Here at last was a region well worth conquering; the ambition and avarice of the Spaniards flamed up at what they saw. But conquest would obviously be difficult in the extreme. The natives were numerous, well equipped, and warlike. Clearly the adventurers could do nothing without reinforcements, and a council was called to determine their course. Almagro wished to leave Pizarro with the troops, as he had done before, and himself go back for help to Panama; while Pizarro not unnaturally protested at being constantly assigned the harder and more perilous part. Hot words would have been followed by blows had not the cooler members of the company intervened. The quarrel was temporarily

¹ Or Tacamez, as it was generally spelled in those days, not to be confused with Atacama in Northern Chile.

² F. Xeres, *Narrative*, ed. C. R. Markham in *Reports of the Discovery of*

Peru (Hakluyt Society, 1872), pp. 3 ff.; Herrera, dec. iii, lib. viii, caps. xii-xiii; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 230 ff., and references there.

patched up, but neither of the participants forgave or forgot. Meanwhile Almagro's plan was adopted. Pizarro and his followers were transferred to the little island of Gallo, farther north, where they were comparatively safe from native attacks. Almagro returned to the Isthmus for more men and supplies. There was grumbling among the troops when the decision was announced; and treacherous attempts were made to have the expedition recalled. Indeed, Pizarro found it advisable to send back to Panama the one ship that had been left him by Almagro, on the pretext of having it repaired, but really as a means of getting rid of the more mutinous of his men.¹

The next phase of the story reveals the truly desperate resolution that animated Pizarro. When Almagro got back to Panama he found the authorities prepared to oppose the further prosecution of his schemes. Pedrarias, who had stood behind the three associates in the early days of their partnership, had been superseded by Pedro de los Rios, whose ears had been reached by the complaints of the faint-hearted. Not only did the new governor refuse further support to the enterprise: he promptly despatched to Gallo a certain Cordovan, Pedro Tafur, with two ships, and orders to bring back to Panama every Spaniard on the island. At the moment that these vessels arrived at their destination, Pizarro and his companions were in the depths of despair. Provisions had run out, and nothing save a few shellfish was to be found in Gallo. Their clothing was in rags; they had no adequate shelter; and the island was swept by drenching rains. Under the circumstances the arrival of Tafur seemed like a deliverance from a prison house; but Pizarro was resolved not to withdraw from the enterprise until he

¹ P. R. Naharro, "Relacion," in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 232 ff.; Zarate, in *lib. x*, cap. iii; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 253 ff., and references there.
Barcia, iii, pp. 2 ff.; Herrera, dec. iii,

had given his luck another chance to turn. He was encouraged, moreover, by letters from his associates, urging him to hold fast, and promising to stand by him. There remained the great question of how to deal with his followers. Prayers and remonstrances could effect nothing; if the faint-hearted were resolved to return, it was better to let them go. But there were certain of his men, Pizarro was convinced, who were like-minded with himself. He therefore determined to give them an opportunity to show their mettle by staging a scene which would appeal to their Castilian pride. In the sand of the shore he drew a line with his sword, from east to west, and then addressed his men: "Friends and comrades! on that side are toil, hunger, nakedness, the drenching storm, desertion, and death; on this side, ease and pleasure. There lies Peru with its riches; here, Panama and its poverty. Choose, each man, what best becomes a brave Castilian. For my part, I go to the south." So saying, he stepped across to the southern side of the line; and sixteen others followed after him, one by one. Tafur regarded the whole proceeding as an act of madness. He refused to countenance it in any way, or even to leave one of his ships for the use of the desperate men who had flouted his authority. Only with difficulty was he persuaded to give them a few supplies. But the scene on the sands of Gallo really marked the crisis of Pizarro's fortunes. It committed him to success, because he had renounced the possibility of failure. It was like Cortés's scuttling his ships off the shore of Vera Cruz.¹

¹ P. Pizarro, *loc. cit.*, i, pp. 236-137; Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, p. 234; Xeres, pp. 7-8; F. Montesinos, *Anales*, p. 61; Herrera, dec. iii, lib. x, cap. iii; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 263-264; and Winsor, ii, p. 510, and references there. There is some question as to whether sixteen or

only thirteen crossed the line. Most of the modern authorities prefer the larger figure; on the other hand, it is to be observed that only thirteen were ennobled in the *Capitulacion* of 1529. Cf. Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 494.

The little band needed all its resolution to support it through the trials of the ensuing weeks. With infinite trouble the men constructed a raft, and ferried themselves across to the neighboring island of Gorgona, where they found rabbits and pheasants, and a plentiful supply of excellent water. Day after day they scanned the northern horizon for the arrival of the succors which Pizarro's associates had promised, and after seven months¹ had elapsed their patience was rewarded. Almagro and Luque had been true to their word, and had finally induced the authorities to consent to the sending out of a vessel and supplies, bearing positive instructions to Pizarro to return to Panama within six months and report. Pizarro was bitterly disappointed that the ship had brought him no reinforcements; but at least he was now possessed of the means of further explorations: and the time limit set by the governor for his return was sufficient to permit him to undertake them. The adventurers accordingly made haste to depart from the "Hell" where they had suffered so much. Guided by certain friendly Indians, picked up in the previous explorations, they coasted southward for twenty days, and finally cast anchor in the Gulf of Guayaquil.²

If Pizarro had been gratified by what he had already seen on his previous voyage to Atacames, he was astounded and overjoyed by his experiences in the next few weeks. The natives on the shore were full of wonder and apparently friendly. Some of them came on board, with presents of delicious food. One was induced to remain and dine, and was told the regulation story of why the Spaniards had come — the omnipotence of the Emperor, and the supremacy of the Christian faith. On the two succeeding days the visit

¹ So at least Montesinos, p. 61; but he does not make it clear whether or not this period included the stay at

Gallo. Xeres, p. 9, makes it five months.

² Xeres, pp. 9 ff.; Montesinos, pp. 61 ff.; Herrera, dec. iii, lib. x, cap. iv.

was returned by Spanish cavaliers, who, after impressing their hosts by discharging their arquebuses, were taken to see the marvels of the land. The fruitful fields, the system of irrigation, the marvellous roads, and the great temple of the Sun in the city of Tumbes, with its walls literally tapestried with plates of silver and gold — all were duly noted and reported to Pizarro.¹ Here at last was El Dorado; here was an inexhaustible reservoir of the precious metal which had been the chief magnet to draw the Spaniards to the New World. Further exploration of the coast to the southward — the adventurers reached a point about nine degrees south of the Equator — brought additional confirmation of the riches of the land, and also of the power of the mighty emperor who ruled over it. Pizarro was convinced that he had at last found an opportunity to win wealth and fame more remarkable, even, than that of the Conqueror of Mexico. But it was clear that he could do nothing with the puny forces which he now commanded. He must return and collect a larger armament. The winter of 1527–28 found him back again at Panama.²

Pizarro had good ground for exultation; for he had come in contact with what was in some respects the most remarkable civilization that the Western Hemisphere had yet produced. The empire of the Incas, whose confines he had reached, extended along the Pacific coast, from the River

¹ There can be no doubt that the accounts of Tumbes brought back by Pedro de Candia, the knight who was sent ashore, were grossly exaggerated. A contemporary relation characterizes them as lies (cf. Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 278–279, notes) save for the description of the temple; and moreover the Tumbes of today shows no vestiges whatever of extensive buildings except a small citadel mound. But, after all, the

literal truth was not nearly so significant for the fate of the expedition as what Pizarro and his companions were led to believe.

² Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 234–236; Zarate, in *Barcia*, iii, pp. 3 ff.; Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios Reales*, parte ii, lib. i, caps. xi–xiii (vol. iii, pp. 145 ff., of H. H. Urteaga's edition, Lima, 1919); Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 275 ff., and references there.

Ancasmayu on the north to the River Maule on the south ; it included the present republics of Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia, northern Chile, and northwestern Argentina. The story of its origin is exceedingly obscure, particularly in the matter of chronology ; but it apparently centres around a hill with caves in it, called Tampu-Tocco or the Tavern of Windows ; from these caves issued certain people led by four brothers, claiming descent from the Sun ; of these, the eldest, Manco, founded the town of Cuzco and gained the leadership over the adjacent tribes. There followed a period of uncertain duration, empty on the whole of decisive events, but with the accession of the Inca Rocca,¹ who flourished in the early part of the fourteenth century, we emerge upon firmer ground. From that time expansion was more rapid. The capital at Cuzco was enlarged and improved. Wars of conquest were undertaken and carried out, first to the south, west, and east, finally to the north in the region of Ecuador ; that last territory, in fact, had been brought under the Inca rule only a few years before the arrival of the Spaniards. Huayna Capac, under whose reign this achievement had taken place, lived to learn of the first expedition of Pizarro and Almagro, and was apparently convinced that it boded ill for his dynasty. On his deathbed, in defiance of the established usage of the Incas, he divided the Empire, leaving the older provinces to the southward to his eldest son, Huascar, the child of his sister and lawful wife ; while the recent conquests to the north were assigned to Atahualpa, the progeny of a concubine said to be descended from the rulers of Quito. On the eve of the Spanish conquest, the two half-brothers had quarrelled. Finally Atahualpa marched on Cuzco, con-

¹ Montesinos confuses this man — the fifth really historic Inca — with Sinchi Rocca, who was the first. Cf.

Montesinos, *Memorias Antiguas del Peru*, ed. P. A. Means (London, 1920); p. 92, note.

quered and imprisoned Huascar, and possessed himself of the entire inheritance.¹

The government of this mighty empire was, in theory at least, an absolute despotism. Legislation, administration, religion, all took their source from the Inca himself, who, as representative and descendant of the Sun, could claim and receive universal obedience. His chief official residence was in one or another of the great palaces which the successive Incas built in Cuzco, and which were composed of massive stone blocks, accurately fitted together without cement. He lived in divine state; he wore a special and distinctive garb, and the elaborate ritual regulating the conduct of those who came into his presence served to place him immeasurably above the mass of his subjects. His wife, at least in the later period of the Inca Empire, was invariably selected from among his own sisters, in order that the purity of the race of the descendants of the Sun might be preserved. He alone had the right to declare war, which he generally exercised on the plea of advancing the worship of the Sun; for the Incas had little to learn from sixteenth-century Europe in the matter of making religion a pretext for conquest. An elaborate system of messengers and itinerant officials kept him closely in touch with every part of his Empire. The census was taken with exactness and regularity; taxation (always in kind, for money was unknown to the Peruvians) was imposed in strict accordance with it; and accurate

¹ Much of this and the succeeding paragraphs still remains in the region of controversy. The chief authorities are Garcilaso de la Vega's *Commentarios Reales*; P. Sarmiento de Gamboa, *History of the Incas* (ed. C. R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society, 1907); and F. Montesinos, *Memorias Antiguas del Peru* (ed. P. A. Means for the Hakluyt Society, 1920). As T. A. Joyce (*South American Archaeology*, p. 77) rightly

says, much depends on "the degree of authenticity which we assign to the writings of Montesinos." Joyce's book contains an excellent summary of the state of our knowledge of the subject in 1912; the introduction and notes to Means's Montesinos carry the story somewhat further. Prescott's account (*C. P.*, book i) is by no means entirely out of date.

records of both were preserved by a complicated arrangement of *quipus* or knotted strings — one of the most serviceable possible substitutes for writing. When a community was believed to be dangerously near revolt, it was leavened by the compulsory importation of colonists of whose loyalty there could be no fear. If a region threatened to become overcrowded, it was relieved by the transportation of a part of its inhabitants to territories whose resources had not been developed. An even distribution of the population and an even rate of economic progress were the ideal. No one was to be overworked; no one permitted to remain idle. Probably never in the world has a communistic experiment, on a large scale, attained a greater measure of success, and it is reasonably certain that it never will again. For there obtained in the Inca Empire three conditions which seem essential concomitants of any socialistic system, and which it now seems impossible ever to reproduce. These are (1) an absolute despotism; (2) a very uniform level of knowledge and culture (save for the Amauta, or men of learning, whose attainments were placed exclusively at the disposal of the government); and (3) no foreign relations. The resemblances to the state of affairs portrayed in Sir Thomas More's *Utopia* (1516) are in some respects very striking.

The conditions of life, and the occupations and achievements of these early Peruvians, reveal a state of affairs far happier and more serene than existed in the grim empire of the Mexican Aztecs. Their Sun worship was never disfigured by such revolting slaughters as drenched the teocalli of Huitzilopochtli with blood. Human sacrifices there probably were — the inheritance of an earlier civilization — though the Incas did their best to suppress them; but it is certain they were limited to occasions of the highest importance, and that the methods of execution were comparatively

humane.¹ The elaborate ceremonies that accompanied burials reveal an unshaken belief in a life after death. The Peruvian love songs and hymns to the Sun, and most of all their dramatic poems, handed down by prodigious feats of memory from generation to generation, attest the existence of a literature among a people who knew no writing.² They had taught themselves something of surveying and astronomy, and had evolved and reformed a very accurate calendar. Their architecture, characterized by "simplicity, symmetry, and solidity,"³ has stood the test of time in a region frequently visited by earthquakes, even better, on the whole, than that of the Spaniards who conquered them. Their roads, their aqueducts, their suspension bridges of osier rope, spanning chasms two hundred feet broad, with roaring torrents beneath, excited the liveliest admiration of Pizarro and his men.⁴ Their sense of beauty is attested by their notable achievements in the textile arts, by their pottery, their stone carving, and the ornaments they made out of silver and gold. But the greatest of all their accomplishments was their knowledge of agriculture; they "surpassed every other American race in their dominion over the earth."⁵ The land was by no means universally favorable to husbandry. The bottoms of the higher valleys were fertile indeed; but the slopes were too steep to be cultivated without terracing; water was unevenly distributed and had often to be brought from afar; and the soil needed to be enriched from the guano deposits on the coast. Over all these natural difficulties

¹ Joyce, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-163.

² The Quechua drama, *Ollanta*, has been called "the most important literary work that has been composed in any language indigenous to America." Controversy has raged hotly over the question whether or not it was composed before the Spanish conquest; but it now seems clear that it was subsequent

thereto, and "that the author was acquainted with the Spanish drama and imitated it." Cf. E. C. Hills, "The Quechua Drama, *Ollanta*," in *The Romanic Review*, v, 2, April-June, 1914.

³ Humboldt, cited in Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 158.

⁴ Xeres, p. 77.

⁵ Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 130.

the Peruvians, aided and directed by the benevolent despotism of the Incas, gained decisive triumphs. The Spaniards, who knew something of the hard lot of the farmer in such arid lands as the plains of Old Castile, were tremendously impressed by what they saw.

The Peruvian army, with which the Spaniards were so soon to come into contact, was considerably less formidable than that of the Aztecs. Its organization and discipline were admirable; and it was plentifully supplied from a series of large magazines, scattered over the country at strategic points. But it was not possessed of that desperate zeal for slaughter and combat which animated the Mexican hosts. It had no 'religion of war'; and seemed desirous of accomplishing its ends with as little misery and inconvenience as possible to both its enemies and itself. Occasionally the Peruvian soldier could be ferocious, when his wrath was provoked by the senseless resistance of a beaten foe, and some of the Incas displayed lust for conquest; but the Peruvians were not primarily a fighting people, in the sense in which that term can be applied to the Mexicans. Their arms and equipment were generally similar to those of the other native tribes of the Western Hemisphere, who knew neither iron nor gunpowder. They consisted of bows and arrows, slings, swords, battle axes, and spears and darts tipped with copper or bone; and, for defence, of quilted tunics and shields.

When Pizarro got back to Panama to report, he found the authorities as unwilling as ever to furnish him with the means of following up his great discoveries. The tale he had to tell was marvellous enough, and he had brought back some llamas and a few specimens of Inca art to corroborate it; but the governor had been too much irritated at the

flouting of his authority to consent to give support to the enterprise on which the adventurer had set his heart. Under the circumstances there was no alternative but to apply to the Castilian crown; and to Spain accordingly Pizarro betook himself, in the early months of 1528. It was characteristic of the ups and downs of his checkered career that on arrival at Seville he was straightway cast into prison at the complaint of the lawyer Enciso,¹ on the ground of an ancient debt; but he was soon rescued from this disagreeable predicament by an order from the Emperor, who had heard rumors of his achievements, and sent for him to come to Toledo to tell his tale. His manner of recounting it was simple and impressive, and the llamas and the golden Inca ornaments aroused the keenest interest. Before the Emperor departed for Aragon (March 8, 1529) he commended Pizarro to the friendly consideration of the Council of the Indies.²

It was not until July 26, 1529, at Toledo, when Charles was about to leave Barcelona for Italy, that the *capitulacion*, for which the adventurer had so ardently longed, was finally executed;³ the Empress Isabella signed it in the place of her absent spouse. It granted to Pizarro and his two associates a stretch of two hundred leagues along the coast of the Pacific, southward from the neighborhood of the Gulf of Guayaquil,⁴ to settle and conquer. The name of New Castile does not appear in the instrument, but it seems to

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 214-216. Two years later Enciso published at Seville his famous *Suma de Geografia de todas las Partidas y Provincias del Mundo*, which he wrote for the instruction of the Emperor.

² Herrera, dec. iv, lib. iii, cap. i; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 301-302.

³ It is printed (under the wrong date) in *D. I. I.*, xxii, pp. 271 ff., and in Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 490 ff.

⁴ The document (Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 491) says "desde el pueblo que en lengua de indios se dice Tenumpuela, e despues le llamásteis Santiago, hasta llegar al pueblo de Chincha"; 'Tenumpuela' is probably the same as the modern Riobamba, northeast of the Gulf of Guayaquil. Cf. P. P. Traversari, *Fundacion de . . . Riobamba* (Quito, 1919).

have been generally applied, from that time forward, to the region in question and the adjacent lands.¹ Pizarro was to have the titles of governor and captain-general of the whole territory, together with those of adelantado and alguacil mayor; he was in fact virtually endowed with viceregal authority, and he was to have an annual salary of 750,000 maravedis. There were the usual inducements to prospective colonists — such as partial and temporary exemption from taxation; and Pizarro was enjoined to see to it that good government was maintained, and that the natives were protected from exploitation and ill usage. His associates, though not forgotten, were less generously treated than he. Almagro was given command of the fortress of Tumbez, with an annual salary of 300,000 maravedis; while Luque was appointed to the bishopric there, and granted the title of 'Protector of the Indians,' with a yearly stipend of 2000 ducats. The uneven distribution of these emoluments excited, when it was reported to him, the jealousy of Almagro, and sufficed to keep alive the ancient grudge which he had cherished against Pizarro since their quarrel of three years before. The measure of Pizarro's responsibility for it is not, however, altogether easy to ascertain.²

Before sailing for America, Pizarro visited his birthplace, where he gathered a number of followers to share his fortunes. Among these were his legitimate half-brother, Hernando, whose arrogance and unscrupulousness exceeded his own; his two brothers, illegitimate like himself, named Gonzalo and Juan; and Francisco Martín de Alcántara, a son of his mother by a different father. His young cousin, Pedro Pizarro, who was subsequently to win fame as a

¹ Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 305.

² "Relacion de los Primeros Descubrimientos," in *D. I. E.*, v, pp. 193-201;

Montesinos, pp. 66-67; P. Pizarro, *loc. cit.*, i, pp. 140-141; Herrera, dec. iv, lib. iii, cap. i.

chronicler, accompanied him as a page; and a fanatical Dominican, Fray Vicente de Valverde, was enlisted as chaplain.¹ On January 19, 1530, he set sail from San Lucar — hurrying off at the last moment with the utmost precipitation, to escape an investigation by the Council of the Indies, which felt that he had failed to fulfil all the obligations imposed on him by the *capitulacion* of the previous year, and attempted to place obstacles in the way of his departure.² At Panama, he found difficulty in enlisting recruits, but at last he mustered a company of about 180 men and twenty-seven horses. With this force — small, indeed, for the conquest of an empire — he set sail in January, 1531,³ on his third and final venture to Peru. Almagro, as on previous occasions, was left to follow with reënforcements.

Heavy weather forced the adventurers to abandon their original project of steering direct for the city of Tumbez, and to land much farther north, at the Bay of San Mateo. An arduous march along the shore ensued, enlivened by the capture of a large booty of gold and emeralds from the fleeing natives of the village of Coaque.⁴ From this point the ships were sent back to Panama to bring on the reënforcements; but before the adventurers reached the Gulf of Guayaquil, they were overtaken by other vessels with recruits and supplies, and the officers appointed by the crown to attend them.⁵ Shortly afterwards they were visited by the chiefs of the inhabitants of the island of Puná, which lies in the centre of the Gulf, just opposite Tumbez. The islanders came over with a large fleet of

¹ Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 236–237.

² Pizarro y Orellana, *Varones Ilustres del Nuevo Mundo* (Madrid, 1639), p. 143.

³ Winsor, ii, p. 514, makes it December 28, but is clearly wrong. Cf. Xeres, p. 12, note 2; Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, p. 238. The New York Public

Library chronicle, fol. 1, puts the date of sailing in February, and gives the numbers as “dozientos y cincuenta hombres los ochenta de cavallo.”

⁴ P. Pizarro, i, pp. 147 ff.; Xeres, pp. 12–13.

⁵ P. Pizarro, pp. 152 ff.

balsas or rafts, and invited the Spaniards to return with them. Despite the warnings of his Indian interpreters, who assured Pizarro that the islanders meditated treachery, the Spanish commander considered the opportunity too good to lose; here seemed to be a place where he could establish his headquarters with perfect safety, in convenient proximity to the territory he hoped to win. The Spaniards accordingly were ferried across. Whatever the original plans of the islanders may have been, a visit to their guests from the Indians of Tumbez was amply sufficient to incite them to arms. Bitter hostility had existed for a long time between the inhabitants of Puná and their neighbors on the shore. Each party told evil tales of the other to the newcomers, until at last Pizarro captured some of the islanders, and handed them over to be massacred by their foes. This outrage was the signal for the outbreak of a devastating war between the Puná Indians and the Spaniards. The latter, of course, were victorious whenever they could induce their enemies to meet them in pitched battle; but night attacks, and sudden forays, they were unable to check.¹ They were consequently much relieved by the arrival of reinforcements under Hernando de Soto, the future discoverer of the Mississippi, together with a fresh supply of horses for the cavalry. With these, Pizarro felt strong enough to set out for the mainland. Leaving Puná, accordingly, with little regret, the Spaniards crossed over to the shores of Tumbez.²

While they were at Puná, and after they had reached the mainland, the Spaniards collected much precious information in regard to the divided state of the Inca Empire.

¹ Xeres, pp. 16-19; Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 239 ff.; Garcilaso de la Vega, part ii, lib. i, cap. xvi.

² Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 330, and refer-

ences there. The New York Public Library chronicle, f. 1, gives the length of the Spaniards' stay at Puná as "quatro o cinco meses."

They learned of the defeat and imprisonment of Huascar ; of the victory of Atahualpa and of the way in which he had determined to utilize it. All this news was exceedingly welcome ; it promised the Spaniards a rare opportunity for the achievement of their objects. Pizarro, accordingly, remained some months in the neighborhood of Tumbez, reconnoitring the country, and waiting for the situation to develop in the interior. To the south of Tumbez, he founded the city of San Miguel, the first European settlement within the limits of the Inca Empire. He also sent out de Soto to obtain intelligence concerning the nearest of the Inca's garrisons among the hills. After an absence of some days de Soto returned, bringing with him an Indian envoy from Atahualpa himself. This emissary, as Pizarro well knew, had been despatched rather to collect information than to bid welcome to the invaders ; but it was the Spanish policy for the time being to preserve, at all costs, the appearance of friendship. The Indian, accordingly, was treated with the utmost courtesy. He was sent back to his master with a few presents of glass and cloth, and a message that the Spaniards would soon visit the Inca at Cajamarca across the mountains, in order to pay their respects to so great a prince.¹

In the autumn of 1532, Pizarro started eastward across the Andes, at the head of a force of 62 horsemen and 102 foot soldiers.² Their upward march was attended with many difficulties and dangers. The tropical heat of the lowlands gave way to a piercing cold ; the luxuriant vegetation to stunted mountain growths ; and the gayly feathered birds of the *tierra caliente* to the lonely condor, circling high

¹ Xeres, pp. 16 ff. ; P. Pizarro, pp. 157 ff. ; Herrera, dec. iv, lib. ix, caps. i, ii ; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 352 ff., and references there.

² At least so Xeres, p. 26 ; the N. Y. P. L. chronicle, f. 1, makes it "ciento y cincuenta, en que yrian quasi sesenta de cavallo."

above the clouds.¹ The path they followed, winding in and out among the cliffs, was so narrow and so steep that the cavalry often had to dismount. Forts were found as they advanced, so placed as to enable the garrisons to overwhelm them, but every one proved to be untenanted; clearly there was no thought of interfering with the Spaniards' march. Embassies from Atahualpa came and went,² but no definite information as to his intentions could be obtained. The Inca apparently was observing a fast in his encampment outside the city of Cajamarca, and could on no account be disturbed, until the season that had been appointed for it had expired. The dread of treachery, never absent from the Spaniards' minds,³ was greatly increased, when, after crossing the range, they began the descent, and saw the fertile valley of Cajamarca spread out before them to the eastward. The ground was dotted with thousands of tents; at night the watchfires blazed forth in such myriads that "it looked like nothing so much as the starriest of skies."⁴ Clearly the Inca had an army of overwhelming strength, ready to do battle; what if he was planning to lure the Spaniards to their destruction, into the heart of his empire and beyond the possibility of retreat?⁵ That fear, though it was probably groundless, is the sole possible excuse — and an utterly inadequate one — for the outrages that were to be perpetrated by the invaders in the ensuing months.

On the afternoon of November 15, 1532, the Spaniards entered the city of Cajamarca. The place was apparently quite deserted; and Pizarro reluctantly consented to send

¹ Xeres, pp. 25 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 383-384.

² Garcilaso de la Vega, part ii, lib. i, caps. xvii-xviii.

³ P. Pizarro, p. 174.

⁴ Xeres, pp. 44 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 390, 401, note 25.

⁵ "Cada uno de los christianos dezia que haria mas que Roldan; porque no esperavamos otro socorro sino el de Dios." N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fol. 3.

his brother Hernando, and de Soto, with five or six horsemen, to the Inca's headquarters a few miles distant to announce the arrival of the Spaniards and learn how the land lay.¹ The envoys found "the tyrant" at the door of his lodging "sitting on a low stool, with many Indians before him and women at his feet, who almost surrounded him;"² but the expression of his face gave no indication of his feelings; his mind seemed to be wholly occupied with the keeping of his fast, and it was only with great difficulty that he was induced even to speak to his guests. Finally, after an exchange of boasts with the envoys as to the respective merits of the Peruvian and Spanish forces, he dismissed his visitors with the assurance that on the morrow, when his fast was ended, he would come himself to Cajamarca to interview the leader of "the Christians."³

When the envoys got back to Pizarro to report, he called a council of his officers, and unfolded to them the plan of action which he had resolved to carry out. It was so plainly reminiscent of Cortés's arrest of Montezuma that there is every probability that it was inspired thereby, for the Conqueror of Mexico and the Conqueror of Peru had had an excellent opportunity for conference and discussion during their sojourn at Toledo in 1528.⁴ The project was nothing less than to seize the Inca in the presence of his own army; and Pizarro justified it on the grounds that thus alone could the possibility of Peruvian treachery be surely anticipated, and the natives terrorized into submission to the Spaniards. The motives of religion were also urged, to salve the consciences of the more scrupulous, and steel their

¹ N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fol. 3.

² Xeres, p. 48.

³ The best account of this episode is to be found in Hernando Pizarro's letter to the audiencia of Santo Domingo; printed, in translation, on pp. 113-127

of the Hakluyt Society's volume entitled *Reports on the Discovery of Peru*. Cf. also P. Pizarro, i, pp. 175 ff.; Xeres, pp. 46 ff.; N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fols. 3-4.

⁴ Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 304-305, 405.

hearts to desperate deeds. Mass was said, and the friars promised eternal salvation to all who should perish in the attempt to advance the faith. On the morrow, November 16, the deed was done. Towards evening the Inca arrived, borne aloft by his attendants in an open litter, adorned with the richest decorations. He was accompanied by some five or six thousand natives, and was permitted to enter and traverse the great square before a single Spaniard made his appearance. At his query, "Where are they?" Fray Vicente presented himself, gave the standard exposition, probably somewhat amplified for the occasion, of the Christian faith, and concluded with the demand that Atahualpa accept it, and acknowledge himself a vassal of the Emperor Charles V. The Inca naturally demurred, and asked the friar to tell him by what authority he spoke. A copy of the Bible was given him by way of reply, but Atahualpa, after looking at it, threw it angrily upon the ground. Scandalized, the friar hurried off to Pizarro. He demanded vengeance for the insult and promised absolution. The signal was given, and the Spaniards, who had lain concealed in the adjacent buildings, poured out into the great square. Overwhelmed by the suddenness of the assault, blinded by the smoke, and stupefied by the discharge of firearms, the Peruvians, incapable of resistance, were butchered where they stood. The estimates of the victims vary between two and ten thousand; but all the accounts agree that the Spaniards escaped with a single wound. That wound was received by Pizarro himself, and from one of his own men. It was inflicted while he was protecting the person of the Inca, whom a Spaniard, despite explicit orders to the contrary, strove vainly to slay as a grand culmination of the bloody work.¹

¹ The principal contemporary accounts of Atahualpa's seizure are printed in Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 497-501; to these may be added Xeres, pp. 52 ff.;

Atahualpa, then, was preserved alive, at least for the time; but he was kept a prisoner of the Spaniards at Cajamarca. His liberty was curtailed as little as was consistent with his security; he was even invited to dinner with Pizarro and taught to amuse himself with cards and with chess.¹ The doctrines of Christianity were frequently expounded to him; and he was visibly impressed by the fact that the new Deity whom he was asked to adore had been able to give the Spaniards a victory against overwhelming odds, while the Sun had been impotent to save him in his hour of need. But he was naturally most anxious to regain his freedom, and as his subjects were too cowed to try to liberate him by force, it occurred to him to appeal to the cupidity of his captors. He had been shrewd enough to detect their overpowering lust for gold, and he finally offered them, as the price of his liberty, a whole roomful of the precious metal—twenty-two feet long, seventeen feet broad, and nine feet high.² To this astounding proposal Pizarro assented, and allowed the Inca two months in which to collect the treasure. But before the process of collection had got fairly under way, Atahualpa gave orders for the perpetration of an act whose ultimate results proved disastrous to himself. Fearing lest his captive brother, Huascar, should take advantage of his own imprisonment to regain his liberty and the scarlet fringe of the Incas, and dreading equally the effects of a scheme of Pizarro's to sit in judgment on their respective claims to the throne, he determined to lose no time in sweeping his rival from his path. By his orders Huascar

N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fol. 4; and Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 242 ff. There are, of course, numerous differences in detail; but not, on the whole, so many as one would expect.

¹ Xeres, pp. 58 ff.; *Life of Alonzo Enriquez de Guzman* (ed. Markham for the Hakluyt Society, 1862), pp. 92-93.

² Xeres, p. 65; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 433-434, and references there. The N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fol. 4, has it "tanto oro como cabria en un apartado que alli estava hasta una raya blanca que alli estava que un hombre alto no allegava a ella con un palmo; y seria de veynte cinco pies en largo, y quinze en ancho."

was accordingly put to death, being drowned — according to the common report — in the river Andamarca.¹

During the early months of 1533 the Inca's ransom began to pour into Cajamarca. It consisted of golden goblets, pitchers, and plates, tiles from the roofs and the walls of the temples, and curious specimens of Inca art. Two Spaniards were despatched to Cuzco to hurry its collection, while Hernando Pizarro was sent off with a small body of horse and foot to the town of Pachacamac on the seacoast, to demolish the local idol and plunder the rich 'mezquita' there.² In the midst of these events Almagro arrived from Panama, with a welcome reënforcement; so overjoyed was Pizarro at their coming that the ancient grudges between the two associates seemed entirely forgotten.³ By the middle of June all the treasure had arrived. It fell somewhat short of the promised amount; but Pizarro professed himself entirely satisfied, and apparently signed a document to that effect. Atahualpa thereupon demanded his freedom. But at that moment the air was filled with rumors of a rising of the natives. How they originated it is impossible to say, but there is no reason to believe that they were based upon fact; it is natural to lay much of the blame on the interpreter Felipillo, who had angered the Inca by his attentions to one of the imperial concubines, and could most easily revenge himself by circulating false reports. Demands were soon heard for the death of Atahualpa, especially among the followers of Almagro, who

¹ At least so say all the Spanish authorities; cf. Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 438, note; Atahualpa denied all knowledge of the act: Xeres, p. 69; N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fol. 7.

² There is no space to go into the details of this interesting episode. Hernando Pizarro's own account of it, in his letter to the audiencia of Santo Domingo, cited above, is probably the

best; cf. also Xeres, pp. 69 ff.; P. Pizarro, i, pp. 206 ff.; and N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fols. 6-7.

³ Xeres, p. 73; P. Pizarro, i, pp. 213 ff.; Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, p. 248. The numbers brought with him by Almagro are not definitely stated in most of the accounts: it does not seem likely that they were more than 100 men.

desired to push onward and get more gold, and regarded the fallen ruler as an encumbrance to their plans. Finally a solemn trial was held, in which the Inca was accused of usurping the throne and murdering Huascar, of seeking to stir up a revolt against the Spaniards, and of adulterous and idolatrous practices at variance with the Christian faith. It is not necessary to enlarge upon the farcical nature of the charges or the false interpretations, by the rancorous Felipillo, of the testimony of the witnesses that were summoned for the defence. It was, as Prescott says, "a question of expediency,"¹ and the Spaniards had determined that it was expedient that Atahualpa should die. He was condemned to be burnt alive in the great square of Cajamarca, on the evening of the very day (August 29, 1533) that the sentence was pronounced. In consideration of the fact that, as the fagots were being piled up around him, he accepted Christianity and consented to receive baptism, he was let off with the milder penalty of death by the garrote. No plea, however, can be offered in extenuation of this judicial murder, which the greatest historian of the Conquest has rightly characterized "as having left a stain, never to be effaced, on the Spanish arms in the New World."²

The character of the rank and file of the men who had accompanied Pizarro was revealed by the unseemly fashion in which they quarrelled over the division of the Inca's ransom. The sum total was reckoned, three-quarters of a century ago, as equivalent to over fifteen million dollars;

¹ Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 482.

² *Ibid.*, i, p. 497; and ii, pp. 504-508. Cf. also Xeres, pp. 99 ff.; P. Sancho, *An Account of the Conquest of Peru* (ed. P. A. Means for the Cortes Society, 1917), pp. 12-19; N. Y. P. L. chronicle, fol. 7; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 25 ff.; Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 249 ff.; Garcilaso de la Vega, part ii, lib. i,

cap. xxxvi. Pizarro and Almagro, who acted as the judges, were really the most guilty, and Pizarro's feigned sorrow after the event deceived no one. The noble Hernando de Soto, who was absent at the time the execution took place, made a vigorous protest when he learned what had been done.

but subsequent calculations have reduced that estimate by more than two-thirds.¹ The royal quinto was duly deducted and sent to Spain under care of Hernando Pizarro;² valuable as his services had been to the expedition, they were equalled or outweighed by his insolence to Almagro, and his brother gladly availed himself of the opportunity to get rid of him. The rest of the treasure was distributed unevenly. Almagro and his men had to be content with a smaller portion, because of the fact that they had faced fewer perils than the rest; and the cavalry in general got more than the infantry. Gambling for high stakes was the natural result of the distribution. Whole fortunes were won and lost, while the prices of every sort of commodity soared to levels hitherto unknown.³ Discipline broke down and Pizarro soon perceived that the sole remedy for the situation was to order a fresh advance. Cuzco, the Inca capital, was clearly the next objective; and thither, in September, the Spaniards directed their march. Pizarro judged it wise, for the time being, to keep up the pretence of maintaining the

¹ Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 467; the *Acta de Reparticion*, there cited, is certified by P. Sancho and is printed in translation on pp. 131-143 of the Hakluyt Society's volume entitled *Reports on the Discovery of Peru* (London, 1872). But cf. also A. Soetbeer, "Edelmetall Produktion," in Petermann's *Mittheilungen*, *Ergänzungsband* xiii, *Ergänzungsheft* 57 (Gotha, 1879), pp. 65-66, and W. Lexis, in *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, xxxiv (1880), pp. 392-393.

² But not all of it, according to the author of the N. Y. P. L. chronicle, who declares (fol. 7) "Vi pesar y quedar alla del quinto de su magestad sin lo que llevo el senor Fernando Pizarro mas de ciento y ochenta mil pesos." The writer grumbles continually about the smallness of his own share of the spoil in view of the greatness of his services, and affirms that much of the ransom was deliberately held back, in order that he

and 24 other "compañeros" who had sought and obtained leave to go back to Castile "por dar relacion a su magestad de la tierra [y] por ver a sus padres o mugeres," might not carry home their part of it. Altogether, though he admits he has got much, he feels fully justified in complaining that he has not got more. The account stops at this point. I should have published more of it, were it not accessible, with certain modifications and additions, in Italian translation, in Ramusio, iii, fols. 371-378; cf. below, pp. 614-615.

³ Xeres, p. 98. Xeres got back to Seville June 3, 1534, and must have left Cajamarca shortly after the execution of Atahualpa. This is the last of his narrative. Cf. "Vida de Francisco López de Xerez," by A. Jiménez-Placer in *Archivo de Investigaciones Históricas* for 1911, i, pp. 418-456; ii, pp. 236-269.

Inca authority. He accordingly selected a younger brother of Atahualpa, presented him to the natives as their lawful sovereign, and took him along with his Spaniards to Cuzco.¹

 The march to the Peruvian capital proved more difficult than that from Tumbez to Cajamarca. The road was narrow and traversed by foaming torrents,² and signs began to multiply that the natives intended to dispute the Spaniards' passage. The first serious encounter took place beyond the town of Xauxa, where Pizarro had halted with the main body of his troops to make a settlement, and whence he had sent forward de Soto with a company of sixty horsemen to reconnoitre. This advanced guard was suddenly overwhelmed in the rocky defiles by an assault of the Peruvians in vastly superior numbers. Had not Pizarro learned of the attack in time to send out reënforcements under Almagro, de Soto and his companions must have perished to a man.³ The affair had a tragic sequel in the Spanish camp; for it led to the burning alive of a captive chieftain named Challecuchima, whom Pizarro had brought along with him, and whom he suspected of complicity with the natives who had delivered the assault; and "all the people of the country," so the notary Sancho assures us, "rejoiced infinitely at his death, because he was very much abhorred by all who knew what a cruel man he was."⁴ The puppet Inca whom Pizarro had set up also died during the march.⁵ He was, however, immediately replaced by the young prince Manco, a brother of Huascar, who arrived at the camp of the Spaniards, opportunely for their purpose, in order to apply for their protection.⁶ He accompanied

¹ P. Pizarro, i, pp. 227 ff.

² P. Sancho, pp. 29-40, *passim*.

³ P. Pizarro, i, pp. 235 ff.; P. Sancho, pp. 41-49.

⁴ P. Sancho, p. 98; P. Pizarro, i, pp. 245-246.

⁵ Challecuchima was accused of compassing his death. P. Sancho, p. 52.

⁶ P. Pizarro, i, pp. 245-246.

the conquerors to the Peruvian capital, which they reached on November 15, 1533, the first anniversary of their arrival at Cajamarca.¹

The Spaniards were delighted and amazed by the greatness and beauty of Cuzco. The architecture of the great fortress on the hill, and of the Temple of the Sun, commanded especial admiration; "the walls," declared one of them, "are made of stones as large as chunks of mountains . . ." and those "who see them say that neither the bridge of Segovia nor any other of the edifices which Hercules or the Romans made is so worthy of being seen."² The treasure that the conquerors gathered was also immense. Whether it was greater or less than the ransom of Atahualpa it is impossible to determine; but it is certain that its collection and division among the troops were succeeded by gaming, and by lavishness in expenditure, fully equal to anything that had taken place at Cajamarca.³ Meantime Pizarro did not neglect the more serious responsibilities of his position. Manco was crowned Inca, with appropriate solemnities, and the farce of preserving native rule was thus continued.⁴ But a truer indication of the real source of authority in Peru was given on the twenty-fourth of the following March by the erection of Cuzco as a Spanish municipality with all the time-honored offices and ceremonies thereto pertaining, and by the taking of the regular preliminary measures for the propagation of the Christian faith. Though the mass of the natives were incapable of realizing it, the supremacy of their ancient civilization had been shattered beyond repair.⁵

¹ P. Sancho, p. 104; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 517.

² P. Sancho, p. 156; P. Pizarro, i, pp. 265 ff.; Garcilaso de la Vega, parte ii, lib. ii, cap. vii.

³ P. Pizarro, i, p. 278; Prescott, *C. P.*, i, pp. 525-527.

⁴ P. Sancho, p. 105.

⁵ Montesinos, pp. 79 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 3-9, and references there.

Yet the conquest which had been accomplished with such extraordinary ease was not destined to be acquiesced in without further native challenge. It had been accepted chiefly because the Peruvians had failed at first to comprehend its real nature; but when they realized the true state of affairs, they longed to throw off the yoke. In the autumn of 1534, Pizarro left Cuzco for the neighborhood of the coast, where he founded, on the eighteenth of the following January, the city of Lima, the future capital of New Castile.¹ His departure from the Inca metropolis was the signal for a native attack. Manco Inca effected his escape from Cuzco, hotly pursued by Juan Pizarro. A bloody battle was fought in the mountains, from which the Spaniards, as usual, emerged victorious. But they were confronted on the morrow by their foes in such overwhelming numbers that they decided it would be the part of wisdom to retreat to Cuzco; and this resolution was confirmed by a message from Hernando Pizarro, who had recently got back from Spain, to say that he was being besieged in the Inca capital. A series of desperate engagements ensued outside Cuzco. There was a furious sally of the Spaniards, in which the natives were slaughtered in droves.² The climax came when an assault was ordered on the great fortress of Sacsahuaman, outside the city, which the Peruvians had managed to occupy; and this assault, though successful, cost the life of the heroic Juan Pizarro, who was hit on the head by a stone hurled down from above. Thereafter the struggle

¹ *Libro Primero de Cabildos de Lima* (ed. E. Torres Saldamando, Lima, 1888), i, pp. 1-13. The date usually given (cf. Winsor, ii, p. 522) is January 6, the festival of Epiphany; and it is commonly stated that this accounts for the first name of the infant capital — *Ciudad de los Reyes*, or City of the Kings. It is possible (cf. Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 24) that

the site was determined on January 6, and that this name is traceable to the origin just suggested; but it seems more probable that it was conferred on the new city in honor of the Emperor and his mother Joanna. Cf. Moses, *Spanish Dependencies*, i, cap. x, *passim*.

² P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 298 ff.; Herrera, dec. v, lib. viii, caps. iv-v.

degenerated into an attempt on the part of the natives to starve the Spaniards out; this lasted until August, 1536, when, the season for planting having arrived, the Inca was obliged to raise the siege.¹ It was the last serious effort of the Peruvians to reassert their power, though Manco Inca continued to be a thorn in the side of the conquerors until his death in 1544. Henceforth the main interest of the story lies not in the struggle of the Spaniards and the natives, but rather in the bloody feuds of the different factions of the invaders over the partition of the rich territory which had been won by their unscrupulousness and valor.

The tale of the development of the conquests of Pizarro during the quarter century that elapsed between the capture of Cuzco and the death of Charles V is not one of the more inspiring chapters in the history of the Spanish Empire. It contains indeed a number of stirring passages, but it is primarily a chronicle of self-seeking and avarice. There is much in it that is reminiscent of the early days of the *Reconquista*, especially in its numerous illustrations of the inability of the Spaniard to sink individual differences in the prosecution of a common aim. The quarrels of the Pizarros, the Almagros, the conquerors of Quito, and the royal representatives remind one irresistibly of the bickerings of the early kings of Leon, of Castile, of Aragon, and of Navarre. Lack of any outstanding personality, such as that of Cortés in Mexico, was doubtless the underlying cause; the talents and abilities of the different personalities in New Castile were so evenly matched that leadership was very difficult. That the conquest progressed at all is under the circumstances remarkable. Certainly it was the fruit of individual initiative and not of coöperation.

¹ Anonymous *Sitio del Cuzco*, in *Libros Raros ó Curiosos*, xiii, pp. 10 ff.; Montesinos, pp. 89-90.

Another factor, which greatly increased the difficulty of maintaining a united and orderly government in the newly discovered lands, was the reports that got abroad of their fabulous wealth. Mexico had been somewhat of a disappointment to the seeker for precious metals, but here in Peru they were apparently to be had for the asking; small wonder if adventurers of every sort and kind fell over one another in their eagerness to reach El Dorado. One of the first to be drawn thither was Pedro de Alvarado, the hero of the famous 'leap' on the Mexican causeway, who had been experiencing grave difficulties with his government in Guatemala. Learning of the wealth that had been found at Cajamarca and at Cuzco, and drawing the natural conclusion that Quito, the capital of Atahualpa, which had as yet been left untouched, would prove equally lucrative, he determined to ignore the fact that it fell within the jurisdiction of Pizarro, and get possession of it for himself. He easily collected 500 followers, landed in March, 1534, at Puerto Viejo, and started, without a moment's delay, on his way eastward across the mountains. The obstacles he encountered are almost impossible to describe. The cold was intense. Cotopaxi was in eruption, and the air was so full of cinders that the men could scarcely breathe. And after all the suffering that had been endured the expedition proved absolutely sterile. Quito was an empty shell, without gold or precious stones; moreover, Alvarado had been preceded there by the followers of the man he was attempting to dispossess. Pizarro, who had become alarmed for the safety of the 'northern province,' had detailed Sebastian de Belalcázar to guard it; and Diego de Almagro, inspired by the same idea, had joined forces with Belalcázar before Alvarado could arrive. A battle seemed imminent, but it was finally decided to negotiate. Alvarado was bought off

for 100,000 castellanos, and gave up his troops, his fleet, and his stores. He subsequently had an interview with Pizarro at Pachacamac, and finally departed in friendship and satisfaction.¹ The episode was but an introduction to the more serious quarrels that were to come.

The source of most of these was the ill-feeling between Pizarro and Almagro that had smouldered since the early days of their partnership. When Hernando Pizarro went back to Spain in 1534 to report to the Emperor, Almagro had taken care that an agent of his own should also be on hand, in order to make sure that his own services should not go unrequited; with the result that while Pizarro's jurisdiction along the Pacific coast had been extended to a point seventy leagues farther southward than that which it had reached before, his associate had been empowered to conquer and occupy a strip extending two hundred leagues to the south of that.² But this arrangement, instead of quieting the jealousy between the two conquerors, actually served to foment it; for, because of the lack of any adequate means of measuring distances, it proved impossible to settle the crucial question whether Cuzco, the capital and principal source of wealth, fell within the jurisdiction of Pizarro or of Almagro. The inevitable dispute at once arose; bloodshed was threatened, and was only avoided through the intervention of friends. Finally the appearance of amity was restored, June 12, 1535, by a singular compact,³ sworn to by both parties under a most solemn oath, in which each promised neither to malign nor to injure the other; but the vital issue of the possession of Cuzco remained unsolved.

¹ *D. I. I.*, x, pp. 152 ff.; xli, pp. 513 ff.; P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 286 ff.; Naharro, in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 281 ff.; Montesinos, pp. 83-85; Herrera, dec. v, lib. vi, caps. viii-x; Moses, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 106-108, and references there.

² *D. I. I.*, xxii, pp. 338 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 26; Moses, i, pp. 109 ff., and references there; Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 489 ff.

³ Printed in the original in Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 509 ff.

Shortly afterwards, Almagro, with a force of 500 Spaniards, and a large body of native carriers, determined to go south to substantiate his claim to the territory that had been allotted to him by the grant of the preceding year. False reports of its great riches had been given him by the Peruvians, who were desirous of ridding their country of as many Spaniards as possible, in order that they might more easily throw off the conquerors' yoke. Almagro put every penny he could raise into the expedition, and departed with high hopes in midsummer, 1535.¹

Seldom have great expectations been more grievously disappointed. The route of the explorers lay inland, through difficult mountains and sandy wastes; hunger, cold, and snow-blindness dogged their footsteps. The Spaniards burnt and pillaged as they advanced. They treated the natives with the utmost brutality, and the natives replied by killing them whenever they could. Worst of all, no gold was to be found; an advance guard, which penetrated, in all probability, to within 100 leagues of the river Maule, returned with the most unpromising reports. Cries began to be heard among the troops for a return to Cuzco, which they now asserted to be clearly Almagro's; and Almagro's tenderness for his young son Diego, to whom he longed to bequeath a great fortune and a famous name, finally induced him to listen to their demands.² By the end of the year 1536 the expedition started to retrace its steps; in the spring of 1537 it had reached Arequipa. After an engagement with the troops of Manco Inca, who had raised the siege of Cuzco only a few months before, Almagro sent a

¹ Diego Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile*, i, pp. 161 ff.; also L. Galdames, *Estudio de la Historia de Chile* (2d ed., Santiago de Chile, 1911), pp. 40-41.

² Herrera, dec. v, lib. x, caps. i-iii; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 34-36; Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 161 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 83 ff.

message to Hernando Pizarro, who was in command at the capital, to demand that the city admit him and recognize his authority. On receiving in reply a request for delay, on the ground that it was not yet possible to determine definitely within whose jurisdiction Cuzco lay, Almagro became convinced that Pizarro was gathering troops to attack him, and resolved to anticipate his rival. On the night of April 8, 1537, he entered Cuzco unopposed, arrested Hernando Pizarro and his brother, Gonzalo, and obtained the recognition of the municipal authorities.¹ "Had not this deliverance come when it did," wrote the young Alonso Enriquez de Guzman, who was weary of the tyranny of the Pizarros, "I should certainly have had no other alternative than to join with the Inca, even though he had been a toad."²

Rumors of Almagro's return had meantime reached Francisco Pizarro at Lima, and he despatched to the relief of his kinsmen a force of 500 men, under Alonso de Alvarado.³ When they reached the banks of the Abancay, some twenty leagues west of Cuzco,⁴ they were met by an embassy of six Spaniards from Almagro, who assured them that the object they had been sent to attain was no longer possible of achievement, but that they were welcome, if they wished, to stay and help fight the natives.⁵ To this Alvarado replied by open defiance, and by casting the emissaries into a stone prison, which he caused the Indians who accompanied him to construct for the purpose. Under the circumstances a battle was inevitable; and it took place, July 12, 1537, on the banks of the Abancay, whither Almagro, with 450 men,

¹ Herrera, dec. vi, lib. ii, cap. v; P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 344 ff.; *Relacion del Sitio del Cuzco*, in *Libros Raros ó Curiosos*, xiii, pp. 94 ff.; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 37 ff.

² *Life of Enriquez de Guzman*, ed. Markham for the Hakluyt Society (1862), p. 107.

³ On this Alvarado, who is not to be confused with his more famous kinsman, cf. *Life of Enriquez de Guzman*, p. 109, note.

⁴ P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 357 ff.

⁵ *Life of Guzman*, p. 110.

marched out to meet his foe. The tactics of the Almagrists were exceedingly skilful. Alvarado, caught napping, surrendered after a struggle in which "only three or four were killed." He himself was placed under arrest; his army was taken over into the forces of his conqueror, and his prisoners "joyfully returned to Cuzco with the victorious party."¹

The news of the defeat of his lieutenant reached Francisco Pizarro at Lima. No longer strong enough to oppose Almagro by force, he prepared once more to negotiate. It was no easy matter to bring Almagro to another conference. His followers urged him to execute Hernando and Gonzalo Pizarro, and boldly assume the offensive against his old associate; and though Almagro's good nature shrank from this extremity, he was determined to hold on to Cuzco, and to fortify his claim to it by gaining for himself a port and an open line of communication with the sea. But his effort to carry out this last project brought him into proximity to his craftier partner, and led to the initiation of the very conference which Pizarro had sought to bring about. This took place in November, 1537, at Mala, on the seacoast, some fifty miles to the south of Lima; and as the two rivals were so bitter that they could not discuss the issue between them without losing their tempers, it resulted in leaving the decision in the hands of a friar named Francisco de Bobadilla, "for the devil always seeks for suitable men to do his will in affairs of importance."² The friar gave judgment that, pending an accurate determination of the limits of their respective jurisdictions, Pizarro and Almagro should both retire into territory unquestionably their own; that they should refrain from all hostilities, and that Almagro

¹ *Life of Guzman*, p. 114; P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 360 ff.; *Relacion del Sitio*, loc. cit., pp. 118 ff.

² *Life of Guzman*, p. 117.

should release his prisoners within six days, and give up Cuzco to Pizarro within thirty. Enriquez de Guzman assures us that "the Friar and Don Francisco Pizarro behaved with duplicity, and concealed a large body of men to seize and kill us, if we should not agree to what they desired."¹

Pizarro violated the terms of the decision of Mala at the first moment that there was any prospect of his doing so with advantage. The release of his brother Hernando provided him with a capable general; his forces increased and were once more eager to fight. Almagro, who had returned to Cuzco, was rudely apprised that the treaty was at an end. Too ill to take command in person of his forces, he handed them over to his able lieutenant, Orgoñez, who sallied forth to meet the advancing army of Hernando Pizarro. The rival hosts encountered one another at Las Salinas, two miles outside of Cuzco. Orgoñez had about 600 men; Pizarro, 800; and the surrounding heights were thronged with natives eager to witness the slaughter of their detested conquerors. It was a Saturday, April 6, 1538.² The desperate valor of Orgoñez proved no match for the more skillful dispositions of his foe; he was overpowered by numbers, and slain in cold blood after having given up his sword; his followers fell into confusion, and finally broke and fled. In less than two hours the fight was over, and the victors were pursuing the vanquished into Cuzco.³ Some time elapsed before any semblance of order could be restored; but Hernando Pizarro did not propose that the rising fortunes of his family should ever again be threatened by the ambition of the Almagros. The young Diego was sent

¹ *Life of Guzman*, p. 118; P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 370 ff.; *Relacion del Sitio*, pp. 139 ff.

² Cf. *Life of Guzman*, p. 126, note 2. The 26th, the date given by Markham, was not a Saturday; the 6th was.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 125 ff.; *Relacion del Sitio*,

pp. 162 ff.; *D. I. I.*, iii, pp. 137 ff.; P. Pizarro, pp. 380 ff.; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 44 ff.; M. de Espinar to the Emperor in *Libro Primero de Cabildos de Lima*, iii, pp. 189 ff.; Cieza de León, *Guerra de las Salinas*, cap. lxiii.

away to Lima, where Francisco Pizarro received him in kindly fashion; for the present he was regarded as harmless, but it was deemed wise to remove him from the neighborhood of his father, whose fate had been already settled by the battle of Las Salinas. After a mockery of a trial, in which he was accused of levying war against the crown, and entering into treacherous conspiracy with the Inca, the old man was secretly garroted in his prison, in July, 1538.¹ His good nature and his unfortunate readiness to mix war and diplomacy made it inevitable that he should be the victim of the more unscrupulous Pizarros, whose cause for the time being had triumphed all along the line. Such at least was the conclusion of the prudent Alonso Enriquez de Guzman, who had recently been the most ardent partisan of Almagro. "At this time," so he assures us, "Hernando Pizarro and I had become friends, because he was alive, and the governor was dead, and it is very disastrous to have any intercourse with the dead."²

The events just recounted form only the beginning of the "chronicle of the civil wars of Peru"; but before we carry that sordid tale to its conclusion, we must pause to relate the pleasanter story of the explorations and achievements of other Spanish conquistadores in the regions to the north, east, and south of the territory that had been won by the Pizarros.

It will be remembered that in the year 1534, at the time of the intervention of Pedro de Alvarado, Pizarro had sent one of his ablest lieutenants, Sebastian de Belalcázar, to hold Quito and the adjacent territory in his name, and to guard it from possible occupation by any other conquistador.

¹ Cieza de León, *op. cit.*, cap. lxx, and *D. I. I.*, xlii, pp. 158 ff.; also Montesinos, *Anales*, pp. 98-99.

² *Life of Guzman*, p. 134.

After the claims of Alvarado had been duly disposed of, Belalcázar established himself at Quito, and soon after received from the crown a definite appointment as governor there.¹ But his restless spirit was not satisfied to remain in a subordinate position. He was eager to carve out a domain for himself, and, with this idea in mind, advanced farther north until he reached the high plateau which forms the southern part of the present republic of Colombia. There, in the year 1536, he founded the town of Popayan, and thence he raided the upper valleys of the Cauca and the Magdalena, slaughtering the natives and devastating their land.² One of these forays brought him, in the year 1538, to the lofty tableland of Santa Fé de Bogotá, where he met with two other conquistadores who had reached the same place from very different starting points. One of them was Nikolaus Federmann, whose expedition from Venezuela has been mentioned in the preceding chapter.³ The other was a fellow Spaniard whose notable achievements require more careful consideration.

Gonzalo Ximenez de Quesada was born, either in Cordova or Granada, in the early years of the sixteenth century, and received an excellent training in the profession of the law.⁴ But he aspired to win fame and wealth in the Indies, and when he was about thirty years old his chance came. In the year 1535, Pedro Fernández de Lugo, the son of that Alfonso de Lugo who had completed the conquest of the Canaries under the Catholic Kings, and the holder of the post of adelantado there, was granted the office of governor and captain-general of the town and province of Santa

¹ Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 22; Moses, *The Spanish Dependencies in South America*, i, pp. 104-105, and references there.

² C. R. Markham, *The Conquest of New Granada*, pp. 94-95; Restrepo

Tirado, *Descubrimiento y Conquista de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1917-19), ii, cap. xxx.

³ Cf. *ante*, p. 536.

⁴ R. B. Cunninghame Graham, *The Conquest of New Granada*, pp. 1-8.

Marta, between the river Magdalena on the westward and the Welser territory in Venezuela on the east.¹ This region, which Rodrigo de Bastidas had first attempted to settle in 1525, had had a checkered history during the succeeding ten years, furnishing the usual chronicle of maltreatment of the natives and bitter rivalries between the different conquistadores. The audiencia of Santo Domingo was at a loss how to deal with it. But the territory contained gold, of that there could be no doubt; and Lugo solved the perplexities of the authorities by indicating his willingness to take charge. He offered the post of chief judge of the new settlement to Quesada, who made haste to accept it. In December, 1535, the two adventurers arrived, with a well equipped expedition, off the harbor of Santa Marta.²

It soon became evident that nothing was to be gained by remaining in the town itself. The place was a pesthole, without nearly enough houses to accommodate the newcomers, while the country for miles around had been laid waste. An expedition into the interior seemed under the circumstances to be the only alternative to withdrawal, and finally Lugo started south into the wilderness with nearly 1000 men. But misfortune dogged the footsteps of the explorers from the first. The Indians were hostile; large numbers of the Spaniards were wounded or slain; and to cap the climax the governor's son, Luis Alonso, escaped to Spain with all the gold that had been found, leaving his father in a pitiable plight.³ But Lugo was not to be easily diverted from his enterprise. A new expedition into the interior was

¹ *Ante*, II, pp. 180-184; Santa Cruz, iii, pp. 542 ff.

² *D. I. I.*, xxii, pp. 98-106, 406-433; P. de Aguado, *Historia de Santa Martha y Nuevo Reino de Granada*, ed. J. Bécker in *Publicaciones de la Real Academia de la Historia* (Madrid, 1916-17, 2 vols.),

i, pp. 29-144; Restrepo Tirado, i, cap. xxvii; Moses, i, pp. 46-52, and references there.

³ Fray Pedro Simón, *Noticias Históricas de las Conquistas de Tierra Firme* (Bogotá, 1891-92, 5 vols), ii, pp. 53 ff.

speedily organized. It was to be composed of 800 men, provisioned and assisted by a flotilla of five large boats on the Magdalena, whose valley was to be the route which the explorers were to follow. Command was given to Ximenez de Quesada, in whom, despite the fact that he had hitherto had no experience save as a lawyer, Lugo had already recognized all the essential qualities of a captain.¹

The expedition departed on April 6, 1536.² Quesada, with most of his men, started southwest across country, planning to strike the Magdalena some 150 miles above its mouth, and there to unite with the flotilla, which had gone around by sea. When he arrived at the rendezvous the boats were nowhere to be seen. One of them had been wrecked at the mouth of the river; two more had deserted and sailed west to Cartagena; the two others were weeks late when they finally reached their destination. The following months were occupied in a joint advance up the Magdalena. The hardships encountered defy description. Those in the boats were harassed by native war canoes, and in constant danger of being devoured by alligators. Those on shore had to cut their way through the densest of tropical jungles; they were bitten by insects and poisonous snakes, and jaguars attacked them in their hammocks at night. But evidences of a far higher civilization in the country that lay beyond them appeared with increasing frequency as they fought their way southward, and enabled Quesada, after the expedition had been gone eight months, to persuade his officers, who wanted to return to Santa Marta, that honor and self-interest demanded that they

¹ Santa Cruz, iii, p. 543; Aguado, i, pp. 160 ff.; Fernández Piedrahita, *Historia de las Conquistas del Nuevo Reino de Granada* (Bogotá, 1881), pp. 67 ff.; Cunningham Graham, pp. 11 ff.

² For details about those who com-

posed it, cf. Quesada's own account, printed in R. B. Cunningham Graham, pp. 251 ff. See also appendix ii, to the same volume, on the "Lost Writings of Quesada."

continue their advance. All at once the ground began to rise before them. The air became cooler and the vegetation less dense. The river grew so swift that it was impossible to navigate it, and the boats had to be sent back. But Quesada and his followers regained their strength in the higher altitudes. They clambered on up ravines and rocky defiles, and finally their courageous leader was rewarded by emerging on a broad cultivated plateau, nearly 7000 feet above the sea, dotted with villages, and traversed by laughing brooks. He had only 166 men and 59 horses left. All the rest had perished on the way or been sent back with the boats.¹

The explorers had every reason to be gratified at what they saw ; for the Chibchas, whose domains they were about to invade, had attained a state of civilization fully comparable to that of the Mayas, Aztecs, and Incas, and unapproached by that of any other of the indigenous peoples of the Western Hemisphere.² At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards they numbered, in all probability, somewhat more than a million souls, spread over an area of about 6000 square miles. Like the Incas to the south, they were primarily sun-worshippers ; but they also adored other objects of nature, such as mountains, lakes, and waterfalls. They also believed in a life after death. Their government was in theory an absolute despotism ; the zipa, or monarch, made and executed all the laws. The country, at the time of the Spaniards' arrival, was apparently divided into a number of independent sovereignties ; but it would seem that the zipa of Bogotá, the latest of them to attain that rank, was rapidly extending his authority over the rest.

¹ Aguado, i, pp. 160 ff. ; Moses, i, pp. 125 ff., and references there ; R. B. Cunninghame Graham, pp. 17 ff.

² On this paragraph, cf. T. A. Joyce,

South American Archaeology, pp. 11-44 ; Markham, *The Conquest of New Granada*, pp. 11-48 ; Moses, i, pp. 129-133, and references there.

The general state of culture which prevailed among the Chibchas on the eve of the Spanish conquest presents the same sort of contrasts between civilization and barbarism which we have already encountered among the Incas and Aztecs. Human sacrifices were still offered to the sun, though the custom was gradually dying out. There was no system of handwriting or substitute therefor. Beasts of burden were unknown. Yet there was a well developed language, a calendar, a system of numeration, and a rudimentary coinage; agriculture, gold work, weaving and spinning, and commerce had reached a high stage of perfection.¹ By a system of regular fairs the Chibchas exchanged the products of the high plateau which they inhabited for those of the *tierra caliente* below them, and were thus able to avail themselves of many of the commodities of the tropical as well as of the temperate zone.

The Spaniards were in no hurry to begin hostilities against the Chibchas, when the odds were so overwhelmingly against them. Quesada ordered his men to treat the natives in friendly fashion; and the natives, overawed by the appearance of the newcomers, and still more by their horses, refrained for some time from attacking them. But it was not to be expected that they should permanently submit to the programme of plunder on which the invaders were plainly intent; an assault was soon delivered on Quesada's rear guard, only to be repulsed with terrible slaughter. This experience convinced most of the Chibchas that resistance was useless, and they began to sue for peace; but in the meantime they took measures to secrete their gold and precious stones, which they were determined that the in-

¹ The Chibcha women were apparently possessed of many unusual privileges. Quesada assures us that a wife had the legal right to beat her husband,

though the number of lashes she could inflict was limited to six. Joyce, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

vaders should not have. Most of the scouting parties that Quesada sent out to search for treasure returned empty handed; only at Tunja, which Quesada visited in person, was any large amount at first obtained. From Tunja the Spaniards directed their steps to the neighboring temple of Suamo (now Sogamoso), which was renowned for its riches; after overcoming a slight resistance, they reached it, but such was their eagerness to possess themselves of the treasures, that its feather decorations caught fire from their torches, and the magnificent structure was burnt to the ground. More efforts of the Chibchas to conceal their valuables, and the attitude of determined hostility adopted by the natives of the region near Bogotá, put an end to all sentiments of mercy in the breasts of the invaders. They surprised and overthrew the native army, and then devoted all their efforts to discovering the hiding place of the zipa's treasures. The zipa was arrested and tortured so that he finally died, but not a word could be extorted from him in the extremity of his sufferings; indeed, it is probable that he had distributed all his wealth among his chiefs before he fell into the hands of the Spaniards. As the outlines of the mountains around the great plain where he was reminded Quesada of the summits of the Sierra Nevada, below which he had passed his boyhood years, he called the conquered region New Granada; and christened the city which he founded there in the summer of 1538 with the stirring name of Santa Fé (de Bogotá). The conquistadores lost few opportunities to remind themselves that the progress of the vast empire which they were winning in the New World was in some of its aspects but a prolongation of the Crusades.¹

Probably the last thing that Quesada had expected when

¹ Aguado, i, pp. 229 ff.; Restrepo Tirado, caps. xxxviii-xxxix, xli-xlii, 1;

Moses, i, pp. 133-139, and references there.

he left Santa Marta was that he should meet with Europeans in the course of his explorations; and yet, shortly after the founding of Santa Fé de Bogotá, Belalcázar, as we have seen, arrived from Popayan, while Federmann at the same time appeared out of the northeast. Each of the explorers had a considerable following, and none of them was in the mood to abandon what he believed to be his own; for a short time there were good prospects of a fight. Yet there were certain considerations which served to draw them together, particularly the fact that they were all more or less at variance with the authorities who had sent them out: Belalcázar with Pizarro, Federmann with the Welsers, and Quesada with Lugo, of whom he now desired to make himself independent in the new territory he had found. Peace and amity were further facilitated by the fact that Belalcázar announced that he would be satisfied with the recognition of his title as governor of Popayan. Quesada and Federmann signed two separate agreements, on March 17 and April 29, 1539, and finally the three adventurers departed together for Spain, to lay their problem before the Emperor; Hernan Perez, the brother of Quesada, being left, with most of the soldiers, in charge at Bogotá.¹ In Spain Belalcázar was confirmed in his governorship of Popayan; but Federmann and Quesada were less fortunate. The former, on his return, was accused by the Welsers, and died in February, 1542, without establishing his innocence; while the latter was obliged to give up all his pretensions to the lands he had found, in favor of that Luis Alonso de Lugo, the son of Quesada's old associate, who had run off to Spain with all the treasure that his father had collected in his first expedition after reaching Santa Marta. The

¹ Fray P. Simon, ii, pp. 250 ff.; Restrepo Tirado, ii, caps. xlviii, l, li; Aguado, i, pp. 357 ff.

elder Lugo had died in October, 1536, and from the purely legal point of view the young man's claims to the disputed territory were strong. Moreover Charles, who was absent in France and the Netherlands at the time of Quesada's arrival, had small opportunity to learn what all Spain knew: namely, that Quesada was a good man, and Lugo an unmitigated scoundrel. Lugo left for New Granada immediately after receiving his appointment, and misconducted himself so outrageously there in the next two years, that when orders to take his residencia were issued in 1544, he did not dare to face the test, but departed for Europe, joined the Spanish forces in Italy, and ultimately died either in Flanders or in Milan. Quesada temporarily went into retirement, and occupied himself in travel and literary pursuits; not till 1550 was he permitted to revisit his conquests in the New World.¹

The history of New Granada during the years immediately succeeding the departure of Quesada is a weary chronicle of confusion and self-seeking. Further complications, over and above those already enumerated, were occasioned by the expansion up the valley of the river Cauca of a settlement founded in January, 1533, by one Pedro de Heredia, at Cartagena, and extending along the coast of the modern republic of Colombia from the mouth of the Magdalena to the Gulf of Urabá. Heredia began by pursuing a policy of conciliation with the natives. He drew much treasure from his new domains, especially from an expedition which he led in 1534 to the famous graves of Zenu; but his conduct drew down on him the jealousy of his associates, and in 1537 he was arrested and sent back to Spain.² His successors devoted

¹ R. B. Cunninghame Graham, pp. 194 ff., and references there; Markham, pp. 158 ff.

² Cf. the various contemporary 'rela-

ciones' collected by M. Serrano y Sanz and edited for the Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles in the volume entitled *Relaciones Históricas de América; primera*

themselves to the exploration of the interior; they penetrated to the upper waters of the Cauca and the Magdalena, and there came into hostile contact with Hernan Pérez de Quesada, and also Belalcázar; and the confusion already existing became worse confounded still, when Pedrarias's old associate Andagoya, who had got a grant along the Pacific coast from the Gulf of San Miguel to the river San Juan, succeeded in invading the same territory from the west.¹ So bitter became the rivalries of the different claimants, that the Council of the Indies was at last obliged to take the matter in hand. In 1546 it sent out a commissioner, Miguel Diaz de Armendáriz, to take the residencia of the different persons concerned, proclaim the 'New Laws'² for the protection of the natives, and report to the home government. The result of his findings, and of the protests they elicited from the conquistadores on the ground, was the establishment in 1549 of a royal audiencia at Santa Fé de Bogotá, which thenceforth became the capital of New Granada. The new tribunal was given jurisdiction over all the different settlements — Santa Marta, Cartagena, Popayan, and the rest — whose chiefs had quarrelled over the control of the rich plateau. Its erection marks the first step in the setting apart of the region which is known today as the republic of Colombia.³ The fates of the two greatest of the conquistadores who had won it were characteristic of the ups and downs of those tremendous times. Belalcázar, who had stained the close of a brilliant career by the judicial murder of one of his rivals, died at Cartagena in 1550, on his way back to Spain to appeal against the penalty of death that had been awarded him.⁴ Quesada, who had been

Mitad del Siglo XVI (Madrid, 1916). Restrepo Tirado, caps. xxiii-xxvi, xxvii; Moses, i, pp. 53-56, and references there.

¹ Andagoya, pp. 60 ff.

² Cf. below, pp. 595 f., 661.

³ Aguado, i, pp. 488 ff.; Moses, i, pp. 147-156, and references there.

⁴ Markham, *Conquest of New Granada*, p. 108.

restored to favor and sent out again as marshal to Bogotá with the judges of the audiencia in 1550, passed away, full of years and honors, at Mariquita,¹ in 1579.²

In Peru, after the execution of Almagro in 1539, the Pizarros made haste to gather in the fruits of their victory, and also to protect themselves against the complaints of their surviving foes. To accomplish this latter purpose, Hernando was sent off to Spain, with a magnificent present of gold for the Emperor; his enemies, however, had contrived to forestall him, and he was cast into the dungeons of Medina del Campo, where he remained a close prisoner until the reign of Philip II.³ Meantime, in New Castile Francisco had distributed the lands and property of his late associate among his own relatives and adherents. He was especially liberal to his brother Gonzalo, who, after conducting a successful expedition against the natives of Charcas, was rewarded with rich territories in the neighborhood of Potosí, and finally invested with the government of Quito, which Belalcázar was held to have forfeited through insubordination. Gonzalo made haste to establish himself in his new domain, which he prized for its own sake, but still more for the opportunities which it gave him to investigate the territory immediately to the east of it, which was reported by a previous explorer to be prolific in cinnamon.⁴

On Christmas Day, 1539, Gonzalo started across the Andes from Quito, at the head of a force of 340 Spaniards. He took with him 4000 natives as porters, and a large flock of llamas; a huge drove of swine was

¹ Northwest of Bogotá, just across the Magdalena. It was subsequently to be the headquarters of the famous eighteenth-century botanist, Dr. José Celestino Mutis.

² Cunninghame Graham, p. 243.

³ Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 137 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 151, and references there.

also brought along, as the easiest method of providing food. But the hardships endured in the early weeks of their march caused the improvident Spaniards to abandon most of their supplies. There were Indian attacks. They experienced an earthquake. Worst of all, the icy cold of the peaks of the cordillera made them long to reach the warmer lands below; they were sure they could obtain provisions from the natives of those parts; at all costs they must hurry on. But when they arrived at their destination they were grievously disappointed. A certain amount of cinnamon was found, but under the circumstances in which they were it profited them nothing. The forests were so dense that they could make only a few miles a day. The Indians, naked and destitute, could give them no food. In a few weeks they were suffering from the pangs of starvation. Before long they came to the banks of the river Coca — one of the confluent of the Napo, the roaring of whose mighty cataract could be heard for miles around — and following it down for a distance of forty or fifty leagues, they came to a place where it dashed through a narrow gorge which Garcilaso de la Vega declares to have been two hundred feet deep and but twenty feet wide. Convinced that the country on the other side of the stream would prove more attractive than that in which they were, and doubting whether they would again find such a good opportunity to reach it, they felled trees across the chasm, and then constructed a bridge on which all but one of their company succeeded in passing over. After enduring more hardships, they reached the broader waters below, and then, seeing that some means of conveyance for the weaker members of their number had become essential, they set to work on the construction of a boat, using “nails made from the shoes of horses which had been killed as food for the

sick," and which "they now found more valuable than gold."¹

When the boat was finished, they placed their sick and their valuables on board, and continued, keeping pace with it, to march down the banks of the river. After much suffering, they reached a spot where the natives informed them that ten days farther on they would get to a point where the river emptied into a still larger stream;² and that there they would find plenty of provisions and gold. As the company was utterly exhausted, Gonzalo Pizarro determined to send forward his lieutenant, Francisco de Orellana, with fifty men in the boat, to get the promised supplies and return with them. In three days Orellana made no less than eighty leagues, but he found no food, and, doubting his ability to work his way back against the current, it occurred to him to continue his voyage down the river, discover new country on his own account, and then get back to Spain. It was the rankest kind of desertion, and he had great difficulty in persuading his followers to countenance it. One of them, indeed, named Sanchez de Vargas, was so firm in his refusal that Orellana at last turned him loose in the jungle, where he was found months later by Pizarro and his men. They, despairing of the return of Orellana, had finally started overland to find him; on learning what he had done, they undertook and accomplished the truly Herculean task of fighting their way back to Quito. It took them till the summer of 1542 to complete that terrible journey; and only the inspiring words and conduct of their heroic leader kept them from abandoning the enterprise in despair.³

¹ Garcilaso de la Vega, "The Expedition of Gonzalo Pizarro to the Land of Cinnamon," ed. Markham for the Hakluyt Society (London, 1859), in *Expeditions into the Valley of the Amazonas*, pp. 3-10.

² The Napo, according to Markham (*Expeditions*, p. 11, note); Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 162-163, makes it the confluence of the Napo with the Amazon.

³ Garcilaso de la Vega (in Markham's *Expeditions*), pp. 11-20.

Meantime Orellana and his companions continued their voyage.¹ For a long time it seemed likely that they would perish of starvation; but supplies became gradually more plentiful as they sailed on, and for a time the natives they encountered were friendly. As their first boat was manifestly inadequate for use on the sea, which they expected to reach many months before they did, they constructed a larger one with infinite labor; the nails for it had to be forged in a charcoal fire, and "they made bellows of their leather buskins."² Farther down, beyond the mouth of the Napo, the Indians became more numerous, and also very hostile. Surrounding the adventurers in war canoes, they shot at them with poisoned arrows; and Orellana was so impressed with the valor of the women that he called them Amazons, an appellation which finally prevailed over that of the discoverer himself as the name of the great river whose entire length he was the first to sail.³ In August, 1541, the explorers reached the sea; and following along the coast to the northwest, they finally arrived at the island of Cubagua on September 11.⁴ According to the reckoning of the priest who accompanied them, they had sailed "for one thousand eight hundred leagues, including the windings of the river,"⁵ and the estimate is not far from correct. Shortly afterwards Orellana departed for Spain to report his discoveries and get authority to conquer and colonize them. This he easily obtained, and, having collected 500 followers, set sail for the New World; but he died on the way thither, and the expedition which he led was dispersed with nothing accomplished.⁶

¹ Herrera, "The Voyage of Francisco de Orellana" (in Markham's *Expeditions*), pp. 23 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁶ *D. I. I.*, xxiii, pp. 98 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 165.

It is an interesting fact that the mouth of the Amazon lies just to the west of the Tordesillas Line, so that all of Orellana's memorable voyage fell clearly within the Spanish demarcation; but it is more than doubtful if this was known at the time. The 'second discovery' of the great river, by the Jesuit, Cristóbal de Acuña,¹ did not take place until nearly a century later, in 1639, when Portugal acknowledged the sovereignty of a Spanish king.

One result of the execution of Almagro was that Pizarro at once resolved to gain possession for himself of the territory of his old associate — the two hundred leagues to the southward of his own dominion. His first efforts to accomplish this purpose were not particularly successful, chiefly because of the difficulty of crossing the great desert to the south of Lake Titicaca — the very nitrate beds over which, more than three centuries later, the Chilean and Peruvian republics were to wage bitter war. But the tide of enthusiasm for arduous enterprises was running high among the best of the Spaniards in those days; and finally Pizarro found the man that he wanted in Pedro de Valdivia, an old soldier of the Italian wars, who had come out to Peru in 1536: a daring adventurer, always keen to press forward while others held back. Under him there took service, though not till after the expedition had got started, another veteran of the Italian campaigns named Francisco de Aguirre, as distinctly a born administrator as Valdivia was a typical conquistador; the two men complemented one another at every point. But there were also elements of discord in the ranks of the invaders, the chief rock of offence being one Pedro Sancho de Hoz, who had been sent out from Spain with a commission to conquer Chile; and it was only with difficulty that

¹ Cf. his account in Markham's *Expeditions*, pp. 47-142.

Pizarro induced him to make common cause with Valdivia, by arranging that the two men should divide the command.¹

The expedition left Cuzco in early January, 1540; it numbered at the time of its departure about 150 Spaniards and 1000 natives.² It had not gone far before Sancho de Hoz was detected in a conspiracy to assassinate Valdivia and gain for himself the leadership of the invading forces. The fortunate result was his own arrest, and his renunciation, as the price of being set at liberty, of all his rights to the Chilean lands and of his share in the command. Before the party crossed the desert Aguirre arrived with a reënforcement of twenty-five men and an ample supply of provisions. It was largely owing to his ability and foresight that the perilous passage of the next 500 miles was accomplished without the loss of a single man. After a three months' rest in the valley of the Copiapo, where the country was solemnly taken possession of in the name of the king of Spain, the invaders pressed on to the site of the present city of Santiago de Chile, which was founded on February 12, 1541.³ The earliest *actas* of its *cabildo* have been preserved to us,⁴ and bear witness to the indispensable services of Aguirre as an organizer during this critical stage of the newly founded colony.

The years 1541 to 1546 were occupied with the establishment and extension of the settlement already made. Valdivia had himself elected governor and captain-general by the *cabildo* of Santiago, very much as Cortés had been by that of Vera Cruz, thereby making himself independent of

¹ Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, i, pp. 203 ff.; Moses, i, pp. 169 ff.; Letter of Valdivia to Charles V (September 4, 1545) in *Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile*, i, pp. 1-2; L. Silva Lezaeta, *El Conquistador Francisco de Aguirre* (Santiago de Chile, 1907).

² T. Thayer Ojeda, *Los Conquistadores de Chile*, i, pp. 69 ff.

³ Barros Arana, i, pp. 222 ff.; Moses, i, pp. 178 ff.

⁴ In *Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile*, i, pp. 63 ff.

Pizarro, and directly subject to the home government in Spain. He was crafty enough to pretend that he did not desire the post; but there is little doubt that he saw that the acquisition of it was indispensable to the maintenance of his authority, and that he had secretly manoeuvred to obtain it from the first.¹ As it was, there were several revolts against his government, culminating, in the year 1547, after Valdivia had departed for Peru, in a conspiracy of Sancho de Hoz against the governor's lieutenant, Francisco de Villagran; it was, however, discovered and nipped in the bud, and the chief rebel paid for his temerity with his head.² In 1541 there was a general uprising of the natives against the invaders. Santiago was attacked and burned; the assailants were repulsed after a bloody struggle, but the work of reconstruction was long and arduous, and had it not been for the timely arrival of a boat with reënforcements from Peru, it is quite possible that the infant colony might have perished. The experience made it evident that the tribes to the north of Santiago must be brought into subjection in order to prevent the isolation of the settlement; and this task, which was begun in 1543, was finally accomplished in 1549.³ In 1545 Valdivia led an exploring expedition to the south as far as the mouth of the river Biobio, and there came into hostile contact for the first time with the Araucanians, who advanced in solid masses "like Germans,"⁴ and fought with a ferocity far surpassing that of any of the other South American tribes. The Spaniards were obliged to return without founding a new city as they had origi-

¹ *Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile*, i, pp. 72 ff.; Barros Arana, *op. cit.*, i, pp. 229 ff.

² Barros Arana, i, pp. 305-309, and references there.

³ *Ibid.*, i, pp. 259 ff., 329 ff. The founding of the city of La Serena

(1543-44) — named in honor of Valdivia's birthplace — commemorates these events.

⁴ Such was the contemporary characterization; cf. Valdivia to Charles V, in *Historiadores de Chile*, i, pp. 23, 43 ff.

nally planned; clearly the conquest could not be pushed farther in that direction until their numbers and resources had been greatly increased. Meantime, in the neighborhood of Santiago, a regular system of encomiendas had been established, and a tradition of good order and strong government set up, which went far to lay the foundations for the large measure of happiness and prosperity which Chile was to enjoy in the succeeding centuries.¹

In 1546 news arrived from Peru which caused Valdivia to leave his new colony and return to the north. In order to appreciate the significance of this news, we must revert to the history of Pizarro's own dominion, which we left at the time of the execution of Almagro in 1538. Thereafter we can carry on the story of the development of Peru and Chile jointly to the end of the reign of the Emperor Charles V.

The arrogance exhibited by Francisco Pizarro in gathering in the spoils of his victory over his old associate made it inevitable that the remnants of the Almagro faction should lust for revenge. 'The men of Chile,' as they were popularly called, were scattered through the country after the death of their leader; but the house of the younger Almagro at Lima furnished a convenient meeting place for the hatching of plots, and as the months wore on without the arrival of the official from Spain whom they had looked for to do them justice, they finally resolved to take matters into their own hands. They formed the desperate resolution of assassinating Pizarro, and fixed on Sunday, June 26, 1541, for the accomplishment of their purpose. Pizarro had ample warning of the fate that was in store for him, but affected to treat the reports of it with indifference; he was, however, finally persuaded to remain away from church on the appointed day,

¹ Barros Arana, i, pp. 276 ff.

so that the conspirators were obliged to betake themselves to his house. It was shortly after noon, and Pizarro was just finishing dinner. His attendants made a futile effort to hold the assailants in parley; but the latter soon forced their way in, cut down Pizarro's half-brother, Martín de Alcantara, and then overwhelmed the governor himself, before he had had time to put on his armor. He fought like a lion at bay, and succeeded in accounting for several of his foes; but he was quickly borne down by sheer force of numbers, and sank lifeless to the ground in a welter of blood.¹

The 'men of Chile' made haste to proclaim the younger Almagro, in whose name they had perpetrated this terrible deed, to be governor of Peru. But their summons to obey him was by no means universally respected. Cuzco remained loyal to the cause of the Pizarros; and their old companion in arms, Alonso de Alvarado, sent a message to Vaca de Castro, the crown's representative, who was known to be on his way to New Castile, apprising him of what had occurred, and urging him to make haste. The fact that the Pizarros were the first to get into touch with the emissary of the home government goes far to explain why he took sides against their foes; and the rash and defiant attitude of the Almagrists confirmed him in his decision. He journeyed overland from the Isthmus to Peru; at Quito he displayed his commission, empowering him to assume the government, and despatched messengers to the cities farther south demanding that they forthwith recognize his authority. Had the Almagrists struck at once, before Vaca de Castro had had time to establish himself, it might

¹ He was probably not far from seventy at the time; cf. Prescott, *C. P.*, i, p. 202, note. The chief contemporary authorities on his death are P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 414-423; López de Gómara, in

B. A. E., xxii, pp. 244-245; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 54-55; others are cited in the footnotes to Prescott, ii, pp. 171-200.

have fared ill with the emissary of the home government. But their young leader was not the man to make the most of his opportunity. His first act was to seize Cuzco, to which he believed that he possessed unquestioned claims. He then wasted his time in futile negotiations, and thus gave Vaca de Castro the chance to occupy Lima. So confident was the latter of winning the victory in the trial of strength which he now saw to be inevitable, that he even refused the proffered assistance of Gonzalo Pizarro, who had but recently returned from the 'Land of Cinnamon.' The decisive battle began in the late afternoon of September 16, 1542, on the plains of Chupas, between Lima and Cuzco. It was a bloody contest, but the numbers and the generalship of the royalists were superior, and when night descended on the battle field the Almagrists broke and fled. A few days later the young Almagro was executed at Cuzco. One cannot refrain from pitying him in his hard fate. He was generous and brave, but born to be the tool of others.¹

A clean sweep had now been made of all the original conquerors of Peru, with one exception, Gonzalo Pizarro; and he, ostensibly at least, was in full accord with the representative of the crown. The government was in the hands of a man of unusual wisdom and ripe experience; for the moment it seemed as if the era of civil war was at an end. But at precisely this juncture the tranquillity of affairs in Peru was destined to be disturbed once more from a most unexpected source. This was the publication of a code, commonly known as the 'New Laws,' which was chiefly the fruit of the labors of the 'Apostle' Las Casas in behalf of the rights of the American Indians.² It received the Emperor's sig-

¹ P. Pizarro, ii, pp. 423-440; Cieza de León, *Guerra de Chupas*, caps. lxxvii-lxxxiv; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 58-69; Herrera, dec. vii, lib. iii,

caps. i-xii; lib. vi, cap. i; other references in Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 201-243.

² Herrera, dec. vii, lib. vi, cap. v; D. Fernández, *Historia del Perú*, ed. L.

nature at Barcelona on November 20, 1542, and the news of it threw the inhabitants of Peru into a perfect ferment of excitement, because it threatened, if rigorously enforced, to deprive them of a large share of the compulsory services of the natives on the encomiendas, the chief basis of the large fortunes which every one of them had hoped to make. In Mexico, where a comparatively efficient form of government had been in operation since the arrival of the Viceroy Mendoza in 1535, the protests of the settlers against the 'New Laws' received such strong support from the royal officials on the ground, that the most burdensome parts of the code were soon suspended.¹ But in Peru the situation was very different. It had been the Mecca of rough customers since its wealth had first become known; and the wrongs which Las Casas was attempting to right were generally believed to be particularly prevalent there. The struggles of the crown representatives and the conquistadores were not yet over;² there was need for reforms and for a strong hand to administer them. One of the provisions of the new code had commanded the abolition of the old audiencia at Panama, and the creation of a viceroy and an audiencia to reside at Lima. The Emperor conferred the viceregal office on Blasco Nuñez Vela, a knight of Ávila, and an ancient servant of the crown; and on May 17, 1544, the royal representative entered the Peruvian capital. He at once made it evident that he intended to enforce the new code with vigor, and that he expected prompt and implicit obedience on every hand.³

de Torre (Madrid, 1913-14, 2 vols.), i, pp. 21-24; Lea, "The Indian Policy of Spain," in *Yale Review*, August, 1899, pp. 143 ff. A facsimile reprint of the original Spanish edition of the New Laws, with an English translation and an historical introduction, was published, in a limited edition of 88 copies, by H. Stevens and F. W. Lucas at London in 1893.

¹ D. Fernández, i, pp. 25-39; Lea, *loc. cit.*, p. 145.

² Charles could not possibly have known of Vaca de Castro's victory at Chupas at the time that he sanctioned the publication of the 'New Laws.'

³ D. Fernández, i, pp. 41 ff., and also "Relación Anónima," printed on pp. 311-329 of the same; N. Albenino (or Alberino, cf. Harisse, *Bibliotheca*

But he reckoned with little knowledge of the sort of men who had conquered Peru. Vaca de Castro, interrupted in the midst of his task of restoring order, behaved, it is true, with tact and moderation.¹ He made haste to get in touch with the viceroy on his arrival. He assured him of his loyalty, and warned him of the danger of high-handed measures; and it was entirely characteristic of Blasco Nuñez's suspicious nature that he should have rewarded his predecessor's confidence by confining him on a ship in the harbor.² But Gonzalo Pizarro took a very different course. He was the last of the brood that had conquered New Castile, and had no mind to surrender all the claims he had inherited to the unpopular representative of an ungrateful sovereign. With Vaca de Castro he had preserved the appearance of friendship, — the time was not then ripe for the revolt he had long been planning; but now, with all his old associates up in arms against the 'New Laws' and looking to him to deliver them from the tyranny of the new viceroy, he saw that his chance had come. He collected a large band of enthusiastic followers at Cuzco,³ and started to march on Lima; there was every prospect that a battle would be fought. But the viceroy was unable even to muster forces to oppose Pizarro. His imperiousness had alienated every one with whom he came

Americana Vetustissima, no. 290); *Verdadera Relacion*, photostat reproduction of original edition (Seville, 1549) now in the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris, pp. 5-9; also *Relacion de los sucesos del Peru*, cited in Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 268, note; P. Gutiérrez de Santa Clara, *Historia de las Guerras Civiles del Perú* (Madrid, 1904, 4 vols.), i, pp. 21 ff.; Cieza de León, *The War of Quito*, ed. Markham for the Hakluyt Society (1913), pp. 1 ff.

¹ He had apparently laid away some treasure for himself and his family; cf. "Relacion del oro y plata que Vaca de Castro envió a su muger" in the N. Y.

P. L. volume of mss. entitled "Indias, Relaciones Varias, 1508-1537"; cf. also J. Francisco V. Silva, "Elogio de Vaca de Castro por Antonio de Herrera," in *R. A.*, for 1917-18, tercera época, xxxvi, pp. 13-42, 249-258, 407-418; xxxvii, pp. 85-110; xxxviii, pp. 96-122.

² Albenino, pp. 31-32; Gutiérrez, i, pp. 108 ff.; Fernández, i, pp. 55 ff. Vaca de Castro subsequently escaped to Spain, where he was arrested and kept in easy confinement for twelve years. After this he was released, vindicated, and given a seat in the Consejo Real. Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 290-292.

³ Albenino, pp. 16 ff.

in contact. Worst of all, the members of the new audiencia, who had followed him from Panama, refused to sanction a single one of his acts; and when he showed signs of resisting them, they had him imprisoned and declared him deposed.¹ Yet when they attempted to assert their own authority, they found that every man's hand was against them. Gonzalo Pizarro was the hero of the hour, and when he demanded that the audiencia invest him with the government, the members of that body did not venture to refuse. On October 28, 1544, he entered Lima amid universal rejoicing. The authority of the last of the conquistadores was restored.²

Gonzalo Pizarro made every effort to establish himself securely in the perilous position he had won, but the prestige of the crown and its representatives in the New World was too high to permit him to do so unopposed. Before his arrival at Lima the audiencia had shipped off the viceroy to Spain in the custody of one of their own members; but the latter's heart soon failed him at the prospect of having to explain to the Emperor the imprisonment of his representative, with the result that Blasco Nuñez, at his own request, was set on shore again at Tumbez. At San Miguel he collected an army of several hundred men; and when Pizarro marched against him with superior forces he retreated to the north, and there got reënforcements from Belalcázar at Popayan. There were long months of marching and countermarching in the mountains, in which Pizarro vainly sought to bring his enemy into action; but finally by feigning a retirement to the south he accomplished his purpose. The crucial battle was fought at Anaquito (just outside

¹ The indictment of the judges against him is given in Cieza de León, *War of Quito* (tr. Markham), pp. 143-152.

² Fernández, i, caps. viii-xxviii, *pas-*

sim; "Relacion Anónima," in i, pp. 311-329, of the same; A. Palomino, "Relación Sumaria," in i, pp. 331-338, of the same; Cieza de León, pp. 56-139; Zarate, in Barcia, iii, pp. 80 ff.

Quito), on January 18, 1546. The viceroy's troops were decisively defeated; Blasco Nuñez himself was unhorsed by a blow from a battle-axe, and his head stricken off by a black slave, as he lay wounded on the ground. He had been loyal and constant in his efforts to perform an impossible task, but he was lacking in every other qualification for the difficult mission with which he had been intrusted.¹

Meantime the news of Gonzalo Pizarro's successful defiance of the royal authority had been received with the utmost consternation in Spain. The Emperor was absent in Germany preparing to suppress the Lutherans, just as he had been at the time of the revolt of the Comuneros, with which the uprising in Peru was popularly compared.² Much correspondence and delay were consequently inevitable before the proper policy to pursue could be finally determined; but at last it was decided to send out to Peru an experienced cleric, named Pedro de la Gasca, who had already given ample proofs of his ability to serve the crown.³ Like Ximenes, he was quite as much of an administrator as a churchman. His feeble body and unimpressive exterior concealed an inflexible will and a keen judgment of men. Foreseeing that he would be unable to accomplish his purpose if constantly under the necessity of appealing to the home government, he demanded and obtained practically unlimited powers. Under the simple and unassuming title of president of the audiencia, he concealed an authority almost equal to that of the crown. In midsummer, 1546, he landed at the Isthmus, which was then under the control of an adherent of Pizarro. He assumed the humble garb of a cleric; and as

¹ Fernández, i, caps. xxix-liv, *passim*, and appendices ii, iii, and iv of the same; Gutiérrez, ii, pp. 1-399, *passim*; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 289-335.

² Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, p. 334.

³ On Gasca's early career cf. Calvete de Estrella, *Rebelión de Pizarro en el Perú y vida de D. Pedro Gasca*, ed. Paz y Mélia (Madrid, 1889, 2 vols.), i, pp. 5 ff.

the scope of his powers became gradually known,¹ assured all men that he proposed to pursue a policy of conciliation. Gradually, inconspicuously, he gained for himself a foothold; and when an embassy despatched by Pizarro to Spain, to secure the formal recognition of his government by the Emperor, passed through Panama, Gasca persuaded its leader to abandon the mission, accept his own pardon, promise to support him, and urge upon Pizarro the expediency of doing likewise. Meantime he used every effort to attain his object in Peru without another war. He sent conciliatory letters to Pizarro, assuring him of pardon for his revolt if he would but return to his allegiance. He promised to remedy all the abuses which had made the late viceroy so detested, and caused announcement to that effect to be made throughout the land. Nothing could possibly be gained, he pointed out, by continuing the revolution, when everything it had sought to win had been conceded by the crown. This reasoning had visible results in various quarters. So deeply did it impress the commander of Pizarro's fleet, which was lying at that juncture in the harbor of Panama, that he finally surrendered the control of it to Gasca, who was thus at last possessed of the means of access to Peru.²

But the president's arguments were wasted on the man whom of all others they were intended to persuade. Gonzalo Pizarro did not venture on the one hand to follow the advice of those who urged him to carry his revolt to its logical conclusion — to defy the Emperor and to proclaim himself king, as the Infante Alfonso had done at Ávila in 1465;³ on the other, he refused to listen to Gasca. He

¹ At first he was apparently successful in keeping them secret: "lo qual hasta entonces no auia querido manifestar ni descubrir á nadie": Albenino, pp. 86-87.

² Fernández, ii, caps. xxi ff.; Calvete

de Estrella, i, pp. 181 ff.; Letters of Gasca to the Emperor and others, in *D. I. E.*, xlix, *passim*; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 336-363.

³ The simile (cf. *ante*, II, p. 13) was used by Pizarro's councillors; cf. Fer-

was puffed up with pride by the victories he had won, and by the adulation that had been lavished upon him.¹ He was slow to see that the army on which he depended was already honeycombed with disaffection as a result of Gasca's proclamations; and when the president finally landed at Tumbez, in June, 1547, with a well equipped force, he found to his deep chagrin that he was incapable of opposing him. His first thought was to retire into Chile; but the way was barred on the shores of Lake Titicaca by an army twice the size of his own, under Diego Centeño, one of the few who had previously supported the royal representative against him, and who now seized the chance to raise his standard for Gasca. The military genius of his octogenarian captain, Francisco de Carbajal, gave Pizarro an unexpected victory in the engagement that followed, October 26, on the plains of Huarina, the bloodiest that had yet been fought in Peru;² and the encouragement he derived from it led him to return to Cuzco, and risk everything on the issue of a battle with Gasca. But the president did not propose to fight until he was certain of victory. He spent the winter in collecting reënforcements, so that by the time that he advanced to the final encounter he commanded the largest, best equipped, and best disciplined European army that had ever trod the soil of New Castile — utterly different from the reckless adventurers of which his enemy's forces were principally composed. The issue was decided in the vale of Xaquixa-

nández, ii, p. 74; Cieza de León, *War of Quito* (tr. Markham), pp. 162-163.

¹ Albenino, p. 82, thus describes his entrance into San Miguel "donde fue rescibido con mucho triumpho; y en la ciudad de los Reyes lo mesmo. E mostraua en su aspecto y grauedad ser otro Julio cesar, o Anibal, quando entrauan en Roma victoriosos. Y era tanta la magestad que este tyrano traya, que ni se puede dezir ni creer."

² Fernández, ii, caps. lxxix-lxxx; Calvete de Estrella, ii, pp. 55 ff.; Albenino, pp. 132-136; Gutiérrez, iv, pp. 510 ff. There is also a "Relacion Sumaria de las cosas acontecidas desde el tiempo que Gasca llevo al Nombre de Dios, que fue 27 de Julio, 1546, hasta 29 de Diciembre, 1547"; transcript of original ms. in N. Y. P. L., in the ms. volume entitled "Peru, Papeles Varios."

guana, some fifteen miles west of Cuzco, on Monday, April 9, 1548. There was no battle. The followers of Pizarro, after a glance at the serried ranks of Gasca's advancing squadrons, deserted their leader, and rode over in large companies to the foe. The last of the conquistadores endured the terrible mortification of being obliged to surrender without a fight.¹

The judgments on the way in which Gasca utilized his victory vary widely according to the viewpoints of those who have pronounced them. For some he is the faithful, benevolent, effective servant of the crown, stern only because the situation in which he found himself demanded it; for others he is but an ignoble and revengeful cleric, who, beginning with insincere professions of pardon and conciliation, left behind him "a trail of blood," and departed with his pockets full and the chief administrative problems of the country unsolved.² But if we approach the problem from the sixteenth-century standpoint, we shall infallibly conclude that this latter verdict is too harsh. It was not an age of mercy, least of all to the authors of revolts against the crown. It was a foregone conclusion that the chief rebel and his principal officers should be condemned to death. One cannot refrain from pitying the last of the Pizarros, the only one of them who had survived the entire sixteen years of the conquest. He had many admirable qualities, and was in the prime of life when he was sent to execution; but under the circumstances it was impossible that he should have been allowed to live. Nor is it fair to blame Gasca

¹ Fernández, ii, pp. 405 ff.; Calvete de Estrella, ii, pp. 127 ff.; Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 421 ff., and references there.

² Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, pp. 453-471, and Moses, *The Spanish Dependencies in South America*, i, pp. 228-229, represent the two extremes. Santiago Arcos, the

historian of La Plata, pronounces Gasca "sans contredit l'homme le plus remarquable que l'Espagne ait envoyé en Amérique." *La Plata*, p. 119. Cf. also S. Lorente, *Historia del Peru, 1542-1598* (Lima, 1863), pp. 199-200.

for returning to Spain without fully settling the government. He had been sent out with exceptional powers for a specific purpose, the putting down of the insurrection; having accomplished it, and initiated reforms which were essential for the prevention of its recurrence, he went back in 1550 to report to the crown, was rewarded with a bishopric, and died in 1567. There was one more small rebellion in Peru, after his departure, that of Francisco Giron, who, dissatisfied with his share of the spoils of the victory over Pizarro, raised the standard of revolt at Cuzco; but it was put down without much difficulty in 1554, and would have been suppressed even sooner than it was, had it not occurred in the interim between the administrations of two viceroys, when the forces of the government were without a leader.¹ The real credit for ending the regime of the conquistadores in Peru, and of establishing the authority of the crown in its place, is principally due to Pedro de la Gasca.

We must now pass on rapidly. After Gasca's departure the chief authority in Peru was exercised by the members of the audiencia for more than a year, until the arrival of a new viceroy, Antonio de Mendoza, sent down, in September, 1551, after a long experience in Mexico. Ten months later he died, to be succeeded, after an interval of nearly four years, by his distant cousin, Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Cañete, who continued to hold office till 1561. These officials were chiefly busied with problems of administration which do not concern us here; but the period of their rule witnessed a further extension of the Spanish territories to the south, and thus rounds out the story of the conquest of Chile. Valdivia, as before, was the principal hero of it. On his return to Peru in the winter of 1547-48, he promptly

¹ Cf. "Rebellion de Francisco Hernandez Giron en el Perú en 1553," in *Varias Relaciones del Perú y Chile*,

vol. xiii of *Libros Españoles Raros ó Curiosos* (Madrid, 1879), pp. 199-235.

joined the forces of la Gasca, and lent invaluable aid in the ensuing campaign that ended at Xaquixaguana. La Gasca rewarded him with his heart's desire, the office of governor of Chile in the name of the king; and after issuing triumphantly victorious from an investigation of his conduct which was demanded by his enemies,¹ he returned to Santiago in the summer of 1549.² The chief thing that occupied him thenceforth was the prosecution of the war against the Araucanians. In 1550-51 he led armies into the south of Chile, and founded the cities of Concepcion, Valdivia, and Villarrica. In 1552-53 he penetrated still farther into the territory of the foe, and left small garrisons. But Valdivia had forgotten that the natives of southern Chile were of sterner stuff than the Incas or the Chibchas, and he was to pay for his error with his life. A tremendous uprising of the Araucanians ensued. The principal stronghold of the Spaniards was taken, and Valdivia was called south to suppress the revolt. In the battle that followed, on New Year's Day, 1554, at Tucapel, near the mouth of the river Lebu, he was overwhelmingly defeated and made prisoner; and subsequently tortured to death by his captors, who cut off his arms, roasted them, and devoured them before his eyes.³

The death of Valdivia threw the affairs of Chile into confusion. There were a number of claimants for his vacant office, of whom the most prominent were Aguirre and Villagran. But Aguirre had been invested in 1552 with the government of the rich mining region of Tucuman to the northeast, where by striving to render himself independent of all superiors save the home government he had become

¹ *D. I. E.*, xlix, pp. 451-571.

² "Cartas de Valdivia al Emperador Carlos V," in the *Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile*, i, pp. 17-53; Barros Arana, *Historia de Chile*, i, pp. 312-332.

³ Such at least is the common story,

though it is difficult to reconcile it with the admitted fact that the Araucanians abhorred human flesh. Cf. Barros Arana, i, pp. 409-443, especially the note on the authorities on the life of Valdivia.

an object of suspicion to the local authorities ;¹ while Villagran had been severely defeated in an effort to retrieve the disaster of Tucapel, and was, in addition, so jealous of Aguirre, that the viceroy, who claimed the decision of the matter, was unwilling to grant him the prize that he desired. The final outcome was the appointment, on January 29, 1557, of the viceroy's son, Garcia Hurtado de Mendoza, to the governorship of Chile — two rival veterans of the conquest being thus obliged to cede their claims to an inexperienced youth, not yet twenty-two years of age. The results of the discontent that this arrangement produced must be reserved for consideration in a later volume ; for the present we are only concerned with the new government's conquests. Some of these were made in Aguirre's old dominion to the south of Tucuman, where the city of Mendoza, named in honor of the viceroy, was founded in March, 1562 ; but most of them were effected at the expense of the Araucanians. The natives were defeated in three battles, on November 30, 1557, and on January 20 and December 14, 1558 ; their leader Caupolican was captured, and cruelly put to death ; and exploring expeditions by land and sea penetrated as far as the Strait of Magellan. But the power of the Araucanians was not yet broken, as the history of the succeeding years was to prove ; and the heroism of their resistance was immortalized by a young soldier in the Spanish forces named Alonso de Ercilla y Zuñiga, in an epic poem which has been held worthy of comparison with the masterpieces of Homer and of Torquato Tasso.²

¹ Cf. J. T. Medina, *Francisco de Aguirre en Tucuman* (Santiago de Chile, 1896).

² *La Araucana*, on which cf. Barros Arana, ii, pp. 267 ff. On this paragraph as a whole cf. A. de Góngora Mar-molejo, *Historia de Chile . . . hasta 1575*,

in *Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile*, ii, pp. 1-315, *passim* ; *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 217-220 ; xciv, pp. 247-254 ; Barros Arana, ii, pp. 1-294, *passim*, and references there ; Moses, i, pp. 184-187, 352-359 ; Silva Lezaeta, *El Conquistador Francisco de Aguirre*, caps. viii, ix.

In order to round out the history of the conquest of New Castile under Charles V, we must briefly recount the explorations of the Spaniards in the region of the Rio de la Plata, first discovered by Juan Diaz de Solis in 1516.¹ The story of these events is closely interwoven with the careers of at least two of the conquistadores whose acquaintance we have already made in other parts of the New World.

It will be remembered that in the spring of 1526 the Emperor and a group of Seville merchants coöperated in the sending out of a fleet under Sebastian Cabot, to follow up the explorations of Magellan and Loaysa, and, if possible, to find a strait through the Western Continent.² But the aims and ambitions of the commander and his subordinates were widely at variance. Disaffection broke out shortly after the departure of the fleet, which Cabot directed to the shores of Brazil; the leaders of the malcontents were arrested and then released; the flagship was lost and everything thrown into confusion. At this juncture reports were received of large quantities of gold and silver that were to be found in the basin of La Plata.³ There was always the bare possibility that the estuary might prove to be the longed for strait; and as the expedition was in no fit state to face the perils of the Pacific, it was decided to ascend the great river of the Argentine. Three dissentients were marooned on the island of Los Patos;⁴ and in the spring of 1527, Cabot started to follow up the explorations of de Solis. He went up the Parana beyond its junction with the Paraguay, which he subsequently also ascended, probably as far as its confluence with the Pilcomayo. He founded a small settlement,

¹ Cf. *ante*, Vol. II, pp. 218-219.

² Cf. *ante*, pp. 449 f.

³ It was at this time that the old name of Mar Dulce began to give way to this. Cf. L. L. Dominguez, *The Conquest of the River Plate* (Hakluyt

Society, 1891), p. xxvi; R. D. Carbia, *Manual de Historia de la Civilización Argentina*, i, pp. 286-288.

⁴ Doubtless Santa Catharina, off the Brazilian coast, in latitude 27° S.

which he called San Espiritu, on the lower reaches of the Parana. But his followers were decimated by disease and by Indian attacks; the promised gold and silver were not found; there were rumors of Portuguese hostility; and in 1528 Cabot started back to Spain, to report to the Emperor and demand reënforcements.¹ On his way down the river he met with an expedition led by a rival explorer — one Diego Garcia de Moguer — under a royal *capitulacion* not very different from his own; but as the outlook was so discouraging, and the priority of Cabot's claims seemed clearly established, the newcomer soon decided to retire.² Both men reached Spain in the summer of 1530, but neither of them got authority to continue their explorations; and the colony at San Espiritu was abandoned two years afterwards.³

Yet their venture was soon to be repeated by others on a larger scale. Clearly La Plata was not the entrance to the strait which all men longed to find; on the other hand it might well be the opening of a shorter and more convenient route to Peru, whose vast riches were rapidly getting to be the talk of all Spain. It was chiefly with this idea that Pedro de Mendoza, a native of Guadix and a soldier in the Italian wars,⁴ applied for and obtained from the Emperor in the year 1533 a license to colonize the new region at his own expense, with the titles of adelantado and governor of

¹ J. T. Medina, *El Veneciano Sebastian Caboto al Servicio de España* (Santiago de Chile, 1908, 2 vols.), i, pp. 135 ff., and F. Tarducci, *John and Sebastian Cabot* (tr. Brownson, Detroit, 1893), give detailed, but very different accounts of this expedition. Cf. also R. D. Carbia, i, pp. 297-300. The statement of Moses, i, p. 189, that Cabot, after his return to Spain, "continued, for the remaining thirty years of his life, the general director of Spanish expeditions to foreign lands," is quite incorrect. In the winter of 1547-

48, he went back to England, took service under Edward VI, and died in 1557, Cf. *Dictionary of National Biography*, under his name.

² Cf. J. T. Medina, *Los Viajes de Diego Garcia de Moguer al Río de la Plata* (Santiago de Chile, 1908), and also J. T. Medina, *Gonzalo de Acosta* (Santiago de Chile, 1908), cap. i.

³ Santiago Arcos, *La Plata*, pp. 80-83; R. D. Carbia, i, pp. 301 ff.

⁴ On Mendoza's origin and early career cf. P. Groussac, *Mendoza y Garay* (Buenos Aires, 1916), pp. 46 ff.

the settlement he proposed to found.¹ Over 2000 Castilians accompanied him, some of them already distinguished; and there were also a considerable number of Germans. Many of these were sent out through the instrumentality of the great house of Welser, which had but recently established itself on the shores of Venezuela and was striving to strengthen its foothold in the New World, while others enlisted in a military capacity; among them was Ulrich Schmidel of Straubing, who wrote the earliest account of the colonization of La Plata.² The expedition left Spain on August 24, 1535; there were violent disputes as to the route to be followed, which led to the murder, at Mendoza's command, of his principal lieutenant, Juan de Osorio; but in January, 1536, the fleet reached the mouth of La Plata, and in the middle of the following March a settlement was established, on the site of the present capital of the Argentine Republic, and given the name of 'Nuestra Señora de Buen Ayre.'³ But misfortunes followed thick and fast. Lack of provisions and Indian attacks played havoc with the colony at Buenos Aires; it ultimately had to be abandoned, and the remnants of it moved up the river to the mouth of the Pilcomayo, where the town of Asuncion had been founded in 1537.⁴ An expedition into the northwest in search of Peru perished miserably in the wilderness; and finally Mendoza, worn out and discouraged, started back to Spain; but

¹ *D. I. I.*, xxii, pp. 350-360.

² Best English translation in L. L. Dominguez, *The Conquest of the River Plate*, pp. 1-91; cf. also *ibid.*, p. xxv, and R. Lehmann-Nitsche, *Ulrich Schmidel, der erste Geschichtschreiber der La Plata-Länder, 1535-1555* (Munich, 1912), pp. 22-27. I can find no basis for the statement of Arcos (p. 90), copied by Moses (i, p. 191), that Schmidel was a "commander of infantry."

³ The date is given wrongly by Schmidel, who used another calendar,

as 1535, and has been taken from him by most of the later historians. Cf. Lehmann-Nitsche, *op. cit.*, p. 29. Carbia, i, p. 313, puts the founding in early February.

⁴ Such at least seems the most probable date; cf. note to p. 22 of L. L. Dominguez, *The Conquest of the River Plate*. The chronology of all these events is much confused, owing largely to the vagaries of U. Schmidel. Cf. also Carbia, i, pp. 322-323.

"when he was come nearly half way, the hand of the Almighty so smote him that he died miserably."¹

The survivors who had been left behind gathered together at Asuncion, and elected Martinez de Irala to be their governor. The Indians of that region proved more friendly than the rest; "they were so scrupulous in the observance of the treaties they made with the invaders, that they exceeded the terms of the obligations imposed,"² and a period of peace and prosperity ensued. Since no gold or silver was anywhere to be found, the Spaniards naturally settled down to a life of ease; their principal occupation was to find themselves wives. The Guarani women were apparently most attractive to them, and polygamy and concubinage became open and avowed. Irala married all seven daughters of the principal cacique, and desired in his will that the children whom they bore him should be considered and treated as Spaniards.³ It was perhaps the first large-scale experiment in the history of Latin America in the practice of indiscriminate mingling of the two races — a practice which was to increase apace in the succeeding years, and is the key to many of the most fundamental differences that exist today between the United States and its neighbors to the south.

But Irala and his associates were not left undisturbed by the home government in the happy seclusion of the forests of Paraguay. As soon as Charles learned from Mendoza's companions of the death of the adelantado and the misfortunes of his colony, he determined to send out reënforcements to the survivors, together with a new governor

¹ L. L. Dominguez, p. 13; P. Groussac, *Mendoza y Garay*, pp. 125-200, *passim*.

² P. Guevara, *Historia del Paraguay, Rio de la Plata y Tucuman*, in P. de Angelis, *Coleccion de obras y Docu-*

mentos relativos a la Historia de la Plata (Buenos Aires, 1835-37, 5 vols.), ii, p. 96.

³ Arcos, p. 100.

appointed by the crown. In looking about for a fit man for this arduous office, his eye fell on our old acquaintance Cabeza de Vaca, who, after his perilous journey from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, had returned to Spain and settled at Seville. But the veteran explorer found European city life dull after his adventures in the wilderness. His interest and imagination were constantly stirred by the stories from the ships that cast anchor in the Guadalquivir, and he eagerly seized the opportunity that was offered him to take out reënforcements to the colony at La Plata, and assume command of the settlement on his arrival. In the end of 1540 he set sail from San Lucar with 400 men and forty-six horses; after a tempestuous voyage, and a series of adventures on the Brazilian coast and the lower waters of the Parana, he reached Asuncion on March 11, 1542. He had no mind to continue the policy of Irala, who, on his arrival, was necessarily relegated to second place. He led vigorous campaigns against the more hostile of the Indian tribes, sent fresh exploring expeditions into the interior, and in general roused the colony to a far greater degree of activity than it had ever known before. But it was inevitable that he should make numerous enemies. The older settlers were hostile to his ideas, and profoundly jealous of the new comers he had brought with him; they longed for a return to the more patriarchal regime of Irala.¹ In the course of an expedition which he had led up the river, the governor had contracted an inflammation of the eyes, and the

¹ The views of the two parties into which the settlement was divided are best represented in the work of Schmidel, who supported Irala, and in Pero Hernandez's *Comentarios de Alvar Nuñez Cabeça de Vaca* (best Spanish edition by M. Serrano y Sanz, with various accompanying documents, in vol. v of *Colección de Libros y Documentos referentes*

á la Historia de América, Madrid, 1906; English translation in L. L. Dominguez, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-262), which state his side of the case. Naturally they contradict each other at almost every point, and have been well described as "the flint and steel which, when struck together, produce light." L. L. Dominguez, p. xvii.

malcontents took advantage of it to effect his removal. In 1544 he was arrested without warning in his house at Asuncion, hurried on board a boat, and packed off to Spain, with a long list of charges against him, on which he was tried shortly after his arrival. The verdict was not rendered till 1551, when he was condemned to an exile of three years in Africa; whether or not the sentence was actually enforced is uncertain, but it seems clear that he was ultimately restored to the favor of the court, and given a judicial office in the city of Seville.¹ On his departure from Asuncion, Irala was reëlected to the governorship of the colony, and was subsequently confirmed in that position by the home government. He was given the title of adelantado, and continued to rule the settlement till his death in 1556.²

This brief concluding account of the early exploration and settlement of the basin of La Plata, and the enormous importance and prosperity which that region was subsequently to attain, must not make us forget that the centre of gravity of New Castile remained in Peru until well on into the eighteenth century. We have seen that one of the chief inducements that led the Spaniards to explore the valley of the great river was the hope that it would afford them a shorter route to the richer territories farther west; and though that hope was not realized in such fashion as to be of much practical value in colonial times, it did not cease to inspire the early settlers of the Argentine. To put it in other, and still more familiar words, the conquistadores were primarily in search of the precious metals; and they neglected to develop regions which did not afford these, though they were

¹ Cf. appendix vii to T. Buckingham Smith's edition of Cabeza de Vaca's *Relation* (New York, 1871), pp. 250-251. The authorities are most contra-

dictory in regard to the closing years of the great explorer's life.

² Arcos, pp. 113-119; Carbia, i, pp. 351-354, gives the story in full detail.

easier to reach, and often pleasanter to live in. Many of the gravest errors of the Spaniards in the New World are directly traceable to their failure to realize that agriculture is the stablest source of a new country's material prosperity ; and the economic history of Latin America since the revolutions has served to emphasize the seriousness of their mistake. The grain country of La Plata, regarded by the Hapsburg sovereigns as a comparatively unimportant outpost, was ultimately to become the greatest of all centres of South American wealth.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

See notes to the two preceding chapters, and add :

Contemporary Authorities.— In addition to the standard general collections and authorities, such as the *D. I. E.*, the *D. I. I.*, Navarrete, Herrera, Oviedo, and the like, there are, on the conquest and civil wars of Peru : Pedro Pizarro, *Relacion del Descubrimiento y Conquista de los Reinos del Peru*, best and most recent English translation by P. A. Means for the Cortes Society (New York, 1921, 2 vols.); Pedro Sancho, *Relación*, English translation by P. A. Means for the Cortes Society (New York, 1917); F. de Xeres, "Conquista del Peru," ed. and tr. C. R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society on pp. 1-109 of *Reports on the Discovery of Peru* (London, 1872); P. de Andagoya, *Relacion de los Sucesos de Pedrarias Davila*, ed. and tr. C. R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society (London, 1865); A. de Zarate, "Historia del Descubrimiento y Conquista del Peru," ed. A. Gonzalez Barcia in *Historiadores Primitivos de las Indias Occidentales* (Madrid, 1749), iii, pp. 1-176: English tr. in Robert Kerr's *A General History and Collection of Voyages and Travels* (Edinburgh, 1812), iv and v; P. Ruiz Naharro, "Relacion de los Hechos de los Españoles en el Perú" (in *D. I. E.*, xxvi, pp. 232-256); Diego Fernández de Palencia, *Historia del Perú, primera parte*, ed. L. de Torre, in the *Colección Hispano-Americana* (Madrid, 1913-16, 2 vols.); Garcilaso de la Vega, *Comentarios Reales de los Incas*, sometimes called *Historia General del Peru*, ed. H. H. Urteaga in the *Colección de Historiadores Clasicos del Peru* (Lima, 1918-19, 2 vols.). All these, and other works which it does not seem worth while to enumerate here, were used by Prescott in his *Conquest of Peru*, though not, for the most part, in the editions here given. His critical estimates of them, scattered through his work, are still valuable (cf. also Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History*, ii, pp. 563-573). Prescott, moreover, made liberal use of an anonymous manuscript account called "Relacion del Primer Descubrimiento de la Costa y Mar del Sur" (cf. *C. P.*, ii, pp. 497-499), which I have been unable to find; it seems probable that it was destroyed, along with other historical papers, in the great Boston fire of 1872.

Since Prescott wrote there have been published *Libro Primero de Cabildos de Lima*, 3 vols., containing, respectively, *Actas desde 1535 á 1539*, *Apéndices*, and *Documentos*, ed. E. Torres Saldamando (Lima, 1888, and Paris, 1900); Cieza de León, *Guerras Civiles del Peru* (i.e., part 4 of his *Crónica*), books 1, 2, and 3 (books 1 and 2,

(*Guerra de las Salinas*, and *Guerra de Chupas*) are published in the *D. I. E.*, lxxviii, pp. 1-451, and lxxvi, pp. 1-371, and also, in English translation, by C. R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society in 1923 and 1917 respectively; book 3 (*Guerra de Quito*) was edited by M. Jiménez de la Espada for the Bibliotheca Hispana-Ultramarina at Madrid in 1877, and again, in English translation, for the Hakluyt Society by C. R. Markham in 1913); Alonzo Enriquez de Guzman, *Libro de la Vida de*, ed. and tr. C. R. Markham for the Hakluyt Society (London, 1862); "Relación del Sitio de Cuzco 1535 á 1539," and "Rebelión de Francisco Hernandez Giron en el Peru en 1553," both anonymous, and edited by the Marquis de la Fuensanta del Valle under the title of *Varias Relaciones del Perú y Chile*, in vol. xiii of the *Colección de Libros Españoles Raros ó Curiosos* (Madrid, 1879); P. Gutiérrez de Santa Clara, *Historia de las Guerras Civiles del Perú, 1544-1548*, ed. M. Serrano y Sanz, in the *Colección de Libros y Documentos referentes á la Historia de América* (Madrid, 1904-10, 4 vols.); J. C. Calvete de Estrella, *Rebelión de Pizarro en el Perú y Vida de D. Pedro Gasca*, ed. A. Paz y Mélia in the *Colección de Escritores Castellanos* (Madrid, 1889, 2 vols.); two "Relaciones de lo sucedido en el Perú después de la llegada del Virrey Blasco Nuñez Vela," one by Antonio Palomino, the other anonymous, and an anonymous "Relación de lo sucedido en el Perú después de la prisión del Virrey Blasco Nuñez Vela," all three edited by L. de Torre, as appendices (i, pp. 311-348) to his edition of Diego Fernández de Palencia, cited above. I have been able to utilize all of these. The editions I have cited are almost always the most recent, if not the only ones, and most of them contain useful estimates of the authors and their works.

Besides the published documents and chronicles above mentioned, there are two contemporary accounts of different phases of the conquest, both in black letter, and known to bibliographers, but not hitherto utilized by historians, at least in the originals: to all intents and purposes they can be classified as manuscripts. The first is an anonymous "Conquista del Peru, llamada la Nueva Castilla," which was printed in Seville in April, 1534; the only copy of it that I know of is in the New York Public Library, and I have referred to it in the footnotes as "N. Y. P. L. chronicle." It is not in the British Museum. For further details, see J. T. Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Americana*, i, pp. 141-142. It forms the basis for the "Relatione d'un Capitano Spagnuolo," printed in Ramusio, *Navigazioni i Viaggi*, iii (Venice, 1565), fols. 371 v-378 v, and utilized there by Prescott; but there are some minor variations, and there are also insertions in the Italian which do not appear in the original. Most of these insertions seem to be taken

from Xeres, but their phraseology, curiously enough, is very different from that of the Italian translation of Xeres which is printed in Ramusio directly after his version of the N. Y. P. L. chronicle; it also varies widely from the Italian translation of Xeres by Domingo de Gaztelù, which was published at Venice in 1535. It seems probable, in other words, that Ramusio's version of the N. Y. P. L. chronicle is a translation of an earlier and possibly Spanish fusion of the N. Y. P. L. chronicle and of Xeres. There are a few other insertions in Ramusio's version of the N. Y. P. L. chronicle which cannot be traced to Xeres; moreover the ending in Ramusio is much fuller than in the original, and gives numerous details of the voyage home and arrival at Seville, which is dated January 15, 1534. There is, however, one glaring misstatement in this latter part, when Pedrarias, who had died in Nicaragua in 1531, is described as aiding the adventurers in their return across the Isthmus of Panama; and this naturally throws some doubt on all those portions of Ramusio's narrative which cannot be directly traced either to the N. Y. P. L. chronicle or to Xeres. The original author of the N. Y. P. L. chronicle was one of Pizarro's companions, and assures us that he bore witness to everything he set down "como testigo de vista"; but he admits that "otras muchas cosas se me han passado de la memoria" — in other words, it seems likely that he wrote his story after he got back to Spain, while Xeres's account, with which it is natural to compare it, was composed on the spot. There is no evidence, save Ramusio's statement, that the author was a captain; but it is abundantly clear that he was an unscrupulous treasure-seeker; lust for gold stands out in everything he wrote. He was in fact probably typical of the rank and file of Pizarro's men, and his story, if only for that reason, is well worth careful scrutiny. It covers the period from the departure from Panama (which the author places in February, 1531) to the execution of Atahualpa in August, 1533, and differs in numerous details from those of Xeres and Pedro Pizarro, and from that contained in Hernando Pizarro's letter of November, 1533, to the Audiencia of Santo Domingo (printed on pp. 113-127 of the Hakluyt Society's volume entitled *Reports on the Discovery of Peru*). The second of these two accounts is a "Verdadera Relación de lo Suscedido en . . . el Perú desde la yda . . . del Virrey Blasco Nuñez Vela hasta el desbarato y muerte de Gonzalo Pizarro . . ." by 'Nicolas Albenino' (not 'Alberino,' as Harris, *Bibliotheca Americana Vetustissima*, no. 290, has it) 'florentino.' This was printed in black letter at Seville in 1549, and there is a copy in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, which has been photostated for the Library of Congress and nine other libraries in the

United States. It consists of 160 pages of small sized paper, and contains a few interesting details, though nothing of great importance. For further information, see J. T. Medina, *Biblioteca Hispano-Americana*, i, pp. 231-232.

On Quesada and Santa Fé de Bogotá there are, besides the works already mentioned, Quesada's own "Relación" (cf. appendix i to R. B. Cunninghame Graham's *Conquest of New Granada* (Boston and New York, 1922), also appendix ii to the same on Quesada's lost writings); *Relaciones Históricas de América; primera Mitad del Siglo XVI*, ed. M. Serrano y Sanz, for the Sociedad de Bibliófilos Españoles (Madrid, 1916); and Fray Pedro de Aguado's *Historia de Santa Marta y Nuevo Reino de Granada*, ed. J. Bécker (Madrid, 1916-17, 2 vols.). For Chile, the *Coleccion de Historiadores de Chile*, i, ii (Santiago de Chile, 1861-62), contain the "Cartas de Valdivia al Emperador Carlos V," the "Primer Libro de Actas del Cabildo de Santiago (1541-1557)," and the "Historia de Chile hasta el año de 1575" by A. de Gongora Marmolejo. For La Plata, *The Conquest of the River Plate, 1535-1555*, ed. L. L. Dominguez for the Hakluyt Society (London, 1891), contains an excellent translation of Ulrich Schmidt's (Schmidel's) work, and of Pero Hernandez's *Comentarios de Alvar Nuñez Cabeça de Vaca*.

Later Works. — At the head of the list of these, on Peru, come the *Análes del Perú* by F. Montesinos, written probably between 1630 and 1645, and edited by V. M. Maurtua (Madrid, 1906). Prescott (*C. P.*, ii, pp. 78-79, 113, note) rated this writer very low, and the reliability of his other work, the *Memorias Antiguas del Perú* (cf. Hakluyt Society edition and translation by P. A. Means, London, 1920, pp. xi ff.) has been the subject of much discussion; but there seems little doubt that he is a far safer guide than was generally supposed seventy-five years ago. W. H. Prescott's *History of the Conquest of Peru* (New York, 1848, 2 vols.) still remains the standard authority. It is one of the author's masterpieces, worthy to rank with *Ferdinand and Isabella*, and the more recent works on the same subject add little or nothing to it, save for the brief period after Gasca's departure, which Prescott left untouched; to this S. Lorente, *Historia del Perú bajo la dinastía Austriaca, 1542-1598* (Lima, 1863), is an adequate guide. For the region now occupied by the republic of Colombia, the *Noticias Historiales de las conquistas de Tierra Firme*, by Fray Pedro Simón (Bogotá, 1882-92, 5 vols.), and the *Historia General de las conquistas del Nuevo Reino de Granada*, by L. Fernández Piedrahita (Bogotá, 1881), are two characteristically prolix seventeenth-century narratives. J. Acosta, *Compendio histórico del Descubrimiento y*

Colonización de la Nueva Granada (Bogotá, 1901); E. Restrepo Tirado, *Descubrimiento y Conquista de Colombia* (Bogotá, 1917-19, 2 vols.); C. R. Markham, *The Conquest of New Granada* (London, 1912); and R. B. Cunningham Graham, *The Conquest of New Granada, being the Life of Gonzalo Jimenez de Quesada* (Boston and New York, 1922), are useful recent works. For Chile, D. Barros Arana, *Historia Jeneral de Chile* (Santiago de Chile, 1884-1902, 16 vols.), vols. i and ii, and L. Galdámes, *Estudio de la Historia de Chile* (Santiago de Chile, 1911), are the best modern authorities. On the La Plata region, vols. i and ii of P. de Angelis, *Coleccion de Obras y Documentos relativos a la Historia . . . del Rio de la Plata* (Buenos Aires, 1835-37, 6 vols.); F. Tarducci, *John and Sebastian Cabot*, tr. Brownson (Detroit, 1893); J. T. Medina, *El Veneciano Sebastián Caboto al Servicio de España* (Santiago de Chile, 1908, 2 vols.; excellent bibliography and documents); Santiago Arcos, *La Plata, étude historique* (Paris, 1865); and the *Manual de Historia de la Civilización Argentina*, ordenado por R. D. Carbia (Buenos Aires, 1917), contain much valuable information. Monographs of a more special nature are cited, at appropriate places, in the text, and the footnotes to B. Moses, *Spanish Dependencies in South America*, will afford additional details.

CHAPTER XXX

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE INDIES

THE growth of the American territories of Spain proceeded at such a rapid pace during the reign of Charles V that the system of administration which he had inherited from his grandparents became manifestly inadequate before he had been many years upon the throne. At his accession he had probably regarded the American continent, in so far as he had any conception of it at all, chiefly in the light of a vexatious barrier, impeding his access to the Spice Islands beyond. At his abdication he realized that it was his principal source of wealth, the financial foundation on which the power of the house of Austria reposed; that his territories there were vastly more extensive than all the rest of his Empire put together; and that the Christianization and civilization of the Indians who inhabited them constituted a problem and a duty far more difficult than he had originally supposed. Small wonder if his reign witnessed an enormous development and ramification of the colonial system of the Catholic Kings.

Yet it is important to observe that all the fundamental principles that underlay the American policy of Ferdinand and Isabella were preserved virtually unaltered by their successor. The crown kept the exclusive control of the new dominions in its own hands. It created and maintained a separate set of institutions to aid in their administration, which was thus totally distinct from that of any of its European possessions. It kept a close watch on its repre-

sentatives in the Indies; and it imposed such manifold limitations upon them that they were constantly under the necessity of referring to the home government. It rigidly supervised immigration to the New World, which, save in special cases, was theoretically restricted to the inhabitants of Castile; and trade was subjected to the same close surveillance. It persisted in regarding all the natives as subjects of the Castilian crown, and put forth edicts and laws to regulate their existence. All the development of the administration of the Indies under Charles V was accomplished in full consonance with these basic ideas. The changes consisted in the manner of their application to a vastly larger field.

Let us start with an investigation of those organs of the government of the Indies which resided in Spain, and there aided the Emperor in his efforts to perform the wellnigh impossible task of dictating, executing, and interpreting the laws for his overseas dominions at a distance of more than three thousand miles. These were the Council of the Indies and the Casa de Contratación.

The Council of the Indies was given its first definite and legal existence by the Emperor in August, 1524.¹ Until that time, as we have already seen, its functions had been discharged by Juan Rodríguez de Fonseca, and a number of subordinates associated with him; but there was increasing discontent with Fonseca's management, and his death in March, 1524, gave Charles a welcome opportunity to reorganize his work.² As constituted at the close of the Emperor's reign, the Council was composed of a president,

¹ Solórzano, *Política Indiana*, p. 893. The earliest law about the Council in the *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias* (lib. ii, tit. ii, ley 1) is of the year 1542. The document cited by Bécker, *Política*

Española en las Indias, p. 105, to prove that the Council existed in 1523, does not seem conclusive; cf. *ante*, II, p. 228, note 1.

² Cf. *ante*, II, p. 227.

the grand chancellor of the Indies; eight councillors; a fiscal, or prosecutor on behalf of the crown; and two secretaries, one for New Spain and the other for New Castile. A number of minor officials were also attached to it, among them a professor of mathematics and a cosmographer-chronicler (*cosmógrafo-cronista*);¹ this last post was to be held by Antonio de Herrera under Philip II and Philip III. The Council was to reside continuously at the royal court, so as to be constantly in touch with the sovereign whom it served; the Emperor might preside over it in person at any time. Its competence in regard to the affairs of the Indies was literally all-inclusive, exactly like that of the Council of Castile in the home government; and all other officials and tribunals in the realm were solemnly forbidden to meddle in its affairs.²

Most of the laws that have come down to us in regard to the methods in which the Council of the Indies was to exercise its manifold functions are from the reigns of Philip II and his successors, when the system which the Emperor evolved was confirmed and established; but many of the provisions then enacted were actually operative before the end of Charles's lifetime. In its legislative capacity the Council prepared all the laws and ordinances regulating the government of the new domains; but its activity in this respect must not be regarded as primarily original, for its chief function was to give legal form to the principles and ideas which emanated from the crown, and to see that they were duly communicated to the officials who administered them. Only in matters of detail was it granted a free

¹ Cf. C. H. Haring, p. 38, note 1; also Diego Barros Arana, "Los Cronistas de Indias" in vol. xviii, pp. 537-558 (May, 1861) of *Anales de la Universidad de Chile*. Later the two

functions of this official were divided between two different persons.

² *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*, lib. ii, tit. ii, leyes 1 and 2.

hand. It was in the execution of these laws that its chief responsibility really lay, for the Emperor had no time to devote to this arduous task, and could only approve or disapprove what his advisers proposed. It was the Council that corresponded with the adelantados, viceroys, and audiencias, watched over their conduct, and made arrangements for their residencias. It was the Council that proposed candidates for every vacant office in the Indies whether temporal or spiritual; for the administration of ecclesiastical affairs also fell within its jurisdiction. It was the Council that devised the limits of the different territorial divisions of the New World. It was the Council that was intrusted with the supervision of the treatment of the Indians. And finally the Council acted as a superior court of appeal in suits arising in the Spanish dominions in the Indies, one year being always allowed for bringing the matter across the seas; and it gave judgment in first instance in certain cases of the highest importance.¹ For the exercise of their exalted functions its members were granted all the privileges and exemptions that were enjoyed by other advisers of the crown. It took conspicuous rank in that great hierarchy of councils and juntas which formed the backbone of the government of the Spanish Empire.²

Its personnel under Charles V deserves passing attention. Its first president, in fact the real successor of Fonseca, was Francisco García de Loaysa, the Emperor's confessor, and head of the order of the Dominicans in Spain³ — a fact which bears eloquent testimony to the genuineness of Charles's zeal

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*, lib. ii, tit. ii, *passim*; Solórzano, pp. 892-926.

² According to Baudrillart, *Philippe V et la Cour de France*, i, p. 65, the Council of the Indies depended on the Council of Castile, and therefore did

not have the title 'supreme.' This may have been true in Bourbon times, but not under the Hapsburgs; cf. *ante*, II, p. 222, note, and Solórzano, p. 892.

³ Cf. notice of him in *D. I. E.*, xiv, pp. 5-6. He was archbishop of Seville from 1538 to 1546.

for the propagation of the faith, and for his determination to Christianize the inhabitants of the New World.¹ When Loaysa went to Rome in 1530 to receive a cardinal's hat at the hands of Clement VII, his place at the head of the Council of the Indies was temporarily taken by Garcia Manrique, Count of Osorio, and *asistente* or chief justice of Seville. The responsibilities of the office were, however, really borne during that period by Francisco de los Cobos, who in addition to his other multifarious duties was most active in American affairs; indeed Cobos's interest and influence in the administration of the Indies continued long after Loaysa's return.² On Loaysa's death in 1546 the presidency of the Council went to Luis Hurtado de Mendoza, Marquis of Mondéjar, who held it till he was called by Philip II, on December 22, 1559, to be the president of the Council of Castile.³ He is described as having rendered particularly valuable services in connection with the differences that had arisen between Spain and Portugal over the demarcation of their respective conquests in the New World; and he was the brother of Antonio de Mendoza, viceroy of New Spain and of New Castile. This relationship was naturally most helpful to him as president of the Council of the Indies. The worst of the many difficulties which that body had to contend with was its dense ignorance of conditions in the New World; and it was still too early to apply the obvious remedy, namely, the selection of a considerable number of its members from ex-magistrates who had seen service in the Indies. The evil, however, might be mitigated if a measure of coöperation

¹ Cf. list of the *Presidentes del Consejo de Indias* in Herrera, *Descripción de las Indias Occidentales*, i, p. 71.

² Cf. *ante*, pp. 141 f.; also *D. I. E.*, xiv, pp. 1-284, *passim*; Gómara, p. 136.

³ Cf. L. Vilar y Pascual, *Diccionario*

histórico de las familias ilustres, v, p. 360; also appendix i to the *Mémoire du Marquis de Mondéjar*, in A. Morel-Fatio, *L'Espagne au XVI^e et au XVII^e siècle*, p. 58, where the date is given as "año de sesenta."

between the officials on both sides of the water could be insured through family ties; and this consideration was doubtless uppermost in Charles's mind when he appointed Mendoza to his important post. The names of all the minor members of the Council have not come down to us;¹ but it appears that in 1542 — an important year in the history of the administration of the Indies — the Council underwent a rigid inspection and reorganization, "as a result of which two of the four Oidores who were in it were put out."²

The Emperor's reign likewise witnessed a notable growth of the organization, powers, and personnel of the Casa de Contratación — first established at Seville by Ferdinand and Isabella in 1503, with a treasurer, a comptroller, and a business manager as its chief officials.³ Ordinances of the years 1534, 1536, 1539, and 1543 formed the basis of the new development; most of these laws, which were first collected and published in 1552, are comprised in book ix of the *Leyes de las Indias*.⁴ But the fundamental purpose of the institution, the maintenance of strict government control over all trade and travel to and from the New World, remained unaltered; the only changes were those which were rendered necessary by the enormous growth of the work that it was created to do.

The Casa continued to reside at Seville, the sole port for American ships at the Emperor's accession. Its office hours, however, were henceforth much longer; and each of its three original chief officials — *juezes oficiales*, as they now were called — had the services of a number of secretaries and clerks, so that each one became, in effect, the head of a

¹ The names of those who composed it in 1524 are given in Solórzano, *Política Indiana*, p. 893.

² Cf. Gómara, p. 112, and references there; also Solórzano, p. 893, and

Recopilación de Leyes de Indias, lib. ii, tit. ii, ley 1.

³ Cf. *ante*, II, pp. 224–226.

⁴ Cf. also Haring, pp. 28–43, *passim*.

department in a government ministry.¹ It now had a private chapel and chaplain, a prison, and a jailer, whose principal functions were those of a man of all work. Its offshoots — the chief pilot's bureau,² the postoffice, and the School of Navigation — were also all developed and enlarged; the latter evoked the admiration of visitors from other lands, especially of Englishmen.³ In the early part of the Emperor's reign a *cosmógrafo y maestro de hacer cartas* makes his appearance; by the year 1536, when the office was conferred on Alonso de Santa Cruz, the title had been changed to that of *cosmógrafo*, or *cosmógrafo mayor de la casa de Sevilla*.⁴

The period is also marked by the creation of two new institutions, both primarily designed by Charles to lighten the burdens of the Casa, and to meet various complaints of the delays that it caused, though the first of them was not entirely successful in attaining these ends. This was the so-called Juzgado de Indias, established in response to ceaseless grumblings from sailors and merchants about the difficulties and dangers of the bar of San Lucar, and the necessity of crossing it in order to get up the Guadalquivir to Seville. Various half-way measures to solve the difficulty having been attempted in vain, it was finally decided, in the year 1535, to set up a *juez oficial* in the city of Cadiz, to act in conjunction with the officials of the Casa, and to permit the

¹ Haring, p. 33, and references there.

² On this cf. J. Pulido Rubio, "El Piloto Mayor de la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla," in the *Boletín del Centro de Estudios Americanistas de Sevilla*, 1923-24, nos. 68-69, pp. 15 ff.; nos. 70-72, pp. 74 ff.; nos. 73-75, pp. 53 ff.; nos. 82-84, pp. 41 ff.

³ Haring, p. 39. Comparisons with Trinity House, London, suggest themselves. Cf. W. H. Mayo, *The Trinity House, London* (London, 1905).

⁴ Cf. G. Latorre, "Los geógrafos

Españoles del Siglo XVI — Alonso de Santa Cruz," in *Boletín del Instituto de Estudios Americanistas*, no. 2 (1913), pp. 29-51; also M. de Saralegui y Medina, *Alonso de Santa Cruz, inventor de las Cartas esféricas de Navegación* (Madrid, 1914), *passim*; Haring, pp. 36-38, 300-302, 306, 308-314, *passim*. The office of *cosmógrafo y maestro de hacer cartas* is not to be confused with that of *cosmógrafo-cronista* of the Council of the Indies; cf. *ante*, p. 620.

loading and unloading of ships for the New World to take place at that port under his immediate supervision. The *juez oficial* was a nominee of the crown, and the Casa at first was expected to appoint deputies to assist him; but such was its jealousy of the functionary at Cadiz that it not seldom failed to do so, with the final result that in 1556 the new official was commanded to perform his duties alone. In reality the authority of the Casa was in no wise infringed by the establishment of the *juez* at Cadiz, for all of his acts had to be fully reported and sanctioned at Seville; and the fact that the Casa persisted in regarding him rather in the light of a rival than of a helper is a sad commentary on the characteristics of the officialdom of the time.¹—The other new body which took shape under Charles V was the Consulado of Seville, erected in 1543. Such *consulados* or guilds of merchants were already in existence in other Spanish cities,² and when the Sevillans interested in the American trade petitioned the Emperor for a license to create one, he readily acceded. He hoped thereby, as he had hoped by the Juzgado, to diminish the work and the responsibilities of the Casa; and in this case he was not disappointed. The Consulado was represented by a prior and two consuls, elected annually by the indirect vote of the merchants of Seville engaged in the American trade. Its principal functions were to settle all civil suits between members of the body it represented, to see to it that their common interests did not suffer from the greed of any one of their number, and to frame rules and regulations for its own procedure, which was far simpler and more expeditious than that of the ordinary law courts. It held its sittings at the Alcazar, in close

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ix, tit. iv; Veitia Linaje, *Norte de la Contratacion*, lib. i, cap. 25; Haring, pp. 9–12, and references there.

² *Ordenanzas del Consulado de Burgos de 1538*, ed. Eloy García de Quevedo y Concellón (Burgos, 1905).

touch with the Casa, which was generally grateful for the relief it afforded, and showed it none of the hostility that it had exhibited toward the Juzgado.¹

Meantime the judicial authority and functions of the Casa itself, of which traces were already discernible in the time of Ferdinand and Isabella, were placed on a firm footing by Charles's ordinance of the year 1539. It was granted criminal jurisdiction over those who infringed its own regulations, or committed misdeeds on the voyage to or from the New World. It was also given cognizance of all civil suits which in any way affected the revenues of the crown, or involved the violation of the laws for the American trade, with an appeal, if the case was particularly important, to the Council of the Indies. The erection of the Consulado, in 1543, relieved the Casa, as we have already seen, of civil cases between different merchants; but even in spite of this its judicial activities increased so rapidly that a separate court, composed of two *oidores*, had to be added to the other departments in 1583.²

The subject of trade and navigation naturally follows that of the Casa which regulated them, and forms a convenient bridge between the organs of the Indian administration which were resident in Spain and those which were established in the new dominions. Certain phases of this part of the story reflect great credit on the Emperor's judgment, and mark off his Indian policy in agreeable contrast to that of his grandparents and that of his son.

Under Ferdinand and Isabella, as we have already seen, the American trade was wholly concentrated in a single port,

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ix, tit. vi; Veitia Linaje, *Norte de la Contratacion*, lib. i, cap. 17; Haring,

pp. 43-45, and references there; Scelle, *Traite négrière*, i, pp. 41 ff.

² Haring, pp. 39-43, 57-58, and references there.

at Cadiz till 1503, and afterwards at Seville; and the same was the case during most of the reign of Philip II. But Charles, whose more cosmopolitan experience gave him a truer vision of the opportunities involved, showed a disposition to extend to other Castilian seaports the privilege of engaging in commerce with the Indies. It seems fair to assume that it was the Flemish advisers of the early years of his reign who turned his thoughts in this direction; and that they urged the advantages of the Biscayan ports, which were so conveniently situated for their own interests. A petition of the Cortes of 1520¹ serves to show that the idea of moving the Casa de Contratación away from Seville was very much to the fore at the time; and shortly afterwards the Emperor was presented with the 'memorial' referred to in a previous chapter, pointing out the advantages of Corunna as a centre of trade and navigation.² It seems clear from the language of the 'memorial' that the Casa de Contratación whose establishment at Corunna it recommended was for the purpose of the Moluccan and not the American trade; and we know that on December 22, 1522, Charles gave orders for the setting up there of a Casa de Contratación "para armamento de flotas y comercio con el Maluco."³ But a passage in Herrera⁴ would indicate that nothing was actually done about the matter, on account of the objections of Seville, until at least as late as 1525, nor does there seem to be any definite evidence of the existence of a Casa at Corunna even afterwards: moreover if such a body was ever actually established it must necessarily have been abandoned in 1529, when the Moluccas were sold

¹ *Cortes*, iv, p. 322.

² Cf. *ante*, p. 448, and note on the probable date of this document.

³ A reference to this document, which is in the Colección Vargas y Ponce in the Hydrographic Office at Madrid,

is to be found in Fernández Duro, i, p. 422. Cf. also *C. S. P., Venetian*, iii, no. 556; Haring, p. 25, note 2; and Bécker, *La Política Española en las Indias*, p. 91.

⁴ Dec. iii, lib. vii, cap. v.

to Portugal. On the other hand the discussion of the project of setting up a 'Casa de la Especeria' at Corunna had served to draw so much attention to the advantages of the chief Biscayan ports, that Charles resolved that they should be given a chance to participate in the American trade. In the same year, 1529, he gave orders that Corunna, Bayona, Avilés, Laredo, Bilbao, and San Sebastian; Malaga and Cartagena on the Mediterranean; and Cadiz on the Atlantic were henceforth to share the privilege of sending ships direct to the Indies.¹ All ships so sent must indeed return to the Guadalquivir and there be received by the Juzgado and the Casa — doubtless for fear that otherwise the royal *quinto* might be lost; it is, moreover, a significant fact that the traditions of the time of the Catholic Kings were too firmly established to permit the Emperor to extend similar privileges to any of the seaports of the realms of the crown of Aragon; the profits of the Indies were to be restricted to Castilians. But what is far more remarkable than the limitations to the Emperor's concessions is the fact that little or no advantage was taken of the privileges that he did concede; the license he granted "remained for the most part a dead letter."² There were certain obvious excuses for the failure of these favored seaports to seize their opportunity — inadequate appreciation of the importance of the Indies, complaints by the Sevillans of the infringement of their monopoly, and most of all the activities of the French and Turkish corsairs; the Biscayan ports offered golden opportunities to the one,³ and Malaga and Cartagena to the other, while Seville was far harder for both of them to reach. The tradi-

Antuñez y Acevedo, *Memorias Históricas*, appendix i; Haring, p. 15; Bécker, *op. cit.*, p. 91. It will also be remembered that it was from Corunna that Charles despatched Estevan Gomez and Loaysa on their voyages of dis-

covery in 1524-25; cf. *ante*, pp. 448, 525.

² Haring, p. 16.

³ It is perhaps worth noting, in this connection, that the year of Charles's decree was the year of the Paix des Dames.

tions of the preceding reign may also be made to account for something. At any rate the fact remains that, save for the temporary outburst of enthusiasm on the part of Corunna in the early years of the reign, there is practically no evidence that any of the ports to which the decree of 1529 applied showed any real interest in availing themselves of its provisions. Charles must have been much discouraged at the failure of his honest efforts to throw open the American trade to the other ports of Castile; but Philip, who personified the Spanish point of view, finally revoked his father's concession in 1573.¹

The Emperor's distrust of the economic capacities of his Spanish subjects also led him, in the year 1526, to abrogate the restrictions which excluded all others than Castilians from the privileges of trade and emigration to the New World.² The principal beneficiaries of the Emperor's liberality in this respect were not, as in the time of Ferdinand, the inhabitants of the realms of the crown of Aragon, but rather the Italians, and still more the Germans, in whom Charles discerned large capabilities for the development of the Indies. The great banking houses, to which the Emperor was under heavy pecuniary obligations, were naturally the first to avail themselves of the new privilege. In 1525 the Welsers established themselves in Seville and in Santo Domingo,³ and began to take a leading part in the American trade. Three years later, in conjunction with the Ehingers of Constance, they made contracts with Charles for the importation

¹ Antuñez y Acevedo, appendices ii and iii; apparently this revocation did not touch the Mediterranean ports.

² Herrera, dec. iii, lib. x, cap. xi; Oviedo, *Historia General*, lib. iii, cap. vii; Haring, pp. 15-17. I have not been able to find the decree itself; but it seems to have been issued at Granada, in November, 1526. Herrera summarizes it as follows: "Se diò licencia

general, para que todos los Subditos de su Magestad, de los Reinos i Señorios de sus Coronas, i à todos los Subditos del Imperio, i asi Ginoveses, como todos los otros, pudiesen pasar à las Indias, i estàr, i contratar en ellas, segun i como lo hacian los Naturales de la Corona de Castilla i de Leon."

³ Häbler, *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen*, p. 48.

of negro slaves and German miners, to aid and instruct the Spaniards in the development of their new domains. It was also at this juncture that they were granted Venezuela, and they participated in Mendoza's attempt to colonize La Plata in 1534.¹ Their rivals, the Fuggers, were not far behind. In 1530 they were granted a license to colonize and develop the Pacific coast, from the southern limits of Pizarro's jurisdiction to the Strait of Magellan. They were to be ready to embark on this arduous undertaking not later than the first of January, 1533, but for some unknown reason the enterprise was given up.² The high-water mark of German activity in the Indies was passed, in fact, before the middle of Charles's reign. The Welsers were forced to retire from Venezuela before his death, and their other undertakings were abandoned one by one. Spanish hostility was undoubtedly the chief explanation. The Council and the Cortes made incessant complaints of the presence of the detested foreigners in the new domains, and though he never formally abandoned his policy of admitting them, Charles found it convenient, in the latter years of his reign, to give secret instructions to the Casa to find excuses for their exclusion. It was but another instance of the progressive Hispanicization of his point of view; and his son, at his accession, lost no time in reverting to the principles of earlier days, and legally restricted emigration to Castilians.³

In other respects the Emperor's policy in regard to those who wished to settle in the New World was entirely in accordance with that of his grandparents. Never had the provision excluding infidels, heretics, and their descendants been more rigidly enforced, nor *limpieza de sangre* been more rigidly insisted on. The early part of Charles's reign also

¹ Häbler, *Die überseeischen Unternehmungen*, pp. 48-56, and *ante*, pp. 534 ff.

² Haring, pp. 99-100, and references there.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 101, and references there.

witnessed a number of wise, though unsuccessful, attempts to prevent the neglect of agriculture for the search for gold, and the consequently nearly universal tendency to abandon the islands for the mainland. Various attractive privileges were offered to prospective colonists who were willing to till the soil; and in 1526 all migration from the Antilles to the continent was forbidden, under pain of confiscation and death. But the tendency the other way proved too strong to be resisted. The edict of 1526 was first modified and then ignored,¹ and the search for the precious metals so overshadowed all other occupations that the colonies were temporarily converted into a "mining speculation on a gigantic scale."

It was during Charles's reign that the practice of communicating with the New World by two annual treasure fleets — the 'galleons' and the 'flota' — was gradually built up,² though the system was not finally established till the time of Philip II. At first the ships sailed either singly, or in small companies; but before long the activities of French corsairs made it evident that some sort of armed protection would be necessary, and that, for the convenience of affording it, there would be certain advantages in having the vessels grouped in larger squadrons. As the wealth of Mexico and Peru was gradually revealed the danger increased apace; for the pirates would take desperate risks for a chance to capture the rich cargoes of gold, particularly whenever France and Spain were at war. In 1537, accordingly, a large armada was sent out under Blasco Nuñez Vela, to collect the gold and silver of New Spain and New Castile,

¹ Haring, pp. 106-107, and references there.

² Those interested in historical precedents will find a description of a similar system used to communicate with

India by the merchants of imperial Rome, in Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, chapter ii (vol. i, pp. 54-55, in the Everyman's Library edition).

and convoy it in safety to Seville ; in 1543, and again in 1552, the same experiment was repeated on a larger scale.¹ In the year 1543 we have the first hint of the later practice of definitely prescribing the routes and dates of sailing of the different squadrons² — a policy which ultimately facilitated the very piracy it was intended to prevent ; but at the same time there is evidence of a tendency to adopt the wiser plan of obliging each merchantman to be sufficiently large and well armed to enable it to beat off the corsairs without assistance, and of permitting each vessel to depart and return alone. It is unnecessary to follow the ebbs and flows of the conflict between these rival policies during the later years of the Emperor's reign.³ Suffice it to say that the system of large fleets, with convoys to protect them, and regular routes and dates of departure, was the one which finally prevailed ; we shall later study it full fledged under Philip II. Since the practice of having regular convoys was not definitely established in the Emperor's reign, it is natural to find that the status of the so-called *avería*, or tax on imports and exports, to defray the costs of the protection of the merchantmen, was likewise unsettled during this period. The rate, at the outset, was probably about 1 per cent ; but later there are instances of 5 and 6 per cent being charged ; a fair average for the reign would probably be from 2 to 2½ per cent. The manner of collecting it was also undecided, and caused endless discussions between the Casa and the Consulado.⁴

A document in the Archivo de Indias⁵ gives the number of registered outgoing vessels from Spain to the Indies during the forty years of Charles's reign as 2421 ; the figures for those returning as 1748. The highest outgoing number in

¹ Haring, pp. 71, 201-202.

² *Ibid.*, p. 201.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 201-204.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 51 ff., 73 ff.

Published in Haring, p. 339.

any one year is 101 (for 1549), the lowest 3¹ (for 1554); the highest returning is 84 (for 1551), the lowest 10 (for 1516 and 1524). Additional lists tell us that four outgoing vessels were lost in 1549 and 1550, and no less than fifty-four returning ones between 1549 and 1555. This last figure was doubtless chiefly due to the activities of the corsairs.²

A few words may not be amiss in regard to the ways and means of local traffic in the Antilles and on the mainland, supplementary to what has been said about the transoceanic voyages. The principal centres of it on the Atlantic side were Havana, Vera Cruz, and Nombre de Dios; on the Pacific, Panama and Callao. Havana, which gradually replaced Santo Domingo as the chief port in the islands, was primarily important as the point of reunion of all ships for the eastward voyage; indeed, until the discovery of the agricultural wealth of Cuba in the succeeding centuries, it drew most of its life and prosperity from the sojourn of the vessels in its harbor.³ Vera Cruz was the gateway to Mexico and the territories of the audiencia of New Galicia. But Nombre de Dios was the most important of all; for it was there that all the passengers and cargoes to and from New Castile were landed and embarked. It corresponded to Panama on the other side of the Isthmus. The town, which had been temporarily established by Diego de Nicuesa in the reign of the Catholic Kings, was refounded in 1519 by order of Pedrarias, at the same time that the capital of the colony was moved across to Panama from Darien.⁴ The problem of determining the most convenient route across the Isthmus

¹ Probably owing to the large number of ships that were sent to escort Prince Philip to England.

² Additional details in regard to the matters treated in the last few paragraphs may be found in G. de Artífano, *Historia del Comercio*, pp. 75 ff., 243 ff.

³ Haring, p. 203, and references there.

⁴ Cf. *ante*, II, p. 214; C. H. Hackett, "The Delimitation of Political Jurisdictions in Spanish North America to 1535," in *Hispanic-American Historical Review*, i, pp. 43, 47.

was ardently debated during the Emperor's reign. At first there was only a rough mule path, eighteen leagues in length, connecting Nombre de Dios with Panama; but as the riches of Peru were gradually revealed, the possibility of utilizing the lower reaches of the river Chagres for part of the distance was vigorously taken up. This stream, whose channel was to be of such great help in the construction of the Panama Canal, empties into the Atlantic just west of Nombre de Dios. In 1536, a station called Venta Cruz was established at the head of navigation thereon; and thenceforth, save in the dry season, the easiest and cheapest way across the Isthmus was eighteen leagues on the river from the Atlantic to Venta Cruz, and five leagues overland from Venta Cruz to Panama. The so-called Armada of the Southern Sea, or Pacific fleet, carried passengers and goods between Panama and Callao (the seaport of Lima), touching at Payta and Truxillo on the way, and collected and distributed throughout the viceroyalty of New Castile.¹

There were also many subsidiary ports on the shores and islands of the Caribbean — notably Cartagena on the north coast of South America — which had to be kept in touch with Spain; and the consequent dispersal of the great fleets on their arrival in western waters gave the corsairs an opportunity which they utilized to the full. So accustomed are we to regard the sacking of Spanish towns and the capture of Spanish treasure fleets as the work of Englishmen, that we tend to forget that the example which they were to follow with such astounding success in the time of Queen Elizabeth was originally set them by the French. The waters off these minor ports were the pirates' favorite hunting ground. They would lie in wait, outside the harbors, for incoming and

¹ Haring, pp. 181-190, *passim*; also M. Serrano y Sanz, *El Archivo de Indias*

y las Exploraciones del Istmo de Panamá (Años 1527 á 1534) (Madrid, 1911).

outgoing ships; then, when they were sure that the coast was clear, and that the inhabitants had not the aid of the crews of transient vessels to help them in defending themselves, they would swoop down on the unsuspecting settlers, pillage homes, carry off valuables, and not seldom extend their depredations into the interior. The inhabitants constantly complained to the Emperor of the inadequacy of their defences, in terms strikingly reminiscent of those used by the Mediterranean towns when suffering from the ravages of the fleets of the Barbarossas; but there is little to show that these appeals were heard. How far the French corsairs were operating on their own initiative, and how far their activities were connived at by the French government, it is impossible to determine; but it is fair to say that the worst of their depredations synchronized with the periods when France and Spain were at war.¹

Spain is also commonly thought of as a country of many customs dues and internal tolls; and many of our readers may consequently be surprised to learn that, until the latter part of the Emperor's reign, practically no duties at all were imposed at Seville on imports from, or exports to, the colonies in the New World. The only exception was on luxuries sent out from Spain to the Indies, and the quantity of these was so small as to be practically negligible. At the other end, an import tax or *almojarifazgo* of $7\frac{1}{2}$ per cent had been charged from the very outset, the rate representing the ordinary import duty of 5 per cent plus the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of export duty which had been remitted at Seville; but the receipts therefrom had been exclusively applied to colonial uses, and exports to Spain had been totally free; the treasury of the mother country had thus far profited nothing from

¹ Fernández Duro, i, pp. 201 ff.; Haring, de Artífano, *Historia del Comercio*, pp. 231-234, and references there; G. 177 ff.

imposts on the American trade. But a change came in 1543, a fruitful year in colonial legislation. The war with Francis I was at its height, and it is natural to infer that the need of getting funds for it was the principal reason for the adoption of a new policy. In that year it was decreed that an export duty of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent should be collected at Seville on all commodities shipped to the New World, the rate of the *almojarifazgo* at the other end being simultaneously reduced to 5 per cent. The effect of this measure was simply to transfer one-third of the proceeds of this revenue from the colonies to Spain; the amount collected remaining the same. On goods entering Seville a new *almojarifazgo* of 5 per cent was simultaneously imposed, and also a 10 per cent *alcabala*, to be paid at once to the officers of the Casa, irrespective of whether the commodity in question was subsequently sold or not; in other words, what practically amounted to an import duty of 15 per cent was levied at Seville after 1543, so that everything brought back to Spain from the colonies paid charges at double the rate of exports to the Indies. Needless to add, all the proceeds of this import duty — and, in fact, seven-ninths of the total customs revenues both ways — were henceforth turned over to the crown, which was free to utilize them in any way it saw fit; only the 5 per cent *almojarifazgo* which was collected in the Indies was specifically devoted to colonial purposes. Needless also to add, the rate rapidly rose in the succeeding reigns; and the business of imposing and collecting the new duties added another to the long list of the responsibilities of the Casa.¹

The problem of estimating the amount of gold and silver that was drawn from the Indies in the Emperor's reign has proved very attractive to most of the historians of the New

¹ Scelle, *Traite négrière*, i, p. 70; Haring, pp. 83-84, and references there.

World from the sixteenth century until today. As the present writer has been unable to make any original investigation of this topic, he cannot do better than repeat the conclusions of the most recent and scientific authority on the subject, who has carefully scrutinized and compared the works of his predecessors.¹ His estimates, in most cases, have effected substantial reductions of theirs; he gives the grand total, down to 1560, as 139,720,000 pesos of 8 reals, or 101,345,000 ducats. Some 10,000,000 pesos need to be deducted from this sum for the products of the islands and coast settlements on the Caribbean under the Catholic Kings; and perhaps 20,000,000 more for the income of the years after the Emperor's abdication. Thus 110,000,000 pesos would probably be a fair estimate for the forty years that Charles was on the throne, and of this the *quinto* would give the government 22,000,000. Until 1545 the yield of gold and silver was probably about even, the preponderance of the latter in Mexico balancing that of the former in Peru; but with the opening in that year of the famous silver mines of Potosí to the southeast of Lake Titicaca, the production of the white metal speedily forged ahead. The amounts increased apace as the result of the conquest and development of New Castile. Probably at least three-quarters of the total that was yielded by the New World while Charles was on the Spanish throne was drawn from it during the last quarter of his reign.

The evolution of the political institutions of Spanish America which resided in the colonies themselves presents certain interesting analogies to the mediaeval constitutional development of the different Christian kingdoms of the

¹C. H. Haring, "American Gold and Silver Production in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century," in *Quarterly*

Journal of Economics, xxix (May, 1915), pp. 433-479.

Iberian Peninsula, as the territory was slowly recovered from the Moors. In both cases the first outpost of the conquistadores was the municipality, with all its inherited traditions of self-government; in both it was gradually superseded and overshadowed by the more extensive and despotic authority of the central power and its representatives.

In the foregoing pages many instances have been given of the Spanish practice of founding a municipality directly on the occupation of any new piece of land, and the list of such cases might be indefinitely extended. It has been well said that whereas "in the English colonies of America the town grew up to meet the needs of the inhabitants of the country, in the Spanish colonies the population of the country grew to meet the needs of the towns."¹ All this was fully in accordance with the best Iberian traditions, and the revival of the time honored practice not unnaturally reawakened all the corresponding aspirations for municipal self-government.² When Cortés wanted to shake off the authority of Velasquez, and get for himself the supreme command, under the crown, over his followers in the expedition against Mexico, he sought and obtained it from the *ayuntamiento* of Vera Cruz, to which, by that act, he assigned sovereign power in the new colony.³ When Armendáriz was sent out in the year 1546 to take the residencias of the different claimants to New Granada, his first step was to get formal recognition of his authority by the local *cabildos*,⁴ in order to preclude the possibility of encountering resistance in the name of the adelantado.⁵ In fact, throughout the whole of the Emperor's reign, the colonial municipalities enjoyed extensive powers. They generally elected the majority of their own magistrates. They

¹ Moses, *Spanish Dependencies*, ii, p. 370.

² Cf. *ante*, I, pp. 183 ff.

³ Cf. *ante*, p. 474.

⁴ Such was the colonial name for the *ayuntamiento*, or body of municipal magistrates.

⁵ Bécker, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

were regarded as possessing a considerable, if indefinite, authority over the regions where they were. They claimed and frequently exercised the right to send representatives to Spain — like *procuradores* to the national assembly — to see to it that their desires were made known to the crown; and it seems reasonable to assume, from the language of some of the Laws of the Indies, that the Emperor cherished plans for the meeting of colonial Cortes, on the model of those of Castile.¹ Altogether it looked as if the finest Spanish traditions of urban democracy were destined to be revived and implanted in the New World.² In later years the tide turned back. The centralizing tendencies ultimately proved too strong. Appointment by the crown representatives and hereditary tenure began to replace the free election of the city magistrates. The powers of the *cabildos* gradually declined; in fact, the same process that had taken place in the mother country in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was subsequently reproduced with but little variation in the colonies. But these later developments should not blind us to the strong foundation for municipal authority and self-government that was laid in the colonies during the period of Charles V; and the memory of it was to prove potent in the New World, as well as in the Old, at the time of the revolutions of the nineteenth century.

The more permanent heirs to the authority of the early conquistadores in the Spanish dominions across the Atlantic were the audiencias and the viceroys. It was through these two institutions that the crown and the Council of the Indies sought to have executed, in the colonies, the policy and laws that were devised for them in Spain.

¹ Especially lib. iv, tit. viii, ley 2; cf. also Lannoy and vander Linden, *L'Expansion coloniale*, p. 355.

² *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. iv, tits. ix, x, xi; Solórzano, pp. 747 ff.; Bécker, pp. 35 ff.

We have hitherto encountered the term *audiencia* only in its original meaning of a tribunal or court of law; and such was its primary significance in the Spanish colonies. But the circumstances in which these institutions found themselves in the New World, and, particularly at the outset, the deliberate policy of the crown of Castile, served to thrust upon the colonial *audiencias* a large number of functions other than judicial. Their presidents — in those of Mexico and Lima this post was held by the viceroy himself — were the principal executive officers in the regions committed to their charge; and the *audiencias*, acting in conjunction with them as councils, were intrusted with "all matters with which governmental authority might properly deal."¹ A fuller account of the range of their powers, and the way in which they executed them, will be given a few pages later, after examination of the manner in which they were established; at this point we only hope to have made it clear that the colonial *audiencias* possessed political as well as judicial authority.

A tribunal of three royal judges had been set up at Santo Domingo by a decree of October 5, 1511, to act as a check on the governor of Española.² We have already encountered it in connection with the early history of the conquest of Mexico, when it had taken a hand in the quarrels of Cortés and Velasquez; it apparently exercised all the powers of a regular colonial *audiencia*, and was also proleptically referred to as such;³ it served in fact as a precedent for the full-fledged institution there, which was formally established by imperial edict of September 14, 1526.⁴ The next one to follow was that of Mexico, first erected by a decree of the

¹ Moses, i, p. 264; Solórzano, pp. 762 ff., gives a list of fifteen matters in which the *audiencias* in the Indies differ from those in Spain.

² Bécker, p. 45; C. H. Cunningham,

The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies, pp. 10 ff., and references there.

³ Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 19, note 27.

⁴ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley 2; E. Ruíz Guíñazú, *La Magistratura Indiana*, pp. 55-67.

Emperor at Burgos, on December 13, 1527;¹ it was subsequently to become the chief judicial and political body of the viceroyalty of New Spain, and the viceroy himself was to be its president. The third was that of Panama, created on February 3, 1535;² it was abolished by the 'New Laws' of November 20, 1542, but was reestablished in 1563-64.³ The audiencia of Lima was set up by the 'New Laws', simultaneously with the suppression of that of Panama; it was to occupy in the viceroyalty of New Castile a position analogous to that of the audiencia of Mexico in New Spain.⁴ The next on the list was the audiencia of Santiago de Guatemala, also provided for by the 'New Laws', and formally established by decree of September 13, 1543;⁵ that of New Galicia (later Guadalajara) followed, on February 13, 1548;⁶ and the last of the seven to be created by the Emperor was that of Santa Fé de Bogotá, July 17, 1549.⁷

It is not easy to determine precisely how these different bodies were composed in the period of Charles V. The standard edition of the Laws of the Indies gives their mem-

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley 3; Ruíz Guiñazú, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-82.

² The *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley 4, gives the manifestly impossible date of February 30, 1535, which has since been unhesitatingly accepted by Peralta, *Costa Rica, Nicaragua y Panama, en el Siglo XVI*, p. 130, Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 16, and others. Foronda, p. 399, puts it on February 3, as I have done, but this, at best, is only a guess, for the sole evidence he cites in support of it is the *Recopilación*. Beltrán y Rózpide, *Colección de las Memorias de los Virreyes del Peru* (Madrid, 1921), pp. 18-19, prefers the later date of February 26, 1538, when Charles issued at Valladolid a *real cédula* concerning the audiencia of Panama. Cf. also Ruíz Guiñazú, pp. 86-94.

³ Herrera, dec. vii, lib. vi, cap. v; Beltrán y Rózpide, p. 20, who further states that the territories over which the audiencia of Panama held jurisdiction were incorporated into those of the audiencia of Lima, but gives no reference in support of this assertion. Cf. also Milla, *Historia de la América Central*, ii, pp. 149, 162. The reestablishment of the audiencia of Panama in 1564 was effected by the removal thither of the audiencia of Guatemala; and a new audiencia was sent out to Guatemala in 1570.

⁴ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley v.

⁵ *Ibid.*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley vi.

⁶ *Ibid.*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley vii; and Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, p. 547, note 28.

⁷ *Recopilación*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley viii; Ruíz y Guiñazú, pp. 94-101.

bership as it was in the days of Philip IV and Charles II; but it is by no means safe to assume, as many historians¹ have done, that they were constituted in the same way at the time that they were set up. We know that the viceregal audiencia of Mexico, as established by the Emperor's decree of December 13, 1527, was composed of a president and four *oidores*, a number which death soon reduced to two,² while that of Lima, as established by the New Laws, consisted of a president and four *oidores letrados*;³ whereas in the *Recopilación*, the composition of both bodies is given as eight *oidores*, four *alcaldes del crimen*, two *fiscales* (or crown prosecutors), and subsidiary officers — more than twice as many as in the time of Charles V. The five lesser audiencias were also originally much smaller than they were to be in the seventeenth century. That of Santo Domingo was composed, two years after it was set up, of a president and two *oidores*;⁴ but it is clear that its membership was sometimes larger and more often smaller than this, during the rest of the reign;⁵ its composition really varied from year to year, according to the exigencies of the immediate situation. The audiencia of Guatemala, as established by the New Laws, was made up of four *oidores letrados*, of whom one was to be president,⁶ and that of New Galicia, which followed in 1548, was originally composed of at least three *oidores*.⁷ Of the first composition of the temporary (1535–42) audiencia of Panama, it seems impossible, at the moment, to obtain authentic information; but we know that in 1550 the audi-

¹ E. g., Cunningham, pp. 16–17.

² Herrera, dec. iv, lib. ii, cap. i; and dec. iv, lib. iii, cap. viii.

³ *Ibid.*, dec. vii, lib. vi, cap. v; cf. also Blasco Nuñez Vela's famous characterization of them — “un Moço, un Loco, un Necio, y un Tonto” — in Gómara, *Historia de las Indias*, cap. clxxi; cited in Prescott, *C. P.*, ii, 316, note.

⁴ Decree of June 4, 1528; cf. *D. I. I.*, 2d series, ix, pp. 309 ff.

⁵ *D. I. E.*, lxx, pp. 463–464; *D. I. I.*, i, pp. 506, 563, 570; also Oviedo, *op. cit.*, lib. iv, cap. v.

⁶ Herrera, dec. vii, lib. vi, cap. v.

⁷ The phraseology of Oviedo, lib. xxxiv, cap. ix, is not quite so definite as one could wish; cf. also Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, p. 547, note 28.

encia of Santa Fé de Bogotá possessed two *oidores*.¹ A fair average for these lesser institutions, then, would be three or four *oidores*, of whom one was usually president; and there seems to be no evidence of the regular presence of a 'fiscal.'² In general these bodies, at the time they were set up, were about half as large as they subsequently became.

Each of these audiencias was given jurisdiction over a definite region — as definite at least as Spanish ignorance of American geography would permit — and an investigation of their boundaries will give us a good general idea of the chief political divisions of Spanish America as they existed at the end of the Emperor's reign.³ The audiencia of Santo Domingo held sway over all the islands of the Caribbean Sea, save those immediately adjacent to the coasts of Mexico and Central America, and over the northern coast of South America from the Rio de la Hacha eastward to the Guianas; all of what is now Venezuela, and the northeastern corner of the present republic of Colombia, consequently fell within its jurisdiction. That of Mexico bore rule over the southern and eastern parts of the present republic of Mexico, save Tabasco, Chiapas, and Yucatan, and over the coasts of the Gulf of Mexico around to the tip of Florida.⁴ Its boundaries

¹ P. de Aguado, *Historia de Santa Marta*, ed. J. Bécker, i, p. 615; Markham, *The Conquest of New Granada*, pp. 180, 183.

² On the other hand it is to be said that a 'fiscal' or crown prosecutor was normally an inseparable adjunct of a full-fledged audiencia, so that the absence of any reference to him does not necessarily prove that he was not there.

³ It does not seem worth while to go into the various boundary changes and developments that occurred in the preceding years. Those interested in the subject are referred to the very competent article of Professor C. W. Hackett on "The Delimitation of Poli-

cal Jurisdictions in Spanish America to 1535," in the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, i, pp. 40-69; and E. S. Zeballos, "Origen y Límites de las Jurisdicciones Políticas," in *Revista de Derecho, Historia y Letras*, for 1899, ii, pp. 614-638; iii, pp. 117-160.

⁴ The precise status of the jurisdiction over Florida in this period seems impossible to determine. The *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley iii, defines the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Mexico as extending "hasta el cabo de la Florida"; while ley ii of the same puts "las Provincias de la Florida" within the limits of the audiencia of Santo Domingo. Information courteously supplied to me by

on the north were the terra incognita of what is now the United States; on the west, the domains of the audiencia of New Galicia, which stretched away to the northwest of a line running about north-northeast from the neighborhood of Zacatula;¹ and on the south, the Pacific, and the regions that belonged to the audiencia of Guatemala, which in turn included everything between the Isthmus of Tehuantepec and the Isthmus of Panama.² The lands of these four audiencias thus comprised everything contained in the viceroyalty of New Spain. Of the other three, all of which fell within the limits of the viceroyalty of New Castile, that of Panama, as we have already seen, was temporarily in abeyance at the time of the Emperor's death, so that in 1558 the territories of the audiencia of Lima included the Isthmus and everything which the Spaniards had conquered to the south of it, save the lands which fell within the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Santo Domingo, and those which had been assigned to the audiencia of Santa Fé de Bogotá. These last comprised the bulk of the present republic of Colombia, as far east as the Rio de la Hacha, westward to the Pacific, and southward to include Popayan.³

Professor H. I. Priestley of the University of California makes it clear that the direct contacts, during the period of Charles V, were with Santo Domingo and Cuba; the Ayllon expedition was sent out from the one, and the de Soto expedition from the other. Under Philip II and subsequently, also, Florida is at times to be regarded as subject to the audiencias of Santo Domingo and of Cuba, and at times independent of control by any political authority whatsoever save the king and the Council of the Indies; but this, of course, applies to settlements on the east coast. For the period of Charles V, I still think that lib. ii, tit. xv, ley iii, of the *Recopilación* justifies me in extending the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Mexico around to the tip of Florida,


as I have done in the accompanying map; but of course the authority which the audiencia exercised there was only theoretical.

¹ Zacatula itself fell within the limits of the audiencia of New Galicia. *Recopilación*, etc., lib. ii, tit. xv, ley vii.

² J. Mills, *Historia de la América Central*, ii, pp. 19, 149 ff. The reader is reminded that the arrangement here described, which placed Yucatan, Tabasco, and Chiapas under the jurisdiction of the audiencia of Guatemala, was only temporary; it began in 1543 and lasted twenty years, but it obtained at the end of the Emperor's reign.

³ *Recopilación de Leyes de Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, leyes ii-viii, *passim*; and Herrera, *Descripción de las Indias Occidentales*, i, caps. v-xvi, *passim*.





THE AUDIENCIAS IN THE INDIES
in the Time of Charles V.

O C E A N

In theory, all these seven audiencias enjoyed the same power and prestige before their common superior, the Council of the Indies;¹ but for practical purposes the two viceregal ones of Mexico and Lima were by far the most important. The viceroys had the right to send to the lesser audiencias within their viceroyalties orders which they were bound to execute and obey; the audiencias were also supposed to keep the viceroy informed of the state of affairs within their respective districts; so that though each one was regarded as sovereign in its own territory under the Council of the Indies, they were likewise generally subordinate to the viceregal administration.² It is also worth noting that the regions under the jurisdiction of the different audiencias were generally coterminous with the so-called captaincies-general, or military districts, into which Spanish America was divided, and that the president of each of the lesser audiencias, who was virtually the governor of the region over which it held sway, generally occupied the post of captain-general as well. In the absence of any superior officer the audiencia itself was generally intrusted with the direction of military affairs.³

It will have been made clear by the foregoing pages that the functions of these bodies were exceedingly extensive. In their judicial capacity they acted as the supreme tribunals, under the Council of the Indies, in the regions committed to their charge. They heard and decided appeals from the minor local courts of the *corregimientos*, *alcaldias mayores*, and other districts into which their jurisdictions

¹ Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

² *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, leyes xlix-li; Moses, i, pp. 264-266; Ruiz Guñazú, pp. 41 ff. The last named author makes three categories of these colonial audiencias: (a) the viceregal (Mexico and Lima), (b) the pretorial (Santo Domingo, Guatemala, and Bogotá), and (c) subordinate (Panama and New Galicia), and

believes that the last named were actually, if not legally, less independent of viceregal control than those of the pretorial sort. It seems, however, most unlikely that any such classification as this could have been valid in the Emperor's day.

³ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley xvi; Solórzano, pp. 917 ff.; Cunningham, pp. 18, 21.

were divided, and in all such cases their verdicts were final; only in suits where the value at stake was 10,000 pesos or more, could an appeal be made from the audiencias to the home government.¹ They had the right to sit in judgment on the acts of their own viceroys and presidents, when appealed to by any one who felt himself aggrieved thereby; in such cases the official concerned was obliged to be absent from their sittings.² They took an important part in the conduct of local *residencias* and *visitas*, chiefly by revising the decisions of the officials appointed to conduct them, and in case they were found just, by taking measures to enforce them.³ And they were specially instructed to conduct the preliminary investigation of all matters arising under the famous law of Malines, put forth by the Emperor in that city on October 20, 1545, in regard to suits about *encomiendas* or the Indians thereon.⁴ The final decision in such cases was rendered by the Council of the Indies in Spain, and it was the primary duty of the audiencias to collect the evidence, and despatch it, sealed, to the home tribunal within a period of six months. As time went on, however, and the accumulation of such suits became intolerable, the audiencias were empowered to do their utmost to diminish them, by preventing on the spot the occurrence of gross injustice. "Two days every week, and also Saturdays when there were no *pleytos de pobres*," were to be devoted to "suits between Indians, and between Indians and Spaniards."⁵

Politically the audiencias were supposed to act as advisory councils to the executives who presided over them. Their sessions, when devoted to this purpose, were known as *acuer-*

¹ According to a law of the year 1543, given in *D. I. I.*, xvi, p. 382.

² *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley xxxv.

³ Cunningham, pp. 121 ff., and references there.

⁴ Cf. Lea, "The Indian Policy of Spain," in *Yale Review*, viii, p. 145.

⁵ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, leyes lxxxii-lxxxiii, cxxiii-cxxv.

dos; and the decisions there reached, when duly promulgated, as *autos acordados*.¹ It was through the development of these *acuerdos* that the colonial audiencias gradually became possessed of legislative and administrative powers such as their Spanish prototypes had never enjoyed; on this side of their functions they were to their respective districts more nearly what the Consejo Real was to Castile. The very early period, before the first viceroys arrived (as in Mexico from 1528 to 1535), was naturally that in which the audiencias possessed the largest measure of independent authority of this sort; and some historians have even thought that it was the Emperor's original intention that they should continue to exercise it alone.² Experience was soon to show that any such idea as this, if it were ever entertained, would be impossible to carry out;³ but the hold on legislation and administration which the first audiencias had acquired in these early years proved too strong to be shaken. They really associated themselves with their respective executives in the discharge of all their functions, and in the interims between the death or removal of one governor and the arrival of his successor they assumed all the authority of the absent official. Thus in 1550 it was decreed that in case of a vacancy in the office of viceroy of Peru, the audiencia of Lima should succeed to the government of all the provinces and districts of New Castile, and that the subordinate audiencias thereof should obey its commands "without excuse, difficulty, or delay."⁴

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. iii, tit. iii, ley xlv; Cunningham, pp. 23, 91, 193 ff.

² Cf. Cunningham, p. 308; Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, pp. 273 ff.; also *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley xvi.

³ It will be remembered that it was

decided to send out a viceroy to Mexico in 1529, and that Mendoza was selected for the place, though he did not reach his post till 1535. Cf. *ante*, p. 511.

⁴ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, ley xlv. Cf. also Solórzano, pp. 809 ff.

It will readily be understood from the foregoing account that conflicts of jurisdiction between executive and audiencia were by no means infrequent, especially in the viceregal jurisdictions of Mexico and Peru. Most of these quarrels took place in later reigns; for under the Emperor the emphasis was so decidedly on conquest that institutional differences had little chance to come to the fore. Yet, at the close of Charles's life, things were sufficiently normal to justify one generalization in regard to these conflicts, which holds doubly good for the years to come. As law courts — their primary and original function — the audiencias maintained their unquestioned supremacy; and the viceroys were repeatedly forbidden to interfere with them in any way.¹ But in executive and administrative affairs the shoe was on the other foot. The viceroy was the king's representative; he had the support of the home government; and his wide powers of appointment served to consolidate his position. The audiencias "may advise, they may remonstrate; but, in the event of a direct collision between their opinion and the will of the viceroy, what he determines must be carried into execution; and nothing remains for them, but to lay the matter before the king and the Council of the Indies."²

The events that led up to the appointment of the first viceroys have been fully narrated in the preceding chapters. They had demonstrated on the one hand that the original conquistadores — Cortés and the Pizarros — had grown too powerful and too independent to be controlled by the home government; and on the other that no audiencia alone, unsupported by an executive with independent authority, was capable of establishing the dominance of the Spanish

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. ii, tit. xv, leyes xxxv, xxxviii, xlv.

² Robertson, *History of America*

(ed. of 1812), iv, p. 18; also *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. iii, tit. iii, ley xxxiv.

crown. Some sort of a royal representative on the spot, with the fullest powers, was an obvious necessity; yet the utmost care must be taken to make sure that the new official did not follow the same course as the conquistadores, and defy the authority of the monarch that sent him out. The Hapsburgs did not, as a rule, take kindly to subordinates of the brilliant or inventive sort, who wanted to strike out lines of their own. The official whom they preferred was the hard-working, competent, but obedient type, who would faithfully discharge the duties laid upon him, and send back for fresh instructions in any case of doubt. In the Indies the problem of finding the right man was particularly difficult. The distance from Spain, the slowness of communications, the new conditions of which Europe was necessarily in the densest ignorance, all rendered supervision from home exceedingly difficult, and offered the greatest temptation to independent action; it was therefore doubly essential that the crown be certain of the men that it placed there. The first viceroy of New Spain was chosen by the Empress and her principal advisers in November, 1529, while Charles was negotiating with Pope Clement at Bologna;¹ and the Emperor never had reason to regret the selection that had been made for him by his representatives in his absence.

Antonio de Mendoza, who was given the post, was a scion of one of the most distinguished of the families of Castile.² His father, the first Marquis of Mondéjar, had done brilliant service in the Granadan war, and subsequently in the administration of the conquered kingdom; his whole family had enjoyed wide experience in the 'problems of the frontier.' Antonio's brothers were also making names for

¹ Cf. *ante*, p. 511.

² I owe much of the information in this and the next four paragraphs to the kindness of Professor A. S. Aiton of

the University of Michigan; cf. *ante*, pp. 503 and 511. The whole story will be told, with a wealth of detail, in his forthcoming biography of Mendoza.

themselves. The eldest was to be President of the Councils of the Indies and of Castile, another captain of the galleys in the Mediterranean, a third — Don Diego Hurtado — one of the greatest political and literary figures of sixteenth-century Spain; while his sister, Maria Pacheco, had been the heroine of the Comuneros.¹ Of Antonio's early career we know very little, but even that is enough to show that at the time that he was chosen to be viceroy of New Spain he was already highly esteemed and trusted by the crown. He had borne a share in the suppression of the revolt of the Comuneros. He had been employed in missions to Flanders and Hungary. Three months after his selection for the viceregal office he was present at the imperial coronation at Bologna. What delayed his final appointment and despatch to the New World for more than five years after he had been chosen for the post, it is difficult to determine. We know that Mendoza was involved in various lawsuits which had to be cleared up before he could depart; the fact that Charles did not get back to Castile until 1534, and had been busy in the interval with so many other things, may also explain something. Mendoza's character was by this time fully developed. Loyalty to the crown and devotion to the church formed the basis of it; firmness and resolution stand out in everything he did. Like the Emperor he made it a rule to listen to the advice of many different counsellors, but to reserve to himself the final decision, and he showed his Spanish training and traditions when he told his successor that the secret of good ruling was to do little, and to do that slowly, since most matters lend themselves to that kind of treatment, and in that way alone can one escape from being deceived.² Nor were the gentler virtues lacking; there are

¹ Vilar y Pascual, *Diccionario de las Familias*, v, pp. 360 ff.; "Mémoire présenté à Philippe II par Iñigo Lopez

de Mendoza," in Morel-Fatio, *L'Espagne au XVI^e et au XVII^e siècle*, pp. 58 ff.

² "Relacion, Apuntamientos y Avisos

countless instances of his generosity, liberality, and boundless hospitality. Such was the splendid equipment of the first of Spain's proconsuls in the New World.

We have spent some time on the personality of Mendoza, because it was he that really laid down the lines on which the viceregal office was to develop in the Indies. During the reign of the Emperor, the history of the institution is the history of its first incumbent. Everything was still in the experimental stage; and the terms of Mendoza's commission¹ and instructions² tell us more about the office that he held than do the Laws of the Indies.³ The viceroy was to be the immediate representative of the Spanish monarchy in his viceroyalty. He was to be welcomed, wherever he went, with royal pomp and circumstance; his progress, on arrival, from Vera Cruz to Mexico was the occasion of a display of unparalleled magnificence.⁴ His appointment was at first during the good pleasure of the king, and Mendoza remained in New Spain from 1535 to 1550; in 1555, however, the normal term of the viceregal office was fixed by law at three years, though the sequel was to show that this provision was not rigorously observed.⁵ With the office of viceroy was coupled that of president of the viceregal audiencia, and the sum total of the regular emoluments of both posts was upwards of 8000 ducats annually; there were also a host of perquisites.

One of the most significant features of Mendoza's instructions is the emphasis they lay on his ecclesiastical and eco-

de Antonio de Mendoza a Luis de Velasco," printed in *Instrucciones que los Virreyes de Nueva España dejaron a sus Sucesores* (Mexico, 1867), p. 238.

¹ Dated April 17, 1535, at Barcelona, and printed in Puga, *Cedulario*, i, pp. 351 ff.

² Dated April 17 and 25, 1535, at Barcelona, and printed in *D. I. I.*, xxiii, pp. 423 ff.

³ Of these there are but six from the time of Charles V — leyes i, v, xxxiv, xlv, lii, and lxxi, of tit. iii, lib. iii, of the *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*.

⁴ Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, p. 378, and references there.

⁵ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. iii, tit. iii, ley lxxi.

nomic duties. He was commanded to provide for the building of an adequate number of churches, to delimit the boundaries of the various bishoprics, and to take special care for the instruction of the natives. He became, in fact, the chief ecclesiastical as well as political representative of the Spanish monarch in America, and exercised in his name the extensive rights of patronage which the crown enjoyed. He was directed to set out, after a brief stay at the capital, on a tour of inspection of the different towns of the viceroyalty. He was to learn of local conditions on the *encomiendas*; above all he was to have his eye out for every opportunity to make money for the crown. He was constantly to be on the watch for hidden treasure; he was to consider whether it was not high time to withdraw the privilege of exemption from the payment of the *alcabala*; he was to investigate the feasibility of government operation and control of the Mexican mines; the welfare of the royal treasury was in fact to be the object of his most unremitting care.¹ Evidently, under the Emperor, the Christianization of the natives and the acquisition of revenue were still the principal keynotes. The one was in fact the *quid pro quo* of the other; and the viceroy, as the king's chief representative, was primarily responsible for the progress of both.

The more strictly political side of the viceregal functions is defined in a law put forth by Charles at Barcelona on November 20, 1542, in the following terms: "The viceroys of Peru and of New Spain are to be governors of the provinces under their charge, and in our name are to rule them: they are to make such gifts and grants as seem meet to them, and to fill such offices of government and justice as are customary, and not forbidden by our laws and ordinances; and the subsidiary *audiencias*, judges, and justices, and all our sub-

¹ *D. I. I.*, xxiii, pp. 426 ff.

jects and vassals are to recognize and obey them as rulers, and permit them freely to exercise their offices; and give them, and cause to be given them, all the aid they desire and need.”¹ This is certainly an inclusive statement; but when we come to examine the actual results, we find not only that the viceroy was considerably less omnipotent than the words of the law would imply, but also that the home government was determined to have a check on him. The story of the development of his relationship to the more anciently established authority of the audiencia, to which reference has been made in the preceding pages, furnishes an admirable instance of this. The viceroy was henceforth to issue and execute all royal mandates, and the *oidores* were forbidden to interfere with him in that capacity; the settlement of lines of policy was to rest exclusively in his hands, though he was directed to consult the audiencia in all important affairs. But when the audiencia sat as a court he was forbidden to vote; his sole function in such cases was to sign the decisions that the audiencia reached alone, and thereby lend to it the majesty of his support.² The judicial supremacy which was the brightest jewel of the Spanish crown was thus specifically denied to its representative across the seas. So fearful was the home government of a revolt against its authority that it dared not permanently concentrate all the power in a single hand. The result was the erection of a system of checks and balances, subsequently to be fortified by an elaborate series of *residencias* and *visitas*, fatal to efficiency at critical moments, and ultimately productive of appalling slowness. The effects of this system were not to be fully evident until the succeeding reign; but the groundwork for it was laid during the period of Charles V.

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. iii, tit. iii, ley v.

² *Ibid.*, lib. iii, tit. iii, leyes xxxiv, xlv; *D. I. I.*, xxiii, pp. 423-424.

We have no space to recount the events of the fifteen years of Mendoza's tenure of the viceroyalty of New Spain. Indian wars, the discovery of new lands, the opening up of economic resources, and the situation brought about by the promulgation of the 'New Laws'¹ constituted the most difficult problems which he had to face. The instructions that he left to his successor are a proof he regarded his work in Mexico as incomplete; but the eminence of his services is demonstrated by the fact that the home government finally turned to him, in 1549, as the only man capable of finishing the labors of Gasca in Peru. His last official order in Mexico was given on October 4, 1550; his successor arrived on November 25; Mendoza reached Lima on September 23, 1551; and died there after ten months' more service on July 21, 1552.² Both north and south of the Isthmus of Panama he had worthily initiated the traditions of a great office.

Those familiar with the relations of the Emperor with the contemporary popes will readily believe that Charles vigorously insisted on the maintenance of all those special powers and privileges over the church in the New World which had been conferred upon the Spanish crown in the preceding reign. These included the exclusive right to found bishoprics, churches, and other ecclesiastical establishments in the Indies; to appoint all the clergy and exercise full jurisdiction over them, and also to collect and appropriate the tithes; indeed practically all the points over which the temporal and spiritual powers of Western Christendom had fought throughout the Middle Ages were here decided at the outset in favor of the temporal. The Pope could really do

¹ Professor Aiton's *Life of Mendoza* takes the view that the *visita* of Francisco Tello de Sandoval, who published the 'New Laws' in 1544, was in large part the result of a well planned at-

tempt on the part of Cortés to oust the viceroy.

² Bancroft, *History of Mexico*, ii, pp. 559 ff.; Moses, *Spanish Dependencies*, i, pp. 302-303.

nothing in the Spanish American colonies without the consent and coöperation of the Spanish crown; it was a situation without precedent "either in law or ecclesiastical usages or customs."¹

Charles's zeal for the purity of the faith in his new domains is revealed by his various measures for the exclusion of infidels and heretics, and his enthusiasm for its propagation, by the number and character of the clergy he sent out. The tale of the bishoprics in the Indies was increased during his lifetime to twenty-two, not counting Mexico and Lima, which were made archbishoprics in 1546;² a number of smaller churches and monasteries were also established. The duties and powers of the clergy who ministered to them are prescribed in detail in the Laws of the Indies;³ the presence of such legislation in a primarily civil code is the best proof of the way in which the spiritual authority was subordinated to the temporal. One of the most important of the functions delegated to the colonial bishops was that of acting as inquisitors. The Holy Office was not formally extended to the New World until 1569; but all its machinery was in active operation under episcopal superintendence during the Emperor's reign. Jerónimo de Loaysa, the first archbishop of Lima, held autos-da-fé at Lima, at Cuzco, and at Charcas. In the first of these, which was celebrated in 1548, a Flemish Protestant, Jan Millar, was burnt alive.⁴

But the most distinctive of the duties of the colonial clergy was that of converting, instructing, and protecting the

¹ D. Vélez Sarsfield, *Relaciones del Estado con la Iglesia en la Antigua America Española* (Buenos Aires, 1889), p. 22; M. Gómez Zamora, *Regio Patronato Español é Indiano* (Madrid, 1897), cap. vii; cf. also *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. i, tits. i-xx, *passim*.

² Gams, *Series Episcoporum*, pp. 137-

168; Lannoy and vander Linden, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

³ *Recopilación*, lib. i, tits. i-xx.

⁴ H. C. Lea, *Inquisition in the Spanish Dependencies*, p. 321 and elsewhere; J. T. Medina, *Historia de la Inquisición de Lima (1569-1820)* (Santiago de Chile, 1887, 2 vols.), i, cap. ii.

Indians. Charles inherited all his grandmother's zeal for the good treatment of his new subjects, and charged all his officers, lay and clerical, in the New World, to see that his commands in this matter were faithfully carried out; but it was on the clergy that he chiefly relied. His failure to accomplish his full desires in this respect was due to the fact that his ideas were far in advance of the prevailing theories of his day and generation, to the inherent weaknesses of "government from across the sea," and most of all to the ambitions of the large majority of the colonists, whose chief object was to derive revenue from the New World, and who regarded the natives as a means to help them in the attainment of that end.¹ The story of the interaction of these conflicting elements is complicated and difficult, and the easiest way to trace its main outlines is to follow the vicissitudes of the career of that impassioned advocate of the rights of the Indians, the 'Apostle' Las Casas, whose acquaintance we made in the preceding reign, but the greater part of whose life's work was done under Charles V.

Las Casas had but one audience with Ferdinand the Catholic on the subject of the wrongs to which the natives were subjected. It promised well, but his hopes were soon dashed; for exactly one month later the old king died. Ximenes, to whom he next applied, was horrified at the tales he had to tell. The 'Apostle' was charged to elaborate a plan for the relief of the Indians, of which the abolition of the encomiendas was the fundamental idea, and was sent back to America to help put it in operation; but the holders

¹ Bécker, *Política Española*, pp. 223 ff. Cf. also the Letters Apostolic of Paul III, in June, 1537, declaring the Indians to be "veros Homines, Christianae Fidei capaces" in opposition to those who, moved by Satan to consider their own temporal welfare, have affirmed that the natives "sub prae-

textu quod Fidei Catholicae expertes existant, uti bruta animalia ad nostra obsequia redigendos esse . . . et eos in servitutem redigunt, tantis afflictionibus illos urgentes, quantis vix bruta animalia illis servientia urgeant." Juan de Torquemada, *Monarquía Indiana*, lib. xvi, cap. xxv.

of the encomiendas succeeded in thwarting it, and in the summer of 1517 Las Casas returned to Spain.¹ Charles and the Flemings had by this time arrived, and the 'Apostle' got the ear of the Chancellor Sauvage; but Fonseca and the Casa were active in opposition, and, despite the fact that the young monarch was favorable to him,² the friend of the Indians could accomplish nothing. Indeed, the sole practical result of this phase of Las Casas's career was to confirm and establish the practice, already begun,³ of importing negro slaves into the New World. Charles had asked him to draw up a plan for ameliorating the condition of the natives of the New World; as Las Casas knew nothing of the evils of the African slave trade, it was but natural that he should grasp at it as an obvious means of relief, particularly as it promised to satisfy his enemies in the Casa and in the colonies. The king's Flemish majordomo, Laurent de Gouvenot (or Gorrevod), was accordingly given a license to export to the islands 4000 negroes. The number was fixed by the officials of the Casa; it was really the first of the famous *asientos*, and de Gouvenot, and some Genoese speculators to whom he promptly sold it, realized a handsome profit thereon. From that time forward the practice rapidly grew. Las Casas tells us that some 100,000 blacks had been sent to the Indies before the end of the reign; and when he realized too late that the effects of his plan had been to increase rather than diminish the sufferings he was attempting to alleviate, he bitterly repented, and doubted if God would forgive him. He was certainly not the first to propose it, nor would he have countenanced it for one moment had he been better informed; but the legend that he originated the idea of

¹ Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lxxv, pp. 281 ff.

² Cf. Charles's decree "para que los indios . . . fuesen bien tratados y doc-

trinados," put forth during his stay at Saragossa (May, 1518-Jan., 1519), in Santa Cruz, i, pp. 188 ff.

³ Cf. *ante*, II, p. 233.

bringing negro slaves into America as a means to relieve the native Indians became so firmly implanted in the years to come that modern scholarship has not completely eradicated it yet.¹

The next phase of the story is Las Casas's attempt to establish a 'model colony' on the northern coast of South America: a settlement from which he promised that the king should derive large revenues, but in which no native was to be maltreated or exploited. He got the necessary grant from Charles at Corunna, on May 19, 1520; he collected a company of hard-working emigrants, and trinkets with which to win the confidence of the Indians; on the eleventh of the following November he set sail from San Lucar. But unfortunately the pearl fishers of Cubagua had got ahead of him; they had raided the mainland in search of slaves; and when Las Casas arrived on the scene of his prospective labors, he found the natives so hostile that nothing could be done. He sailed over to the islands in the hope of getting help, and asserting his rights under his *capitulación* with the crown; but the colonists, who regarded him much as a modern banker would a Bolshevik, opposed him even more violently than the Casa had done at home. One day, as he was taking his siesta under a tree, he was awakened by a party of travellers with the news that the Indians had looted all the stores that he had landed at Cumana, and murdered the few followers whom he had left behind to guard them! It was a stunning blow — a catastrophe which the Apostle was at first inclined to interpret as a proof that God had found him unworthy to be the

¹ Even Lea (*Yale Review*, viii, pp. 135 ff.) does not seem to have been fully aware of the facts, which are well stated in Scelle, *Traite négrière*, i, pp. 133 ff. On the events recounted in this para-

graph, cf. Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lxx, pp. 379 ff.; lxxvi, pp. 28 ff.; A. M. Fabié, "Vida de Las Casas," *ibid.*, lxx, pp. 48 ff.; also MacNutt, *Bartholomew de las Casas*, pp. 92 ff., *passim*.

instrument of His will; and, feeling the need of rest and reflection, he took the vows of a Dominican monk in 1523. For the next six years he remained in seclusion, studying theology, and composing his famous *Historia Apologetica* — one of the earliest and most valuable of the descriptions of the New World. But he never wavered in his faith in the justice of his cause; and he was soon to reënter the lists as its active champion.¹

The main interest of the period of Las Casas's retirement is that it shows that the favorable attitude of the Emperor with regard to the Indians was not solely dependent on the pleadings of the Apostle. Laws of 1523 and 1526 strictly forbade all maltreatment or enslaving of the natives, and exhorted all colonial officials to insist on their strict observance. Charles also seemed convinced that the system of *encomiendas* was not working satisfactorily; for he repeated to Cortés in 1523 an injunction which he had given to the governor of Cuba five years before, forbidding any further grants.² Moreover, with the death of Fonseca in 1524, the bitterest of Las Casas's enemies in Spain was removed; as far as the intentions of the home government went, everything was now proceeding in accordance with the Apostle's desires. But when it came to translating these intentions into practice, there was another, and far less satisfactory, tale to tell. *Obedézcase pero no se cumpla* — let it be obeyed, but not enforced — was the formula for the colonists' reception of unpopular decrees from Spain; and the intervening distance made it impossible for the Emperor to enforce the laws. The compulsory labor of the natives on the *encomiendas* had by this time become an established system,

¹ Las Casas, "Historia," in *D. I. E.*, lxvi, pp. 37 ff., 165 ff., 180 ff.; Lea, in *Yale Review*, viii, pp. 137-140; MacNutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-178, *passim*.

² *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. vi, tit. ii, ley i; lib. vi, tit. x, ley iv; Lea, in *Yale Review*, viii, p. 140.

which could not be changed without revolutionizing the whole economic life of the Indies. Admit it, and the way was wide open to all the cruelties and abuses of which Las Casas complained, particularly in a community where "getting rich quick" was the primary objective. Yet the colonists were determined that the system should be maintained, and the edicts of the Emperor were tacitly ignored.¹

It was this state of affairs, the glaring contrast between the will of the king and the situation as it actually existed in the colonies, that aroused Las Casas to renewed activity in 1529. In 1530 he was once more pleading his cause in Spain; two years later we find him in Peru; and then after four more years of fruitless effort in the islands,² he scored the sole victory of his long career in the colonies. The province of Tuzulutlan, in Northern Guatemala, had hitherto defied every attempt of the Spaniards to conquer it; the difficult nature of the country and the warlike character of its inhabitants had thus far combined to render it impregnable. The authorities of Guatemala challenged Las Casas to subdue it by the peaceful methods he had consistently advocated, and promised that for five years he should be absolutely undisturbed. The Apostle promptly accepted the opportunity, and was making rapid progress towards the accomplishment of his undertaking, when he was called away in 1538, by a summons from his Dominican superior at Guatemala; in the following year he was sent back to Spain to collect more clergy for the conversion of the Indians. But the work that he had started in Tuzulutlan survived him. He revisited the region in 1545, to be joyfully welcomed by happy throngs of Christian Indians, and two years later the name of the province, which had hitherto been known as

¹ Lea, in *Yale Review*, viii, pp. 140-141.

² Fabié, "Vida de Las Casas," in *D. I. E.*, lxx, pp. 135 ff., 464-486.

the 'Tierra de Guerra,' was officially changed to Vera Paz.¹

The five years from 1539 to 1544, which Las Casas spent in Spain, were chiefly notable for his successful efforts to secure the enactment of the so-called 'New Laws,' to which reference has been made in the preceding chapter. Though the encomiendas, which Las Casas roundly declared to be the root of all the evil, were not abolished, all further granting of them was forbidden, and those already in existence were to lapse on the death of the holders; moreover, all enslavement or enforced personal service of the Indians was henceforth prohibited in the most specific terms. When, on November 20, 1542, the code received the imperial signature at Barcelona, Las Casas thought that his life's work had been successfully accomplished. He had yet to learn the futility of all laws made in Spain in defiance of the wishes of the colonists in America, when the means of enforcing them were so lamentably deficient. The furious opposition which the 'New Laws' aroused in Peru has already been described. In Mexico, as we have also seen, it would probably have been even greater, had not the official charged with their promulgation been prudent enough to give directions to suspend them. When, in 1545, the Apostle reappeared in New Spain, where he had accepted an appointment as bishop of Chiapa, he found not only that the 'New Laws' were a dead letter, but that he himself, as their originator, was the most unpopular man in the colonies. For two years more he fought manfully in his new see, against overwhelming odds, for the triumph of the cause to which he had dedicated his life; but in 1547 he returned, utterly disheartened, to Spain for the last time, and three years later he resigned his bishopric. He

¹ Fabié, "Vida," in *D. I. E.*, lxx, pp. 144-153, 182-186, 487; MacNutt, *op. cit.*, pp. 190 ff.

was by this time seventy-six years old, and unable to do any more active work on behalf of the oppressed natives, though he continued to defend them by written and spoken words until his death in 1566 at the age of ninety-two. Yet he recognized, at the end, the futility of all his efforts; for he admitted, in a letter of the year 1562 to the Dominicans of Guatemala, that the evils which he had labored so heroically to mitigate had gone on steadily increasing throughout the period of his active life.¹

His noble career left a curious and rather tragic legacy behind it. Like most ardent advocates, Las Casas generally overstated his case; but things so fell out, in the years after his death, when the power of Spain was the nightmare of Europe, that the various tracts, in which the Apostle had exaggerated the sufferings of the Indians for the purpose of securing their alleviation, were greedily seized upon by Spain's numerous enemies as affording a true picture of conditions in the Spanish colonies. They made excellent propaganda, and were utilized to the limit of their possibilities. Thus the most permanent result of the work of the Apostle was not the accomplishment of the end he had in view, but rather the perpetuation of the "legend of Spanish cruelty."² The facts as they actually existed were doubtless bad enough, but no reasonable person would rely solely on the testimony of Las Casas in regard to them, any more than he would take John Foxe's description as his only authority for the sufferings of the Marian martyrs.

The rank and file of the colonial clergy, though none of them approached the record of Las Casas, were generally active on the Indians' behalf. The worst of them, indeed, took sides with the *encomenderos*, and tacitly countenanced

¹ Las Casas, *Brevissima Relacion de la Destruccion de las Indias* (Seville, 1552), *passim*; Fabié, "Vida," in *D. I. E.*,

lxx, pp. 154 ff.; Lea, in *Yale Review*, viii, pp. 143-153.

² Bécker, pp. 367 ff.

their most outrageous oppressions, and the jealousies and rivalries of the Franciscans and the Dominicans often neutralized the good intentions of those who worked hardest for the Indian cause; but for the most part the weight of the church was thrown on the right side. It was in the matter of conversion and education that it was able to accomplish most, for the *encomenderos* rather welcomed what would serve to keep the Indians harmlessly occupied during off hours, provided the periods of their labor were undisturbed. Elementary principles were inculcated in the *doctrinas* on the encomiendas, and schools and colleges were provided in the different cities for those who showed themselves capable of advancing beyond the elementary stages. The first of these institutions was the Colegio de Santa Cruz, established, at the instance of the first bishop of Mexico, in the Indian quarter of that city in 1535. It gave instruction in Latin, philosophy, and music, and in Mexican languages and medicine. In its faculty appear the names of Bernardino de Sahagún, "the founder of American anthropology," and of Juan de Torquemada, the author of the *Monarquía Indiana*; and some of its graduates rose to fill municipal offices in the Indian towns.¹

Nor was the education of the conquistadores and their descendants forgotten. Charles was resolved that Spain's culture, as well as her religion and institutions, should be transplanted and established in his new dominions across the seas; and he looked principally to the colonial clergy for the execution of his will. The first steps towards the founding of schools in America for the education of the children of Spanish parents were taken as early as 1536; and the imperial decree for the establishment of the universities of Mexico and Lima bears the date of September 21, 1551.

¹ Bourne, *Spain in America*, pp. 308 ff., and references there.

It declares them to be established "for the service of God, and the public welfare of our kingdom" and "because we desire to protect the inhabitants of our Indies from the darkness of ignorance."¹ They were Harvard's "elder sisters on the American continent" by a period of no less than eighty-five years. The high level of their scholarship in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is attested by the names and achievements of their professors and graduates; indeed "it is not too much to say that in number, range of studies, and standard of attainments by their officers, they surpassed anything existing in English America until the nineteenth century."²

The end of Charles's life is in many respects an unsatisfactory point at which to interrupt an account of the administration of the Indies. By far the greatest thing which was accomplished in the Western Hemisphere during his reign was the extension of the Spanish dominion from the islands to Tierra Firme, and the conquest of the Aztec and Inca Empires; the emphasis, in other words, is on discoveries and on feats of arms. The institutional side of the story had scarcely begun — particularly in New Castile; and the state of affairs that we have attempted to portray in the foregoing pages was not really established until the time of Philip II. Yet the Emperor deserves the credit for laying the foundations of the system of administration under which the Spanish American colonies continued to be governed for the succeeding two centuries and a half. There were modifications and amplifications; there were readjustments and improvements, particularly in Bourbon times; but the underlying principles, and the chief institutions that were

¹ *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias*, lib. i, tit. xxii, ley i; Icazbalceta, *Obras*, i, p. 193.

² So Bourne, *Spain in America*, p. 310; I should have preferred "equalled" to "surpassed."

charged with the duty of carrying them out remained, with little change, down to the era of the Revolutions.

Of all these principles by far the most important, in fact the one on which everything else in a measure depended, was that of the maintenance in the new dominions of the absolute power and control of the Spanish crown. It is not a principle which appeals to us today, and it was undoubtedly the primary cause of those unfortunate characteristics for which the Spanish colonial system became notorious in later years: its meticulous paternalism, its unwieldiness, its appalling slowness. Yet it is hard to see how the Emperor could have adopted any other. In the first place he had inherited it from Ferdinand and Isabella; it was also the very essence of the political atmosphere of his own day and generation. Moreover, the special circumstances in which Charles was placed seemed to render its maintenance particularly imperative. In the eyes of the economist of that time it was the sole way to insure to the Spanish government its fair share of the revenues of the Indies; and it was to Spain that the Hapsburgs invariably looked to pay the expenses of their foreign wars. Political events also seemed to point to the same conclusion. Royal control was not only deemed essential to the repulse of hostile corsairs and the exclusion of foreign trespassers; it also appeared to be the sole practical method of keeping the Spaniards themselves under proper discipline. Had the greatest of the conquistadores, such as Cortés and the Pizarros, been men of a less daring type, it might have been judged safe to intrust them and their successors with a larger measure of independent authority, to the lasting benefit of the system as a whole. But Charles did not venture to take this risk, especially in view of the remoteness of the new domains. He could not permanently collaborate with such men, any more

than a bridge-player, whose methods are conservative, can be happy with a partner who is perpetually taking risks. It was almost always the policy of the Spanish Hapsburgs to play safe; they had everything to lose and nothing to win. The conquistadores, on the other hand, took the most desperate chances; they had everything to win, and nothing to lose. The Emperor did not even permit them permanently to retain those powers with which they were originally invested. When they had done their great work, they were ruthlessly cast aside, to make way for a system of monarchical control from afar, under which men of their type were virtually relegated to impotence.

We can scarcely be surprised, then, at the principles by which Charles was guided in establishing the foundations of the Spanish colonial system; in this, as in so many other phases of his multifarious activities, he was, more than most men, the child of fate. Indeed the wonder is that in view of the position in which he found himself, he should have given so many proofs of liberality and enlightenment. Of the excellence of his intentions in regard to the natives, it is impossible to entertain a doubt; though most of the regulations he made for them proved impossible of fulfilment, they were inspired by the highest sense of duty. His attempted relaxation of the strict system of the Seville monopoly, and of the exclusion of non-Castilians which he had inherited from the Catholic Kings, shows an economic vision far in advance of his day and generation. Had his policy in this respect been continued by his successors, the later chapters of the story might well have made less dismal reading. His open-mindedness on the subject of local government in the Indies is revealed by his measures in regard to the colonial municipalities, and by the powers and privileges he conceded to the *cabildos*; in fact, his friendly tolerance of democracy is

quite as well illustrated in the Indies and in the Netherlands as in his dealings with the representatives of the cities of Castile. Altogether Charles's methods of administering his American dominions furnish one of the best arguments that is afforded in his entire reign for the case of those who seek to show that he aimed rather to raise his Spanish subjects to higher levels, than to utilize them, regardless of their own interests, for the benefit of the house of Hapsburg. Fate, on the whole, was against him throughout. His acquisitions in the Western Hemisphere so enormously increased the preponderance of his dynasty, that it became, more than ever, an object of suspicion and dread; and it was Spain, under Philip II, that had to pay the price. But it was impossible for Charles to see how the future would develop; and, as the careworn Emperor surveyed his life's work from the solitude of Yuste, the achievement that may well have afforded him the greatest satisfaction was the establishment of the supremacy of Spain in the New World.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Practically all the published sources and contemporary authorities on the field covered by this chapter have been mentioned in the bibliographical notes to Chapters XVII, XXVIII, and XXIX, and need not be repeated here. Since so large a portion of the material for the study of it still remains unprinted, it seems worth while to add that the names and characteristics of the most important guides to the collections in the Archivo de Indias at Seville, at Mexico, at Havana, and elsewhere may be learned by studying the text and footnotes to pp. 1-9 of C. E. Chapman's *Catalogue of Materials in the Archivo General de Indias for the History of the Pacific Coast and the American Southwest* (Berkeley, 1919).

The relative importance of these different sources, and of the works of the most famous authorities of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, has been variously estimated by different writers according to their several interests and methods of approach. One of the most valuable of these estimates is that which appears on pp. xv-xxvii of C. H. Haring's *Trade and Navigation between Spain and the Indies* (Cambridge, Mass., 1918); in this the emphasis is of course primarily economic. In the present chapter the problem has been, not that of following any one line of development through a long period, but rather that of covering many during a short one; the difficulty, in other words, has been to distinguish what was done during the reign of Charles V from what was accomplished under his predecessors and successors. For this purpose I have been obliged to rely more on the *Recopilación de Leyes de las Indias* (Madrid, 1681, 4 vols.) and on Vasco de Puga's *Cedulario* (Mexico, 1563, under the title *Provisiones, cédulas, instrucciones . . . para la . . . gobernacion de esta Nueva España . . . desde el año 1525, hasta este presente de 63*; new edition, Mexico, 1878-79, 2 vols., with an excellent "advertencia" by J. García Icazbalceta), which follow a chronological scheme, than do those who have attacked the problem with a different end in view; and proportionately less, for the same reason, on such works as Juan de Solórzano Pereira's *Política Indiana* (Madrid, 1647), Joseph de Veitia Linaje's *Norte de la Contratación de las Indias Occidentales* (Seville, 1672), and Rafael Antúñez y Acevedo's *Memorias Históricas* (Madrid, 1797). Despite the glaring inaccuracies of the marginal chronological data in the *Recopilación* (cf. *ante*, p. 641, note 2), they not seldom afford the sole possible method of determining the period of the inauguration of some new policy, institution, or law, and their errors may quite

often be rectified, at least for the reign of Charles V, by collation with the documentary references in Foronda. The "Relacion, Apuntamientos, y Avisos que por mandado de S. M. dí[yo D. Antonio de Mendoza] al Sr. D. Luis de Velasco, Visorey, y Gobernador y Capitan General desta Nueva España" is printed on pp. 227-240 of *Instrucciones que los Vireyes de Nueva España dejaron a sus Sucesores* (Mexico, Imprenta Imperial, 1867), and is a most useful guide to the political philosophy of the first viceroy of Spain in the New World.

Among important recent monographs of a more special nature may be mentioned D. Vélez Sarsfield, *Relaciones del Estado con la Iglesia en la Antigua America Española* (Buenos Aires, 1889); M. Gómez Zamora, *Regio Patronato Español é Indiano* (Madrid, 1897); J. M. Piernas y Hurtado, *La Casa de la Contratación de las Indias* (Madrid, 1907); C. H. Haring, "American Gold and Silver Production in the First Half of the Sixteenth Century," in the *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May, 1915 (xxix, pp. 433-479); E. Ruíz Guiñazú, *La Magistratura Indiana* (Buenos Aires, 1916); G. de Artíñano, *Historia del Comercio con las Indias durante el Dominio de los Austrias* (Barcelona, 1917), which covers, though somewhat less thoroughly, the same field as Haring's *Trade and Navigation*; C. W. Hackett, "The Delimitation of Political Jurisdictions in Spanish North America to 1535," in the *Hispanic American Historical Review*, February, 1918 (i, pp. 40-69); C. H. Cunningham, *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila* (Berkeley, 1919); J. Bécker, *La Política Española en las Indias* (Madrid, 1920); and J. Pulido Rubio, "El Piloto Mayor de la Casa de Contratación de Sevilla," in *Boletín del Centro de Estudios Americanistas de Sevilla*, nos. 68-75, 82-84, *passim* (Seville, 1923-24).

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